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0521432235 - Markets and Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficiency

Edited by Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and Bo Gustafsson

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	<i>page</i> xii
<i>List of tables</i>	xiii
Preface <i>Bo Gustafsson</i>	xv
1 Post-Walrasian political economy	1
<i>Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis</i>	
1 Introduction: new light on an old debate	1
2 Post-Walrasian democratic theory	2
3 Walras' fiction	4
4 Walrasian economics and post-Walrasian political economy	5
5 Varieties of post-Walrasian economics	9
Part I Agency, incentives, and democratic accountability	11
2 The democratic firm: an agency-theoretic evaluation	13
<i>Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis</i>	
1 Introduction	13
2 The employment relationship and contested exchange	15
3 Short-side power and democratic accountability	20
4 Market failures arising from contested exchange	21
5 The efficiency of the democratic firm in regulating work	27
6 Impediments to the success of the democratic firm in a competitive capitalist economy	31
7 Conclusion	34
3 Alternative employment and payment systems	40
<i>D. M. Nuti</i>	
1 Wage employment: fixed rate, subjection, and job insecurity	40
2 Permutations of the employment contract	40
3 Lowering the marginal cost of labor	40
4 Cyclical flexibility of earnings	42
5 Productivity enhancement	42
6 Overclaims	42
7 Profit, capital gains, and capital-sharing	43
8 Power-sharing	43
9 Job security	44

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Edited by Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and Bo Gustafsson

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

viii	<i>Contents</i>	
10	Cooperatives	44
11	Meade's labor–capital partnerships	45
12	From dependent workers to part-time co-entrepreneurs	46
Part II	Institutions and institutional change	49
4	Toward a framework for analyzing institutions and institutional change	51
	<i>Leonid Hurwicz</i>	
1	Introduction	51
2	Mechanisms and adjustment processes	52
3	Institutions	58
5	Imperfect choice and rule-governed behavior	68
	<i>Ronald A. Heiner</i>	
1	Introduction	68
2	From imperfect choice to predictable behavior	68
3	Analytical tools for studying imperfect choice	69
4	Rule-governed plus information-ignoring behavior	75
5	Instinctive rules in non-human behavior	78
6	Dynamic rules and ethics in human exchange	80
7	Rule instability with sufficient intelligence	82
8	Agreement versus stability of social rules	83
9	Conclusion	84
6	Organizational equilibria and institutional stability	86
	<i>Ugo Pagano</i>	
1	Introduction	86
2	The New Institutional view of the firm	86
3	A “radical” inversion of the New Institutional view	89
4	Property rights/technological equilibria: a simple model	94
5	Generalization of the argument, drawing an “inverted” Williamson contracting scheme	103
6	Conclusion	110
7	Agency problems and the future of comparative systems' theory	116
	<i>Mieke Meurs</i>	
1	Introduction	116
2	Agency problems and comparative systems	117
3	Toward a new paradigm	123
Part III	Conditions for the success of the democratic firm	127
8	After the employment relation: problems on the road to enterprise democracy	129
	<i>Louis Putterman</i>	
1	Introduction	129

Cambridge University Press

0521432235 - Markets and Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficiency

Edited by Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and Bo Gustafsson

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

	<i>Contents</i>	ix
2 Why capital hires labor, revisited	129	
3 Conceptualizing the transition to democratic enterprises	131	
4 The labor-managed economy: labor and product markets	132	
5 Finance and property rights in capital	136	
6 Participation, empowerment, and the workplace	138	
7 Conclusion	144	
9 Unions versus cooperatives	148	
<i>Karl Ove Moene and Michael Wallerstein</i>		
1 Introduction	148	
2 Competitive capitalist equilibrium	149	
3 Competitive equilibrium with workers' cooperatives	150	
4 Capitalist equilibrium with collective bargaining	153	
5 Bargaining rights versus property rights	155	
10 Demand variability and work organization	159	
<i>David I. Levine</i>		
1 Introduction	159	
2 Literature review	160	
3 The model	162	
4 Statistical evidence	167	
5 Conclusions	174	
11 Democracy versus appropriability: can labor-managed firms flourish in a capitalist world?	176	
<i>Gregory K. Dow</i>		
1 Introduction	176	
2 Output choice, expected dividends, and organizational form	177	
3 Investment incentives and organizational form	182	
4 Evolutionary outcomes and welfare comparisons	186	
5 Failures in the market for LMF membership	191	
Part IV Productivity, distribution, and power	197	
12 Cooperation, conflict, and control in organizations	199	
<i>Avner Ben-Ner</i>		
1 Introduction	199	
2 Definitions	200	
3 Control as a consequence of incentives for cooperation and conflict	203	
4 The exercise of ultimate control: organizational design	206	
5 The allocation of ultimate control in organizations	210	
6 Conclusions	212	

Cambridge University Press

0521432235 - Markets and Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficiency

Edited by Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and Bo Gustafsson

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

x	<i>Contents</i>	
13	Wage bargaining and the choice of production technique in capitalist firms	217
	<i>Gilbert L. Skillman and Harl E. Ryder</i>	
1	Introduction	217
2	The bargaining game	217
3	Bargaining outcomes and the firm's choice of technique	221
4	Discussion	224
5	Conclusions	227
Part V	Ownership, participation, and capital markets	229
14	The motivational role of an external agent in the informationally-participatory firm	231
	<i>Masahiko Aoki</i>	
1	Introduction	231
2	The value of participatory information-processing	232
3	The incentive difficulties of pure workers' control	236
4	The P-value-enhancing role of an external agent	241
5	Institutional remarks	244
15	Unstable ownership	248
	<i>Tone Ognedal</i>	
1	Introduction	248
2	The model	249
3	Instability	251
4	Restrictions on the trade with shares	256
5	Conclusions	258
16	The simple analytics of a membership market in a labor-managed economy	260
	<i>Ernst Fehr</i>	
1	Introduction	260
2	A legal structure for labor-managed firms	261
3	Demand and supply for membership rights	263
4	Membership adjustment and the shut-down condition	264
5	LMF-maximand, comparative statics, and turnover	267
6	Labor-market equilibrium and shock absorption properties	268
7	Membership markets for different types of labor	271
8	Differential income shares for identical workers	272
9	Summary and conclusions	273

Cambridge University Press

0521432235 - Markets and Democracy: Participation, Accountability and Efficiency

Edited by Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and Bo Gustafsson

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

	<i>Contents</i>	xi
Part VI Political democracy and economic democracy		277
17 Investment planning in market socialism		279
<i>Ignacio Ortúño-Ortín, John E. Roemer and Joaquim Silvestre</i>		
1 Introduction		279
2 The economic environment		282
3 Constrained Walrasian equilibrium: a command-market-thought experiment		283
4 A generalization of Lange's idea		285
5 Direct provision of investment by the state		288
6 The sales-tax model		289
7 Conclusion		292
2* The economic environment		294
3* Constrained Walrasian equilibrium: a command-market-thought experiment		295
4* A generalization of Lange's idea		296
5* Direct provision of investment by the state		298
6* The sales-tax model		299
18 Capitalism and democracy: a summing up of the arguments		306
<i>Martin L. Weitzman</i>		
1 Introduction		306
2 Some definitions		307
3 Capitalism and socialism		309
4 Capitalism and democracy		312
5 Conclusion		315
Bibliography		316
Author index		335
Subject index		338