

> This book is a collection of papers, including three not previously published, by one of the leading philosophers in epistemology. It defends a well-groundedness account of justification and knowledge in a way that transcends the stereotypes of two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy - foundationalism and coherentism. Robert Audi constructs a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates major virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He also develops important distinctions, crucial for any epistemology, between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, and several forms of internalism. These contrasts are applied not only to rational belief but also to rational action and rational desire. The result is an integration of theoretical and practical reason that exhibits both as having a common structure and a basis in human experience.

> In its detailed, cumulative treatment of many of the central topics in epistemology, the book will interest teachers and students in the theory of knowledge. However, by offering a theory of rationality – including practical rationality – as well as an account of justification and knowledge, it will also interest readers in ethical theory, philosophy of action, and philosophy of the social sciences.



The structure of justification



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To my children



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Preface and acknowledgments

This book brings together most of my epistemological papers published in the past fifteen years. There are also three prepared specially for this volume, including the introductory essay, which presents an overview of my position in epistemology. I offer the papers in the hope that they will repay reading or rereading, and that the whole is more than the sum of the parts. Within each of the book's four parts, the order of the papers is chronological. This is also their natural order. Many of the papers develop points, problems, or arguments introduced in their predecessors. Inevitably, then, there is some overlap. I believe, however, that any inconvenience to readers who, for this reason, choose to speed through certain parts will be outweighed by the gain in continuity and in the level of detail with which some of the recurring problems are treated. I should add that in one sense this book represents work in progress: My epistemological position is still very much in development.

For permission to use the previously published papers – in which only minor revisions have been made – I thank the editors of the following journals, listed with the relevant chapters: Chapter 1, The Monist (62, 4, 1978, 592–610); Chapter 2, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy (XII, 1, 1982, 163–182); Chapter 3, Synthese (55, 1, 1983, 119–139; Copyright © 1983 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.; reprinted by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers); Chapter 5, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy (IV, 2, 1974, 253–267); Chapter 6, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (V, 1980, 75–95); Chapter 7, The Journal of Philosophy (LXXX, 7, 1983, 398–415); Chapter 8, Philosophical Topics (XIV, 1, 1986, 27–65); Chapter 9, The Journal of Philosophical Research (XVI, 1991, 473–492); Chapter 10, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (XLIX, 1, 1988, 1–



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29); Chapter 11, American Philosophical Quarterly (26, 4, 1989, 309–320); Chapter 13, Social Theory and Practice (9, 2–3, 1983, 311–334); Chapter 14, Synthese (65, 2, 1985, 159–184; reprinted by permission of Kluwer Academic Publishers); and Chapter 15, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association (62, 1, 1988, 227–256). This chapter was prepared as a presidential address to the American Philosophical Association and given at its Central Division Meeting in April 1988.

I wish it were possible to name all of the philosophers – and students of philosophy - from whom I have learned some of what went into these papers. They include authors of papers presented to the American Philosophical Association, at conferences, in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska, and in the National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminars and Summer Institute I directed during the 1980s. They also include many of the authors referred to in the papers - and many not referred to only because of space constraints. I particularly thank William P. Alston, Albert Casullo, Roderick M. Chisholm, Richard A. Foley, Paul K. Moser, Alvin Plantinga, and Ernest Sosa for critical comments and stimulating epistemological conversations over many years. In recent years, I have fruitfully discussed issues in epistemology with, and benefited from reading, Frederick R. Adams, Robert Almeder, John A. Barker, John B. Bender, Laurence BonJour, Panayot Butchvarov, the late Hector-Neri Castañeda, Wayne A. Davis, Michael DePaul, Fred Dretske, Susan Feagin, Richard Feldman, Richard Fumerton, Carl Ginet, Alan H. Goldman, Alvin I. Goldman, Gilbert Harman, John Heil, Risto Hilpinen, Jaegwon Kim, Peter D. Klein, Jonathan Kvanvig, Keith Lehrer, James Montmarquet, George S. Pappas, John R. Perry, Louis P. Poiman, Lawrence Powers, Philip L. Quinn, William L. Rowe, Frederick Schmitt, Robert Shope, Eleonore Stump, Donna Summerfield, Marshall Swain, James Van Cleve, Jonathan Vogel, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.