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1 The Athenian polis and the evolution of democracy

1.1 Athenian views of developments to *c.* 500 B.C.

At some time about the 460s an Athenian boy was given the name Demokrates, which would seem to signify approval of the *kratos* (rule or power) of the *dēmos* (the people). This is the earliest known occurrence of the name. The choice might appear somewhat surprising, for the father Lysis belonged to a propertied family wealthy enough to engage in horse-breeding and chariot-racing. Whatever the precise significance of Lysis' choice, the name at least suggests that the political role of the Demos in Athens was a matter of interest or perhaps of much debate at the time. To some the notion of the rule of the Demos was anathema. But the playwright Aeschylus probably reflected more accurately the attitudes of most Athenians in his play *The Suppliants* (produced *c.* 463). In anachronistic fashion not unknown in Attic tragedy he depicted – with evident approval – the need and the propriety for the king of ancient Argos to consult the people in assembly and win their support before giving refuge to the fugitive daughters of Danaos. Certainly by the mid-fifth century the power of the Demos was recognised in the public life of the Athenian state.[1]

Athenians of the later fifth century and the fourth century had differing views about the beginnings of democracy. Some even traced the origins back to their legendary king Theseus, but for most, Solon, the lawgiver of the late 590s, was a key figure. During the political dissension of the last years of the fifth century 'Solon's laws' were invoked by both oligarchs and democrats to give venerability and authority to their views.[2] Solon's primary aim seems to have been to restore stability to his native city when it was threatened by bitter civil strife and to prevent the seizure of power by a single individual. Some of his reforms guaranteed certain fundamental individual rights. In particular, they protected the personal liberty of Athenians against enslavement through debt

[1] Pl. *Lys.* 205c, *APF* 359–60, cf. Sealey 54–5 and Sealey (1974) 290–1; Aesch. *Suppl.* 397–401, 517–23, 600–24, 698–700, cf. Sealey (1974) 263–72, see ch. 1.4; see also the choice of the name Philodemos ('friendly to the Demos' or possibly 'befriended by the Demos') for an Athenian born by 480 (ML 33.35, Connor 101 n. 20).

[2] Isok. 10.34–7, 12.129, [Dem.] 59.75, 60.28 (cf. Paus. 1.3.3), Plut. *Thes.* 24; Webster (1969) 98–104, Boardman (1975) 228–9; Lys. 30.2, 26, Isok. 7.16–17, Dem. 18.6–7, 22.30–2; Arist. *Pol.* 1273b35–74a21, *AP* 35.2, 41.2; Fuks (1971) 14–25, 35–40, 95–6, 107–13, Ruschenbusch (1958) 398–424, Finley (1975) 39–40, 50–2.

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default, they permitted anyone to seek redress on behalf of a person who had been wronged, and they provided for the right of appeal to the people against the decisions of arkhons or officials.[3] Solon also unlocked the door to leadership in Athens by breaking the aristocratic monopoly of office-holding. He divided the citizen body into four classes: *pentakosiomedimnoi* (those who produced at least 500 *medimnoi* or 'bushels' of grain a year), *hippeis* (knights or cavalrymen – 300 and more), *zeugitai* (hoplites, or perhaps 'teamsters' – 200 and more) and *thētes* (labourers – under 200). Using the census classes to determine eligibility for office, Solon provided for the various offices of the polis to be open to the highest class (in the case of the Treasurers of Athena), probably the top two classes (in the case of the arkhons), or the top three classes (the routine offices). The opening of the door was to be a slow process.[4] And the overall tenor of Solon's reforms is epitomised in some of the verses which he wrote to promote or to justify his views and his laws:

> I gave to the people as much privilege as is sufficient for them,
> Not detracting from their honour or reaching out to take it;
> And to those who had power and were admired for their wealth
> I declared that they should suffer nothing unseemly.
> I stood holding my mighty shield against both,
> And did not allow either to win an unjust victory.

And, as Solon also wrote:

> This is how the people will best follow their leaders:
> If they are neither unleashed nor restrained too much.
> For excess breeds insolence, when great prosperity comes
> To men who are not sound of mind.[5]

Another symbol of the spirit of the Athenian people was the tyrannicides. Around the figures of Harmodios and Aristogeiton there grew up or there was promoted the legend of champions of freedom who had rid the Athenian people of tyranny by slaying Hipparkhos in 514. The tyrant-slayers were the first men to have statues set up in their honour in the Agora or civic centre of Athens, and after the originals were removed by Xerxes in 480 new statues were dedicated. They had a striking impact, for not only were they placed in the centre of the Agora but they stood in splendid isolation.[6] The tyrannicides were commemorated, too, in drinking songs which proclaimed: 'they gave back to Athens fair laws to obey' and 'they made Athens a city of equal rights

3 *AP* 9.
4 *AP* 7.3–4, 8.1, 26.2, 47.1 (and *CAAP*), Plut. *Solon* 18; Hignett 101–2. On the primacy of military considerations or economic/occupational criteria, see Andrewes (1956) 87–9 and *CAAP* 138, 143.
5 *AP* 12.1–2 (Penguin tr. adapted), Plut. *Solon* 18; Arist. *Pol.* 1273b35–74a21.
6 Arist. *Rhet.* 1368a17–18, Arr. 3.16.7; Thompson and Wycherley 155–9, Taylor (1981) 10–50; Dem. 19.280, *AP* 58.1; free meals (*sitēsis*) in the prytaneion enjoyed by the descendants of the tyrannicides (*IG* I³.131.5–6, Dein. 1.101).

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(*isonomos*)'.[7] The divergence between the myth and reality was recognised by Herodotos who noted that the murder of Hipparkhos made the rule of Hippias even harsher; more than that, he contended that it was rather the Alkmeonidai who freed Athens. Thucydides went out of his way to expose the myth, for he selected it to show how the Athenians like most people accepted traditions quite uncritically. Thucydides maintained that the origin of the slaying of the tyrant was a personal grudge, that the reigning tyrant was not Hipparkhos but his elder brother Hippias, that it was Hippias who was to be removed, but that in panic Harmodios and Aristogeiton killed Hipparkhos when they suspected that their plans had been revealed to Hippias.[8] Nevertheless, the tyrannicides remained the heroes of the Athenian democracy in the fifth and fourth centuries.

The Peisistratid tyranny, in fact, came to an end when the Spartans, accompanied by the Alkmeonidai and other Athenian exiles, expelled the tyrant Hippias in 510. Peisistratos and his sons, intent as they were on retaining their own position of power, had largely suppressed the rivalries between local aristocrats or 'local dynasts', and their rule from 546 to 510 had marked a period of stability and the encouragement of a sense of unity in Attike. The encouragement of city festivals in honour of Athena, the patron deity of Athens, and Dionysos provided not simply an alternative to local ties and loyalties but a potential focus on festivals held in the city and open to all Athenians. The Panathenaia and the City Dionysia were to prove powerful symbols of Athens and its people in the fifth century.[9]

However, in the early years after the expulsion of Hippias the Athenian polis was riven by the re-emergence of intense factional struggles between aristocratic families. Their strength lay in their ability to dominate the traditional four Ionic tribes which were the basis of the social, religious and political organisation of Attike. In the faction fighting the Alkmeonid Kleisthenes found himself being worsted. In an attempt to win the support of ordinary Athenians who did not belong to the traditional leading families, he took cognisance of the fears of many that their claim to be Athenians would be set aside,[10] for bitter disputes had arisen about who were entitled to be regarded as Athenians. These matters had been in the hands of the aristocratic families who controlled membership of the phratries (or brotherhoods) and thus admission to the tribes. Kleisthenes opposed rigid investigation of family backgrounds and favoured the recognition of those whose claim to being Athenians was in doubt, and in particular his reforms transferred control over these questions from the old aristocratic families to the demes or local communities in which all free Athenians were now to register. In this way Kleisthenes 'mixed up' the people, and locality replaced kinship or supposed

[7] Ath. 15.695a–b, Ostwald 121–36, Taylor (1981) 51–77.
[8] Hdt. 5.55, 62–5, 6.123, Thuc. 1.20.1–2, 6.53–9; *AP* 18.
[9] Andrewes (1956) 107–15, Parke 34–45, 125–35.
[10] Hdt. 5.66, 69, *AP* 20 (and *CAAP*).

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kinship as the basis for political organisation.[11] Membership of the deme in which a man was living at the time became the vehicle for enrolment in the ten new tribes instituted by Kleisthenes: all Athenians enjoyed an equal status as citizens. Each of the tribes drew members from three regions: the City, the Coast and the Inland. No one local group could by itself dominate the affairs of a tribe. Moreover there were meetings and corporate activities not only at the tribal level, but also at the intermediate level of the 30 trittyes (or thirds) which formed the link between the demes and the ten tribes, and, most importantly, at the level of the demes. The adoption of the deme structure helped resolve the problems of disputes about Athenian status, while the trittys structure attempted to deal with the problem of local vested interests.[12] The prospect of extending political participation at various levels to ordinary Athenians who, as Herodotos put it, had earlier been pushed aside or spurned may well have been an important factor in winning support for Kleisthenes, whether (as is probable) he rallied support by adopting *isonomia* (equality of rights) as a slogan or not. The deme meetings in particular must have provided Athenians with the opportunity of interest and participation in matters with which they were more closely concerned, and thus, over time, have encouraged demesmen to challenge aristocratic dominance of local affairs, especially in the village communities of rural Attike.[13]

Kleisthenes' reforms, while dealing with the fundamental problem of the composition of the Athenian body politic, thus had some potentiality for circumscribing the political power of aristocratic leaders and limiting the effects of dynastic feuds. More important, by breaking up old ties and establishing new units for political and military organisation, Kleisthenes' arrangement succeeded in producing a greater cohesiveness among the Athenians. The disruptive or atomistic did prove unifying. For the ten new tribes, each drawing together citizens from different parts of Attike, were used as the basis for a new Boule (or Council of 500) and also for military organisation, with each tribal regiment of hoplites commanded by a *stratēgos* (general).[14] Kleisthenes' 'political' motive, however, was to strengthen his own faction and he expected that the Demos or Athenians at large would show gratitude and loyalty to his faction. Yet what was intended as a manoeuvre in aristocratic politics was to turn out quite differently as ordinary Athenians became conscious of their own political potential.[15]

11 *AP* 13.5, 21.1–4 (and *CAAP*), Arist. *Pol.* 1275b34–9, 1319b19–27, Hignett 132–4.
12 *AP* 21.4; Eliot (1962) 136–58, D. M. Lewis (1963A) 22–40, W. E. Thompson (1966) 1–10, Traill, Andrewes (1977) 241–8, Traill (1982) 162–71, Siewert (1982) 1–138, Whitehead 5–38.
13 Hdt. 5.69.2; Ostwald 142–60; Headlam 165–8, Hopper (1957) 14–18; see ch. 3.1.
14 *AP* 21.3–4 (and *CAAP*), Hignett 132–58, Rhodes 208–10; Bradeen (1955) 22–30, Siewert (1982) especially 139–53, D. M. Lewis (1983) 431–6; see Kearns (1985) 189–207; on ostracism see *AP* 22 and ch. 7.2.
15 Woodhead (1967) 135–40; on Kleisthenes as the founder of Athenian democracy, see Hdt. 6.131, Isok. 15.232, 16.26–7, *AP* 29.3 (cf. Plut. *Kim.* 15), Larsen (1948) 12–15; see also Martin (1974) 5–22.

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1.2 The growing power of Athens *c.* 500–*c.* 450

The possibilities for Athenians in general to assert some influence began to materialise in the course of the next two generations. In that period the Athenians passed from being rather subservient to Sparta to leadership of an alliance which enabled the city of Athena to win naval supremacy in the Aegean and to act independently and decisively. The Athenian hoplites who routed the Persian invaders on the field of Marathon in 490 created one of the great 'myths' of Athens. These 'Marathon-fighters', numbering probably some 9,000 men and assisted only by the full force of the Plataians (perhaps 600), demonstrated the ability, not of full-time soldiers such as the Spartans but of militia troops, to defeat the might of the Persian king who since 546 had loomed as a threat on the eastern shores of the Aegean. A generation later the Marathon victory was selected as the subject for one of the great paintings in what came to be known as the Stoa Poikile (Painted Portico). This stoa was erected, probably *c.* 460, in the Agora, where, as Aiskhines put it, 'the memorials of all our noble deeds are depicted'. The stoa was one of the main focal points of Athenian life, and here in this 'hall of victories' Marathon joined two of the most popular myths of the Athenians – the victory of Theseus and the Athenians over the invading Amazons and the sack of Troy, the subjects of two of the other paintings in the stoa.[16] The primacy of Marathon in time, a victory won virtually unaided, and the prestige of the hoplite assured the Marathon-fighters an aura at least equal to the renown won by the Athenians at large who in 480 chose to evacuate their country and played a crucial role in the Greek naval victory over Xerxes' fleet at Salamis. The magnitude of the defeat inflicted by the free men of Athens, slaves or subjects of no man, on the arrogant Persian king and his vast armada was captured in the tragedy by Aeschylus, *The Persians*, which was produced at the City Dionysia in 472.[17] In the victory at Salamis even those Athenians who could not afford to arm themselves as hoplites or heavily armed infantry had taken part as rowers in the fleet. After the Delian League was formed in 478 under Athenian leadership, it was these poorer Athenians who along with the hoplites formed the major part of the League forces which in the course of the next decade drove the Persians out of the Aegean and inflicted a crushing defeat on another Persian expedition at the Eurymedon. These remarkable military successes engendered in the Athenians in general a high confidence in their polis and in themselves, and also a recognition of the contribution of all Athenians to the security and safety of their polis. It was probably in the mid-460s that the Athenian polis assumed the responsibility for bringing the war dead back to

[16] Aiskhin. 3.181–90 (the roll call of great Athenians), Paus. 1.15.1–16.1; [Lys.] 2.20–6, Isok. 4.85–7, Pl. *Menex.* 240d–e, Lykourg. *Leok.* 104; Robertson (1975) 1.242–5, Thompson and Wycherley 90–3; Meiggs 471–2; see also *AP* 22.3. On Theseus see Tyrrell (1984) 2–22.

[17] Paus. 1.14.5; Loraux (1981), 157–74, 406–11; Aesch. *Pers.* 230–4, 241–2, 807–8, Pritchett 3.172–83. Athenian aristocrats like Andokides (3.38) preferred to date Athenian supremacy from Marathon and even to ignore Salamis (1.107–8).

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Athens for burial. A practice which applied only to the leaders (for example, the Spartan kings) was being extended by the Athenian polis to all Athenians.[18]

The growing power of Athens and the confidence of the Athenians were clearly reflected in the 460s and 450s in the changing relations with other Greek states. In 465, for example, conflict between Athenian interests and those of Thasians in the north Aegean erupted in an attempt by Thasos to withdraw from the Delian League. The Thasians were besieged and were finally forced to surrender in 463. The Athenians not only enforced terms which deprived the Thasians of the capacity to contemplate secession but also took over from them their mining and trading interests in Thrace.[19]

More significant was the rupture in relations between Athens and Sparta in 462. Sparta had long been regarded as the most powerful Greek state. Indeed, it was to the intervention of the Spartans that the Athenians had owed their liberation from the tyrant Hippias in 510 (and perhaps this was no slight factor in encouraging fifth-century Athenians to attribute the liberation to Harmodios and Aristogeiton). In the following decades, though Spartan attempts to restore Isagoras failed, the Athenians had generally to acquiesce in the superior power of Sparta, and it was to the Spartans that the Athenians turned in times of crisis such as the pro-Persian stance of the Aiginetans in the late 490s or the Persian invasion of 490.[20] In 481, when faced with the invading forces of Xerxes, the Athenians acknowledged, as did other Greeks, the power of the Spartans by accepting their leadership in both land and naval operations. At the battle of Salamis in 480, it is true, the Athenians provided 200 of the 378 ships in the combined Greek fleet, with Corinthian ships numbering 40, Aiginetan 30 and Spartan 16. Herodotos depicted the Athenians as forgoing their claim to command the fleet in the interest of Greek unity: for a variety of reasons, Athenian leadership even at sea had hardly been a serious possibility.[21] After the Greek victories at Salamis, Plataia and Mykale, the Athenians accepted, and no doubt quietly encouraged, the invitation by other Greek states to lead an ongoing campaign against Persia. Whether the Spartans were quite as happy with that development as Thucydides represents may be doubted, not least because of their opposition to the rebuilding of the fortifications of Athens.[22] The Athenians, however, established their independence by pushing through the refortification. During the next decade or more they were willing to follow Kimon's doctrine of sharing the leadership of the Greek world with their 'yoke-fellow' Sparta while pursuing operations against the Persians. It was by an appeal to this doctrine that Kimon persuaded the Athenian assembly in 462 to send a hoplite force to help the Spartans put down a helot revolt.[23] The Spartan

[18] Paus. 1.29.4; Jacoby (1944) 47–55, cf. *HCT* 2.94–101, Clairmont (1983) 9–15; see R. Osborne (1985) 61; see *AP* 22.3, 27.1.
[19] Thuc. 1.100–1.
[20] Hdt. 5.49, 64–5, 72–6; 6.49–50, 105–6.
[21] Hdt. 8.1–3, 14, 42–8, Plut. *Them.* 7.2–3; cf. Amit (1965) 18–20.
[22] Thuc. 1.90, 95 and D.S. 11.50 for Spartan attitudes to the leadership question; de Ste Croix (1972) 170–1.
[23] See ch. 2.3.1.

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dismissal of this force was the result of, but also increased, growing suspicion of Athens and Athenian policies. In Athens Kimon's doctrine was discredited.

The confidence of the Athenians was further encouraged by the conclusion of two alliances in 461/0 – an alliance with Megara which thus protected Attike from direct land invasion from the Peloponnese and an alliance with Argos, the old rival of Sparta in the Peloponnese. Athens became actively involved in the north-east Peloponnese (459), conquered its old rival in the Saronic Gulf, the island state of Aigina (458), and gained control of its northern neighbours, the cities of Boiotia (457). In 454, however, it suffered a serious setback with the defeat of an allied expedition which had been sent in 459 to help the Egyptian rebel Inaros in his attempt to throw off Persian rule.[24] In the late 450s and the early 440s Athens had to deal with disturbed conditions in, and problems in its relations with, its allies in the Aegean. These difficulties were precipitated by the 454 disaster, or by Persian interference in some of the cities or by internal dissension, or again by strained relations arising from allied perceptions of their ties with Athens and Athenian attitudes towards Persia.[25] One important element was the allied expedition against the Persians in Cyprus and Egypt (451). This seems to have had a catalytic effect: its success, coupled with the death of Kimon, the chief advocate of active operations against the Persians, may well have led Athenians to pay even greater attention to their relations with their allies. More so, because to the allies the need for a continuing alliance against Persia had been called into question by the success of Kimon's expedition. An indication of their restiveness has been seen in the payment of the annual *phoros* (tribute) by the allies. There is no evidence of the payment of phoros in 449/8, while in 448/7 some allies did not pay and some paid only part of their assessment. The payments seem to have been restored to a high level in 447/6 as the Athenians took various strong measures in their dealings with their 'allies'.[26] This restiveness is the more readily understood if the Athenians concluded in 450/449 a peace agreement with Persia recognising distinct spheres of influence, but even if no formal peace was concluded the Athenians, it would appear, did not again take up operations against the Persians.[27]

The Athenians may have overstretched themselves but their power was not to be underestimated, especially if they opted to concentrate their energies in Greece and the Aegean. Moreover, in 454 the Delian League funds had been transferred from the temple of Apollo on Delos to the temple of Athena in Athens. In the early 440s there was sharp controversy about the use of what represented a very large financial reserve – probably some 9,700 talents in 447.[28] The mere existence of this very large resource in Athens made the Athenian

[24] Thuc. 1.103–10, Meiggs 92–108.

[25] *IG* i³.14 (ML 40), 21; Plut. *Per.* 11.5, D.S. 11.88.3, Paus. 1.27.5; *IG* i³. 37 (ML 47); Meiggs 109–28, 152–74.

[26] Thuc. 1.112 (and *HCT*), Meiggs 124–8; ML 39, 50; Meiggs 152–74.

[27] Isok. 4.118, D.S. 12.4.5, Theopomp. *FGrH* 115 F134–5; Plut. *Per.* 17 (Congress Decree); Meiggs 129–56, 487–95, 512–15.

[28] Thuc. 2.13.3 (and *HCT* 20–33); see ch. 2.3.1.

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assembly less dependent on the allies but also less amenable to check by the Athenian upper classes, for the assembly could now be less concerned with the financial resources of the upper classes whether in the form of benefactions to the Demos or in support of warlike activities. The Demos might feel less dependent on the propertied classes. The vast reserve was drawn upon in a major way, in the first instance, to build the Parthenon which was begun in 447, but it was also available for the maintenance of Athenian power.[29]

In a matter of a few decades Athens' position had indeed been transformed. A vital element in that transformation was the development of naval power. The credit for that should be largely accorded to the Athenian leader whose farsightedness, judgement and ability to expound a case were much admired by the historian Thucydides. In the late 480s Themistokles had persuaded the Athenians to use the proceeds of rich silver finds in south-east Attike to build probably 100 triremes (warships), more modern and faster than pentekonters (50-oared galleys), thereby more than doubling the size of the Athenian fleet.[30] In 480 the Athenians had evacuated Attike before Xerxes' invading forces in accordance with an oracle which urged them to seek safety in their 'wooden wall'. That decision to accept the interpretation of Themistokles and other Athenians against the views of the 'professional' interpreters and to put their trust in their triremes was symbolic. In the next two decades the fleet and the mobility of power which it provided enabled Athens to spread its influence throughout the Aegean.[31] Vital for the fleet, it should be added, were the harbours of the Peiraieus. In the sixth century the open bay of Phaleron had been the maritime centre for Athens, but during his arkhonship in 493/2 Themistokles had initiated the fortification of the Peiraieus and in the early 470s had persuaded the Athenians to complete the walls of the Peiraieus. He recognised the potentialities of its three natural harbours and he took the view that the Athenians would gain a great advantage in the acquisition of power if they became a seafaring people. He was the first, according to Thucydides, to tell the Athenians to 'cling to' the sea. By making the Peiraieus easily defensible, Themistokles was able to give top priority to the fleet. In Thucydides' view, he played a key role in laying the foundations of their fifth-century empire. To Themistokles the Peiraieus was a more valuable place than the city of Athens: if ever the Athenians were hard pressed by land, he argued, they should go down to the Peiraieus and withstand all their enemies with their fleet.[32]

Attike indeed might still be vulnerable to invasion – to the invasion of Peloponnesian hoplites, for example, led by Sparta as had happened in 506 or as

[29] Davies (1978) 111; see ch. 8.2; Thuc. 2.13.3, Meiggs 154–5.
[30] Thuc. 1.14.3, 138.3; *AP* 22.7 (and *CAAP*), Plut. *Them.* 4, cf. Hdt. 7.144; Hdt. 6.89, 132.1.
[31] Hdt. 7.141–4; Thuc. 1.18–19, 96–101, [Xen.] *AP* 2.2–16; on Athenian naval power see Amit (1965) 18–26, Morrison and Williams (1968) 223–43.
[32] Thuc. 1.93.3–7 (and *HCT*), D.S. 11.41.2–4, Paus. 1.1.2–5; D. M. Lewis (1973A) 757–8, Dickie (1973) 758–9; cf. *AP* 24.1–2 (and *CAAP*).

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had been promised in the mid-460s when the Thasians sought help in their revolt from Athens. However, the unexpected alliance in 461/0 with their western neighbours, the Megarians, held out the strong possibility that the Athenians could prevent direct Peloponnesian invasion, though the defeat of their army at Tanagra near the Attic–Boiotian border at the hands of the Peloponnesians in 457 was to serve as a reminder of the limitations of Athenian land power and the vulnerability of Attike.[33] And by 457, the Athenians were carrying through a plan to secure the city of Athens against one of the standard methods of fifth-century warfare – the siege of a city and the cutting off of its food supplies in order to force surrender. The plan was the 'Long Walls' which joined the Akropolis and the city area to the Peiraieus and their naval power. These walls linking the fortified city to the port of the Peiraieus and the Bay of Phaleron enabled the Athenians, even in the event of enemy invasion, to supply the city with food and other necessities brought in by sea.[34] The navy was the critical factor. Not only for this reason was it regarded as the symbol of Athenian power and Athenian democracy.[35]

1.3 Socio-economic changes *c.* 480–*c.* 450

Parallel to the transformation of Athens' standing in the Aegean world, and in many respects closely connected with it, were changes in the social and economic life of the Athenians in the first half of the fifth century – changes which probably accelerated in the 440s and 430s as resources were diverted from anti-Persian operations to public building in Athens and Attike. In the generation after Xerxes' invasion, for example, the population of Attike seems to have begun to increase considerably. Precise figures are not available, but between 480 and 431 the total population of Attike may well have doubled. There is general agreement that the largest increases were in the numbers of metics (foreigners permanently resident in Attike) (to perhaps 30,000–40,000 in 431 as a plausible 'guesstimate') and in the numbers of slaves (to perhaps 100,000 as a plausible guess). Athens offered opportunities which other Greeks had recognised since the early sixth century, and by the mid-fifth century they were beginning to flock to Athens. Moreover, prisoners captured in Delian League operations and a trade in slaves for sale on the lucrative Athenian market led to, and reflected, a much more extensive use of slave labour. Athenians – that is, men, women and children of citizen stock – may have numbered about 120,000 in 480 and 160,000–170,000 in 431. The number of adult male Athenians in 480 was perhaps approaching 30,000 and by 431 it probably was in the low 40,000s. These figures are modern estimates based on very limited evidence, but the

33 Thuc. 1.107–8, de Ste Croix (1972) 187–96.
34 Thuc. 1.107.1, 108.3, Plut. *Per.* 13.5.
35 [Xen.] *AP* 1.2, Arist. *Pol.* 1304a17–24.

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broad trends may be accepted even though it is impossible to determine the rates of growth of the various elements in the population over the half-century from 480.[36]

Population movements were not, however, in one direction only. As early as the mid-470s Athenian settlers were sent to Skyros to replace the inhabitants who had engaged in piracy. In the mid-460s Athenian settlers sought to establish themselves on the river Strymon at the site of the later Amphipolis (founded in 437 by colonists from Athens and allied states). In the late 450s–440s many Athenians, while retaining their Athenian citizenship, went abroad as klerouchs or, so to speak, soldier-settlers in order to secure the loyalty of the area and its adherence to Athens. Some went to the Thracian Khersonesos at the southern entrance to the Propontis and the Black Sea. This was not a new area of Athenian interest, for in the mid-sixth century Athenians such as the Philaids, on their own initiative or with strong encouragement from Peisistratos, had left Athens and settled in this area (now known as the Gallipoli peninsula). Other klerouchs in the mid-fifth century went to the islands of Andros and Naxos and, on Euboia, probably to Karystos, Khalkis and Eretria as well as to Hestiaia where in 446 the population was removed and an Athenian settlement known as Oreos was established.[37] In the process not a few Athenians would have risen in status from the thetic to the zeugite class, for each klerouch (allotment-holder) received an allotment of land (*klēros*). But as well as the state-organised klerouchies, Athenian enterprise operated at the individual level. The Athenian merchants who in the 460s were active in the Thraceward area and were encroaching on Thasian interests were the successors in a sense of men like Peisistratos who in the mid-sixth century had exploited the mineral resources of that area. The long tradition of Athenian enterprise overseas may also be exemplified by the production of fine pottery beyond the needs of the local market and its export to widely scattered areas from the Black Sea to Italy and Sicily.

Other non-agrarian activity assisted in the Athenian recovery after the devastation caused by the Persian invaders. At Laureion in south-eastern Attike new rich veins of silver had been discovered in *c.* 483: these finds had been devoted, as we have seen, to the expansion of the navy. In the ensuing decades the mines were extensively exploited, providing a basic means of acquiring imports and being used particularly in the production of the Attic 'owls' – the coins which depicted the national types of Athena and her owl and which won wide acceptance, later with enforced measures by the Athenian polis, throughout the Aegean and beyond.[38] Furthermore, many Athenians were

[36] See Appendix IA–C. On the proportion of thetes in the citizen population, see Gomme 12–16, 26, Jones 9, 177, Patterson (1981) 55–8.
[37] Thuc. 1.98.2, Plut. *Kim.* 8.3–6; Thuc. 1.100.3; Plut. *Per.* 11.5, D.S. 11.88.3, Paus. 1.27.5, Meiggs 121–3; Thuc. 1.114.3; see Green and Sinclair (1970) 515–27, but cf. Jones 161–80; Brunt (1966) 71–92.
[38] Ar. *Frogs* 718–26, ML 45, Meiggs 167–72.

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