The remembering self
Construction and accuracy in the self-narrative

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1

Self-narratives: True and false

ULRIC NEISSER

Human beings exist through time, just as everything else does: One thing happens after another. But unlike anything else, people remember what happened to them – some of it, anyway. This is a remarkable achievement. The remarkable thing is not just that past events influence the present (which happens in all biological systems) but that they are explicitly reconstructed by the person who experienced them. By definition, such reconstructions are examples of *episodic memory*. If the remembered event seems to have played a significant part in the life of the rememberer, it becomes an example of *autobiographical memory* and may form part of a *life narrative*. Life narratives are significant because they are one way of defining the self.

This book has two goals: to explore the relations between remembering and the self, and to see those relations in proper perspective. Life narratives are often described as if they were the chief or even the only ingredient of the self: "They [life narratives] are the basis of personal identity and self-understanding and they provide answers to the question 'Who am I?'" (Polkinghorne, 1991, p. 136). This claim goes too far: Self-knowledge depends on perception, conceptualization, and private experience as well as narrative (Neisser, 1988). Self-narratives are *a* basis but not *the* basis of identity. It is appropriate, then, that the present volume is only one of a series devoted to self-knowledge and the self. An earlier book (Neisser, 1993a) was concerned with ecological and interpersonal perception; the self-concept will be considered in a subsequent volume.

However important those other sources of self-knowledge may be, they are not our focus here. This book is concerned with the remembering self: with self-narratives and whether to believe them, with the functions of those narratives and what happens without them, with the social and individual determinants of what is recalled and what is forgotten, with skills of remembering and how those skills are acquired. In the chapters ahead these issues are addressed by a talented and diverse group of contributors; first it is appropriate to present some views of my own.

1

Narrative and reality

Not all self-narratives are true. Even when people strive for accuracy, what they remember may not be just what happened. In episodic memory we must distinguish: (1) the actual event; (2) the event as it was experienced by the individual in question; (3) the subsequent act of remembering it; and (4) the remembered event, that is, the particular version of (1) that is established by (3). The analogous categories in autobiographical memory are: (1) actual past events and the *historical self* who participated in them; (2) those events as they were then experienced, including the individual's own *perceived self* at the time; (3) the *remembering self*, that is, the individual in the act of recalling those events on some later occasion; and (4) the *remembered self* constructed on that occasion. Moreover, self-narratives do not rely on episodic memory alone. People often begin narratives with their own birth, although they do not remember it; sometimes they even start with the deeds of their ancestors. Later events may also be reported without being actually remembered, if the narrator is sufficiently sure of them.

These distinctions seem rather obvious to me, but in fact they are controversial. Not everyone agrees that it is useful to speak of real historical events, or of a "historical self." The British psychologists Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter, for example, note that "the epistemological status of 'original events' is problematic" (1992, p. 204). They see little point in postulating such events, which can never be definitely established anyway. The ordinary course of life rarely generates objective records. Even when a record happens to exist (e.g., a tape recording; cf. Neisser, 1981), it is often susceptible to more than one interpretation. According to Edwards and Potter, reality is not so much something against which memories can be checked as something established by those memories themselves. "Everyday conversational remembering often has this as its primary concern – the attempt to construct an acceptable, agreed, or communicatively successful version of what really happened" (1992, p. 210).

This postmodern approach to the study of memory is not without its critics (cf. Edwards, Potter, & Middleton, 1992; with replies by Baddeley, 1992; Hyman, 1992; Neisser, 1992; and others). The main thrust of the critique is that it *does* matter what really happened. To manage the present or survive the future, we often need an honest account of the past. Even when no such account is available, we must still *believe* that the past consisted of some definite set of events that have had specific consequences for the present. Otherwise, why would we think of the present

as having consequences for the future? How would wild fabrication be different from sober report? Perhaps most important, how would false allegations and accusations differ from those that are true?

Recollections and accusations

The problem of false accusation first became salient for psychologists in the work of Sigmund Freud. In the early years of his practice, Freud noticed something remarkable: All his hysteric patients recovered vivid memories of childhood sexual experience at some point in their analyses. His initial interpretation (Freud, 1896/1985) was that repressed memories of such experiences, in combination with less repressed later events, were the underlying cause of their illness. Soon afterward, however, he decided that the patients must have been recalling fantasies rather than real experiences. It was those fantasies, again in combination with later memories, that produced the symptoms of hysteria.

In terms of Freud's overall theory, this was a relatively small change. Even in the first interpretation he had insisted that the basic cause of hysteria was not the event itself but its mental representation: "The matter is not merely one of the existence of the sexual experiences, but that . . . the scenes must be present as *unconscious memories;* only so long as, and in so far as, they are unconscious are they able to create and maintain hysterical symptoms" (Freud, 1896/1985, p. 280; italics in original). In fact, however, this revision has had momentous consequences. From that time onward, psychoanalysts have systematically sought the origins of mental illness in early fantasy rather than in concrete life experience.

Just why Freud abandoned the "seduction theory" so easily is a hotly disputed question (Masson, 1985). I will not enter that dispute here; the real facts of the matter (i.e., whether the reported sexual experiences actually happened) are forever beyond our reach. Unfortunately, however, the issue is of much more than historical interest today. Very similar reports – apparent memories of sexual traumas that were experienced in childhood and then long forgotten – are often given by patients today. A full century after Freud's initial investigations, it is still hard to be sure what they mean.

These sexual-abuse memories appear during psychotherapy, often together with participation in "incest survivor" groups. Often they strike the patient as surprising, having "emerged" for the first time during the therapy itself. This fact does not arouse the therapist's skepticism; on the contrary, it is usually taken as evidence that the memories must have been very deeply repressed. With the lifting of that "repression," many terrible recollections may appear. At that point, the presumptive experience of childhood sexual abuse becomes the turning point of the patient's life

narrative. (See Bruner, chap. 3 of this volume, for more on turning points.) She (most of the patients are women) now sees herself as victim; formerly beloved family members are seen as perpetrators. Accusations are made, lives changed, families broken up; legal action may be undertaken. The sheer number of such cases is remarkable. The False Memory Syndrome (FMS) Foundation, set up in 1992 as a support group for persons accused in this way, received thousands of calls for help in its first year of operation.

Are these accusations justified? For therapist and patient, the vividness of the memories and the coherence of the narrative that they support seem to be self-validating. Nevertheless, they may be far less plausible to outsiders. The alleged perpetrators typically deny everything: The accusations seem to take them by surprise and their friends may warmly defend their characters. In addition, the reported abuses are often wildly implausible. In an FMS Foundation (1993) survey, 18% of the narratives include "satanic cult" stories – bizarre torture rituals conducted by robed figures, children made pregnant to produce babies for human sacrifice, infants killed and eaten. In other cases the events are described as occurring so openly and often, with so many people, that it seems impossible they could have gone unnoticed. In one case the victim reported that her father and his poker buddies used to rape her routinely, every weekend, with the collusion of her mother (Wright, 1993). Then, apparently, normal family life would resume.

Patients like these are dominated by their remembered selves. Their current life problems are interpreted as resulting from their awful past experiences. They may recall those experiences in rich detail; when this happens, the vividness of the memories is taken as strong evidence for the narrative they support. Oddly, however, patients can also be convinced that they were sexually abused in childhood without remembering very much at all. Recalling/imagining just the faint touch of a hand, or having an indefinite feeling that "something bad was done to me," is often enough to confirm the therapist's abuse hypothesis. These minimal fragments often lead to further suggestions: "Tell me what that bastard did to you!" Because strong conviction is contagious, the patient may accept the therapist's interpretation without actually recalling any specific memories to substantiate it. A "remembered self" constructed in this way is based less on the patient's own life experiences than on whatever incest narratives the therapist takes to be prototypical. Albright (chap. 2 of this volume) might want to call it a "plagiarized self" instead.

The acute reader will have detected a skeptical note in this discussion. I believe that many of these memories are confabulated, many of the accusations false. In some cases, my disbelief rests on the implausibility of

the narratives themselves. There is scarcely more evidence of the existence of satanic cults as described than of flying saucers; any suggestive situation that elicits such bizarre stories must be regarded with considerable skepticism. Here, the key elements of the situation seem to be (1) a distressed patient urgently seeking an explanation of her problems, and (2) a strong therapist who expects to find that explanation in a sexual-abuse narrative. The dynamics of this situation provide the answer to a question that is frequently asked: Why would anyone make up such terrible things if they weren't true? It is because they are essential to a narrative in which both parties are heavily invested.

I am also suspicious of the unusual form of "repression" that must be postulated to make these stories true: The events occur regularly for years, are then forgotten for decades, and finally reappear in florid detail. Although child abuse certainly does occur – more often than we like to think – I am inclined to believe that it is usually remembered rather than forgotten. Victims of other traumas – concentration camp survivors, Vietnam War veterans, eyewitnesses to murder – rarely repress them in this way. On the contrary, they may be haunted by their experiences for years.

The prevalence of error

Cases like these raise significant questions for students of memory. Is it really possible for vivid recollections to be completely fabricated? Isn't there a "grain of truth" in even the most distorted memory? And on the other hand, does the existence of false memories mean that no memory can ever be trusted? Are all our recollections wrong? To what extent?

The answer to the first question is simply *yes*. People can indeed have convincing memories of things that never happened. This has long been known for suggestions made in hypnosis (e.g., Laurence & Perry, 1983), but it can also happen without any hypnotic involvement. Richard Ofshe (1992) recently suggested a novel memory of sexual abuse to a man who had already been arrested for, and confessed to, many other bizarre abusive acts. The suggestion was readily accepted, and an elaborated version of the suggested experience was soon incorporated into the "perpetrator's" self-narrative. A very different set of examples comes from recent work by Elizabeth Loftus (1993). Using plausible suggestions made by trusted relatives, Loftus has successfully implanted false recollections of *having been lost in a shopping mall when a child* into the memories of normal adults. Her subjects, who soon elaborate these "memories" in plausible ways, are fully convinced that the event actually happened. A similar dynamic was probably responsible for Jean Piaget's (1962) famous memory of a childhood kidnapping attempt that later turned out to have been a complete fabrication.

Another recent study is worth mentioning because it shows that false memories can appear even without explicit suggestion. On the morning after the space shuttle *Challenger* exploded in 1986, I asked a group of Emory students to record how they had first heard the news on the preceding day. Three years later, the 44 who were still on campus were again asked to recall how they had heard about *Challenger,* and to rate their confidence in various aspects of that memory (Neisser & Harsch, 1992). About a quarter of those accounts, including many reported with high confidence, were entirely wrong. One subject, who in fact had first heard about the disaster from fellow students in class, later recalled being stunned by the news while watching TV with her roommate. Another, who had actually heard the news from friends at lunch in the cafeteria, remembered how "some girl came running down the hall screaming 'The space shuttle just blew up.'" In subsequent interviews, we showed the subjects their original 1986 questionnaires. Even then they were reluctant to abandon their incorrect memories: "Yes, that's my handwriting – but I still remember it this other way!" Established self-narratives are very hard to change.

What about the notion that there is "a grain of truth" in every memory? Freud, of all people, seems to have believed this. He thought of psychoanalysis as comparable to archaeology (Freud, 1937/1964), a science that retrieves genuine fragments from the past and constructs essentially valid scenarios of ancient events. (At first sight this seems to conflict with his earlier rejection of the seduction theory, but the contradiction is only apparent. The truth-grains in which Freud believed were fragments of fantasies or images, not memories of actual events.) As Donald Spence (1982) has shown, this claim reflects a basic confusion between "narrative truth" and "historical truth." Images and memories are never simply "observed" by the patient and then "reported" to the analyst, as the archaeological metaphor would imply. They are always constructs, shaped by the shared need to establish a psychoanalytically satisfactory narrative of the patient's mental development.

In denying that memories must contain grains of truth, I do not mean to deny that they have comprehensible causes. Sometimes those causes are obvious. The subject who falsely remembered first learning about *Challenger* from TV, for example, had probably watched television coverage of the disaster later that day. It is harder to guess the origin of the mythical girl who ran screaming through the dorm, but she too must have started somewhere. (I am tempted by Freud's fantasy hypothesis in this case. Perhaps the subject herself felt like screaming, and transformed her feeling into an image that eventually became a memory.) False memories of childhood sexual abuse also have their sources, but those sources

need not lie in the actual childhood of the patient. It is often supposed that "something must have been going on" to give rise to such a memory, but this assumption is not justified. It is at least as likely that the underlying ideas were acquired later, perhaps in adult life.

The fact that *some* memories can be dramatically mistaken does not mean that *all* memories are wrong. That would be impossible. Many recollections concern events that have present consequences: I remember my wedding, and am still married; remember moving to Atlanta and still live there. Such consequences do not guarantee the accuracy of details, which may indeed be mistakenly remembered, but they do constrain the main outline of the narrative. In addition, many recollections involve other people. We may have to construct an "agreed or communicatively successful version of what really happened" (Edwards & Potter, 1992, p. 210) with someone else who was there too. The process of construction may uncover real differences, but it usually reveals substantial consensus as well.

In recent years a number of psychologists have conducted "diary studies," in which subjects record their experiences on a daily basis and later test their memories of those experiences (Linton, 1982; Wagenaar, 1986, and chap. 10 of this volume; Brewer, 1988; White, 1989; Larsen, 1992; Hirst, chap. 14 of this volume). These studies show a good deal of forgetting, but not much misremembering: There are very few overt errors or confabulations. Diarists may be unusually dependable people, or – as Eugene Winograd observes in chapter 13 of this volume – they may just be unusually careful because they know their memories will soon be checked.

Another relevant line of research focuses on memory in young children. Two-, 3-, or 4-year-olds can be asked to recall specific life events: holidays, trips to the zoo, and the like (e.g., Fivush, Gray, & Fromhoff, 1987; Fivush & Hamond, 1990). Experimenters trained to be sympathetic and yet not suggestive can elicit a surprising amount of information about the past, even from very young subjects. Although most of the memories are fragmentary and incomplete, they rarely include confabulations or serious errors. This does not mean that young children are always right; on the contrary, they are very vulnerable to suggestion (Ceci & Bruck, 1993). That vulnerability is important for understanding a different set of child-abuse accusations, those based not on long-delayed recollections by adults but on contemporary accounts given by the children themselves. Some of those accounts are certainly valid, but others are just the product of prolonged and suggestive interrogation. Children's memory, like that of adults, is more or less on the mark in many situations but vulnerable to suggestion in others.

2

The oblivious self

In short, autobiographical memory is best taken with a grain of salt. The self that is remembered today is not the historical self of yesterday, but only a reconstructed version. A different version – a new remembered self – may be reconstructed tomorrow. *How* different? I myself am biased toward continuity, and tend to think of most remembered selves as fairly stable from one day to the next. Perhaps my bias is predictable: don't psychologists always hope to find order in behavior? In any event, it is not a universal preference. Many literary accounts of human nature are very different: chaotic, mysterious, full of surprises. The contrast between these attitudes can be very sharp. In Daniel Albright's memorable phrase (chap. 2 of this volume), "Literature is a wilderness, psychology is a garden."

Albright's chapter 2, which I hope you will read next, is a tour de force – one of the most original contributions ever made to a symposium on memory. It begins with what he calls "the brokenness of memory." The remembered self is radically incomplete; it "begins and ends in a state of nothingness, and from beginning to end is riddled with nothingness." Childhood amnesia – "Alzheimer's other disease" – is only its most obvious gap: The self might be better called "oblivious" than "remembering." Rememberers must gloss over vast empty spaces, like the miles between unconnected bits of a great Chinese Wall. Yet oblivion is not always undesirable: On the contrary, it establishes a kind of absolute freedom that memory denies.

Albright is suspicious of the unity and coherence implied by the word *self.* We are more plural than that, divided against ourselves, discontinuous. "The human self is crazily mutable; my face may seem impassive, but beneath the calm exterior I am shifting, shifting, shifting, growing unrecognizable from moment to moment" (sec. 2). Albright is not the only contributor to this volume who emphasizes the multiplicity of the self. The same theme turns up in several other chapters, including Edward Reed's concluding comparison between memory and perception (chap. 15). Where perceiving is an essentially unitary act (at any given time, each individual is embedded in the environment in one particular way and perceives exactly that), memory is always dual. Reed describes autobiographical memory as "the me-experiencing-now becoming aware of a prior-me-experiencing its (prior) environment." This is exactly the duality of the remembering and the remembered self.

We met the remembering and remembered selves earlier in this chapter. It is time now to meet their more famous cousins, the *I* and the *me.*

These concepts were first introduced by William James (1890) and later elaborated by G. H. Mead (1934). *I* is the subject himself/herself. In Mead's analysis *I* is the doer; it is always the *I* who acts or speaks or knows anything. The *me*, in contrast, is just something known by the *I*. Essentially, it is a (socially generated) mental representation of the self. Many aspects of the *me* are included in what I have elsewhere called the *conceptual* self (Neisser, 1988), but others with a more narrative form constitute the remembered self. In this context the *I* is the remembering self, inventor and constructor of the remembered *me*. But here too, Albright enriches our thinking. He argues that we can also reverse these definitions, regarding the remembered self as the inventor and the present self as its continuing invention. Is *he* not now the (albeit imperfectly realized) object that was intended long ago by the young Dan Albright?

The multiplicity of narrative

Jerome Bruner (1986, 1990) is psychology's most eloquent advocate of the narrative mode. Nevertheless, he is keenly aware of the ambiguities involved. In chapter 3, Bruner specifically rejects the term "remembered self." For one thing, actual self-narratives are not so dependent on memory as it implies. "The crucial cognitive activities involved in self-construction seem much more like 'thinking' than 'memory'" (sec. 1). For another thing, there is the multiplicity of the selves that we remember. Self-narratives vary from one occasion to the next, one audience to the next, one mood to the next. Moreover, they are always shaped by implicit theories of narrative and narration. It is because of those theories, for example, that crucial turning points so often appear in life narratives – probably much more often than in life itself. Bruner also introduces another important concept, one that students of false sexual-abuse memories may find especially useful. Conceptions of narrative often lead us to emphasize our own "agency" (the effect of choices we made ourselves), but they can occasionally produce "victimicy" as well. That is, sometimes the best life narrative is one in which we seem to be the helpless victim of choices made by someone else.

Bruner and Albright and Reed are not the only ones with reservations about the singleness of the self. Such reservations are expressed even more strongly by Craig Barclay in chapter 4. Barclay, a longtime student of the vicissitudes of memory, is especially concerned with the affective aspects of recall. "Remembrances that become selves are pregnant with meanings: Meanings are bound together by the emotional life of individuals interconnected with the lives of others." In addition, Barclay emphasizes that autobiographical remembering is typically a matter of skillful improvisation rather than direct retrieval. The results of these improvisa-

tions are *protoselves,* selves in the making, new on every occasion, innovatively adapted to the present circumstances and emotional needs of the individual.

In chapter 5, Kenneth Gergen goes even further than Barclay in emphasizing the importance of social context. He begins by describing two extreme positions in the study of memory. For what he calls *psychological essentialism,* memory is a self-contained process within the mind (or the brain). This is, indeed, the underlying assumption of most modern memory research. Such research has been productive in many ways, but it has little to say about the issues discussed in this volume (e.g., about the accuracy of recall). The other position is that of *textual essentialism.* For postmodern thinkers like Barthes and Foucault, only texts matter; "person" and "self" are not even useful categories. Although I myself have never understood how to take this view seriously, Gergen apparently does. Therefore, he sees a need to compromise between these two alternatives. To this end he proposes *social constructionism,* a position in which "accounts of memory gain their meaning through their usage, not within the mind nor within the text but within social relationships."

Gergen is probably the leading psychological exponent of postmodern epistemology, so his willingness to make such a compromise – even to find a place for "the kinds of experimental explorations that have been the hallmarks of psychology as a science" (chap. 5) – is important. In a roughly reciprocal way, I hope to find a place (in my own ecological/cognitive framework) for social constructionist accounts of the self. Many selections in this book can be seen as attempts to do just that. Nevertheless, no theory based only on social process and socially constructed memory can do full justice to self-knowledge. People are perceivers as well as rememberers. At all times we can directly see (and hear and feel) where we are and what we are doing; even whether we are socially engaged (Neisser, 1993b). However accurately or inaccurately we may recall or reconstruct the past, *this/here/now* is the present state of affairs for us. On the other hand, perception and the present are not always the individual's most important concern. Wherever we happen to be here and now, we can still be caught up in some compelling memory from long ago and far away. Like it or not, then, self-knowledge is intrisically multimodal. It cannot be reduced to any single source of information.

Given the constructive nature of social recall, one might expect to find wide individual differences in its constructions. Do some people remember their experiences more fully than others? Vary their accounts more freely from one social setting to the next? Bias them in a more self-serving way? Construct different kinds of narratives about them? There has been surprisingly little work on these questions, but Greg Neimeyer and April Metzler make a good start in chapter 6. They focus on a dimension of

individual difference that is particularly applicable to young people of college age, a dimension that derives from the work of Erik Eriksen. At any given point in time, a person may be in one of four "identity statuses" (Marcia, 1966). *Diffuse* individuals do not have stable commitments to any set of values; *Foreclosed* individuals have committed themselves prematurely; *Moratorium* and *Achieved* individuals are actively seeking self-relevant information to establish or confirm such commitments. In Neimeyer and Metzler's computer-controlled experiment, subjects from the two information-oriented groups generated the most autobiographical memories while Diffuse subjects produced the fewest. There were also specific patterns across groups in the recall of positive and negative experiences, as well as in the impact of memories that disconfirmed the subject's own self-perceptions.

The development of the remembering self

Remembering is a skill, first learned by young children in social settings. We all begin, in childhood, by remembering with and for other persons; only later are we able to spin narratives just for ourselves. Memory is where social constructionism and developmental psychology meet. On the one hand, Gergen's (chap. 5 of this volume) claim about the social nature of remembering applies especially well to children. On the other hand, Vygotsky's (1978) claim that all intellectual skills appear first in social settings applies especially well to remembering. It is appropriate, then, that three chapters of this book deal with the development of the remembering self.

The existence of parental memory "styles" – different ways of talking with one's children about past events – has been known for some time. Some mothers are more *elaborative* in such contexts, while others are more *repetitive* (Engel, 1986; Fivush & Fromhoff, 1988). In chapter 7, Robyn Fivush shows that children's own modes of recall – how they themselves describe past events – depend on the styles to which they have been exposed. As might be expected, the children of elaborative mothers are later more elaborate in recalling their own experiences.

Fivush also reports another, less expected result. It turns out that parental memory styles vary with the gender of the child who is being addressed. Mothers of daughters discuss the past in more elaborative ways than mothers of sons; what's more, they interpret the past differently. These differences are especially marked when the topic of discussion is an emotional event. In recalling some frustrating experience (when a playmate broke their child's toy, for example), mothers of girls often say something like "It made you sad, didn't it?" Mothers of boys, in contrast, are likely to tell their sons, "It made you angry." These findings may be

giving us an early and important glimpse of the processes by which gender roles are established.

Fivush's observations remind us of what might be considered a special kind of "remembered self": A's past experience as it is interpreted for A by B. This happens often in everyday life, and regularly in psychotherapy. Many therapists take the reframing and reinterpretation of the patient's life experiences as a major part of their responsibilities. Our earlier discussion of false memories makes it clear that such reinterpretations can be powerful indeed! Nevertheless, the authority of parents in interpreting the past for their children must be even more powerful. Not only is the parent–child relationship intrinsically an asymmetric one, but the parent often has the added authority of having shared the very same experience. This is inevitable, and I do not mean to deplore it. Parents cannot help interpreting the world for their children; indeed, they must do so if culture is to be transmitted to the next generation.

The process of interpreting the past is not always subtle or unconscious. On the contrary, as Peggy Miller notes in chapter 8, it may be very deliberate. "The flow of social and moral messages is relentless in the myriad small encounters of everyday life." In the working-class families that Miller studied, mothers constantly tell stories about the past. No such story is without its moral: "A neutral story about the self is virtually inconceivable." At first (when the children are very young) the mothers just talk around them. A little later, they start to talk about the child's own exploits; eventually the child joins in. The stories that the children tell are not fixed or memorized; no two tellings are ever identical. Their "elaborative" mothers encourage them: They are proud of their elaborative children.

As Rebecca Eder points out in her commentary (chapter 9), children tell stories for a purpose. Often their stories include a strong element of self-presentation: The child is trying to create a particular impression on its listeners. This observation implies that the self is not established for the first time by the act of telling the stories themselves: To be worth presenting in a certain light, it must already exist. In general, autobiographical memory presumes the prior existence of a conceptual self – of the very *me* whose experiences are being remembered. This poses no theoretical difficulties, however; we already know that the basic self-concept appears in development long before the first stirrings of episodic memory. Following Michael Tomasello, I would put its appearance not long after the development of joint attention – that is, at around 9 months of age (Neisser, 1993b; Tomasello, 1993). In contrast, genuine remembering becomes possible only in the third year or later (Miller, chap. 9 of this volume; Fivush & Hudson, 1990).