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052143405X - Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography, Volume I

Mary Pickering

Excerpt

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Introduction

At twenty-seven, Auguste Comte remarked to a friend, “The essence of my life is a novel, and an intense novel, which would appear truly extraordinary if I ever published it under some assumed names.”¹ Although Comte never turned his attention to writing fiction, he remained thoroughly preoccupied by his own emotional development, which increasingly dominated his philosophy. In his letters and works, he set out to refashion his life to give the impression that he was a thoroughly original and creative genius, whose philosophy was unjustly neglected by his “metaphysical” contemporaries. Indifference to Comte’s life and work has continued to be a problem. Although Comte is among the dozen most important intellectual figures in modern European history, he has never been the subject of an exhaustive or balanced book in any language. His story, however, is worth telling. This study in intellectual history seeks to fill this gap by deciphering the various strands of the myth consciously elaborated by Comte and further embellished by his disciples. It concentrates on Comte’s so-called first career, which ended with the completion of his most influential work, the *Cours de philosophie positive*, in 1842, the year he turned forty-four. It was during this period that he made his main contribution to modern culture: the establishment of positivism and sociology.

This work seems particularly relevant because a new concern with Comte’s thought has emerged in the past twenty years, due partly to a revived interest in the history of science and in the roots of sociology and modern positivism. It is reflected in new editions of his works, such as the *Traité philosophique d’astronomie populaire* and the *Cours de philosophie positive*, and in the publication for the first time of all of his early essays and his complete correspondence, primarily by the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales.²

¹ Comte to Valat, November 16, 1825, *Auguste Comte: Correspondance générale et confessions*, ed. Paulo E. de Berrêdo Carneiro, Pierre Arnaud, Paul Arbousse-Bastide, and Angèle Kremer-Marietti, 8 vols. (Paris: Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, 1973–90) (hereafter, CG), 1:163. Unless otherwise noted, the translations of all passages originally written in French are my own.

² Auguste Comte, *Traité philosophique d’astronomie populaire précédé du Discours sur l’esprit positif*, Corpus des oeuvres de philosophie en langue française (Paris: Fayard, 1985) (hereafter, *Traité*

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Stanislav Andreski and Gertrud Lenzer have provided English translations of selections from Comte's works.³ Other evidence of a new interest in Comte is demonstrated by Angèle Kremer-Marietti's and Sarah Kofman's semiotic analyses of his works, Pierre Arnaud's study of his religion, the *Revue philosophique's* two issues devoted to his thought (published in 1985 and 1988), the *Revue de synthèse's* analysis of his politics in a 1991 issue, and Joan Landes's examination of his ideas on gender in *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution*.⁴ Most of this work is being done by philosophers. This book seeks to complement their efforts. It explores not only Comte's thought but his personal and familial life as well as the cultural, intellectual, social, and political environment that helped to shape his outlook. In this way, it sheds light on the interaction between Comte's ideas and their context.

The issue that was most important in the aftermath of the French Revolution was that of the basis and ends of power. How could the nation best be governed? How could it avoid the problem of mob rule (i.e., a renewal of the Terror) as well as that of dictatorship (i.e., a new Napoleon)? Why should citizens obey a specific authority or hold certain values? Was there even such a thing as truth any more?⁵ Such questions led to the ideological controversies of the

philosophique d'astronomie populaire); idem, *Philosophie première: Cours de philosophie positive, leçons 1 à 45*, ed. Michel Serres, François Dagonet, Allal Sinaceur (Paris: Hermann, 1975) (hereafter, *Cours*, 1); idem, *Physique sociale: Cours de philosophie positive, leçons 46 à 60*, ed. Jean-Paul Enthoven (Paris: Hermann, 1975) (hereafter, *Cours*, 2); idem, *Ecrits de jeunesse, 1816–1828: Suivis du Mémoire sur la cosmogonie de Laplace, 1835*, ed. Paulo E. de Berrêdo Carneiro and Pierre Arnaud (Paris: Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, 1970) (hereafter, *Ecrits*); CG, 1–8.

³ Stanislav Andreski, ed., and Margaret Clarke, trans., *The Essential Comte: Selected from "Cours de Philosophie Positive"* (New York: Harper & Row, Barnes & Noble, 1974); Gertrud Lenzer, ed., *Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings* (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1975).

⁴ Angèle Kremer-Marietti, *Le Concept de science positive: Ses Tenants et ses aboutissants dans les structures anthropologiques du positivisme* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1983); idem, *Entre le Signe et l'Histoire: L'Anthropologie positiviste d'Auguste Comte* (Paris: Klincksieck, 1982); idem, *Le Projet anthropologique d'Auguste Comte* (Paris: Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1980); Sarah Kofman, *Aberrations: Le Devenir-femme d'Auguste Comte* (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1978); Pierre Arnaud, *Le "Nouveau Dieu": Préliminaires à la politique positive* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1973); *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, no. 4 (1985), no. 3 (1988); *Revue de synthèse* 112 (January–March 1991); Joan B. Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

⁵ Isaiah Berlin, *The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas*, ed. Henry Hardy (London: John Murray, 1990; New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1992), 97–8; Stephen Holmes, *Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), 15, 85, 96–99; Biancamaria Fontana, *Benjamin Constant and the Post-Revolutionary Mind* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), 106.

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Bourbon Restoration and July Monarchy. By revealing how these disputes helped to define the characteristics of Comte's system, I hope to contribute to the growing debate on the process by which postrevolutionary France modified and domesticated the explosive principles of 1789.⁶

I maintain that given the circumstances in which he developed his philosophy, Comte from the very beginning of his career distrusted the type of morally neutral, "positivist" or "scientistic" thinking that is now associated with his name. "Positivism" is indeed a problematical term. Reduced to extreme scientism, a strong faith in the ability of science to solve all problems, positivism is usually equated with empirical, experimental, and statistical methods of research applied to all areas of knowledge.⁷ Irving Louis Horowitz provides one example of this interpretation: "By positivism is meant the development of a total portrait of man derived from the combination of discrete questionnaires, surveys, and other atomic facts."⁸ Other social scientists call positivism a materialistic and antisubjective doctrine that delights in sterile formalism and disregards the emotional and moral side of human existence as well as the whole subject of values. They criticize Comte not only for promulgating such a philosophy, but for advocating the dictatorship of scientists.⁹ But there is much evidence to demonstrate that Comte always gave his philosophical system a practical, political mission, one based on social justice.

As a boy, Comte was deeply affected by the chaos of ideas, uncertainties, and social and political divisions created by the French Revolution. Whereas his parents and the majority of townspeople in his native city of Montpellier tended to sympathize with the counterrevolution, Comte rebelled against their strong Catholicism and royalism and was attracted to the republican and secular ideals of the Revolution. Responding to the anarchy of his time, he committed himself at an early age to completing the work of the Revolution, which he came to realize had touched the entire Western world. Owing to his rebellious nature and the force of circumstances,

⁶ Jack Hayward, *After the Revolution: Six Critics of Democracy and Nationalism* (New York: New York University Press, 1991), xi.

⁷ Richard H. Brown, *A Poetic for Sociology: Toward a Logic of Discovery for the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 17, 33; Jack D. Douglas, "Understanding Everyday Life," in *Understanding Everyday Life: Toward the Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge*, ed. Douglas (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), 23–4.

⁸ Irving Louis Horowitz, *Professing Sociology: Studies in the Life Cycle of Social Science* (Chicago: Aldine, 1968), 200.

⁹ See, e.g., William R. Catton, Jr., *From Animistic to Naturalistic Sociology* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), 42; F. A. Hayek, *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 13–14, 20; idem, *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), 92, 183, 201–2.

his efforts to find a place for himself in postrevolutionary society failed. He became more and more marginal and increasingly disillusioned with his contemporaries' political experimentation. His association with Saint-Simon contributed to his growing awareness that he could rise above the Revolution by formulating an intellectual doctrine that would appeal to the traditionalism of the Right and the rationalism of the Left and thereby establish social harmony.

This doctrine, positivism, was all-encompassing, centering on a general understanding of the main sciences. Comte maintained that positivism systematized the whole range of human knowledge because of its keystone – a new science of society. Forged by Comte from different elements of the philosophies of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries, this new science, which he called sociology in 1838, derived from the extension of the scientific method to society. It was based on his classification of the sciences and his law of the three stages of history. By making all ideas rest on the scientific method, which sought certain knowledge through the observation of facts, positivism would be able to establish irrefutable principles acceptable to each member of society. In this way, it would ensure social consensus.

Moreover, with a grasp of the laws of social progress acquired through the study of history, Comte contended that human conduct and development could be made more rational and predictable. Knowledge about the social world would give one control over the social world. No longer would there loom the threat of anarchy.

Comte never intended for sociology to be “objective” or purely empirical. Indeed, he felt pure empiricism was as dangerous as mysticism. Instead, he argued that induction must be complemented by deduction, for a person must first have a theory in order to observe. Comte's hierarchy of the sciences and his stress on the ruling power of ideas further demonstrate his idealistic, antimechanistic, and antireductionist inclinations. He denounced the statistical approach to scientific research that scholars, such as Horowitz, tend to equate with positivism. In fact, his abhorrence of the quantification of human experience led him to look favorably upon vitalism. Contrary to current assumptions, Comte was from the beginning of his career fully aware of the power of emotional and spiritual needs.

He maintained that positivism and its principal component, sociology, would profoundly change the way people think. This intellectual revolution would lead to a revival of moral order and then a political transformation that would usher in a new era of consensus. The people who would control the new society would not be scientists. Despite what is commonly believed about him, Comte distrusted scientific specialization, for he was convinced that the division

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of labor led to a narrowing of views and sentiments. His failed efforts to become a member of the Academy of Sciences and a professor at the Ecole Polytechnique reinforced his aversion to scientists. He argued that philosophers who had training in all of the sciences and thus had the most general knowledge possessed the widest possible views. They should replace the traditional clergy and guide the new positivist society, directing its energies toward a common goal, the improvement of humanity. As Comte's relationships with his friends and his wife foundered and he felt deprived of a rewarding emotional life, he found fulfillment in considering himself the savior of "humanity." And to save the species, he warned in particular against allowing his new spiritual power to have full authority over society; he feared the reign of the mind would stifle the progress he hoped to ensure.

In sum, although Comte's solution to the malaise of his era was an intellectual system that would give people new, homogeneous ideas and convictions, his central concerns were always political activism and social reform. He considered his goal to be "spiritual" because it involved the fundamental reorganization of people's ideas and sentiments. Society could function effectively only if based on a set of common opinions, ideas, and mores. Even before the blossoming of his love for Clotilde de Vaux in 1845, Comte was ready to proclaim that the belief system of positivism was a "religion" and that positive philosophers represented the new spiritual power. Thus there was no sudden change of direction from his "first" career to his "second."

Chapter 1 of this book sets the context and covers Comte's life up to 1817. After offering a glimpse of the chaos in France, especially in Montpellier, just before and during Comte's childhood, it reveals Comte's response to the challenges bequeathed by the French Revolution to the nineteenth century and his reaction to the Napoleonic regime and the Bourbon Restoration. In addition, this chapter explores his family life and his educational experience and explains his projects after his expulsion from the Ecole Polytechnique. It also discusses Comte's crucial reading of Montesquieu and Condorcet at this time.

Chapter 2 takes a long look at Saint-Simon, who had a significant impact on Comte's personal and intellectual development. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 deal with Comte's association with Saint-Simon and his journalistic endeavors. They also place Comte's efforts to establish a new doctrine within the context of the general search for a new foundation for liberal politics – a search that was partly inspired by the rejection of the discredited abstract language of the Revolution. After showing how Comte was beginning to combine his interest

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in politics and science and formulate positive philosophy, I analyze Comte's rupture with Saint-Simon in 1824.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 concentrate on Comte's struggles to find personal and intellectual connections from 1824 to 1828. They cover his search for ideas and reassurance in the counterrevolutionary tradition, liberalism, the Scottish philosophy of the Enlightenment, phrenology, and the doctrines of Herder, Kant, and Hegel. I also examine Comte's work for the Saint-Simonian journal *Le Producteur*. Finally, I analyze his marriage to Caroline Massin and her role in his attack of insanity in 1826, which occurred after he finally began to give a course on positive philosophy.

Chapters 9 through 13 cover Comte's continuing efforts to find a stable source of livelihood and a place for himself in scientific circles from 1828 to 1842. They highlight his friendship with John Stuart Mill as well as his difficulties with the Academy of Sciences, the Ecole Polytechnique, his wife, his friends, and the Saint-Simonians. They also show Comte's problems in writing and publishing the *Cours de philosophie positive*. Chapters 14 and 15 offer a detailed analysis of the ideas contained in this masterpiece.

In the Conclusion, I reexamine the evidence refuting the contention that Comte was first an arid scientific thinker and then became a mad religious reformer in his so-called second career because of his sudden love for Clotilde de Vaux.¹⁰ Comte's case is enlightening because his reversion to a traditional religious terminology exemplifies the nineteenth-century problem of dealing with spiritual longing in an age of growing skepticism. His authoritarian solution underscores the weakness of liberalism in nineteenth-century France.

¹⁰ Raymond Aron calls Comte's religion a "biographical accident." Raymond Aron, *Main Currents in Sociological Thought*, trans. Richard Howard and Helen Weaver, 2 vols. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1968), 1:124.

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Chapter 1

The Early Years

The Revolution is still operative.

Alexis de Tocqueville, 1856

THE CONTEXT: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

On 16 Nivôse Year VI, the Directory sent an ordinance to the administrators of Montpellier, the former center of the royal province of Languedoc and now the capital of the newly created department of Hérault. The decree asserted that order was impossible to maintain in the town in view of the fanaticism of the people and their violent, vengeful acts. As one of the nineteen cities having the most difficulty with royalist agitation, Montpellier was immediately placed in a state of siege.¹ It was amid such chaos that Isidore-Auguste-Marie-François-Xavier Comte was born on 30 Nivôse Year VI, more commonly known as January 19, 1798.²

Although Comte's life began in the waning years of the French Revolution, the turbulent decade of upheaval left its imprint upon him as upon several generations of Frenchmen. In his famous "Personal Preface" to volume 6 of his *Cours de philosophie positive*, the only childhood experience that he discussed at length had to do with the Revolution. He explained that by age fourteen, he had gone "through all the essential stages of the revolutionary spirit." Because of the

¹ J. Duval-Jouve, *Montpellier pendant la Révolution*, 2 vols. (Montpellier, 1879–81), 2:359–61; F. Saurel, *Histoire religieuse du département de l'Hérault pendant la Révolution, le Consulat, et les premières années de l'Empire*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1894–6), 3:188.

² The best biography of Comte for the period of his life up to age twenty-six is Henri Gouhier's *La Jeunesse d'Auguste Comte et la formation du positivisme*, 3 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1933–41). For standard biographies that cover Comte's entire life, consult Henri Gouhier, *La Vie d'Auguste Comte*, 2d ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965); Emile Littré, *Auguste Comte et la philosophie positive*, 2d ed. (Paris, 1864); Joseph Lonchamp, *Précis de la vie et des écrits d'Auguste Comte* (Paris, 1889; extract from the *Revue occidentale*), and [Jean-François Eugène] Robinet, *Notice sur l'oeuvre et la vie d'Auguste Comte*, 3d ed. (Paris, 1891). Two authors who evaluate his thought and also give biographical indications are Aron, "Auguste Comte," chap. in *Main Currents*, 1:73–143, and Frank E. Manuel, "Auguste Comte: Embodiment in the Great Being," chap. in *The Prophets of Paris* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 249–96. A useful summary of Comte's thought can be found in D. G. Charlton, "From Positivism to Scientism (1) Auguste Comte," chap. in *Positivist Thought in France during the Second Empire, 1852–1870* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), 24–50.

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Revolution – the “salutary crisis, whose principal phase [the Terror] had preceded my birth” – he “already felt the fundamental need for a universal regeneration” that would be both “political and philosophic.”³ The French Revolution was thus the point of departure for his thought. Throughout his life he was preoccupied with its accomplishments, its failures, and, most of all, the wide-ranging problems that it left to his generation.

Furthermore, he declared that the Revolution had a profound impact on him, since it “fully conformed to my own nature and was at that time repressed everywhere around me.”⁴ It had been “repressed” because in mid-1793 Hérault joined the federalist movement to resist the authoritarian, centralizing tendencies of the Convention, the new government in Paris. Suspecting Hérault of being disloyal to the Republic, the Convention denounced Montpellier as a potential source of civil war.⁵ The Terror was beginning. As Comte’s bourgeois family was very Catholic and royalist, it too opposed the Revolution.

The ensuing civil war, especially in Montpellier, stemmed partially from the Jacobins’ attempt to exert control over the wealthy and powerful Church as a way of sweeping away the inequalities and abuses of the entire old order. Beginning in 1792, the revolutionaries permitted civil marriage and civil divorce, closed many churches and monasteries, eliminated the teaching and charity orders, and promulgated the revolutionary calendar. The de-Christianization campaign culminated in November 1793 with the abolition of Catholicism and its replacement by the Cult of Reason, which was supported by an elaborate ritual of festivals in honor of such entities as the Family and Nature. A placard in Montpellier’s Temple of Reason (formerly the Cathedral of Saint-Pierre) appropriately read, “*The earth is destroying heaven.*”⁶ Several months later Montpellier was subjected to yet another revolutionary religion – the Cult of the Supreme Being established by Robespierre. Influenced by the Enlightenment’s dream of establishing a system of justice and fraternity on earth, the revolutionaries were trying, according to one historian, to create a “secular religion of humanity.”⁷ It would become the prototype of Comte’s own Religion of

³ *Cours*, 2:466. ⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Jacques Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution: Doctrine and Action, 1789–1804*, trans. Salvator Attanasio (New York: Fertig, 1971; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 216–17; Duval-Jouve, *Montpellier*, 2:54–65, 116–20; Comte to Mill, March 4, 1842, CG, 2:37.

⁶ Saurel, *Histoire religieuse*, 3:57.

⁷ John Walsh, “Religion: Church and State in Europe and the Americas,” in *The New Cambridge Modern History*, vol. 9, *War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval*, ed. C. W. Crawley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 148. See also Saurel, *Histoire religieuse*,

Humanity, which he established in the 1850s. A great admirer of the activism of the Convention, he would plan festivals, model the Positivist Society on the Jacobin Club, devise his own sacraments, and create a new calendar celebrating the great figures of the history of humanity.

Resistance to the government's religious innovations spurred counterrevolutionary and federalist activity in the Midi, especially in Montpellier, whose inhabitants were intensely devout after centuries of bitter religious wars. By late 1793, as a result of the revolutionary army's terrorist activities and other means of repression, the Church in Hérault had lost 354 priests, monks, and nuns from emigration, deportation, or incarceration. In Montpellier alone, the bishop and forty-four priests had been forced to leave France, and by the end of the Terror, fifteen people had been guillotined and four hundred imprisoned.⁸ The issue of religion had clearly created profound social agitation in the city and would later be foremost in Comte's mind when he took up the task of regenerating France.

Although the French people in general and those of Montpellier in particular were weary of revolution, the turmoil did not abate after Robespierre's execution in July 1794. To eliminate the problems caused by the abolition of Catholicism, the new government, that of the Directory, took additional punitive steps against the Church and tried unsuccessfully to create a secular, humanistic religion with the *culte décadaire*. Challenged constantly by the Left and Right, it resorted to unconstitutional measures, including rigged elections, censorship, and arbitrary arrests, in order to stay in power. Once people discovered the worthlessness and instability of their new authoritarian government, they became politically apathetic, refusing to vote or accept office.⁹ This contempt for the political

3:28–61, Duval-Jouve, *Montpellier*, 2:135–6, 179–80; Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1955), 6–7, 151; George Lefebvre, *The French Revolution*, trans. Elizabeth Moss Evanson, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 1:130, 159, 166–71, 241–7, 2:76–81.

⁸ Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *The Peasants of Languedoc*, trans. John Day (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 269–86; Louis J. Thomas, *Montpellier: Ville marchande – Histoire économique et sociale de Montpellier des origines à 1870* (Montpellier: Valat, 1936), 209; Duval-Jouve, *Montpellier*, 2:145; Saurel, *Histoire religieuse*, 3:62–122; Richard Cobb, *Les Armées révolutionnaires des départements du Midi (automne et hiver de 1793, printemps de 1794)* (Toulouse: Soubiron, 1955), 14, 21–2, 78–80.

⁹ Duval-Jouve, *Montpellier*, 2:191; Georges Lefebvre, *The Directory*, trans. Robert Baldick (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1967), 4–12, 16–17, 46, 170, 221; Denis Woronoff, *La République bourgeoise de Thermidor à Brumaire, 1794–1799* (Paris: Seuil, 1972), 7, 51–3, 222, 224; Lefebvre, *French Revolution*, 2:141, 162–4; Martyn Lyons, *France under the Directory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 5, 19, 36–7, 104, 106, 113, 165–7, 173, 215, 237.

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process lingered for a long time and would later be evident in Comte's attitude.

In many ways, the Directory period – the period when Comte was born – was the low point of the Revolution, for the people suffered severely from cold winters, bad harvests, famine, poverty, and increasing conscriptions and requisitions for the war effort. As political and social divisions became exacerbated, no consensus was possible. Anger over the religious policies, still a leading cause of dissatisfaction, was largely responsible for the increased power of the royalists in Montpellier, who triumphed in the elections of 1797 but were unable to rout the Jacobins completely. The situation became so tense in France as a whole that on September 4, 1797, the republicans staged a coup d'état to prevent a royalist takeover. A new repressive dictatorship, the Second Directory, quickly inaugurated another reign of terror, which again was particularly harsh in Hérault, a stronghold of the royalist conspirators.¹⁰

Born in the midst of this civil war, Comte would spend most of his life grappling with the problems produced by the Revolution of 1789 – problems that troubled the nation throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. One of the principal challenges bequeathed by the Revolution to his generation was that of creating a social consensus for the modern era. Coming from an area shaken by the disunity of the civil war, Comte was particularly sensitive to the need to erect a social system that would give France the peace and stability it desired, especially in an age when the nobles and clergy would no longer dominate. This concern for social harmony and order would lead him to create the science of society. This science was a direct response to the vast problems stemming from the upheaval of his era.

The political reorganization of France was another problem addressed by Comte and his generation. Once rid of the traditional monarchy, the nation had to establish a new governmental system. Throughout the late eighteenth century and most of the nineteenth, it experimented unsuccessfully with different forms of government: constitutional monarchies, dictatorships, and republics. The role of the state and the problem of reconciling liberty and equality were constant subjects of dispute.¹¹ Despite the example of the Terror, a

¹⁰ Saurel, *Histoire religieuse*, 3:143–226, 287–300; Duval-Jouve, *Montpellier*, 2:164, 203, 275, 284, 289–92, 305–7, 315, 331–3, 402–9; Colin Jones, *Charity and Bienfaisance: The Treatment of the Poor in the Montpellier Region, 1740–1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 201; Lefebvre, *Directory*, 12, 106–7; Lyons, *France under the Directory*, 221–2.

¹¹ Stanley Hoffmann, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," in *In Search of France: The Economy, Society, and Political System in the Twentieth Century*, by Stanley Hoffmann et al. (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1965), 13–14.