

OTTOMAN
MANUFACTURING IN
THE AGE OF THE
INDUSTRIAL
REVOLUTION

DONALD QUATAERT

Binghamton University



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Introduction

Opening remarks

This book is about manufacturing and manufacturers in the Ottoman Middle Eastern world between *c.* 1800 and 1914. It is a study of events that happened, not about failures to industrialize according to a pattern prescribed from outside. Concerns of our own day frame this work, as Third World countries attempt, and too many fail, to improve their living standards through high technology industrial change. The locus of analysis is the Ottoman Empire, one of the original Third World countries, and its efforts to grapple with an expanding, highly efficient and competitive European industrial order. The geographic focus is on areas that remained within the Ottoman Empire until the twentieth century. Thus, the book includes manufacturing in Salonica, Macedonia and in the Anatolian, north Syrian and, to the extent possible, the Iraqi provinces. Since Damascus, south Syria and Palestine have a far richer literature, they were excluded except for comparative purposes.

Although there are fragmentary accounts of Ottoman manufacturing in various works, there has been no comprehensive examination of this fascinating and complex subject. In the following chapters are stories of manufacturing decline and failure, of adaptation, restructuring, growth and resistance. Four major regions of industrial activity bustled in the late nineteenth-century Ottoman world. Salonica and the Macedonian countryside formed the first of these, mainly concentrating on wool cloth and yarn production but increasing cotton cloth output towards the end of the period. Western Anatolia formed the second major manufacturing region and produced a wide variety of textiles, including raw and woven silk, carpets, and several different cotton cloths. The third and perhaps least important of the regions was clustered in a group of towns, some 100–200 kilometers south of the Black Sea coast between Samsun and Trabzon. Here, chiefly cotton cloth and some wool cloth production prevailed, with the addition of carpetmaking very late in the period. Likely the most important region centered in southeast Anatolia and northern Syria, where weavers focused on silk and silk-cottons, with a growing late-century emphasis on pure cotton cloth. Altogether, the tale of these four regions trace out

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once-unknown activities and demand a change in the way that we view the manufacturing sector of this last great independent Islamic state in the Age of Imperialism. Collectively, the details mass up to challenge and, I believe, refute the notion that Ottoman industry merely declined and/or stagnated in the era of European industrial hegemony.

The overall importance of manufacturing in the nineteenth-century Ottoman economy is not now and may never be susceptible to accurate aggregate measurement. It surely contributed far more than one-tenth of Ottoman GNP, as once was indicated in a pioneering compilation of Ottoman statistics.¹ Existing measurements of its overall significance are essentially worthless, in part, because the available Ottoman statistics generally are very poor and because manufacturing has not been a discrete object of study. But there are other, more substantive reasons. Most observers considered only two forms of industrial activities when they sought to measure or evaluate Ottoman manufacturing. To them, manufacturing was visible only when it was urban-based and either guild-organized or located in a factory setting. As seen below, this assumption is incorrect. Also, many Ottoman economic historians have been led astray by the agrarian nature of the Ottoman Empire. In the nineteenth century, more than 80 percent of Ottoman subjects lived in rural areas. The importance of manufacturing was grossly underrepresented because of a prevailing if unconsidered assumption that cultivators necessarily only cultivated. We now know from studies of the American, British, German, Chinese and other economies that manufacturing often is an integral, variously important, part of agrarian life.² Agrarian economies commonly were mixed and rural families engaged in both agriculture and manufacturing, both for subsistence and commercial purposes. Thus, the account of Ottoman manufacturing must tally rural industry as well as non-guild urban production; it must reckon the contributions of Ottoman households and workshops as well as those of factories and guild organizations.³

There are many important lacunae in the present study. The relationship between land tenure and manufacturing, for example, is discussed infrequently. Overall, most Ottoman cultivators were small landholders, a pattern that remained generally true over the period. We know very little, however, about patterns of landholding or agricultural exploitation at the micro-level. Therefore, we cannot properly link what we learn in this book about clusters of manufacturing to local agrarian structures. Readers, after seeing where industry was most successful and concentrated, hopefully will be prompted to explore the prevailing land tenure and cultivating patterns.⁴ Many active manufacturing regions possessed poor soil and marginal agriculture but it seems that some held comparatively fertile soil and comparatively dense populations. Security of property generally did improve and near the end of the period there were nearly full property rights. The book frequently does speak about the relationship between changing outputs in agriculture and industry. It repeatedly shows that

manufacturers, both for the local market and for Ottoman buyers outside their districts, expanded output when agrarian production in the market area increased and contracted in the presence of failed or poor crops.

There are gaps in the analysis regarding the mechanisms used to market Ottoman manufactured goods. Sometimes we do not know if the manufacturers were independent producers or participants in a putting-out network. There is distressingly little on the personal consequences of changes such as lost jobs in hand spinning or new jobs in cloth weaving, cloth printing or ready-made clothing assemblage. Presently there is no information, for example, that we can use to assess the impact of such changes on gender relations within the family. The issue of capital accumulation among peasant manufacturers is *terra incognita* on the Ottoman manufacturing history map. Therefore, our analysis does not discuss how their successes led either to land acquisition, further industrial activity, or higher levels of consumption. These and other deficiencies underscore the introductory nature of this book, a quality that I would like to stress at this point. While answering many questions, the book leaves others insufficiently explored.

The gap regarding state-owned and managed factories, however, is deliberate. These factories economically were not important. According to one enumeration, all Ottoman factories (both state and privately owned) employed perhaps 36,000 persons in 1913.⁵ Moreover, the state-run factories were *sui generis* and their history is of very limited general applicability. They were founded to supply state needs and operated as protected, subsidized establishments with guaranteed markets. Any of them would make an interesting subject for a monograph, and there certainly is super-abundant documentation available. But the game does not seem worth the candle at this primitive stage in the development of Ottoman manufacturing literature. While many new and fascinating details surely would be learned from studying government factories, few new insights into the structure and nature of the manufacturing sector are likely to be gained.

State policy

To the extent possible, this book is not about Ottoman governmental policy towards manufacturing. State decision-making did exert influence upon the manufacturing sector and could be of critical importance to Ottoman manufacturers. Before the Tanzimat reforms, for example, sumptuary laws governed “the strange and fantastic costumes and headgear worn by the members of the Ottoman military and civil hierarchy . . .”⁶ and by others in the various occupations and religious communities. These regulations afforded Ottoman textile manufacturers a certain protection from foreign competitors and when Sultan Mahmud II abolished them in 1826, the consequences were devastating.

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Ottoman clothmakers' market vanished literally overnight. They suddenly were compelled to compete with European manufacturers in supplying the new frock coats and uniforms worn by the Westernizing bureaucrats and soldiers.

Similarly, the state's need for revenues often meant oppressively heavy taxes on manufactures. In one instance *c.* 1850, some 16 of the 18 cloth-printing factories in the city of İzmir closed, allegedly because of excessive taxation which made it impossible to compete with foreign goods.⁷

Many Ottoman artisans and entrepreneurs fought prolonged battles to reduce or eliminate taxes and tariffs. Take, for example, the Aleppo merchants who fought for decades to obtain relief from state levies. A pair of petitions from Aleppo, in 1846, complained of excessive tariffs. The first complained about the 1839 Tanzimat decree that, for the first time, placed customs fees of 12 percent, on *kumaş* cloth of every kind.⁸ As a result, they stated, merchants had stopped purchases, sales had evaporated and the industry had fallen to a weak and destitute state. The second petition, from the Greek Catholic patriarch and the merchants of Aleppo, bemoaned the collapse of the silk and silk-cotton cloth industry brought about by excessive customs charges. Foreign-made silk-cotton (*kutni*) textiles, they said, paid only 3 percent customs and an additional 2 percent at the point of sale, but locally made silk and cotton textiles paid heavier multiple taxes, including land customs on the silk and import duties on the foreign yarn and dyestuffs. Consequently, they said, people were buying the cheap imported goods. The petitioners requested removal of the customs duty as well as the new taxes on the dyehouse, the fulling house and the cloth-polishing house at Aleppo.⁹ In 1862, a new treaty gave some relief and reduced export duties from 12 to 8 percent. But the 12 percent duty on shipments into the interior remained. And, since the new treaty raised the duty on British yarn and imported dyestuffs, it added to the final production costs of Aleppo textiles.¹⁰

In 1866, in two separate petitions, a group of Aleppo Muslim merchants (joined by one European) and the Muslim populace petitioned successfully against the new customs fees. They appealed to a previous regulation that had placed duties of 2 to 6 percent on Aleppo textiles, according to the amount of synthetic dyes used. The greater the proportion of synthetic dyes used, the lower the tariff. The government in this case agreed and ordered that Aleppo textiles made for domestic consumption would pay the lower sliding-scale rates and not the flat 8 percent duty.¹¹ A few years later, in 1874, the state abolished the 8 percent internal tariff since "many products of agriculture and native manufactures were suffering from that oppressive impost."¹² Aleppo merchants again petitioned in 1875 and won tariff reductions, from 6 to 4 percent, on textile exports via Alexandretta. The government noted that the petition had no legal grounds but approved it anyway in order to help trade, maintain the Aleppo looms and increase production.¹³ In later years, the abolition of tariffs on

domestic seaborne trade was said to be playing a major role in the booming prosperity of this city's textile exports.¹⁴

Thus, as this extended example from Aleppo shows, tariffs and taxes could play an important role in the health of the textile industry. Such accounts must be treated cautiously since they may reflect other agendas. In the İzmir example, the author of the account likely was an Ottoman partisan of higher duties. The stress on tariff policies, in my view, is another way of giving primacy to the actions of the state in shaping economic development. Insistence on tariffs as the culprit distracts attention from the larger complex of international political and economic relationships that prevailed between Europe and the Middle East during this period.

It also is true that the state retained some importance in the manufacturing sector although its control slipped quite considerably over the nineteenth century. During the first half of the century, it enlisted tribes in western Anatolia to supply wool for a cloth factory that it was seeking to build. At this time, the networks of centuries past that had provided sail cloth to the navy still partially functioned, for example on the Gallipoli peninsula and in northern Anatolia. Quite a high proportion of all the mechanized factories built before c. 1900 were at the state's behest, both at İstanbul and everywhere else in the empire.

To determine just how important the state was remains quite another matter. Debates on the centrality of the state's role in economic development are familiar enough and rage in areas of historical inquiry far more developed than Ottoman history. For example, many have contrasted Japan's extraordinary leap to the status of a mature industrial power with that of continuing underdevelopment of India. To understand the differences between the performances of the Indian and Japanese economies, some scholars have focused on state policies as the crucial, determining variable. They have contrasted Meiji subsidies and support for industrialization with Indian *laissez-faire* policies. But others argue against such an effort and deny that state policies are crucial. They instead insist on explanations that stress the changes that percolated up from below rather than those that seeped down from above.¹⁵

The Ottoman state is important but does not need to be brought back in because, to misuse Theda Skocpol's oft-quoted remark, it never had left. The state always has been at the very center of Ottoman historiography and of Ottoman historians' consciousness. Ottoman scholars in fact have overly focused on the state and its concerns and the story of manufacturing has been no exception. Recounting state policy too often is merely recording what the state intended or wished reality to be, a vision very far removed from the actuality of the industrial sector itself. While such plans and programs have significance and interest, they are not our focus.

The following is a brief sketch, a guide to Ottoman state policy towards

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manufacturing; it is not, however, an exhaustive account.¹⁶ In the era before the nineteenth century, according to one formulation, Ottoman economic policy generally aimed to provide a cheap, good and abundant supply of goods to the state and its urban populations, particularly those in İstanbul.¹⁷ Complex control mechanisms embraced every part of the empire, seeking to direct the flow of raw and finished materials, ranging from wheat to shoe leather to wool cloth and most commodities in between. The state contracted with a host of different groups in Ottoman society, including nomads who provided wool and yarn and merchants who supervised putting-out networks. To facilitate control, the state characteristically worked with guilds not only in the big cities of İstanbul, Aleppo, Bursa and Salonica but also in small towns such as Merzifon in the Black Sea region. Guilds provided goods and services. They also cooperated in assessing and collecting government taxes on the manufacturing sector. For example, at Merzifon in the 1840s, guilds made certain that their textiles either paid a stamp tax for local sale or customs duties if sent outside the home district.¹⁸ In exchange, they received production-distribution privileges and monopolies and government assistance in their maintenance.

The reforming statesmen of the nineteenth century, or at least some of them, sought to abandon this policy in favor of free trade. The official turning point, however, was neither the 1838 Anglo-Turkish Convention nor the Tanzimat decree of 1839, usually cited as such in the literature. These were only some more nails in the coffin of the prevailing “provisionist” policy. Rather, the decisive turning point in policy already had taken place. It occurred in 1826, when the government attacked and destroyed the Janissaries, whom the state and its chroniclers considered thugs, a vulgar and violent rabble. Indeed, the state had cause for concern since Janissary violence guarded the interests of urban guilds against encroachments by the state and the elites. The destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 was no mere removal of reactionary opponents to military and political modernization, as it generally has been considered. This state action had profound economic consequences, for it destroyed the armed protectors of guild privilege and thus facilitated implementation of now-favored *laissez-faire* policies. With the disappearance of these Janissary defenders of popular sovereignty, the state could promote free trade, hence the 1838 treaty and the 1839 decree.

State policy in the nineteenth century thus turned in 1826. But a fundamental inconsistency towards promotion of a free market economy characterized most of the remainder of the period. This inconsistency derived from a split within the Ottoman elite, between the free traders and the protectionists, who perhaps simply were later-day provisionists. The battle in part was fought on the field of tariffs, with the protectionists seeking to re-erect customs barriers demolished in 1838 and 1839. They won some successes with increased tariffs in 1861–62, when the state also employed other means to stimulate manufacturing, and again

in 1907 and 1914. The inconsistency also shows up in government responses to urban guild artisans' appeals for assistance. On some occasions, officials responded by pointing to the Tanzimat decrees, reiterating that guild privilege officially was dead and open competition now prevailed. But, in many other instances, the state maintained the monopolies and privileges of the petitioning guilds. Similarly, the state continued to require possession of a certificate (*gedik*) in order to operate a shop, although this system clearly was incompatible with a free market economy. It repeatedly re-affirmed the legitimacy of these certificates into the 1860s, for the revenues they generated and sometimes from considerations of equity.¹⁹ The extent to which the certificates actually hindered guilds and urban manufacturing, however, is not clear since the government repeatedly allowed their number to increase and permitted shops to open without them.²⁰ The certificates nonetheless did conflict with free market principles being promoted by the state. Another example of government inconsistency comes from a monopolistic method used to regulate and tax urban textile production, that persisted into the final quarter of the nineteenth century. Since 1805, cloth finishing in a city legally had been performed only at a single centralized location. There, the state recorded, taxed and stamped the cloth being polished, a procedure that also helped the guilds to restrict competition. Driven by fiscal considerations, the system had continued deep into the free trade era in a number of cities, including Diyarbakır, Erzurum and Harput. It was abandoned only in 1878, many decades after free market principles officially had been adopted.²¹

The historiography of Ottoman manufacturing

Our understanding of the Middle Eastern economy and its manufacturing sector has been influenced profoundly by now-discredited stereotypes concerning the inferiority of Islam as a religious system and the general stagnation and backwardness of the region. In this false vision, just as Islamic civilization underwent permanent decline after the 1,001 Arabian Nights, so did its economy, seen as equally incapable of dynamism and change. If the door of independent thinking (*ijtihad*) in religion had been closed, so too was the possibility of economic evolution. The economic institutions of the Islamic classical age, like the political ones, were assumed to have continued nearly unchanged into later centuries. Any shifts were seen as corrupted deviations from Golden Age norms. These stereotyped notions of Middle Eastern political and cultural life now largely have been abandoned in favor of more accurate depictions of internal evolution and change. But, in the realm of economic history and particularly manufacturing, these static conceptions have left a powerful and largely intact legacy.

This inheritance of older Orientalist prejudices concerning backwardness and

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modernization has shaped our understanding of nineteenth-century Ottoman manufacturing particularly in regards to guilds and their importance. There has been too much implicit insistence on the history of guilds as representative of Ottoman manufacturing in general. Still worse is the tendency to regard nineteenth-century Ottoman guilds as unevolved versions of their sixteenth-century predecessors, virtually identical in structure and function everywhere in the empire (except in Egypt). This stress on guilds also derives from an acceptance of the Ottoman state's vision of industrial reality, a perspective fraught with significant consequences for our understanding of manufacturing. The dominance of this official vision no doubt is due partially to the incredible abundance of the source materials in the Ottoman archives, which, more generally, capture state perspectives, policies and activities. Indeed, the ability of the İstanbul government to largely dominate the political and cultural life of the empire for most of its existence probably reinforces widespread scholarly acceptance of the government view. Ultimately, however, state reports and documents tell us only about activities that the regime thought were important and/or were able to record. In the case of manufacturing, state concerns focused on urban areas and particularly on the guilds that played various administrative, supply and/or tax-collecting roles. Hence, the government recorded their activities. But, too often, the documentation grossly misrepresents the guilds' actual economic importance.

There are other grave dangers in relying on guilds as the sole barometer of manufacturing. Most of the extant literature relating to them suffers from a serious fault. It insists that since guilds declined in the nineteenth century, so did manufacturing overall; and, it ignores non-guild forms of industrial activity. Their restrictive qualities in fact made guilds comparatively inflexible and particularly unable to meet mounting Western competition. As the economy worsened during the late eighteenth century, the guilds began losing out but used the Janissary Corps to mobilize in self-defense.²² Many Ottoman guilds, their rigidity making them exquisitely vulnerable, subsequently vanished or declined in the face of European competition. Contemporary and modern-day observers too often falsely equated the fate of the guilds – the most fragile components of the industrial sector – with manufacturing in general. They concluded that because many guilds had collapsed, so had Ottoman industry.²³ And, it is not even true that all the guilds collapsed; many continued throughout the nineteenth and some into the twentieth century. What they had become, however, is not at all clear; these late survivals probably were perpetuated thanks to their social functions, not to their economic logic.²⁴

There were a great variety and number of manufacturing activities that fell outside the purview of guilds, both in urban areas and the countryside. Surely these must be considered in any study of manufacturing. The task is difficult if not impossible, however, if we rely solely on government records, or, to put it

more accurately, on those currently available. Manufacturing activities carried on outside guilds were not particularly well-controlled, that is, counted by the state. These forms of production thus are nearly invisible in the government documents typically examined, sources that have remained at the heart of much of the literature on manufacturing.²⁵ For at least part of the nineteenth century, the state quite imperfectly taxed non-guild urban artisans. Also, it does not appear to have taxed commercial household industry in the countryside, at least in some of the locations where we know it was present. For example, if male members of the family performed military services, their household's commercial manufacturing output was exempted from taxation. And, because they were tax exempt, this production for the marketplace went unrecorded. Thus, such manufacturing activities have been neglected in virtually all the historical accounts.²⁶ In order to compensate for the silent official sources, this study examined a wide body of alternative materials that indeed do speak of Ottoman manufacturing.

The historiographies of Ottoman economic decline and de-industrialization have deep indigenous roots. Ottomans' beliefs in their own economic decline are nearly as old as the Ottoman Empire itself. These conceptions are embedded in the accounts of the empire's political and military woes, reported by the official and unofficial court historians of the Sultans. During the later sixteenth century, these chroniclers already were detailing a long list of factors – corruption, the reward of incompetents, rule by women – that, they said, were destroying the empire from within. These accounts powerfully affected views of the Ottoman economy since readers assumed, not illogically, that economic decay accompanied this reported political decline. Barkan's famous 1975 article on the Ottoman price revolution, for example, seems to imply that the late sixteenth-century crisis described therein initiated a centuries-long and permanent economic decline. The crisis is not discussed as a short-term, if severe, dislocation that may have passed. Thanks to recent scholarship, we now know that the court historians were not objective observers of Ottoman decline but rather partisans who represented events to serve their own causes.²⁷ Often the losers in elite political struggles, these authors wrote biased and dark tales of political decay to win their way back into power or, at least, to carp at the winners. That is, their stories of decline are tracts serving personal political agendas and are not reliable indicators of political or economic conditions.

In the nineteenth century, Ottoman political weakness in the international arena had become real and Ottoman histories of that decrepitude no longer simply were projections of personal political failure onto a larger stage. But the use of nineteenth-century court chroniclers' accounts remains risky for economic historians. Sometimes, in common with their predecessors, this is because they were participants in the struggles they recorded. Take, for example, Mehmed Esad's account of the Janissaries' demise in 1826. Less than one year before the

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slaughter of the Janissaries, this reporter was promoted to the post of official chronicler (*vakanüvis*) precisely because he was opposed to that group. He personally took part in their destruction in 1826 and was enriched and honored for it. His description of Janissary economic activity, to put it mildly, is highly biased.²⁸ So too are the accounts of industrialization and manufacturing by the chroniclers Lütfi and Cevdet, as well as by the great recorder of İstanbul events, Osman Nuri, who provides perhaps the most detailed account.²⁹

The distortions in their accounts, at least in part, come from a different source: the ongoing adoption of modernization models by Ottoman elite circles during the nineteenth century. As is known, modernization, i.e., westernization, in the political realm meant a large and effective military, the centralization, increase and extension of state power into every area of life, and the rationalization and specialization of function of the bureaucracy. In the industrial sector, modernization meant manufacturing according to European methods and even with Western mentalities! Take, for example, this 1852 Ottoman inspector's report on industrial conditions in western Anatolia.

I travelled around studying industry and, in most of the areas where I observed, the majority of artisans were restricted in the kinds and types of manufactures. They have not reached the stage of development to invent other things, as is the case in Europe, where there is an era of renewal and the capabilities and mental dispositions of the people are suited to invention. For this reason, some ancient industries are abandoned and neglected and are profitless.³⁰

Whatever their stance on specific issues, Ottoman modernizers shared a definition of manufacturing as properly understood. It ought to be machine-based and factory-located.³¹ If not, it had little legitimacy and hence visibility in the eyes of nineteenth-century Ottoman recorders of Ottoman industry.

There are exceptions. For example, the author Salaheddin Bey does enumerate the many Ottoman handicrafts exhibited at the 1867 Paris exposition. But his willingness to discuss non-machine manufacturing derives not from his sensitivity to such activities but rather from his determination to record the Ottoman contribution to this international meeting.³² There is the Ottoman industrial survey, taken in 1913 (and again in 1915), that enumerates either those factories with inanimate power sources and ten workers or those with animate power and twenty workers. In this latter case, therefore, centralized production on some scale was a key variable and not simply the machinery.³³

Generally, however, officially inspired accounts of nineteenth-century Ottoman manufacturing discuss only mechanized factories. Most historians note the establishment of state-run factories early in the century and then jump to the private factory foundings after c. 1880, with attention to the burst of activity in the early twentieth century. They hardly ever discuss home or workshop manufacturing, in common with the state documents and perspective on which they are based.

Until *c.* 1970, there were few scholars in modern Turkey interested in nineteenth-century Ottoman economic history. Most of those who studied the nineteenth century preferred political events, specifically, the modernization of the Ottoman state. Hence, when discussing economic affairs, they, in common with most nineteenth-century Ottoman authors, discussed only (1) the role of the modernizing state in the economy and (2) efforts to form a factory-based industrial order.³⁴ An influential article by Sarç appeared in 1940, as part of a volume honoring the 100th anniversary of the official 1839 beginning of Ottoman westernization. This account reflects both the nineteenth-century Ottoman modernizers' bias in favor of big factories and its twentieth-century Kemalist republican variant. Written in the late 1930s, the article reflected recent efforts by the Turkish administrative elite to industrialize from above. Sarç's view is that of the modernizing Turkish state and transmitted to another generation the standard account of failed factories and economically inept Ottomans. This Tanzimat-republican Turkish tradition is alive and well in the present-day. Önsöy's 1988 book on Ottoman industry and the politics of industrialization is a latter-day version of Sarç, Osman Nuri and the nineteenth-century court historians, a study of mechanized factory industrialization from above.³⁵

Heavy emphasis on mechanized, factory-based manufacturing, of course, is hardly unique to Ottoman and republican Turkish writers. Rather, it is part of an intellectual tradition that, until recently, held sway in Western scholarship on manufacturing. Indeed, as is well-known and readily acknowledged, the interpretations of Middle Eastern scholars have been shaped profoundly by European economic historians, a part of the westernization process itself. Moreover, European and American literature concerning other regions of the globe has provided the intellectual inspiration for scholarship produced within the territories of the former Ottoman Empire.³⁶

Thus, in addition to their indigenous origins, the historiographies of Ottoman decline and de-industrialization also are heavily indebted to Western historiographical traditions concerning modernization and the Industrial Revolution. For the mainstream of Western writings on manufacturing, the Industrial Revolution was machine-driven production and an easily demarcated event that overwhelmed, outmoded and replaced (or soon would replace) existing, more primitive methods of manufacturing. Highly efficient, large-scale, capital-intensive factories *were* the Industrial Revolution that, in a triumphant march to a better world, outcompeted, out-produced and under-sold the artisans of the globe.

The high-tide of confidence in this future occurred in the 1960s, as victorious big-factory industrial capital was seen to be sweeping all before it. At this time, influential, benchmark studies appeared in both European and Middle Eastern economic history, works that scholars in both areas have profited from and