

Index

- Achinstein, P., 93n
 acquaintance, 82–3
 adequate grounds, 38–9
 Adler, J. E., 119n
 agnosia, 87
 Albert, M. L., 87n
 alethic variability, 245–7
 Alston, W. P., 38–41, 71n, 74n, 111, 143n, 153n, 156, 193n, 215n, 234n
 Annis, D. B., 183n
 Appiah, A., 80n
 Aristotle, 2, 4, 9, 13n, 24, 26, 167
 Armstrong, D. M., 13n, 20n, 90n, 159n, 189n, 233n
 assent, 15–16; *see also* belief
 association relation, 141–3, 154
 attention attraction, 81–3, 84, 171, 187–8
 attention focusing, 81–2
 Audi, R. N., xi, 17n, 142, 156
 awareness, 80–8; *see also* experience
 direct, 82, 186–8
 and noticing, 82
 nonconceptual, 84–5, 187–8
 Ayer, A. J., 164n
- Bach, K., 14n
 basic proposition, 8, 113; *see also* foundationalism
 basing relation, 8, 22, 45, 154, 156–8
 Bauer, R., 87n
 belief, 13–23
 and assent, 15–16
 cause of, 16–17
 conscious, 20
 de dicto, 14, 17
 de re, 14, 17
 definition of, 18
 disposition to believe, 17, 19
 dispositional, 16
 and evidence, 64–9
 foundational, *see* foundationalism
 and justification, 38, 44, 48; *see also* justification
 and knowledge, 3–4, 13–23
 and memory, 21
 objects of, 13, 17
 reasons for, 47–8; *see also* reasons
 state of, 17, 48
 state–object view, 4, 17
 tendency requirement, 21–2
 voluntary, 18, 40n, 41n, 210–11
 believing–true, 14–15, 23
 Belnap, N., 93n, 94n
 Berkeleyan Idealist Hypothesis, 161–2
 Black, I., 119n
 Bonjour, L., 38n, 173–6, 178, 194n
 Brentano, F., 82n, 86n, 87n
 Bromberger, S., 93n
 Brown, H. I., 183n
 Brown, J., 87n
 Burge, T., 14n
 Butchvarov, P., 36n, 90n
- Campbell, R., 215n
 certainty, 43, 111, 160, 210, 211–12
 Changeux, J.-P., 119n
 Chisholm, R. M., 10, 11, 14n, 38, 55n, 82n, 86n, 96, 159, 210n, 217–18, 229, 242n, 246, 263n
 Church, A., 14n
 Churchland, P., 179, 180
 Clark, R., 78n
 Clifford, W. K., 41, 214n
 Cohen, S., 14n
 coherence, 61–3; *see also* Coherentism
 Coherentism, 61–3, 68, 172–82; *see also* Probability Coherentism
 dilemma for, 173–6
 isolation objection to, 62–3, 176–82, 204
 concepts, 29–30, 80–1
 Conee, E., 36n, 235n
 confirmation, *see* probability

- contextualism, 183–6, 204
 contraveners, 8, 37, 100–6, 113–15,
 125, 128–31, 133, 137–9
 and beliefs, 106
 direct, 104–5, 128–9, 133
 and entailment relations, 113–14,
 132
 indirect, 101–3, 105, 129–31, 133,
 137–9
 merely knowledge-precluding, 242
 nonoccurrent, 102, 125, 139
 uncontravened, 102, 104, 129, 130–
 1, 138
 Cooper, L. A., 119n
 Cornman, J. W., 78n, 83n, 86n, 89,
 100n, 158n, 172n, 186n, 188
 correspondence, 23–35; *see also* truth
 Craig, E. J., 189n
- Dark, V., 81n
 Davidson, D., 27n
 Davies, D. R., 82n
 Davis, W., 20n
 defeaters, *see* contraveners
 Demon (deceiver) Hypothesis, 104,
 105, 128–9, 161–2
 Descartes, R., 82n, 87n, 210–13, 233,
 255
 Devitt, M., 32n
 disposition to believe, 17, 19
 doxastic justification, 143–4, 154
 Dream Hypothesis, 161, 162–3, 233,
 255–8
 Dretske, F. I., 86n
 Ducasse, C. J., 64n, 78n, 83n, 86n, 89,
 188
- epistemic blamelessness, 39–40, 230
 epistemic goodness, 38–9, 41–2, 48
 epistemic importance, 206, 216–17,
 220–3, 224, 226
 epistemic objectives, 213–31
 epistemic obligation, 38–41, 213–14,
 217–18, 229–30
 epistemic permissibility, 38–41, 207–8
 epistemic relativism, 200–2, 221–2
 epistemological behaviorism, 183–6
 Evans, G., 87n
 evidence, 5, 36 *et passim*
 and beliefs, 64–9
 circular, 60–1
 experiential, 91–111
 nonoccurrent, 117–25, 155
 occurrent, 7, 70, 72–3, 76–7, 93,
 151–5
 and propositions, 64
 truth-resistant, 10, 242–7
 unextended, 225
 evidential probability, 6, 7, Chs. 2–4;
see also probability and probabil-
 ity-makers
 evidence basis of, 51–2
 inference basis of, 51, 109, 164
 maximal, 8, 136–51
 minimal, 53, Ch. 2
 nonoccurrent, 117–25
 occurrent, 70, 93
 experience, 83–8
 conceptual, 83–4, 86
 contents of, 2, 43, 44, 68, 83–91
 nonconceptual, 84–5, 86, 88
 nonperceptual, 85, 86
 perceptual, 83–4, 86
 taxonomy of, 83–8
 explanation, 7, 91–100, 127–8
 best, 150, 160
 better, 98–100, 162–3
 decisively better, 99–100, 128
 and epistemic importance, 220–1
 gratuitous, 97–8, 104–5, 114–15,
 162–3
 and skepticism, 158–64
 and why-questions, 93–5
 explanatory particularism, 11, 260–5
 Externalism, 6, 37, 44, 71–7
 Moderate, 6, 69–70, 74–7
 Radical, 6, 69–74
 Feldman, R., xi, 36n, 72n, 120, 233n,
 236n
 Field, H., 27n
 Firth, R., 143n, 188n, 192n
 Fodor, J. A., 190
 Fogelin, R., 158n
 Foley, R., 14n, 49n, 64n, 65–8, 148
 Forbes, G., 32n
 foundationalism, 2, 7, 144–5, 166–72
 modest, 2, 145
 radical, 2
 and regress problem, 9, 182
 Rorty on, 166–71
 and self-justification, 2, 144
 Frege, G., 14
 Gensler, H. J., xi
 Gettier, E. L., 3, 5, 20, 22, 36, 37,
 153n, 232–3, 244, 249

- Gettier examples, 3, 5, 10, 36–7, 45,
 Ch. 6
- Ginet, C., 143n
- given, the, 168, 186–93
- Goldberg, M., 82n
- Goldman, A. H., 38n, 87n
- Goldman, A. I., 38n, 40, 71n, 72n,
 143n, 196–203, 214n
- Goldstein, K., 86n
- Goodman, N., 5, 29n
- gratuitous entity, 97–8, 104–5, 114–15
- Grim, P., 247
- Hallett, G., 25n, 26n
- Hallucination Hypothesis, 161, 162–3
- Hamlyn, D. W., 36n
- Hardin, C. L., 88
- Harman, G., 17n, 61n, 64n, 106n,
 114n, 233n
- Harnad, S., 86n
- Harrah, D., 94n
- having a reason, 8, 151–5
- Hecate, H., 87n
- Heidelberger, H., 96
- Hempel, C. G., 218–19
- Hirst, W., 81n
- Hiz, H., 94n
- how things are, 28, 29–31, 49
- Hume, D., 91, 103, 125, 158n, 159,
 167n, 266
- Internalism, 6, 37, 70, 77–80, 107–11
 Awareness, 109–11
 Moderate, 7, 77–80, 107–11
 Radical, 78, 79, 107–11
- isolation objection (to Coherentism),
 62–3, 176–82
- Jackson, F., 86n, 89, 190
- James, W., 41, 187, 213–14, 217
- Johnsen, B. C., 159n, 194n
- Johnston, W., 81n
- justifiability, 8, 96–7, 125, 141–5, 154
- justification, 5, 36–45, Chs. 2–5
 and belief, 38, 44, 48
 and certainty, 43, 160
 and coherence, 61–3, 172–82
 concept of, 2, 5, 35, 37–44
 and consensus, 183–6
 and consistency, 148–50
 contraveners of, *see* contraveners
 deontological notion of, 5–6, 38–41
 doxastic, 143–4, 154
 and epistemic goodness, 38–9, 41–2,
 48
 and experience, 91–111
 inferential, 37, 154
 and knowledge, 3–4, 5, 13, 35–6,
 Ch. 6
 and meta-justification, 2–3, 10, 11,
 260–5
 noninferential, 2, 97, 144, 154, 164
 nonoccurrent, 117–25, 140, 155
 occurrent, 7, 70, 72–3, 76–7, 93,
 151–5
 as perspectival, 43–4, 184
 and procedural rationality, 9–10,
 205–9, 225–6
 and reliability, 71–6, 194–203
 showing and having, 183–4, 185
 transitivity of, 146–7
 truth-resistant, 10, 37, 45, 242–7
- justifiedness, 8–9, 96–7, 125, 141–5,
 154
- Kant, I., 232
- Kaplan, M., 233n
- Keim, R., 214n
- Kiefer, F., 94n
- Klein, P. D., 148, 160n, 232n, 243,
 251n
- Kneale, M., 13n
- Kneale, W., 13n
- knowledge, *l et passim*
 analysis of, 247, 254–5
 and belief, 3–4, 13–23, 45
 defeasibility account, 232, 254
 dispositional, 4, 19–23
 and Gettier-style examples, Ch. 6
 and justification, 3–4, 5, 13, 35–6;
see also justification
 nondispositional, 4, 19–23
 and skepticism, 3, 255–61; *see also*
 skepticism
 and truth, 3–4, 23–35, 45; *see also*
 truth
- Kosslyn, S., 117n
- Kuhn, T. S., 183n
- Kyburg, H. E., 50, 51, 150
- Lehrer, K., 20n, 179–82, 193n, 214,
 216, 218n, 222, 232n, 236n, 237n,
 243n
- Levi, I., 10, 218–19, 233n
- Lewis, C. I., 1, 80, 82n, 86n, 110,
 145, 192

- Lewis, D. K., 32n
 Locke, J., 31, 166–8, 171, 182
 lottery paradox, 147–8
 Lycan, W. G., 14n, 15n, 38n
 Lynch, G., 119n
 Lysenko, T. D., 185
- Mackie, J. L., 4, 26, 164n
 Medin, D. L., 80n
 Meiland, J. W., 230n
 Mele, A. R., xi
 memory, 21, 117–25
 methodism, 263–4
 Meyers, R. G., 71n, 232n, 233n
 Michalos, A., 214n
 Moore, G. E., 89, 159
 Morawetz, T., 52n
 Müller-Lyer illusion, 190
- Naylor, M. B., 210n
 negative relevance, 101–2, 115, 129
 Neisser, U., 80n, 86n
 Newton, I., 96
 noninferential justification, 2, 97, 144, 154, 164
 nonoccurrent justification, 117–25, 140, 155
- occurrent justification, 7, 70, 72–3, 76–7, 93, 151–5
 O'Connor, D. J., 25n
- Pappas, G. S., 193n
 Parasuraman, R., 81n
 particularism, 11, 263–4
 Paxson, T., 232n, 243n
 Peacocke, C., 19n, 87n
 perception, 188–94; *see also* experience
 Petersen, S. E., 82n
 Phenomenalism, 161, 163
 Pinker, S., 119n
 Plato, 3, 13, 36, 232
 Pollock, J. L., 14n, 38n, 40, 64n, 72n, 106n, 110n, 182
 Popper, K. R., 10, 91, 159, 218–21
 Post, J. F., 29n, 172n
 presentation, 82–3, 187–8
 Price, H. H., 86n, 90n, 210n, 214n
 Prior, A. N., 25n
 probabilistic competition, 39, 135, 137
 probability and probability-makers, 7, 43, 50, Chs. 2–3
 basic, 8, 113, 131, 139, 144
 derivative, 7, 112–17, 131–4, 139–40, 145
 evidential, *see* evidential probability
 justifying, 125, Ch. 3
 maximal, 136–40, 151
 minimal, 70, 106–7, 125, Ch. 2
 nonbasic, 8, 115–16, 133, 140
 nonoccurrent, 117–25, 134, 140
 nonpropositional, 69–111
 occurrent, 7, 70, 72–3, 76–7, 93
 overbalancing, 126–35
 propositional, 52–69
 unconditional, 97, 107, 110–11, 127, 136–7
- Probability Coherentism, 6, 54, 61–3
 Probability Infitism, 6, 54, 56–60, 172
 problem of the criterion, 3, 11, 260–5
 procedural rationality, 9–10, Ch. 5
 Putnam, H., 5, 26n, 27n, 29n, 31n, 32
- Quine, W. V., 6, 14n, 74n
- radical conceptualism (about perception), 189–91
 Radical Externalism, 6, 69–74
 Radical Internalism, 78, 79, 107–11
 rationality, 9–10, Ch. 5
 and an evidential objective, 223–31
 and gathering evidence, 227–9
 and justification, 9–10, 205–9, 225–6
 and perfectionism, 214–15
 procedural, 205, Ch. 5
 and relativism, 221–2
 static, 205
- realism, 32, 161–4
 reasons, Chs. 2–3; *see also* probability and probability-makers
 for believing, 47–8, 136
 conclusive, 116–17
 epistemic, 44, 47–9, Chs. 2–3
 explanatory, 49
 having of, 151–5
 nonepistemic, 44, 48–9
 for a proposition, 47, 136
 regress problem, 9, 43, 172, 173, 182, 192, 204
 reliabilism, 71–3, 74–6, 194–203, 204, 223n
 Rescher, N., 189n, 192n
 Robinson, D. L., 82n
 Rorty, R. M., 5, 9, 29n, 64n, 166–71, 183–6, 192n

- Rubens, A., 87n
 Runzo, J., 189n
 Russell, B. A., 14, 24, 82, 89, 164n
- Salmon, W., 93n
 Scheerer, M., 86n
 Scheffler, I., 88, 189n, 192n
 schema T, 27–8, 33
 Schiffer, S., 14n
 Scholnick, E. K., 80n
 Searle, J., 19n
 seeming to perceive, 75, 78n
 self-justification, 2, 65–8, 144
 Sellars, W., 9, 166–8, 169, 186, 189n, 193n
 Sextus Empiricus, 3, 11, 91, 159, 260
 Shepard, R. N., 119n
 Shiner, R., 52n
 Shope, R. K., 10, 20n, 36n, 232n, 233n, 235–41, 242n, 251n, 252n, 254, 265n
 skepticism, 3, 9, 11, 73–4, 90–1, 108, 158–64
 and deductive support, 159–60, 259
 dilemma for, 160–4
 justification, 3, 9, 73–4, 90–1, 158–64, 259
 knowledge, 3, 255–61
 and problem of the criterion, 3, 11, 260–5
 Smith, E. E., 80n
 Soames, S., 27n
 Sosa, E., 57n, 72n, 75n, 172n, 194n, 233n, 242n
 Squire, L., 119n
 Steel, T., 93n, 94n
 Stove, D. C., 158n
 Stroud, B., 256–60
 subjective contents, 2, 43, 44, 68, 89–91, 95n, 171–2, 181–2, 186–93
 supervenience, 51
 Swain, M., 20n, 36n, 74n, 232n, 252n
- Tarski, A., 1, 5, 27, 33
 Teller, P., 93n
 Temple, D., 93n
 Thagard, P., 114n
 Thesis of Circular Probability, 6, 54, 60–1
 Thesis of Self-Probability, 6, 54, 55–6;
 see also self-justification
 truth, 1, 2, 4, 23–35
 correspondence theory, 1, 2, 23–35
 criterion of, 2, 4, 31, 33–4, 49
 definition of, 4, 26, 31, 32–4, 49
 as nonepistemic, 5, 24, 45
 Tarski's condition, 5, 27–8, 33
 truth indicators, *see* probability and probability-makers
 truth-resistant evidence, 10, 242–7
 Tye, M., 78n
- understanding, 95–6
 Unger, P., 159n
- Van Cleve, J., 82n, 87n, 194n
 van Fraassen, B. C., 93n
 vander Nat, A., xi
 Vision, G., 26n
- Watkins, J., 159n
 Weitz, M., 80n
 White, A. R., 82n
 why-questions, 93–5
 Williams, B., 10, 14n, 211–12, 215, 216, 223n
 Williams, M., 192n, 194n
 Wittgenstein, L., 24, 52n, 183n
 Wright, C., 52n
 Wurtz, R., 82n
- Yolton, J., 82n