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> In an important departure from current theories of causation, David Owens proposes that coincidences have no causes, and that a cause is something which ensures that its effects are no coincidence. In *Causes and coincidences*, he elucidates the idea of a coincidence as an event which can be divided into constituent events, the nomological antecedents of which are independent of each other. He also suggests that causal facts can be analysed in terms of non-causal facts, including relations of necessity. Thus, causation is defined in terms of *coincidence*, and *coincidence* without reference to causation.

> David Owens challenges ideas associated with Hume, Davidson and Lewis, constructing a theory which distinguishes nomological necessity and sufficiency from their logical counterparts. He is able to offer novel solutions to the major problems of causation, including the direction of causation, the logical form of causal statements, the problem of deviant causal chains, and the relationship between psychological and physical causation.

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TO MY PARENTS

Cambridge University Press 0521416507 - Causes and Coincidences David Owens Frontmatter More information

Contents

	Preface	page xi
	Introduction	1
I	THE INEXPLICABILITY OF A COINCIDENCE	6
	What is a coincidence?	6
	The inexplicability of a coincidence: agglomerativity	11
	The inexplicability of a coincidence: transitivity	15
	Explanation and laws	20
2	CAUSES AND LAWS	23
	Causal and nomological relations	24
	Some Humean theses	27
	Laws	32
	An argument for necessity?	38
	Conclusion	40
3	EVENTS AND NON-CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS	41
	Davidson	42
	Lewis	49
	Causation as causal explanation	60
4	CAUSAL EXPLANATION	63
	Empirical content	63
	Causal explanation	68
	Non-causal explanation	71
	Constitutive explanation and event constitution	77
5	THE DIRECTION OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION	82
	Causal forks	84
	Coincidences and the direction of causation	94

Cambridge University Press 0521416507 - Causes and Coincidences David Owens Frontmatter More information

x	Contents	
	Dummett's apple	98
	Experience and causation	102
	Some objections	105
	Knowledge and time	110
6	LEVELS OF CAUSATION	114
	The primacy of physics	115
	Reductionism and causal pervasion	121
	Reduction	124
	Autonomy and reduction	132
	Autonomy and causal pervasion	137
7	DEVIANT CAUSAL CHAINS	143
	The causal theory of perception	143
	Perception and physiology	152
	Perception and teleology	155
	The causal theory of memory	158
8	CAUSATION IN ACTION	163
	The causal theory of action	163
	Is decision theory empirical?	167
	The autonomy of psychology	170
	Deviance in action	173
С	onclusion: WHITHER CAUSAL REALISM?	178
Bi	182	
In	dex	186

Cambridge University Press 0521416507 - Causes and Coincidences David Owens Frontmatter <u>More information</u>

Preface

This book was written during my tenure of a Research Fellowship at Girton College, Cambridge. My greatest debt is to the Mistress and Fellows of Girton for electing me to that fellowship, without which this book could not have been written. During the last year of my stay in Girton, I held a British Academy Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship and I am grateful to the Academy for enabling me to complete the work.

Parts of this book derive from a D.Phil thesis submitted to Oxford University in 1988. Paul Snowdon was my thesis supervisor and the present work has greatly benefited from his patience, insight and intellectual generosity. Jennifer Hornsby first directed my attention to many of the issues discussed herein and, though we rarely agreed, her demand for clarity and her anti-reductionism have had their effect. Susan Hurley introduced me to decision theory and made me aware of its philosophical implications.

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xii

Preface

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