

> In this major new interpretation of the crisis of democracy in Italy after World War I, Douglas Forsyth uses unpublished documents in Italy's central state archives, as well as private papers, and diplomatic and bank archives in Italy, France, Britain and the United States, to analyze monetary and financial policy in Italy from the outbreak of war in August 1914 until the March on Rome in October 1922. Forsyth argues that the collapse of parliamentary government resulted from the failure of governments after 1918 to balance the conflicting claims of great power politics, social welfare, economic growth, and macroeconomic stability. Liberal reformers, such as Giovanni Giolitti, had performed a difficult balancing act between these goals under exceptionally favorable circumstances prior to World War I; after the war their room for maneuver was drastically reduced; and they chose stability, sacrificing the redistributive and social policies which would have been necessary to secure broad electoral support. Forsyth focuses on four aspects of Italy's political economy which shaped the post-war crisis: large budget deficits, and the inability of liberal governments to reform the tax system; the vulnerability of the Italian banking system to crises, which in turn threatened to undermine the basis of economic growth; persistent tensions between monetary and Treasury authorities in Rome on the one hand, and the leadership of the country's largest commercial banks in Milan on the other; and the collapse of the pre-war equilibrium in Italy's international balance of payments.



THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL ITALY



# THE CRISIS OF LIBERAL ITALY

MONETARY AND FINANCIAL POLICY, 1914–1922

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