Introduction

J. Arch Getty and Roberta Manning

Serious academic study of the Stalin period began in the 1950s. Carried out mostly by political scientists and supported by the "know your enemy" mandate of the Cold War, research on the USSR fairly quickly led to a "shared paradigm" of Soviet history.[1] That view, which was loosely labeled *totalitarian*, reflected scholarly consensus in a scientific manner and seemed to explain Soviet reality in a satisfactory way. Of course, like all scientific paradigms, it did not spring from nothing. Writings and testimonies of active anti-Soviet or anti-Stalin politicians (Trotskyists, Mensheviks, and former Whites) combined with memoirs of victims and with our limited external view of a closed society to produce a vision of a monolithic and unitary dictatorship whose existence and survival were based on terror. Research evidence available at the time confirmed totalitarianism as logical, honest, and scientific.

In a nutshell, and necessarily at the expense of nuance, the totalitarian paradigm went as follows. The Soviet system under Stalin consisted of a nonpluralist, hierarchical dictatorship in which command authority existed only at the top of the pyramid of political power. Ideology and violence were monopolies of the ruling elite, which passed its orders down a pseudo-military chain of command whose discipline was the product of Leninist prescriptions on party organization and Stalinist enforcement of these norms. At the top of the ruling elite stood an autocratic Stalin whose personal control was virtually unlimited in all areas of life and culture, from art to zoology. Major policy articulation and implementation involved the actualization of Stalin's ideas, whims, and plans, which in turn flowed from his psychological condition. By definition, autonomous spheres of social and political activity did not exist at all in Soviet society, although the more sophisticated advocates of totalitarianism, like Merle Fainsod, allowed for the input of bureaucratic interest groups, like the party and

[1] The term "shared paradigm" comes from Thomas Kuhn, a historian of science. Thomas A. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (2d ed.) (Chicago, 1970).

state apparatuses, the armed forces, and the NKVD (*Narodnyi Komissariat Vnutrennykh Del*, Peoples' Commissariat of Internal Affairs), which intervened periodically in politics to promote and defend their own institutional concerns. In any case, the Soviet populace and rank-and-file party members remained outside the political process, objects acted upon or manipulated from above but never historical actors in their own right.[2]

For some scholars, the totalitarian system had its origins in Communist ideology and was thus the inevitable product of the Russian Revolutions of 1917 or of socialism in general. For others, the nondemocratic traditions of prerevolutionary Russian autocracy accounted for the intolerant and unified political dictatorship of Stalin's time. But for all, terror was an indispensable part of the political essence of Stalinism; it spread downward in a planned, systemic fashion to enhance the dictator's power and envelop every corner of society in an irrational but functional way.

With the death of Stalin, ever larger numbers of his victims began to record their experiences in memoirs, and literary accounts of the terror proliferated. Based largely on such sources, interviews with terror victims, and Soviet revelations of the Khrushchev era, Robert Conquest, Roy Medvedev, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn published the first major empirical studies of Stalin's terror in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when Soviet archives on the subject remained closed and seemed likely to stay that way.[3] These works focused on the well-known show trials of the Old Bolsheviks and the arrest, interrogation, and prison experiences of countless other victims. Conquest and Medvedev followed Stalin's successor Nikita Khrushchev in attributing the terror to Stalin's personality and political needs,[4] whereas Solzhenitsyn blamed the Communist system, as did much of the earlier, largely nonempirical body of Western scholarly writings on totalitarianism.[5] Despite their differing emphases, these studies adhered

[2] Most Western studies of Stalinist Russia published after Hannah Arendt's classical study of totalitarianism in 1951 described the Soviet system under Stalin as *totalitarian*. Major examples of such works include Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951); Merle Fainsod, *How Russia is Ruled* (Cambridge, MA, 1963); Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, MA, 1956); Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge, MA, 1959). Only recently have scholars abandoned such terms and begun to suggest that Stalin's enforcement of Leninist norms developed gradually and later than we hitherto thought. For this latter point of view, see Graeme Gill, *The Origins of the Stalinist Political System* (Cambridge/New York, 1990).

[3] Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties* (New York, 1968); Roy A. Medvedev, *Let History Judge. The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism* (New York, 1971); Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago 1918–1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation* (New York, 1973). Recently a new, somewhat updated edition of the Conquest study has been released: Robert Conquest, *The Great Terror: A Reassessment* (New York/Oxford, 1990).

[4] Nikita S. Khrushchev, *The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1956).

[5] Of the large body of works on totalitarianism, only the studies of Brzezinski and Fainsod dealt with the terror in an empirical manner. Brzezinski drew on the materials of the Harvard Emigre Interview Project and the press, whereas Fainsod used the Smolensk

to the totalitarian paradigm and agreed on the monolithic and strictly hierarchical nature of political power in the Soviet system of Stalin's time.

This view of the Stalinist system, like all coherent scientific paradigms, was, in its time, capable both of satisfactorily interpreting reality and of encompassing counter examples. Totalitarian theory was never dogmatic and was able to withstand what might appear to be powerful critiques. Thus, the theory had always posited mass participation (by labeling it elite mobilization of the masses and a tool for rational control at the top). Struggles among courtiers were integrated into the interpretation, as was evidence of confusion, chaos, and disobedience. Similarly, apparently challenging points of view, like conflict and interest group theory, which appeared even in the infancy of totalitarianism, could be accommodated by the reigning consensus without threatening its supremacy. These alternative views did, after all, follow the theoretical prescriptive rules of the totalitarian school by focusing attention on politics at the top. Moreover, a pervasive and widespread terror, evident to all, provided both a powerful defence for the theory and a unifying theoretical mechanism to explain away or minimize discrepancies.

Totalitarianism posed the questions, provided the tools, and set the agenda for research. For decades, research was oriented toward the entirely valid goal of filling in the blanks and probing the unknown corners that a broad theory necessarily leaves unfilled. As Thomas Kuhn, a historian of science, has pointed out, the work of filling in the gaps left by a major theory fall entirely within the bounds of "normal science" and is the proper work of researchers in the field. The result in the case of Soviet studies was a significant body of research disseminated in important books and articles.

Researchers continued to seek new material and subjects to which ever more sophisticated research tools could be applied. But naturally in the process of this work within a shared paradigm, "anomalies" arose, as Kuhn argues inevitably happens in the development of any science. These anomalies multiplied after historians began to join political scientists in the study of the Stalin era and focused their attention more on society and its relationship to politics and less on structural models of power. Beginning in the 1970s, a generation of trained historians, educated in the social history of prerevolutionary Russia and that of other lands, applied the methodologies of their discipline, along with the tools of the reigning paradigm, to investigate Stalin-period history as *history*.[6] This book

Archive. Fainsod, however, qualified his use of the term "totalitarianism" considerably, describing the political system that existed in Smolensk in the 1930s as "inefficient totalitarianism," although totalitarianism was supposed to be efficient by definition. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism* (Cambridge, MA: 1958), pp. 49–115, and Merle Fainsod, *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge, MA, 1958), pp. 132–137 and 210–237.

[6] For a description and debate on this new work, see *Russian Review*, vol. 45, no. 4 (October, 1986), pp. 357–400 and vol. 46, no. 4 (October, 1987), pp. 382–431.

consists of part of their research. The essays in this volume thus build on the pioneering studies of Stalinist terror, even as they pose anomolous conclusions.

This collection of writings by scholars from six nations – the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France, and Russia – makes several major contributions to our knowledge of Stalinist terror in the 1930s. They explore in greater depth than before the background of the terror and patterns of persecution, while providing more empirically founded and substantiated estimates of the numbers of Stalin's victims. Some contributors tap unexplored or underutilized source materials long available in the West. Others have taken advantage of *glasnost'* and the recent opening of Soviet archives and libraries for the years of the terror to draw on newly available archival and secondary materials. Many do both. All the authors try to handle their sources systematically and critically and concentrate on a particular period or aspect of the terror. The contributors to this volume, with the exception of Alec Nove and David Hoffman, the oldest and youngest of our authors, began their research on Stalinist terror in the late 1970s and 1980s. They were stimulated, in part by the works of Conquest, Medvedev, and Solzhenitsyn, to want to learn more about the terror and the society that spawned it.

The main emphasis in much of this new work, some of which has been labeled *revisionist*, was the inclusion of society into the Stalinist equation. Indeed, this was not new. The totalitarian view had always encompassed society; researchers in the traditional mode had shown that totalitarian regimes depended on a mobilized (if atomized) society. But borrowing from the long-established state–society dichotomy in Russian history, scholars working within the totalitarian paradigm had ultimately seen society as a completely passive participant in the relationship. Society was something used and molded by the totalitarian leadership; social support for the regime was created by propaganda and enforced with terror. Social support for the regime was therefore artificially induced and coerced.

Initially making no assumptions about the society part of the state–society relationship (their first violation of the paradigm's rules), historians have recently described a group of historical situations and relationships that seem anomalous within the shared concept of totalitarianism. Signs of chaotic administration, indecision and lack of planning, a wide disparity between central pronouncements and local outcomes, the relative autonomy of some social processes, and more ambiguous multicausal origins of terror all seemed increasingly inconsistent with the tenets of the ruling paradigm. A monolithic and efficient state/party regime now seems an exaggeration. As Moshe Lewin, the pioneer social historian of the Stalin era, wrote,

For no matter how stern or cruel a regime, in the laboratory of history only rarely can state coercion be so powerful as to control fully the course of events. The depth and scope of spontaneous events that counter the wishes and expectations of a dictatorial government are not a lesser part of history than the deeds and misdeeds of the government and the state.[7]

Although it would be perfectly appropriate to concentrate entirely on social history and case studies, no collection on Stalinist terror would seem complete without dealing with politics and the role of personality. Our collection therefore begins with two contributions, by Boris A. Starkov and J. Arch Getty, on Stalin's role and that of his leading henchman at the time of the Great Purges of 1936–8, Nikolai Ezhov, the head of the Soviet secret police, the NKVD.

Boris Starkov uses previously closed party archives to present the first serious survey of the life and activities of the notorious Nikolai I. Ezhov, Stalin's secret police chief at the height of the terror in the late thirties. Starkov shows conclusively that Stalin supported Ezhov's activity and personally directed key events of the terror. Stalin knew full well when he appointed Ezhov to head the NKVD in September 1936 that Ezhov believed the nation was riddled with a vast conspiracy of former Party Oppositionists, directed by Trotsky from abroad, committed to the assassination of Soviet leaders and the sabotaging of the economy. Stalin also knew that Ezhov was prepared to act on these convictions by extending the terror to industrial leaders and the Right Opposition.

But Starkov's work also raises intriguing questions about police politics in the 1930s and confirms some previous speculation about the importance of factional conflicts within the Stalinist leadership. Writing in *glasnost'*-era Moscow, far from any "revisionist" influences, Starkov shows, for example, that there was a center–periphery conflict in the early 1930s. Moreover, opposition to Ezhov arose from within his own NKVD apparatus *during the terror* and this opposition was the beginning of the end of Ezhov's career. In showing that Ezhov was attacked by other Politburo members despite Stalin's support of him and that Ezhov's replacement, Beria, was forced upon Stalin (whose candidate was Malenkov), Starkov confirms revisionist arguments about the alternative, anti-Ezhov position of A. A. Zhdanov (who began the final assault on Ezhov) and about Stalin's ambiguous power at the end of the terror.[8] Finally, Starkov's intriguing observation that at the time of his fall "Ezhov's primary crime consisted in

[7] Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation* (Berkeley, 1991), p. 25.

[8] See J. Arch Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges: The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered, 1933–1938* (New York), chaps. 4, 6, 7 for Zhdanov's role; and Gábor T. Rittersporn, *Stalinist Simplifications and Soviet Complications: Social Tensions and Political Conflicts in the USSR, 1933–1953* (London, 1991), especially chap. 4: "Stalin in 1938: Rhetorical Apotheosis, Political Defeat."

the fact that he had not informed Stalin of his actions" invites further research.

Getty's article, "The Politics of Repression Revisited," uses recent *glasnost'* revelations published in the former USSR to raise some nagging questions about Stalin's ability to plan the terror in advance. Although it is clear that Stalin perpetrated much of the terror, his input and activites in *organizing* it remain obscure: We still do not know what he decided and when. Using newly available materials, Getty discusses the strange zigs, zags, and periodic indecision displayed by Stalin and his clique and shows that the newly available evidence is consistent with several possible explanations. The problem of Stalin's exact role is not likely to be resolved until the stenographic proceedings of the Politburo and Central Committee meetings of 1928–53 have been published and assimilated by scholars and Stalin's personal archives and NKVD archives have been made freely available. Happily, as of this writing, this possibility may soon materialize.

Having briefly looked at the role of leaders in the terror, we then move on to survey the social and economic context in which the Soviet leadership, including Stalin and Ezhov, functioned in the 1930s in four articles on the background and preconditions to the terror. In the first of these articles, "The Second Coming: Class Enemies in the Soviet Countryside, 1927–1935," Lynne Viola finds consistency among chaos in the rural repression of the collectivization period. Utilizing Soviet legal journals to study the kinds of persons persecuted as kulaks or expelled from collective farms in the 1927–35 period, Viola concludes that traditional village culture shaped the patterns of persecution, especially before 1930 and in 1932–4, when outside agents and actors, dispatched by Moscow to oversee the collectivization process, were absent from the countryside. Although the victims of rural repression between 1927 and 1935 range far beyond the much publicized kulak, as previous scholars have long indicated, persecutions were far from random. Indeed, one finds "certain clearly identifiable victims of repression," not unlike those found in Russia and other peasant societies under stress in earlier times–traditional elites, outsiders to the village, marginal types, economically weak households, and women of ill repute. Such persecutions often proceeded against explicit strictures from Moscow to the contrary and were apparently fueled by the suffering engendered by "the economy of scarcity," created by onerous export-oriented government procurements and low harvests of this period. Viola attributes the prevalence of such traditional forms of victimization in rural Russia of the 1930s to the exodus of the more modern village elements – the young, the skilled, and the educated – under the impetus of industrialization and collectivization.

"The Omnipresent Conspiracy: On Soviet Imagery of Politics and Social Relations in the 1930s," by Gábor Tamás Rittersporn, discusses the widespread belief in the existence of conspiracies on the part of elites and

ordinary people alike in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. Such beliefs surfaced repeatedly in the interrogations of Soviet POWs during World War II and in citizen complaints found in the Smolensk Archive.[9] According to the transcript of the interrogation of General G. S. Liushkov (a provincial NKVD chief who defected at the end of 1938 to avoid arrest), Stalin, national NKVD chief Ezhov, and highly placed NKVD operatives sincerely believed that the nation was riddled with plots and conspiracies.[10] Rittersporn maintains that such theories were used by both the populace and those in power to explain the hardships of daily life and the chronic disfunctioning of the system, which were attributed to various conspiracies and sabotage. He intimates that this response was rooted in traditional rural beliefs that the machinations of evil spirits accounted for commonplace misfortunes.[11] Like Viola's, Rittersporn's work suggests that elements of prerevolutionary rural culture helped fuel Stalinist persecutions, under the impact of the omnipresent economy of scarcity, the widespread misery of these years, and leaders who shared, politicized, and used such traditional beliefs.

The role of the economy of scarcity in the repression also looms large in the contribution by Roberta T. Manning, "The Soviet Economic Crisis of 1936–1940 and the Great Purges." Earlier scholars have attributed the sharp drop in Soviet economic growth rates after 1936 to the impact of the repressions on economic administrators and planners. Manning instead argues that an unexpected slowdown and, in some areas of the economy, even a slump in growth rates that set in midway through 1936 was as much a cause as a consequence of the terror, although the purges exacerbated existing economic difficulties considerably. She attributes the upsurge in repression in the second half of 1936 to a series of economic problems, like stagnating production of key fuels and construction materials, which in turn checked the growth of much of the remainder of the economy, and the 1936 crop failure (the worst harvest

[9] The Smolensk Archive consists of Soviet Communist Party archives from the Smolensk region (Western Oblast), which were seized by the Germans during World War II and subsequently fell into American hands at the end of the war. The archive was used by Merle Fainsod to write his classic study *Smolensk Under Soviet Rule*. The archive is now kept in the U.S. National Archives and is available for sale on microfilm from the U.S. Government Printing Office. A not entirely accurate guide to the archive also exists: *Guide to the Records of the Smolensk Oblast of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1917–1941* (Washington, DC, 1980) and J. Arch Getty, "Guide to the Smolensk Archive," in Sheila Fitzpatrick and Lynne Viola (eds.), *A Researcher's Guide to Sources on Soviet Social History in the 1930s* (Armonk, NY/London, 1990), pp. 84–96. The archive is not complete and appears to consist of files saved at random from a fire by German occupation authorities. Many documents are charred and difficult to decipher, which has limited use of the archive by American scholars until recently.

[10] *British Foreign Office Russia Correspondence*, 1939, Reel 10, vol. 23698, pp. 318–339. A copy of Liushkov's interrogation by the Japanese made its way into British hands.

[11] For a discussion of such beliefs, see Moshe Lewin, *The Making of the Soviet System: Essays in the Social History of Interwar Russia* (New York, 1985), pp. 57–71.

since the 1932–3 famine), which strained food supplies throughout the nation. These problems manifested themselves at a point when the terror of the collectivization and famine period had abated and the urge to seek scapegoats had apparently died down. The new economic difficulties were attributed to enemy sabotage or "wrecking," the prime charge against the victims of the terror from the fall of 1936 to the fall of 1938.[12]

Robert Thurston in "The Stakhanovite Movement: The Background to the Great Terror in the Factories, 1935–1938" uses newly available Soviet archives to examine the impact of the Stakhanovite movement on the shop floor in an attempt to discern whether the rise of this movement in the fall of 1935 could have contributed to the wave of terror that swept over industrial managers and administrators a year later. Stakhanovism arose in the fall of 1935 after the widespread publicity given Aleksei Stakhanov's increasing of his coal hewing by a factor of fourteen in a single shift resulted in numerous workers the nation over seeking to emulate and exceed Stakhanov's achievements.[13] According to Thurston, Stakhanovism from its inception encouraged conflicts and exacerbated existing tensions in the factories, because workers, prompted by the high material rewards and publicity accorded Stakhanovites, sought to reorganize their work methods in ways that could only be detrimental to productivity of the enterprise as a whole. Managers in turn, hardpressed by the high targets of the Five-Year Plan, had little choice but to resist such efforts.[14] Consequently the rise of Stakhanovism was immediately accompanied by the proliferation of accusations of wrecking leveled against managers by workers, along with repeated efforts in many areas of the country to prosecute managers for sabotage.

The next section of the collection presents a series of case studies of the Great Purges of 1936–8 in a variety of different settings, including Moscow factories, a rural raion, the Red Army, and the Donbas coal-mining region. By presenting these case studies, we hope to assess how the terror affected different regions and social strata. We need far more specific, detailed studies like these for *all* phases of Stalin's Terror, not just the Great Purges of 1936–8. Only then can we discern the mechanisms, motives, incidence, and scope of the repression over space and time and make the comparisons that need to be made among different geographic regions and the various periods and phases of the terror, which may well have differed markedly in terms of the kinds of victims affected,[15] the means by which the terror

[12] Lewis H. Siegelbaum, *Stakhanovitism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935–1941* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 248–259.

[13] Siegelbaum, 66–98.

[14] For a manager's attitude toward Stakhanovism, see Viktor Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom: The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York, 1946), pp. 187–197.

[15] Brzezinski was the first to suggest on the basis of the Harvard Project interviews with Soviets displaced by World War II that the victims of Stalinist terror in the first half of the thirties (the period of the First Five-Year Plan and the cultural revolution) differed

spread, and the relative involvement of government and society in the process.

David L. Hoffman in "The Great Terror on the Local Level: Purges in Moscow Factories, 1936–1938" examines the ensuing purge activities of the Moscow Party committees and factory party organizations, found in the Moscow Party Archive. He suggests that the repressions in the factories were directed almost exclusively against managers and technical specialists and "often echoed the antimanagerial tone of Stakhanovitism." In the process, "few rank and file workers were victimized" and Stakhanovites appeared oddly immune, although the purge victims were frequently charged with "sabotaging the Stakhanovite movement or ignoring it."[16] Moreover, Stakhanovites along with newly educated specialists of working class origins actually benefited from the terror by being promoted en masse to the many empty managerial positions, vacated by the purge victims.[17]

The second of our case studies, "The Great Purges in a Rural District: Belyi Raion Revisited" by Roberta T. Manning, moves from city to countryside to explore popular input and the process by which the repression unfolded among local Communist Party members in the heavily agricultural Smolensk region in 1937. Manning argues that documents from Belyi Raion indicate that a groundswell of sentiment and resentment among local Communists, brewing for months, played an important role in purging the local political establishment by expelling them from the Communist Party and sometimes recommending their arrest by the NKVD. Like some of our other authors, Manning maintains that within the party the prime victims of the terror were leaders or "bosses," including the heads of most local institutions of any importance.

Roger Reese in "The Red Army and the Great Purges" follows Manning in extending the concept of the Great Purges and "purge victim" to include those expelled from the Communist Party and dismissed from their official positions as well as those arrested, imprisoned, or executed. Drawing upon recently published Soviet data in *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* and *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, Reese maintains that primary party organizations in the armed forces, which included both officers and enlisted men among their membership, engaged in mass expulsions of officer Communists that raged "out of Moscow's control" after the arrest of Marshal Tukhachevskii and other military leaders in June 1937 and that "with rare exception, it was only officers who were expelled." Reese also shows that newly released statistics on the military purges indicate that at most 9.7% the officers at the height

significantly from those of the second half of the thirties (the Great Purges), a conclusion upheld by the works of Sheila Fitzpatrick (including her contribution to this volume) and the contribution to this volume by Chase and Getty. Brzezinski, 98–115.

[16] Siegelbaum earlier, without access to the archives, made these same points on the basis of published sources. Siegelbaum, 255–257, 267–276.

[17] Siegelbaum, 255, 266–277.

of the terror in 1937 were "repressed," in contrast to earlier estimates by Robert Conquest and John Erickson that 25–50% of the officer corps fell victim to arrest in 1937 and 1938.[18]

In the last of our case studies, Hiroaki Kuromiya explores the repression in one of the nation's leading industrial regions, the Donbas coal mines in "Stalinist Terror in the Donbas: A Note." On the basis of Commissariat of Heavy Industry archives and the local press, Kuromiya concludes that terror reverberated through the Donbas from the summer of 1936 to the autumn of 1938, usually erupting in full force in the wake of visits to that region by Politburo member Lazar Kaganovich, who also played a key role in unleashing terror against local elites in the Western, Ivanovo, and Iaroslavl oblasts and in Bessarabia.[19] Kuromiya points out that the Great Purges in the Donbas as elsewhere fell heavily but not exclusively on higher administrative levels and the party apparatus.

At this point our collection passes to more general overviews of the quantitative impact of the terror on the Soviet elite and Soviet society as a whole. The first of these articles, "Patterns of Repression Among the Soviet Elite in the Late 1930s: A Biographical Approach" by J. Arch Getty and William Chase, suggests that one way to approach the causes of the terror is to examine the biographies of the repressed. They conclude that elite members with higher official positions in the armed forces, party work, and the direction of the economy were most likely to have fallen victim to the repressions, with the Soviet intelligentsia significantly less impacted. Although certain biographical variables were important in determining purge vulnerability, the authors' quantitative analysis of their data leads them to conclude overall that statistical analysis of strictly biographical factors is not the best approach to studying vulnerability. They call on us to examine more closely the problems that beset the Communist Party, economic administrators, and the Soviet armed forces on the eve of the terror and to avoid monocausal explanations of Stalinist repression.

In the next article, Sheila Fitzpatrick attempts to gauge the impact of the repression on Soviet elites in a manner quite different from Getty and Chase. Fitzpatrick studies the "dropout rates" of random samples taken

[18] Conquest *The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge*, 228, 485, and John Erickson, *The Soviet High Command* (New York, 1962), 449, 451–452.

[19] Getty, *Origins of the Great Purges*, 168–71 and *Moscow News*, no. 48 (Dec. 4–11, 1988), p. 9. The article in *Moscow News* is an excerpt from the memoirs of an Ivanovo NKVD man, Mikhail Shreider, that discusses Kaganovich's visit to Ivanovo in August 1937 as an emissary of the Central Committee. Although Shreider blames Kaganovich (and Stalin with whom Kaganovich was in frequent telephone contact) with greatly expanding the terror in Ivanovo, he also mentions casually that when Kaganovich arrived in Ivanovo, the local prisons were already filled to capacity with "leading Party functionaries and local government officials," leaving no room for bandits or other common criminals. Hopefully when Shreider's memoirs are published in full, they will reveal what was happening in Ivanovo *before* the arrival of Kaganovich.