Cambridge University Press & Assessment 978-0-521-45035-5 — Multiparty Democracy Norman Schofield, Itai Sened Index <u>More Information</u>

## Index

Activist contract curve, 167 Activist groups/coalitions, 207-208 in British elections, 159–163 in Netherlands 1979-1981 elections, 131-142 (See also Netherlands, 1979-1981 elections in) Activist pull, marginal, 165 Activist valence (model), 16-17, 22-23, 129, 130, 141, 206 in United States, 188-189, 196 Assessment, of model, 199-200 Balance condition, 165 Bayes' factor, 15, 80 Bayesian statistics, 2, 4 Belief operator, 23-24 in Israel elections, 31 Borel probability measures, in local equilibria under electoral uncertainty, 51-52 Boundary condition, 54 Britain, 1979–2005 elections in, 151–174 activist and exogenous valence in, 168-170 formal model of vote-maximizing with activists in, 163-168 Centrifugal effect of coalition risk, 63 Centrifugal tendency, 116, 120 in British 1979–2005 elections, 158 in Dutch 1979–1981 elections, 141 Centripetal tendency, 128 Centrist strategies, 71 Certainty, in voting, 71 Chaos theorem, 13-14

Cheapest minimal winning coalition, 201-202 Civil Rights Act, U.S., 197-198 Coalitional risk, 19, 34-35, 58 Coalition bargaining, 19-20 core party and core position in, 128 core point in, 26-29 in Israel 1988–1996 elections, 92-95 in Italy 1996 election, 123-124 Coalition formation Riker on, 5 Coalition game, core point in, 26-27 Coalition risk, 53 centrifugal effect of, 63 Coalition structure, 24 Competition electoral, 11-12 party (See Party competition) two-party, under plurality rule, 13-15, 14f Concavity of activists' valence, 129 local, 72 of payoff functions, 84 of vote functions, 84 Condorcet point, 37. See also Core point Continuous selection, 57 Convergence in British elections, 158 to electoral mean, 22, 38 in Dutch elections, 128-129, 137 Convergence coefficient, 15, 22, 39, 45-46, 48-49 Core structurally stable, 59, 206

Cambridge University Press & Assessment 978-0-521-45035-5 — Multiparty Democracy Norman Schofield, Itai Sened Index More Information

### Index

Core party, 13, 19, 29, 128 maximizing probability of core position in, 32 Core point, 37 of coalition game, 26-28, 28 Critical election, 178 Critical Nash Equilibrium (CNE), 54 Decisive structure, 28 Democracy accountability and responsibility of, 6 essence of, 199 representative, empirical and theoretical models of, 70-71 representative, primary objective of all parties in, 15-16 representativeness of, 6-7 Dominant parties, 28, 30, 103 Economic dimension, 154 Eigenspace for low-valence party, 200 of vote function, 39 Elections, 20-21. See also specific countries and elections electoral models with valence in, 32-34 expected vote maximization in, 21-23 general model of multiparty politics in, 34-36 legislative bargaining and, 95-97 legislative stage in, 17-20 multiparty representative democracy in, 15-17 party leader selection in, 23-25 two-party competition under plurality rule in, 13–15, 14f voting rule induced by, 58 Electoral college in contentious elections, 12 formation and intent of, 11-12 Electoral competition, 11-12 Electoral game, 21 Electoral mean convergence to, 22, 38 convergence to, party, 86-87 divergence of, 38 vs. electoral median, 174 Electoral models. See specific models

Electoral periphery, low-valence parties at. 15 Electoral principal axis, 88 Electoral probability function  $\pi$ , 51-52 Electoral realignment, 178 Electoral risk, 34-35, 53 Electoral rule, political systems determined by, 7, 7t Electoral support, policy positions maximizing, 15-16 Electoral uncertainty, local equilibria under, 50-55. See also Local equilibria under electoral uncertainty Empirical concerns, domain of, 5 Empirical evidence, theory and, 207-208 Equilibrium concepts, for formal model, 42-44 Exogenous valence, 21-22, 206, 207 in British 1979–2005 elections, 164, 168-170 spatial models with, 32-34 in United States, 188 Expected vote maximization, 21-23 Expected vote-share, 42 Extreme value distribution, 44-45 Factions Madison on, 11 in two-party competition with weakly disciplined parties, 18 Factor analysis, in 1996 Israel elections, 97t Factor coalitions, 196 Fan space, 54 Feasible profile, 60 First past the post. See Plurality rule Formal stochastic vote model, 41-42 Game, politics as, 178-179 Game form, with policy preferences, 52-54 Game profile, 53 Germany September 2005 elections, 201-202, 202f Global Nash equilibrium, 74

Heart, 30, 55 of German Parliament, 2005, 201

220

# CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press & Assessment 978-0-521-45035-5 — Multiparty Democracy Norman Schofield , Itai Sened Index More Information

#### in Israel elections, 1988, 30 in Israel elections, 1996, 30-31 and uncovered set, 56-57 High-valence parties, 70, 73, 199, 200 Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA), 132 Institutional dimension, 108 in Italian politics, 1994, 104f, 111, TTTf Israel, 1988–1996 elections in, 70–100 1988, coalition structure in, 29-30, 29f 1988, heart in, 30 1992, core parties in, 28-29 coalition bargaining in, 92-95 multinomial logit analysis of, in 1988 election, 100t multinomial logit analysis of, in 1992 election, 99t multinomial logit analysis of, in 1996 election, 98t preliminary conclusions on theory of, 87-88 proportional representation in, 2 recent Knesset changes in, 202-206, 203f-206f Italy, 16 1987-1996 votes/seats in Chamber of Deputies in, 107, 107t 1987 party positions in, 102, 103f 1994 votes/seats in Chamber of Deputies in, 112-113, 114t changes in political party landscape, 1980s vs. 1990s, 105, 106f politics before 1992 in, 102-105, 103f Italy, 1992-1996 elections in, 101-127 1991-1996, new institutional dimension of, 105–110, 106f, 107t, т08f 1994 election in, 110-116 1996 election in, 116–124 1996 election in, logit analysis for, 126t-127t 1996 election in, voter ideal points and party positions in, 116, 116f background on, 101-102 Joint electoral origin, 84

Judgment, in utility calculus of voters, 15

#### Index

Leaders, 20 Leaders, party estimating electoral effects of party policy by, 41 selection of, 23-25 valence in voter judgment on, 40 Legislative bargaining, elections and, 95-97 Legislative stage, 17-20 coalition bargaining in, 19-20 party competition under plurality rule in, 18-19 party competition under proportional representation in, 19 two-party competition with weakly disciplined parties in, 18 Local equilibria, 200 dynamic, in United States, 195-197 Local equilibria under electoral uncertainty, 50-55 game form with policy preferences in, 52-54 lottery outcome in, 51-52 Local Nash equilibrium (LNE), 22, 74 activist effect on valence and, 141 at electoral origin, 129 in Netherlands 1979–1981 elections, 129-130 in stochastic model, 40-41 in United States political realignments, T Q 2. Local strict Nash equilibrium (LSNE), 42-43 Log marginal likelihood (LML), 136 Low-valence parties, 70, 73, 90, 96, 199-200 Madison, James, on voters in the Republic, 11 Manifesto. See Policy positions Marginal activist pull, 165 Marginal electoral pull, 164 Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, 75 in Netherlands 1979–1981 elections, 132 Mean voter theorem, 38 for empirical analysis, 84 Median voter theorem, 3, 13 Minimal winning (MW) coalition, cheapest, 201-202

221

# CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press & Assessment 978-0-521-45035-5 — Multiparty Democracy Norman Schofield , Itai Sened Index More Information

### Index

Mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, 40 Model  $M(\lambda; \beta; \Psi)$ condition for joint origin to be an LSNE in, 46, 49–50 convergence coefficient of, 45-46, 48 - 49Multinomial logit (MNL) model/estimation, 20, 33, 75 in analyses of Israel and Italy, 22 in Israel 1988-1996 elections, 75, 80, 81t, 83 in United States, 185-187 Multinomial probit (MNP) model/estimation, 20, 75 in Netherlands 1979–1981 elections, 131, 132–137, 137t, 146t in United States, 185-187 Multiparty politics. See also specific areas general model of, 34-36 mathematical modelling of, 17 Multiparty representative system (MP)aggregating individual preferences into social choices in, 6, 7-8 democracy, 15-17 Nash equilibria global, 74 mixed-strategy, 40 Nash equilibrium concept, 21-22, 71. See also specific types Local Nash equilibrium (LNE) in, 22 Netherlands, elections in, 128-150 estimated probability functions in, 149f, 150f models of elections with activists in, 131-142 probit analysis of 1979 Dutch Survey Data in, 146t results of, 133, 135t spatial model with activists in, 128-131 vote-shares, valences, and spatial coefficients in, 134-135, 135t Nonconvergence, accounting for, 40 Pareto set, 56-57 Parliamentary systems origins of, 1

pure, 5 vs. U.S. presidential system, 1-2. Parties, high-valence, 70, 73, 199, 2.00 policy positions of, 15 Parties, low-valence, 70, 73, 90, 96, 199-200 Party competition. See also specific topics under plurality rule, 18-19 under proportional representation, 19 two-party, with weakly disciplined parties, 18 Party leaders. See Leaders, party Plurality rule, 206-207 party competition under, 18-19 two-party competition under, 13-15, 14f Policy preferences game form with, 52-54 of party principals, 34 Political realignment, 207. See also United States political realignments Politics, comparative, 3 Preferences, individual. See Voter choice aggregation of, 6 Principals, party. See also specific countries and elections in British 1979-2005 elections, 162-163 in Netherlands 1979–1981 elections, 133 Probabilistic formal vote model, 71-72. See also Stochastic model Probability of victory, 40, 50 Proportional representation, 12, 200-206 governmental instability in, 12 Proportional rule in multiparty electoral systems, 3-4 political systems determined by, 7, 7t Pure Nash equilibrium (PNE), 25 in competition between two agents under majority rule, 37 Pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE), 42-44 Randomization. See Lottery, postelection policy outcome as

Representation, proportional. See Proportional representation

222

Cambridge University Press & Assessment 978-0-521-45035-5 — Multiparty Democracy Norman Schofield , Itai Sened Index More Information

#### Representative democracy empirical and theoretical models of, 70-71 primary objective of all parties in, 15-16 Resource allocation, with government in power, 6 Social choice theory, 55-56 Sociodemographic variables, 134–135 in Israel elections, 82 in Netherlands elections, 134-135, 135t, 139-140, 141, 146t Spatial model, 184, 196, 199 with activists, 128–131 Spatial models, 37 with activist valence, 34 with exogenous valence, 32-34 Stochastic vote model, formal, 41-42 Stochastic vote-share functions, 50 Strategic behavior, party, 129 Strict, pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE), 42-44 in Israel 1988–1996 elections, 84 Structurally stable core, 59, 207 Uncertainty, in voting, 71 Uncovered set, 37 heart and, 56-57 Unidimensional multiparty politics, United States, 17 1860-2000 political history in, 180-185, 181f-184f plurality rule in, 206–207 United States political realignments, 175-198 1860 election in, 180-181, 181f 1896 and 2000 presidential state votes in, 175, 176t, 177t 1896 election in, 180, 181-182, 182f 1932-1960, party positions in, 182 1932 Democratic Party policy shifts

## Index

Civil Rights Act in, 197-198 dynamic local equilibria in, 195-197 economic and social dimensions in, 180-181 joint model of activists and voters in, 189-192, 190f vote-maximizing positions for Republican vs. Democratic candidates in, 189-192, 190f U.S. Congress, as two-party competition with weakly disciplined parties, 18 U.S. presidential system, vs. parliamentary systems, 1-2. Valence, 38-39, 70, 199 asymmetries in terms of, 40 in British 1979-2005 elections, 163-164 definition of, 15 electoral models with, 20, 32-34 in empirical model, 15, 130 fixed vs. general interpretations of, 130 in Israel elections, 75 low-valence parties in, 15 in Netherlands 1979–1981 elections, 128-129 in United States, 188, 192 in voter judgment on party leaders, 40 Valence, activist, 16-17, 22-23, 130, 141, 206 Valence, exogenous, 21–22, 206, 207 in British 1979-2005 elections, 164, 168-170 spatial models with, 32-34 in United States, 188 Victory, probability of, 40, 50 Vote maximization, expected, 21-23 Vote maximization, in United States, 193-195 Voter covariance matrix, 44 Voter utility, stochastic, 20-21 Vote-share, expected, 42 Voting, uncertainty in, 71 Voting models. See also specific models

in, 182, 183f

1964-1980 presidential candidate

positions in, 183–184, 184f