Introduction

This history is the story of two men, and of the stories they and others told in order that it might be known who they were. It is a history of identity, about 'the self' and about 'the social', the latter in the sense of collective identities, and the contexts in which these were set. The quotation marks signal that these terms have significance in so far as their meanings are made by us, and not found by us in a world beyond this assignation of meaning. In thinking about identities in the past, whether of the 'self' or of the collective, class has, until recently, occupied a very considerable role among social historians, especially those of the nineteenth century. The sorrows of Edwin Waugh, and the measured certainties of John Bright, serve to question this dominance, as do the democratic romances that gave shape to the social and political imagination of millions of their contemporaries. Other forms of the self and of collective identity emerge, long obscured by the concentration on class. And class itself, like any other collective 'social' subject, is seen to be an imagined form, not something given in a 'real' world beyond this form.

All three accounts involve looking at subjectivities, at the subject as a self and as an imagined collectivity. The two are seen to be inextricably connected. The 'social' or collective selves, that arguably had more significance than class at the time, were represented by terms like 'the people', 'humanity', 'mankind', 'the Million', and so on, selves that went to make up the sense of what it meant to live in a democratic polity, but also in a society and a culture that were also felt to be 'democratic' (or felt *not* to be democratic). The pun in my title points therefore to these linked subjectivities, to a subject as a person and as a subject of democracy.

The social subjects I describe, and the narratives that gave them meaning, are seen to be the means by which contemporaries named, and hence lived, the 'social relations' of their day. The inclusions and exclusions these subjects and narratives enforced are understood to have often been more important than class, though in their turn these distinctions were classifications of another kind. Many of them have been hidden from view because they have been naturalised, or reified, taken in a

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'common-sense' way to exist beyond our naming of them: 'man' and 'woman' are good examples, as well as 'humanity' and the others. The aim of this book is to subvert perhaps the central distinction which enacts this naturalisation of the social and its categories, that between representation and the real. The studies have been chosen with this end in view, that of Edwin Waugh concerning the 'reality' of poverty, that of John Bright concerning the processes by which personal and public selves were made, and that of narrative as a means of analysis that can itself be said to blur the distinction between representation and the real.

The three studies, while linked by these concerns, are comprehensible in themselves, and designed to be so. They are 'studies', in deed as well as name, sustained and close observations of particular subjects which each has its own distinctiveness, meriting thereby a response on something like its own terms. The studies can be approached singly, but are best read in succession, as one builds on the other in order to achieve its full effect. Whichever way they are read, my aim is to make them accessible to readers not necessarily versed in the questions raised in this introduction. None the less, these questions comprise a context in which the book as a whole can usefully be situated.

The subject of class has become a matter for disputation among historians. The opening statement of the position taken here may itself seem disputatious to some of these. I had originally called this book *The Fall of Class*, hardly a neutral title. There is a powerful sense in which class may be said to have 'fallen'. Instead of being a master category of historical explanation, it has become one term among many, sharing a rough equality with these others (which is what I meant by the 'fall' of class). The reasons for this are not hard to find. In Britain, economic decline and restructuring have led to the disintegration of the old manual sector of employment, and of what was, mistakenly, seen to be a 'tradi-tional' working class.[1] The rise of the right from the 1970s, and the decline of the left, together with that of the trade unions, pointed in a similar direction to that of economic change, towards a loosening of the hold class and work-based categories had, not only on the academic mind, but also on a wider public. Changes going on in Britain were mirrored elsewhere, but the greatest change of all was the disintegration of world communism, and with it the retreat of intellectual Marxism.

Feminism represented another current of change, one also combining social and intellectual elements: it presented a new object of analysis,

[1] On another level, a new gradualist reading of the 'Industrial Revolution' in Britain has removed a good deal of the ground from under the feet of the class idea. For an account see Patrick Joyce, 'Work', in F. M. L. Thompson (ed.), *The Cambridge Social History of Britain 1750–1950*, (Cambridge 1990), 3 vols., II.

gender, and problematised our understanding of identity itself. Allied to
feminism, though of enormous significance in itself, post-structuralist
thought led in a similar direction: an understanding of identity as radically
de-centred and unstable could hardly be without consequences for the
concept of class. The term 'post-structuralism' does not do justice to the
range of what has been a fundamental rethinking of Western traditions:
the term 'post-modernism' has often, and somewhat confusingly, been
used to describe this range. Behind this rethinking, and behind all the
other transformations so far described, may be said to emerge a new
condition of society itself, the condition of post-modernity. Partly in the
form of the so-called 'new cultural history' these currents have coalesced
for historians in what has come to be known as the 'linguistic turn'. It is
within this 'turn' that I would situate my own work.

Whether class has fallen quite so far as some think is another matter: the
hold of older categories is still strong in labour and social history, both in
Britain and the US, for liberal as well as for left historians. Among the
former, if the accent on conflict is not so marked, then whole histories are
narrativised around the collective subjects of classes: classes become the
actors around which explanations of social change take place, and whole
swathes of human behaviour are cast in the roles of these actors (such as
'working-class culture', or the 'pastimes of the working class').[2] This
applies even when these same historians imagine they are not writing
under the sign of class. In its historical origins, as will be evident in these
studies, class was as much a product of the liberal, as of the Marxist, mind.
One manifestation of the latter, in the form of the influence of E. P.
Thompson, is still immense (and beyond historians too, a recent sociology
textbook on 'current debates' on class seeing fit to cite Thompson as the
only historical work worthy of note).[3] So, there are still arguments to be
had, though as will become apparent class is more the occasion than the
cause of such arguments.

By way of providing, first of all, a theoretical and historiographical
context for the three studies that follow, and then a historical context, I will
identify the position from which this book is written by means of a couple
of quotations, the first from E. P. Thompson. Thompson's famous words
from the opening of *The Making of the English Working Class* go as follows,

And class happens when some men, as a result of common experiences (inherited
or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between themselves,
and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed

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[2] For a typical example, see F. M. L. Thompson, *The Rise of Respectable Society: A Social
History of Victorian Britain, 1830–1900* (1988).
[3] Rosemary Crompton, *Class and Stratification: An Introduction to Current Debates* (Cam-
bridge 1993).

to) theirs. The class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into which men are born – or enter voluntarily. Class consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in traditions, value systems, ideas and institutional forms. If the experience appears as determined, class consciousness does not.[4]

The familiar formula is apparent, one that has charmed a generation. Productive relations, themselves beyond discourse, are primary, despite the qualification. These then give rise to an 'experience' which itself seemingly floats free of 'culture'. 'Experience' is then acted upon by values, traditions, and so on. Despite the emphasis on culture it quite clearly comes at the end of things, not the beginning. What vast assumptions are made about people and knowledge in this contraption of causes and stages! Once this machine is set in motion it turns out a 'class consciousness' which then becomes both a class made and a class self-making as it progresses through history. Class has become the – unacknowledged – leading player around which the drama of history is then written.

A different understanding is possible when we begin to put 'culture' at the beginning of our thinking, not at the end, when we become aware that 'experience' and 'productive relations' cannot be understood outside discourse and the 'imaginary' to which it gives rise. This is Cornelius Castoriadis writing about the 'imaginary institution of society',[5]

Those who speak of 'imaginary', understanding by this the 'specular', the reflection of the 'fictive', do no more than repeat, usually without realising it, the affirmation that has for all time chained them to the underground of the famous cave: it is necessary that this world be an image *of* something. The imaginary of which I am speaking is not an image *of*. It is the unceasing and essentially *undetermined* (social, historical and physical) creation of figures/forms/images, on the basis of which alone there can ever be a question *of* 'something'. What we call 'reality' and 'rationality' are its works.

In this book I am concerned with an imaginary that is not the image *of* something else, but without which there cannot be something else. In the understanding of Castoriadis, and of myself, society and 'the social' are the outcome of this 'imaginary'.

I frequently employ the terms 'social imaginary' and 'democratic imaginary' in what follows. By using the former I point to the countless,

[4] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (1968), pp. 9–10. This is not at variance with Thompson's later formulation, E. P. Thompson, 'Eighteenth-Century English Society: Class Struggle Without Class?', *Social History*, 3:2 (May 1978), esp. 146–50.
[5] Cornelius Castoriadis, *The Imaginary Institution of the Social* (1975; translated by Kathleen Blaney, 1987), p. 3. See also 'The Imaginary: Creation in the Social Historical Domain', in L. Appignanesi (ed.), *The Real Me: Post-Modernism and the Question of Identity*, (1987).

and relatively uncharted forms in which 'society' has been understood. As well as the forms of its understanding I also include the ways in which these forms are produced. 'Society' is therefore itself an historical construct, one we might best approach through an etymology of the term.[6] The idea that 'society' comprised a *system*, was one particular manifestation of this much larger history of 'society', a manifestation taking clearer form in the eighteenth century. It was, however, a manifestation the people I write about in this book were not usually in tune with, though it has since grown to be a major part of our thinking.

I employ the term 'democratic imaginary' as one manifestation of this protean social imaginary, in the Victorian period a new and overwhelmingly important one. I might more correctly have used the term 'demotic imaginary', for, in order that a democracy could be imagined at all (and hence realised in practice), it was first necessary that a subject, and hence a cause and justification of this democracy, be imagined in the shape of demos. So that a democratic polity might be thought about, demos had first to be born, and in these studies it is the shapes of demos that are traced ('the people', 'mankind', and so on). They were indispensable to the feeling of living in a democratic culture and society, as well as a polity; the stability of the polity itself resting on these broader foundations of what was felt to be democratic. None the less, I have stuck with the term 'democratic imaginary' because so much of my attention is given to politics, and because I want to indicate how these different aspects were always in practice linked together (a 'demotic' reading 'public' say, with a democratic polity). These demotic identities, often formed outside and prior to politics, as it were, I consider to circulate within the 'political unconscious', a term I use in the study of narratives below. My use of this term is metaphoric not analytic, designed as it is not to denote an unconscious, but to signpost the significance of the proto-political, imagined forms of power and the social order which were articulated by formal politics.

In thinking about the shapes of demos I am interested in the 'soft, sticky, lumpenanalytical' notions Baudrillard describes:[7]

The term 'mass' is not a concept. It is a leitmotif of political demagogy, a soft, sticky lumpenanalytical notion. A good sociology would attempt to surpass it with 'more subtle' categories: socio-professional ones, categories of class, cultural status etc. Wrong: it is by prowling around these soft and acritical notions . . . that one can go further than intelligent critical sociology.

I, too, want to prowl around these soft and acritical notions, this time those of demos in the nineteenth century.

[6] Raymond Williams, 'Society', in *Keywords: a Vocabulary of Culture and Society* (1976).
[7] Jean Baudrillard, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, or, The End of the Social and Other Essays* (New York 1983), p. 3.

When we look closer, as Baudrillard also says, the seeming hardness of 'more subtle' categories dissolves (categories like 'class', 'status'). It is necessary to pursue something of this history of the softness and hardness of concepts. The notion that some knowledge is 'hard' is inseparable from the idea that there is somewhere a basis or origin for it which sanctions this hardness, this certitude. Such modes of thought have been called 'essentialist' or 'foundationalist'. It is the immensely liberating, but immensely troubling, message of post-modernist thought that this is not so, that there is no 'centre' which will serve as a fixed point for knowledge and action. This is the burden of post-structuralism also of course, but I prefer the broader term, which speaks about the dissolution of centres in a post-modern condition of society as well as a post-modern condition of knowledge.[8]

This 'essentialist' mode of thinking, this idea that there is a 'bottom line' which serves as an epistemological foundation, has been attacked from many quarters, and not least by historians. Here the work of feminist historians has been inspirational, drawing heavily as it has upon post-structuralism. There is no more important figure than Joan W. Scott. Most recently the foundation she has challenged has been 'experience', a category central to earlier thinking about the social order, especially, as we have seen, that of E. P. Thompson.[9] Scott's one-time collaborator, Denise Riley, has been equally innovative in releasing us from the naturalised, 'essentialised' categories of 'man' and 'woman'.[10] A now enormous history of medicine and the body has similarly shaken the idea that the body itself is a foundation for knowledge and truth.[11] In historicising 'science' this new history has also undermined what was once a pillar of 'the real'. The category of 'the social' is similarly shaken, as will already be apparent, not least the idea of class itself, which has been a founding concept for 'social history' in Britain and the US. A history of class has emerged which has questioned the earlier ontological certitudes surrounding the concept,[12] and

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[8] Zygmunt Bauman has been a crucially important figure in the field of sociology, looking at once for a sociology of the post-modern condition and a post-modern sociology, Zygmunt Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (1992), chaps. 4, 9.

[9] Joan W. Scott, 'The evidence of "experience"', *Critical Inquiry*, 17 (Summer 1991).

[10] Denise Riley, *'Am I That Name': Feminism and the Category of 'Women' in History* (1988).

[11] On the body and foundationalist thinking see the remarks of Judith Butler, 'Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism"', in Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (eds.), *Feminists Theorise the Political* (1992).

[12] See for example Gareth Stedman Jones, *Languages of Class: Studies in English Working-Class History 1832–1982* (Cambridge 1983); Joan W. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (1988); Patrick Joyce, *Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class, 1840–1914* (Cambridge 1991). See also Patrick Joyce, *Class: A Reader* (Oxford, forthcoming).

as a consequence of this a new questioning of social history has begun to emerge.[13]

Most of the forms of this philosophical foundationalism are related to ideas about 'the real'. The 'real' is the hard, the imaginary the soft. Concepts and procedures gain hardness, and hence credence, as they approach it. 'The real' is the ultimate guarantee that there is a centre or foundation to knowledge. 'Representation' rests upon its firm foundations, reflecting it in the secondary domain of the imaginary. It is the aim of these studies to question these distinctions, distinctions that are as firmly entrenched in history as elsewhere, perhaps more entrenched, as history has been particularly impervious to the intellectual ferment of the last quarter of a century, at least in Britain. The impact of what has come to be called 'post-modernism' has been registered as an attack on history itself, 'history' here becoming privileged as the beleaguered guardian of the real.

This sensitivity has been evident in several places in Britain and elsewhere,[14] also in the Anglo-American pages of *Past and Present*, still perhaps the most prestigious historical journal in the English-speaking world, and a noted keeper of the historian's conscience.[15] An exchange emerged following Lawrence Stone's *ex cathedra* denunciation of the post-modernist menace. Both Stone and Gabrielle M. Spiegel were willing to go so far but no further ('the right side of breakpoint' for Stone): the acceptable face of 'post-modernism' could be allowed, but in the end it was these historians' invocation of the certainties of the real that was most apparent (for which in Spiegel's case 'the social' interestingly

[13] David Mayfield and Susan Thorne, 'Social History and its Discontents: Gareth Stedman Jones and the Politics of Language', *Social History*, 17:2 (May 1992); Jon Lawrence and Miles Taylor, 'The Poverty of Protest: Gareth Stedman Jones and the Politics of Language – a Reply', *Social History*, 18:1 (January 1993); Patrick Joyce, 'The Imaginary Discontents of Social History: a Note of Response . . .', *ibid.*; D. Mayfield and S. Thorne, 'Reply', *Social History*, 18:2 (May 1993); James Vernon, 'Who's Afraid of the Linguistic Turn? The Politics of Social History and its Discontents', *Social History*, 19:1 (January 1994).

[14] Bryan D. Palmer, *Descent Into Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of Social History* (Philadelphia 1990); Gertrude Himmelfarb 'Telling It as you Like It: Post-Modernist History and the Flight from Fact', *Times Literary Supplement*, 16 October 1992; Geoffrey Elton, *Return to Essentials: some Reflections on the Present State of Historical Study* (Cambridge 1992). For a welcome antidote to this negative understanding of 'post-modernism' see Raphael Samuel, 'Reading the Signs: Part I', *History Workshop*, 32 (Autumn 1991), and, 'Part II', *History Workshop*, 33 (Spring 1992). See also the citations of J. Vernon, 'Whose Afraid of the Linguistic Turn?'.

[15] Lawrence Stone, 'History and Post-Modernism', *Past and Present*, 131 (May 1991); Patrick Joyce, 'History and Post-Modernism I', and Catriona Kelly, 'History and Post-Modernism II', *Past and Present*, 133 (November 1991); Lawrence Stone, 'History and Post-Modernism III', and Gabrielle M. Spiegel, 'History and Post-Modernism IV', in *Past and Present*, 135 (May 1992). See also Gabrielle M. Spiegel, 'History, Historicism and the Social Logic of the Text in the Middle Ages', *Speculum*, 65 (1990).

8   Democratic subjects

enough stood proxy),[16] and their recourse to history as its defender.[17] For
historians, there is the danger that 'the real' and 'history' themselves
become a new foundation upon which to base a defence of truth against
the perils of what is taken to be the chaos of relativism evident in
post-modernism.[18] This outlook tends to rest on a view of language in
which there is still a direct correspondence between it and the world.[19]
Whereas it is the burden of the view of language that underlies the advent
of 'post-modernism', however broadly it is defined, that this is not so.
Rather, what has been called the 'semiotic challenge' questions our
assumption that 'the difference between the signified and the signifier is
the categorical difference between a phenomenal entity and its epiphe-
nomenal *representation*'. I quote from a recent, and very useful, reformu-
lation of this position to which I shall later return,[20]

the referential gap between sign and signified is integral to language itself,
informing its very structure; all speech acts are structured metaphorically as the
identification of one thing in terms of something different. The very act of
'understanding' merely indicates a specifically human capacity 'to express some-
thing new in the language of something old and familiar'. No knowledge of the
world, no recognition of attributes pre-given in the concrete, material quality of
the signified could therefore produce a perfect correspondence between the sign
and the signified. The link between sign and signified is only established historic-
ally through the 'extraneous' power of social convention.

Some historians are in danger of defending history by assuming that a
discourse is either a matter of fact or fiction, either a form of reference
or 'merely' a discursive construction, which is to imagine that some texts
can perfectly reflect the real. I paraphrase Antony Easthope's recent

[16] Historians must cleave to 'an examination of the play of power, human agency and social
experience as historians have traditionally understood them' (*ibid.*, p. 85), and – on texts –
this history must be seen as involving 'the determinate social locations of texts', their
'social logics', the social sites that 'disclose the political, economic and social pressures
that condition a culture's discourse at any given moment' (*ibid.*, pp. 77, 85).

[17] As Spiegel puts it, historians must insist on 'the importance of history itself as an active
constituent of the elements which themselves constitute the text' (*ibid.*, p. 84).

[18] For an illuminating discussion of the reification of 'history' as a ground of appeal beyond,
and superior to, the other human sciences, a 'certain test of knowledge' because of its
immersion in the real, see M. Cousins, 'The practice of historical investigation' in D.
Attridge, G. Bennington and R. Young (eds.), *Post-structuralism and the Question of
History* (Cambridge 1987).

[19] Even for a sophisticated historian like Spiegel a correspondence notion of language seems
to come into play in her defence of what she terms the 'classical' view of language as
mediating the world. This notion depends upon an equivalence obtaining between the
different 'phenomenological categories' of language and the world, an equivalence
secured by language. This seems to me to contradict the inherently *metaphorical* working
of language as presented here. See G. M. Spiegel, 'History and Post-Modernism IV', pp.
197–202, esp. p. 198.

[20] D. Mayfield and S. Thorne, 'Social History and its Discontents', pp. 180 and 181.

account of the unacknowledged rhetoric of history writing here, fittingly enough of a text of Stone's.[21] His particular point is that 'truth cannot escape participation in both fact and fiction, both a form of reference and a discursive construct, both logic and reference'. His overall argument, as to realism and anti-realism, is that the epistemological question is (a) insoluble and (b) not very interesting, and with this I am in considerable sympathy. The gist is: human beings are thrown into 'the middle of Being contingent on a world we have not and could never choose'. There is therefore 'no position available from which to inspect and assess the possible validity of the correspondence or non-correspondence between our discourse and the real. God could do it, but we cannot because we are inside it, always already part of it'.[22] As Easthope further observes, it does not follow that we are therefore thrown into some relativistic chaos in which anything goes, as some historians seem to fear. For a fact to be accurate or not there does not have to be a relation of correspondence or adequacy between discourse and the real. If the epistemological debate is not resolvable, then there is no problem about discriminating accurate from inaccurate data, and tenable from untenable arguments. We do this all the time, widely different protocols obtaining in different areas. None the less, these protocols are themselves the product of history, logic turning out on inspection to depend on 'consensus and social construc-tion (rhetoric)'.[23]

These kinds of argument are not going to please everyone. However, my concern here is less with the status of epistemological arguments as with their effects: the ideology or rhetoric of 'the real' erected in part on the foundations of an unreflecting understanding of the real itself.[24] To this is due that 'hardness' of supposedly objective knowledge already described. The ideology of 'the real' has many sources, as does the element of conservatism and complacency that marks some historical writing in Britain (where the response to the currents of thought described here has more often been indifference than outright hostility). This conservatism is in part due to the institutionalisation of 'the real' in the discipline as it itself became institutionalised in the later nineteenth centu-ry.[25] Also, 'discipline' has often tended to be precisely that, a training in

21 Antony Easthope, 'Romancing the Stone: History-Writing and Rhetoric', *Social History*, 18:2 (May 1993), 238. See also Dominick La Capra, 'Rhetoric and History', in *History and Criticism* (1985).
22 Antony Easthope, 'Romancing the Stone', p. 237.   23 *Ibid.*, p. 239.
24 On the rhetoric of 'the real' see Roland Barthes, 'The Discourse of History' and 'The Reality Effect' in *The Rustle of Language* (1986).
25 James Vernon, 'Narrating the Constitution: Macaulay, Stubbs, Maitland and the Inven-tions of Nineteenth-Century Constitutional History', in James Vernon (ed.), *Re-reading the Constitution: New Narratives in the History of English Politics* (Cambridge, forth-coming).

certain intellectual and moral procedures, rather than an encouragement
to speculative thinking (and of course a training in the disciplines of rule
as well as 'the real'). The weight of this past is considerable, and, despite
the sound and the fury that is from time to time made, a conservative
prognosis may not be inappropriate. Here it is apposite to quote Zygmunt
Bauman on the way in which 'the advent of postmodernity' may turn out
to have little effect on the academy:

> There is nothing to stop one from doing just that (pursuing 'objective' knowledge
> and declaring 'post-modernity' to be a sham). In the vast realm of the academy
> there is ample room for all sorts of specialized pursuits, and the way such pursuits
> have been historically institutionalized renders them virtually immune to pressures
> untranslatable into the variables of their own inner systems; such pursuits have
> their own momentum; their dynamics subject to internal logic only, they produce
> what they are capable of producing, rather than what is required or asked of them;
> showing their own, internally administered measures of success as their legiti-
> mation, they may go on reproducing themselves indefinitely.[26]

However, one enters here an area far beyond the scope of the present
account, so I will turn to much more specific matters. The studies that
follow grow out of my previous book on class and 'populism' in nine-
teenth-century England, and this work, and its reception, provides me
with a convenient way of relating some of the matters already broached to
the studies in this book. *Visions of the People* drew upon itself a wide range
of critical responses, ranging from the constructive, to straightforward
denunciation for defying the sacred tenets of historical materialism.[27] The
more measured strictures of the old New Left *Weltanschauung* betray a
number of the usual confusions about 'identity' and 'experience'.[28] The
most constructive responses suggested that I had not gone far enough
down the 'post-modernist' road I had taken, and with this I agree, this
book in many senses being a complement and completion of the previous
one. One particular criticism was that I replaced one overarching cate-
gory, 'class', with another, 'populism', so working against post-structura-
lism's understanding of texts as involving in their reading a constant

26 Z. Bauman, *Intimations of Postmodernity*, pp. 103–4.
27 Palmer's denunciation of myself, but especially Stedman Jones, has all the usual, and
    hateful, vocabulary of 'betrayal' and 'treachery' typical of the old New Left at its worst.
    See Bryan Palmer, 'The Poverty of Theory Revisited; or, Critical Theory, Historical
    Materialism, and the Ostensible End of Marxism', *International Review of Social History*
    (forthcoming at the time of writing).
28 Also a little of that Left's sanctimoniousness. See Theodore Koditschek's review,
    American Historical Review (October 1992), 1217–18. This tells me that 'the pioneers of
    social history knew something I have forgotten, namely that language is a product of
    "social conflict", and that if we wish to understand the visions of the people we must
    study their experiences and identities first', as if the two could ever be separated. As usual
    there is the familiar shunting of some areas into 'the real' (experience and identity) and
    some into the imaginary ('visions').