

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-42907-8 - A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy

Edited by Peter Dronke

Excerpt

[More information](#)

INTRODUCTION

PETER DRONKE

It is an exciting moment to be looking at twelfth-century philosophy. The last thirty years have seen the discovery in manuscript of many major texts in this field, and the appearance of an imposing number of new editions and specialist studies. Many of those who have worked at first hand with the documents of twelfth-century thought have come to see the achievements in this century as among the most original and most brilliant in the whole of pre-Renaissance philosophy. Till now, however, the histories of philosophy have lagged behind. In Bernhard Geyer's medieval volume (1927) in the standard history begun by Ueberweg, the twelfth century was given some ninety pages – about one ninth of the space devoted to the Middle Ages as a whole. In the best histories available in English from the post-war period, however, the century that spans from St Anselm to Alan of Lille occupies only a twelfth of the space in Etienne Gilson's *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, and less than a fifteenth in the early medieval volume of Frederick Copleston's *History of Philosophy*, a volume that does not extend beyond the thirteenth century. In the recent *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, which treats the period 1100–1600, apart from a brief chapter on 'Abelard and the Culmination of the Old Logic', twelfth-century thought features only in incidental allusions.¹

There is thus a need to chart, at least provisionally, the full range of the contributions that were made to philosophy in twelfth-century Europe, taking account of all the detailed research of recent decades and attempting to set the newly accessible works, as well as those of renowned figures such as Anselm and Abelard, in their cultural context.

Winthrop Wetherbee, in the first chapter, looks particularly at this wider

¹ F. Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie II: Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie*, ed. B. Geyer (11th ed., Basel–Stuttgart 1927); E. Gilson, *A History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (London 1955); F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus* (London 1950); *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg (Cambridge 1982) [= *CHLMP*]. The bio-bibliographical section of *CHLMP* (pp. 855–92) includes only nine of the authors who have entries below (pp. 443–57); even such major figures as Adelard of Bath, David of Dinant, Gilbert of Poitiers, Gundissalinus, Hermann of Carinthia and Thierry of Chartres are omitted.

intellectual context, which, since Haskins' classic study (1927), has been aptly designated *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century*. Wetherbec adumbrates the role of philosophical enquiry in relation to the methods of teaching and learning current at the time, and the educational programmes, both traditional and more adventurous, that were then devised. He also shows how certain kinds of cosmological speculation, far from being confined to the schoolroom or the cloister, left their mark on major works of literature.

In the chapters that follow, the contributors have outlined as precisely as possible the range of texts that were or became available to twelfth-century philosophers, the texts that quickened their writing. A leading historian of medieval thought has even in a recent standard work affirmed as a 'fact that until the middle of the twelfth century the only ancient philosophy directly accessible to the Latin medievals was contained in two of Aristotle's works on logic'.² How far from fact this is emerges, among other things, from Chapters 2 and 3. First and foremost, the whole of the twelfth century stands under the sign of Plato's *Timaeus*. In the Latin *Timaeus* and its commentaries from Calcidius (in the fourth century) onwards, to cite Raymond Klibansky, 'the Middle Ages became acquainted with the classical formulation of the principle of causality . . . The emphasis they laid on Plato's doctrine that "Whatever comes to be must be brought into being by the action of some cause" and on the necessity to "give reasons" (*reddere rationes*) taught the mediaeval scholar to search in every phenomenon, not excluding the creation of the world, for its "legitimate" cause and reason.'³ Admittedly, this was the only Platonic dialogue that was widely diffused, and Calcidius' Latin version was not complete. The two dialogues that Henry Aristippus translated in the 1150s – the Latin *Phaedo* (which survives in two recensions, seven manuscripts in all) and *Meno* (five manuscripts) – appear to have had scant influence. Yet the many-sidedness of the Platonism of the ancient world that was handed down (through Calcidius' commentary, through Macrobius and various popularizers of the Roman world, as well as Greek and Latin Fathers), and how freshly this variegated Platonism was utilized in the twelfth century, becomes clear in Tullio Gregory's chapter (Ch. 2).

The nature and the extent of Stoic influences still pose more problems than the Platonic; yet Michael Lapidge (Ch. 3) is able to map the principal paths of transmission. While the *Peri hermeneias* ascribed to Apuleius will have given twelfth-century scholars only a partial conception of Stoic logic, the extent

² N. Kretzmann, in *CHLMP*, p. 5.

³ *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages, with a new preface and four supplementary chapters . . .* (Munich 1981), pp. 74f.

to which key works of Cicero and Seneca were read in the twelfth century, that could convey precise notions of Stoic cosmology and ethics, emerges here, I believe, for the first time. It also becomes clear that a number of widely read authors who have commonly been held to transmit Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas – Calcidius, Martianus Capella, the ‘Hermes’ to whom *Asclepius* is ascribed – were likewise influential in the dissemination of Stoic thought.

But many of the most fecund new arrivals in the Latin twelfth century hail from the Arabic world. Whilst Averroes (1126–98) was not yet known in northern Europe – the first sure traces of his presence there are not seen till around 1230, in Paris – the second half of the twelfth century shows us the translation and diffusion of vital works by Averroes’ greatest predecessors: al-Kindī († after 870), al-Fārābī († 950), Avicenna (980–1037), and Algazel (1058–1111). The plenitude of the Arabic contribution is evoked in Chapters 4 and 5, which are in some measure complementary. Where Jean Jolivet (Ch. 4) brings out especially the transformations of the language and conceptual framework of western philosophy in the later twelfth century, and the interplay, throughout the century, of translating and creative thought, in the work of such men as Adelard of Bath, Petrus Alfonsi, Hermann of Carinthia, and Gundissalinus, Charles Burnett (Ch. 5) concentrates especially on what the extraordinary range of scientific translations, both from Arabic and Greek, brought with them that leavened philosophical speculation. First came the medical works translated from the Arabic in late-eleventh-century Salerno, by ‘the cursed monk, daun Constantyn’ (as Chaucer’s Merchant sardonically calls him, disappointed at having found him no help as a guide to sexual bliss), and by scholars in Constantine’s circle. In northern Europe these Constantinian translations had already by about 1120 reached Chartres, where they were used creatively, with a keen sense of their philosophical implications, by William of Conches⁴ (cf. Ch. 11). Only a little later, in the first half of the twelfth century, the stream of scientific translations becomes a flood. Burnett sketches the ways in which newly accessible works of astronomy and astrology (particularly the two

4 While our sources offer no outright statement that William, who had studied with Bernard of Chartres, was still there as a teacher at the time when he first cites the newly translated works (in his *Philosophia*, ca. 1125), the circumstantial evidence that William taught at Chartres is considerable: see most recently O. Weijers, ‘The Chronology of John of Salisbury’s Studies in France (*Metalogicon*, II 10)’, in *The World of John of Salisbury*, ed. M. Wilks (Oxford 1984), pp. 109–16. For a contrary view see R. W. Southern, *Harvard 1982*, p. 129: ‘The chief claimants for [William’s] school have been Chartres and Paris, but on present evidence neither can be strongly supported.’ On p. 133, by contrast, Southern writes (on account of a printing error?) that William taught John of Salisbury ‘certainly in Paris’.

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-42907-8 - A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy

Edited by Peter Dronke

Excerpt

[More information](#)

translations of Abū Ma'shar's *Introductorium*, that helped to make Aristotelian cosmology familiar), as well as of mathematics and physics, provided stimuli to fresh philosophical endeavour.

In some ways it would have been desirable to include a further chapter, 'The Aristotelian inheritance', in the 'Background' section of the volume, so that the importance of this inheritance, alongside the Platonic, Stoic, and Arabic, should be made plain. This has not been done, however, since Aristotelian influences take historically a very different shape from the rest: the Aristotelianism in logic (discussed in Chapters 7 and 8) follows a path that scarcely crosses the other path, of Aristotelian natural philosophy, epistemology, and metaphysics, which becomes clearly visible only in the later decades of the century, and to which the fourth section of the book is dedicated.

Many new perspectives emerge from Chapters 6–8, which again in several important aspects complement one another. The speculative grammar of the thirteenth century has become well known in recent decades, through a fine series of editions (Boethius of Dacia, Martin of Dacia, and others) and studies, in which the late Jan Pinborg played a leading part.⁵ The beginnings of speculative grammar in the twelfth century, on the other hand, are still largely an undiscovered country. It is significant that Margareta Fredborg, who provides an orientation here (Ch. 6), has, more than any other contributor to the volume (except perhaps Danielle Jacquart in Chapter 15), had to cite unpublished sources from manuscripts. What emerges in particular is the significance of the new kinds of grammatical analysis, from William of Champeaux to the 'Porretans' (the disciples of Gilbert of Poitiers), for the semantic discussions of the logicians, and their famous quarrel over the nature of 'universals'.

This problem of universals is central to Martin Tweeddale's survey of the developments in logic that culminate with Abelard (Ch. 7). He sketches a tradition that reaches back to the eleventh century, to the comprehensive *Dialectica* (probably towards 1040) of Garlandus and to the highly individual contributions to logical theory in two early works by Anselm; he also evokes the rich diversity of problems that Abelard as dialectician broached, and the kinds of already existing controversy that he entered. While the later part of the century, as Klaus Jacobi shows (Ch. 8), produced no single logical innovator of Abelard's stature, the argumentation in this field – in such

⁵ The texts have been published particularly in the journal *CIMAGL* and the series *Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi*; see also J. Pinborg, *Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter – Ein Überblick* (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt 1972).

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-42907-8 - A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy

Edited by Peter Dronke

Excerpt

[More information](#)

Introduction

5

matters as sophisms, and the semantics of terms and propositions – reached a degree of subtlety in the works of several Parisian schools that makes understandable (even if we do not concur) John of Salisbury's criticism in his *Metalogicon* (1159), that logic was being transformed from an aid to knowledge into a self-sufficient discipline, endlessly refined for its own sake.

In the chapters (9–14) that comprise the third section of the volume, the writings of six thinkers are outlined in greater detail, with special emphasis on the elements of philosophical originality embedded in them. I should like to suggest briefly some of the reasons why it was decided to focus more closely on these six, rather than others. The choice of Anselm and Abelard hardly needs explanation. The other four have not yet been favoured with detailed discussion as major figures in any history of philosophy. It has been difficult to do them justice till now, partly because their writings have only recently become available in scholarly editions: those of N. M. Häring for Gilbert (1966) and Thierry (1971), and of Charles Burnett for Hermann (1982). For William of Conches, the problem is only partially resolved: there are good modern editions of his *Philosophia* (by Gregor Maurach, 1980) and his *Glosae super Platonem* (by Edouard Jauneau, 1965); but for William's masterpiece, the *Dragmaticon*, one must still turn to the *editio princeps* (1567), and for his other commentaries, except for occasional printed extracts, to the manuscripts.⁶

There is also another way in which this choice of authors distinguishes itself from those made in older histories of medieval philosophy. Both Geyer and Gilson, for instance, included chapters on the twelfth-century mystics. It might well be argued that, if one were to understand the expression 'medieval philosophy' in a wider sense, that includes medieval spirituality – a sense that is clearly also fruitful and valid in its own terms – then figures such as St Bernard, Richard of Saint-Victor, Hildegard of Bingen, and Joachim of Fiore would have to be among the protagonists chosen for extended consideration in any study of the twelfth century. Yet this would obviously lead to a book of a somewhat different kind. Similarly, most of the works in that fascinating borderland of medieval Platonism, where cosmology is nourished by imaginative fictions more than by analytic thought

6 *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (Toronto 1966); *Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his School* (Toronto 1971); Hermann of Carinthia, *De essentiis* (Leiden–Cologne 1982); Wilhelm von Conches, *Philosophia* (Pretoria 1980); Guillaume de Conches, *Glosae super Platonem* (Paris 1965). The edition of the *Dragmaticon* by G. Gratarolus – *Dialogus de substantiis physicis . . . a Vuilhelmo Aneponymo philosopho* (Strasbourg 1567) – exists in a facsimile edition (Frankfurt/Main 1967).

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-42907-8 - A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy

Edited by Peter Dronke

Excerpt

[More information](#)

– to which Winthrop Wetherbee and I have both devoted books⁷ – are not included here, or are discussed only incidentally, as Bernard Silvestris' *Cosmographia* is, for example, in Chapter 1. Detailed treatment, however (not only in the section on individual authors but throughout the volume), has been limited to those writings in which reasoned argument, bearing on a traditional sphere of philosophical enquiry (such as logic, epistemology, or metaphysics), plays an important role.

Nonetheless, the question of the relations especially between philosophical and theological discussion in the authors and works treated in Part III is a complex, many-branched one. The contributors have broached this question in diverse ways, as best fitted their particular topics. Thus David Luscombe, for instance, has indicated certain philosophical impulses that underlie Abelard's more strictly theological work as much as they do his explorations in dialectic, metaphysics, and ethics. Dorothy Elford has aimed primarily to single out what is of intrinsic philosophical interest in the thought of William of Conches; John Marenbon, by contrast, argues that Gilbert of Poitiers, to be seen aright, must be considered as principally a theologian, and he proceeds to show how a new range of philosophical language and problems arises as it were within Gilbert's theological discourse itself.⁸ Stephen Gersh writing on Anselm, and I on Thierry, are concerned particularly to delineate areas of philosophical argument in the works of two thinkers who saw no impropriety in using such argument in the same context as theological speculation.

The various ways in which philosophical and theological aims could converge did not, at least for the most gifted and original minds, imply any constriction of rational enquiry. Both Jolivet and Burnett allude to a celebrated passage in Adelard of Bath's *Quaestiones naturales* that bears on this, and that I should like to cite a little more fully here, in an attempt to set it in a certain intellectual and historical perspective. When Adelard's nephew

7 W. Wetherbee, *Platonism and Poetry in the Twelfth Century: The Literary Influence of the School of Chartres* (Princeton 1972); P. Dronke, *Fabula: Explorations into the Uses of Myth in Medieval Platonism* (Leiden–Cologne 1974).

8 A twelfth-century MS of Gilbert's Boethian commentaries, Valenciennes Bibl. municipale 197, fol. 4v, has a splendid picture of Gilbert, in episcopal regalia, teaching his most advanced students 'theological philosophy': the heading begins: 'Magister Gillebertus Pictaviensis episcopus altiora theologice philosophic secreta diligentibus auctius pulsantibus reserans discipulis quatuor . . . (Master Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers, unlocking the higher secrets of the theological philosophy for four diligent disciples who knock more forcibly)'. The page is reproduced, with elucidations by E. Jeancau, in *Notre-Dame de Chartres* (11ème année, no. 44), Septembre 1980, p. 12. On the uses of the term *philosophia* up to 1200, see particularly E. R. Curtius, 'Zur Geschichte des Wortes Philosophie im Mittelalter', *Romanische Forschungen* LVII (1943) 290–309.

Introduction

7

asks him to explain the nature of living beings, Adelard in his dialogue replies that it is difficult to discuss such matters with him:⁹

For I have acquired one type of learning, with reason as guide, from my Arabic teachers, while you, fettered by the appearance of authority, follow another, as a halter. For what else should authority be called but a halter? Indeed as brute beasts are led by a halter, not discerning in what direction or to what purpose they are led, following only the rope that holds them fast, so there are not a few among you whom written authority leads into danger, caught and bound as you are in bestial credulity . . . For your listeners do not understand that reason has been given to each person to distinguish between true and false, reason being the prime judge. If reason were not to be that universal judge, she would have been given to each one in vain . . . Moreover, those who are called authorities did not gain their first credence among lesser mortals except in that they followed reason . . . I do not cut to the quick, saying authority should be despised. But I affirm that reason must be sought out first, and when she is found, authority, if she lies near, can then be made to follow . . . For I am not one of those whom the painting of the skin (*pictura pellis*) can satisfy. Indeed every written statement is a wanton, exposed now to these¹⁰ affections, now to those.

With his witty sexual innuendo – the ‘painting of the skin’ means both the writing on the parchment and the false lures of the seductress – Adelard seems to arrive at a radical scepticism, at least in questions of natural philosophy. What is more surprising is that towards the end of the century (1185–95) Alan of Lille, writing a theological work directed against heretics,¹¹ should likewise make such a witty contrast between reason and authority. To counter those who deny that the human soul is immortal, Alan adduces both biblical and pagan authorities – including (for the first time in northern Europe) the Neoplatonic *Liber de causis*, based on Proclus, as well as alluding to Plato’s *Phaedo*. He continues:

But because authority has a waxen nose, that can be bent in different ways, she must be fortified by reasons.

Alan was here, I believe, recalling a phrase of Thierry of Chartres’s:

Plato says that primordial matter is flexible like wax, for what exists in potentiality can be bent to this and to that.¹²

⁹ Adelard von Bath, *Quaestiones naturales*, ed. M. Müller (BGPTM xxxi 2), pp. 11f.

¹⁰ Reading *nunc ad hos nunc ad illos affectus (nunc ad hoc Müller)*.

¹¹ *De fide catholica*, also known as *Contra haereticos* (P.L. 210, 305ff); on the date of the work see M.–Th. d’Alverny, *Alain de Lille: Textes inédits* (Paris 1965), p. 156 n. 4 (citing the study by C. Vasoli). The quotation from the *Liber de causis* (here called *Aphorismi de essentia summae bonitatis*) and the passage cited below both occur at 130 (331 C, 333 A).

¹² Thierry 1971, pp. 76f; the ‘Plato’ allusion appears to be to Calcidius ch. 310 (ed. Waszink, *Plato Latinus IV: Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus* (2nd ed., London–Leiden 1975), p. 311); see Häring’s note *ad loc.*

Alan's wit lay not only in transferring the flexibility from *materia* to *auctoritas*, but in adding the dimension of illusion. A wax nose is a disguise, a false nose – it is potentially of any shape only because it is unreal.

Yet I also think that Alan (and perhaps Adelard too) was echoing a much earlier affirmation of the ideal of reason *vis-à-vis* authority, that he found in Scotus Eriugena's *Periphyseon* (composed 864–6).¹³ The master (*Nutritor*) in Eriugena's dialogue has been arguing that all verbs that apply properly to mutable creatures can be used only metaphorically of God. The pupil (*Alumnus*) replies:

A. You strongly press me to admit that this is reasonable. But I should like you to bring in some supporting evidence from the authority of the Holy Fathers to confirm it.

N. You are not unaware, I think, that what is prior by nature is of greater excellence than what is prior in time.

A. That is known to almost everybody.

N. We have learnt that reason is prior by nature, authority in time. For although nature was created together with time, authority did not come into being at the beginning of nature and time, whereas reason arose with nature and time out of the Principle of things.

A. Even reason herself teaches this. For authority proceeds from true reason, but reason certainly does not proceed from authority. For every authority which is not upheld by true reason is seen to be weak, whereas true reason is kept firm and immutable by her own powers and does not require to be confirmed by the assent of any authority.¹⁴

Eriugena's influence in the twelfth century has been studied in a fine essay by Paolo Lucentini;¹⁵ much further work still remains to be done. It is clear at least that Eriugena's independent, daring spirit found response more than once in the later period.

13 Alan names 'Johannes Scotus' and cites the *Periphyseon*, e.g. in his *Summa* 'Quoniam homines' (ed. P. Glorieux, *AHDLMA* xx (1953) 113–364), pp. 138, 140, 154, 263.

14 *Periphyseon* I, ed. and trans. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin 1968), pp. 196–9 (= P. L. 122, 513 A–B); I cite Sheldon-Williams' translation.

15 *Platonismo medievale: Contributi per la storia dell' erigenismo* (2nd ed., Florence 1980); Lucentini's study 'Giovanni Scoto e l'eresia di Amalrico' is forthcoming in the *Colloquium zur Wirkungsgeschichte Eriugenas*, ed. W. Beierwaltes.

An extensive knowledge of the *Periphyseon* is revealed in the recently edited *Comentum* of William of Lucca on the Dionysian *De divinis nominibus* (ed. F. Gastaldelli, Florence 1983); at the same time William, writing between 1169 and 1177, is influenced in his method by Gilbert of Poitiers (see below, p. 354). Another work that draws profoundly on Eriugena (as well as on the *Liber de causis* and Avicenna), and also has 'Porretan' features of argument, is the *Liber de causis primis et secundis*, composed in the late twelfth or early thirteenth century (see below, p. 354).

Most recently C. Meier, 'Eriugena im Nonnenkloster?', *Frühmittelalterliche Studien* xix (1985) 466–97, has argued for the knowledge of Eriugena by Hildegard of Bingen – whose first major work, *Scivias* (1151), interestingly enough, is alluded to by William of Lucca,

Another area of major importance where further studies (and indeed in this case editions) are needed is the Aristotelianism of the later twelfth century. The uses of Aristotelian logical texts in this century, and the advent of new translations from Aristotle's *Organon*, have become well documented recently; the more pervasive use of Aristotle in the mid thirteenth, by men such as Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, and Siger of Brabant, has long been known. But no history of philosophy to my knowledge has yet charted the twelfth-century influence and creative uses of Aristotle's non-logical treatises. Despite the outstanding work of scholars such as Lorenzo Minio-Paluello in defining the achievements of the twelfth-century 'freelance' translators of Aristotle from the Greek,¹⁶ the myth that most of his writings reached the West only in the thirteenth century, or that they made no impact earlier, retains exceptional tenacity.

The knowledge and use of some of Aristotle's works of natural philosophy among the medical writers in Salerno, in the third quarter of the twelfth century, was pointed out by Alexander Birkenmajer in a pioneer article half a century ago.¹⁷ Nonetheless, as Danielle Jacquart observes (Ch. 15), though significant details have meanwhile been added to Birkenmajer's picture, the majority of the relevant Salernitan texts are still unpublished and must be cited from manuscripts. She thus makes accessible, and clarifies in the light of the latest researches, much evidence that histories of philosophy have not yet taken into account. Already soon after 1150, commenting on Johannitius' 'introduction to Galen's art' (*Ysagoge*), Bartholomew of Salerno and Petrus Musandinus cite Aristotle's *Physics* (which had been recently translated from the Greek by James of Venice), his *De generatione et corruptione* and *Nicomachean Ethics* (of which the earliest translations from the Greek remain anonymous). In the 1170s Urso of Calabria

who appears to have visited Hildegard in person (see *Comentum*, p. 221). Meier, who bases her argument principally on Hildegard's alleged use of Eriugena's *Expositiones* of pseudo-Dionysius, does not take the problems of transmission sufficiently into account. Of Eriugena's *Periphyseon* and its abridgement, Honorius' *Clavis Physicæ* (ed. P. Lucentini, Rome 1974), there survive 24 MSS in all; of his translation of the *Corpus Dionysiacum*, more than 100 MSS; of his *Vox spiritalis aquilæ* (ed. E. Jeuneau: Jean Scot, *Homélie sur le Prologue de Jean* (Paris 1969)) there are 54 MSS, though it is ascribed to Eriugena only in 5 (cf. *ibid.* p. 53). These are works of Eriugena's that Hildegard might plausibly have known (the last perhaps not under his name). His *Expositiones*, which survive only in one complete and four incomplete MSS, are much less likely to have been accessible to Hildegard.

16 L. Minio-Paluello, *Opuscula: The Latin Aristotle* (Amsterdam 1972), esp. the essays 'Iacobus Veneticus Grecus' (pp. 189–228) and 'Giacomo Veneto e l'Aristotelismo Latino' (pp. 565–86).

17 'Le rôle joué par les médecins et les naturalistes dans la réception d'Aristote aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles' (1930), repr. in his *Etudes d'histoire des sciences et de la philosophie du Moyen Âge* (Wrocław–Warsaw–Cracow 1970), pp. 73–87.

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-42907-8 - A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy

Edited by Peter Dronke

Excerpt

[More information](#)

shows his familiarity not only with these works but also with the *Meteorologica*, and uses his Aristotelian texts more profoundly and extensively than his predecessors, in order to give his medical discussions a coherent philosophical basis.

Still more far-reaching than the Aristotelianism in Salerno is the knowledge and understanding of Aristotle that David of Dinant brought to Paris, probably shortly before 1200. David, like the Salernitans, was a physician; but he had studied in Greece, where, he says, the *Problemata* ascribed to Aristotle ‘came into my hands (*pervenit ad manus meas*)’.¹⁸ Not only did David translate the *Problemata*, but he compiled a group of ‘Notebooks (*Quaternuli*)’ in which his own philosophical thoughts – set out in the succinct, discrete form he had learnt from the *Problemata* – alternate with passages from a wide range of genuine Aristotelian writings, which he cites in his own renderings, adding notes and comments. As well as quoting from the works known in Salerno, David gives long extracts from *De generatione animalium* and *De somno et vigilia*, and knows the *De anima* and the *Parva naturalia*.

When the Parisian Synod of 1210 ordered the destruction of all copies of David’s *Quaternuli* (which had clearly been widely circulated) and forbade the reading and teaching of ‘Aristotle’s books on natural philosophy and their commentaries’ – *nec libri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia nec commenta legantur*¹⁹ – David was fortunately out of the Synod’s reach, probably living in Rome as the chaplain of Pope Innocent III. The reasons for the Parisian ecclesiastics’ hostility towards David’s own thought, and towards the ‘natural’ Aristotle that he had brought with him, will have lain partly in David’s attempts (basically similar to those of William of Conches and Thierry of Chartres earlier in the century) to use principles of natural explanation for the alleged miracles in the Bible – to account for the Flood, or the plagues of Egypt, or the star of the Magi, physically, without the need to postulate specific divine interventions – and even more in David’s venture to think through the implications of the relationship between body and soul, matter and spirit, in a radically Aristotelian way, banishing every vestige of Platonic dualism in his attempt to see these not as two realms but as one. It is this initiative that has been called, imprecisely, David’s ‘pantheism’.

In Paris before 1204, quite possibly even before the arrival of David with his *Quaternuli*,²⁰ an Englishman, John Blund, who later taught in Oxford

18 *Davidis de Dinanto Quaternulorum Fragmenta*, ed. M. Kurdziałek, *Studia Mediewistyczne III* (Warsaw 1963), p. 3.

19 See below, pp. 429ff.

20 Thus D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt, in their edition: *Iohannes Blund, Tractatus de anima* (London 1970), p. xi.