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Index
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Index

accessibility relation, 59–60
act utilitarianism, *see* utilitarianism, direct
Aczel, Peter, 100, 107
algorithm, 75, 76, 79, 101; *see also* feasibility
Anderson, C. A., 82, 86
antiextension, 106–6, 112, 115
antirealism, 89
arbitrary individual, 138, 140; *see also* quantification
arithmetic: epistemic, 72; justifiability of, 6, 7, 46, 49; Peano, 14, 51, 54–7; Robinson, 4–5, 52, 72
artificial intelligence, 132
Asher, Nicholas, 13, 64
as-if modeling, 152
Aumann, Robert, 30, 33, 63, 151

backward induction, 26, 28
Barwise, Jon, 64, 81, 82, 95, 98, 99–101, 104, 109–10, 125, 127, 132, 136
Bayesian conditionalization, 21, 23, 28, 29, 36, 40, 41
Bayesian game theory, *see* game theory, Bayesian
Bayes's theorem, 36, 40
belief, *see* de re/de dicto distinction; doxic logic; doxic paradox; justifiability of belief; mutual belief; objects of belief; probability; virtual belief
Benacerraf, Paul, 72
Bicchieri, Christina, 28, 29
blindspots, 9, 23, 24, 39, 150–2
Burali–Forti paradox, 100, 160
Burge, Tyler, 53, 81, 82, 89, 95, 98, 101, 109–10, 118–22, 132, 144, 161, 165

calling path, 112, 145
calling relation, 101, 112, 130, 135–6, 145
Carnap, Rudolf, 63
chains, infinitely descending, 98–9, 101, 113, 114, 118, 121–2, 146–7, 148
chain-store paradox, 2, 24, 26, 126–7, 131–2
charity, principle of, 117, 130, 144
Church, Alonzo, 48, 73, 74, 86
Clark, Herbert H., 62, 64
closing off operation, 105, 106, 108, 134
common knowledge, 25, 41–2, 62, 162 ; *see also* mutual belief
computational feasibility, *see* feasibility
computationalism, 62–4, 69, 80, 81, 86–7 150; *see also* representationalism
consequentialism, *see* utilitarianism
context sensitivity, 81–2, 96–7, 98–101, 124, 131, 143, 150, 162, 163, 165
convention, 62–3
correlated equilibrium, *see* equilibrium, correlated

Davidson, Donald, 63
data: degree of reliability of, 5, 65, 125, 143; inconsistent, 65–9; *see also* evidence
data sentences, 19, 66, 70, 75, 134
deduction, 138–40, 164
deductive closure, 6, 7, 45, 49, 138; *see also* logical omniscience
deductive consequence, 134, 138–9
demonstratives, 96, 111–12
denial, 85, 89–91, 100, 102
de re/de dicto distinction, 123
detached observer, 126
diagonalization, 5, 58, 59, 90; *see also* Gödel; self–reference
Donnellan, Keith, 89, 95
doxastic logic, *see* doxic logic
doxic logic, 58–61, 129
doxic paradox, 9, 13, 16, 19, 24, 43, 123, 126, 128, 134, 136; *see also* paradox of the disprover; paradox of the knower
Dutch book theorem, 20, 50, 54

epistemic logic, 15, 58, 61, 79–80
epistemic paradox, 13, 43; *see also* paradox of the disprover; paradox of the knower
epistemic situation (or state), 5, 16, 17, 19, 47, 66, 67, 72, 74, 75, 77, 125, 126, 134, 136, 143, *see also* data; self–evidence
equilibrium: correlated, 30, 151; mixed-strategy, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36; Nash, 24, 29, 32, 62, 70, 151; weak, 31

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Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-41269-8 - Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality
Robert C. Koons
Index
More information

Etchemendy, John, 81, 82, 95, 98–101, 104, 109–10, 125, 127, 132, 136
evidence, 16, 18–9, 23, 65; *see also* data, self-evidence
extension, 81, 99, 112, 115, 161

feasibility, computational, 69, 71, 72, 74, 78, 79
Feferman, Solomon, 51, 92–5
fixed point, 113, 114, 133, 148; minimal, 105, 106, 147
fixed-point definition, 64
Fodor, Jerry, 124
formal language, 160; *see also* natural language
foundation series, 104, 156
four-valued truth table, 93
Frege, Gottlob, 47
fundamental completeness, 104, 108, 155–6

Gaifman, Haim, 1, 2, 95, 98, 101–2, 110, 114, 116, 125, 127, 134
game: constant-sum, 31; iterated, 24; of incomplete information, 33; *see also* chain-store paradox; prisoners' dilemma
game theory: Bayesian, 24; noncooperative, 62, 151
Gärdenførs, Peter, 28
Gettier, E., 5, 62
Gödel, Kurt, 14, 43, 44, 46, 50, 51, 54–6, 59, 67, 72, 74, 76, 150; *see also* paradox of the disprover; self-reference
graph, directed, 112, 125–6, 135
Grice, H. P., 62
groundedness, semantic, 161; *see also* semantic well-foundedness
Gupta, Anil, 89, 96–9

Harman, Gilbert, 64
Harsanyi, John, 33, 34
Herzberger, H., 89
Hintikka, Jaakko, 63
Hodgson, D. H., 3

ideal belief, 46, 87; *see also* justifiability of belief; probability
ideal reasoner, 65, 67, 68, 74, 75, 78; *see also* logical omniscience; provability
incompleteness theorem, 50–1, 54–6, 67–8, 72, 74; *see also* Gödel
indexicality, 47, 81, 82, 96–7; *see also* context sensitivity
indication, 65–6
induction, 105–6, 133; *see also* backward induction
intensional equivalence, 92
intensional logic, 86
intensionalism, 13, 86–8; *see also* logical omniscience; modal logic; sentential operator
interest, principle of, 144
interpretation of tokens, 101, 105, 141–2; *see also* proposition-assigning function
iteration of belief, 7, 68, 69, 76

justifiability of belief, 3–4, 6, 14, 17, 24, 27, 126, 128, 130–1, 135, 143; ultimate, 18, 66, 67, 68, 72, 74, 89; *see also* probability; rational economic man

Kamp, Hans, 13, 64
Kaplan, David, 43, 46, 56–7, 59–60, 64, 80, 87
knowledge, 5, 62, 86; *see also* common knowledge; epistemic logic; paradox of the knower
Kleene truth table, 91, 105, 108, 134
Konolige, Kurt, 64
Kreps, David, 29, 34, 36
Kripke, Saul, 14, 53, 58, 63, 81, 88, 105, 116, 120, 161
Kyburg, Henry, 6, 16

lambda abstraction, 21
language, *see* formal language; metalanguage; natural language; pragmatics; semantics; syntax
levels of truth, 96, 99, 105–6; *see also* Tarskian hierarchy
Levi, Isaac, 28
Lewis, David, 22, 62, 64, 65, 67
liar paradox, *see* paradox of the liar
liar proposition, 100, 128, 161
Lindenbaum's lemma, 60
Löb, M. H., 43, 54, 57–8, 80
logical closure, *see* deductive closure
logical consequence, *see* deductive consequence
logical consistency, 5
logical omniscience, 5, 63, 65, 67, 69
logical saturation of models, 105, 111
loop, 101, 112, 114, 117, 118, 120, 121, 125, 126, 127, 129–30, 146
lottery paradox, 6
Lukasiewicz truth table, 91

many-valued logic, 91–5
Marshall, Catherine R., 62, 64
Martin, D. A., 92, 122, 160, 164
materialism, 150
mathematical community, 47–9
mathematical intuition, 48, 49, 53, 73, 90, 153; *see also* provability; self–evidence

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-41269-8 - Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality
Robert C. Koons
Index
More information

metalanguage, 85, 88
metalinguistic hierarchy, 81, 85, 116; *see also* Tarskian hierarchy
Milgrom, Robert, 29, *see also* Kreps, David
Miller's principle, 20, 21, 37, 38, 39, 41, 50; *see also* probability, second-order
modal logic, 14, 58–61, 87; canonical system of, 60; normal, 59, 73; paradoxical, 59; *see also* semantics, possible-worlds; sentential operator
modal operator, *see* sentential operator
model: Austinian, 106; Burgean, 103, 105–9, 111; partial, 100, 105, 111
Montague, Richard, 13, 15, 43, 45, 46, 56–7, 59–60, 62, 64, 80–1, 86
Moore's paradox, 16
mutual belief, 25, 28, 41–2, 62–72, 77–82, 132–3, 150

Nash equilibrium, *see* equilibrium, Nash
natural language, 81, 88, 98–100, 116, 160; *see also* sentence tokens
necessitation, rule of, 7, 58, 90, 95
negation, 85, 89–95, 102, 106, 128, 131
negative noniteration, principle of, 7, 16, 80

objects of belief, 86–7, 109, 123
Olin, Doris, 16, 22

paradox of the disprover, 43, 61, 85, 87, 94–5, 125
paradox of the knower, 7, 43, 45, 56–7, 59–60, 80, 82, 85
paradox of the liar, 1, 8, 9, 13, 26, 43, 58, 64, 81, 85, 87, 100, 104, 110, 123, 125, 149, 150; higher-order, 116, 160; strengthened, 89
paradoxicality, order of, 59
parameter, 100, 101, 102, 103, 110, 127, 132, 142, 143
Parsons, Charles, 81, 82, 95, 100, 132, 161–2, 165
Parsons, Terry, 89–91
partial models, *see* model, partial
payoff function, 33, 34
Peano arithmetic, *see* arithmetic, Peano
Perlis, Donald, 13
plausible reasoning, 4, 7, 65–6
pointer, 101, 110, 134
possible worlds, *see* semantics, possible worlds
pragmatics, 96–8, 110
preface paradox, 6
prior probability, *see* probability, prior
prisoners' dilemma, 2, 9, 24
probability: interval-valued, 132; of mathematical sentences, 48, 153–4; prior, 22, 33, 41; rational, 20, 21, 23, 24; second-order, 20, 37, 39
probability calculus, 19
proof, 46, 47, 48, 153
proposition: Austinian, 101–3, 127, 131, 137–9; Burgean, 99, 101–2, 107, 165; expression of by a sentence token, 87, 111, 136–7, 149, 161; individual, 87; inexpressible, 103, 110, 155
proposition-assigning function, 112–3, 142
provability: in arithmetic, 14, 51, 52, 58, 72; subjective, 43, 46, 72–4, 87, 154

quantification, 87, 100, 122, 148, 162–5

ramified type theory, *see* type theory, ramified
rational credibility, *see* justifiability of belief; probability
rational economic man, 4, 151
rational maximizer, 26
rationality, resource-bounded, 4, 69
redundancy theory of truth, 86
reference, definite, 62
refutation, 90–1, *see also* denial; proof
Regan, Donald, 3
rejection, *see* denial
Reny, Phillip, 28, 29
representationalism, 62, 150, *see also* computationalism
reputation, 24, 26–7, 150–2
Rescher, Nicholas, 4, 65–6
retaliation, 26–8
Roberts, J., 29, *see also* Kreps, David
Robinson arithmetic, *see* arithmetic, Robinson
rootedness, semantic, 104, 121, 163; *see also* semantic well-foundedness
Rowena–Columna story, 1, 3, 5, 17, 21, 23, 125–6, 128–9
rule-following, 152
Russell, Bertrand, 8, 62, 86, 87, 123, 162–3
Russell's paradox, 8, 9

Schiffer, Stephen, 64, 65, 67
Schwartz, Gideon, 17
self-evidence, 46–8, 52, 72–3, 75, 77, 90, 153–4
self-reference, 13, 14, 44, 50, 52, 54, 62, 65, 85, 86, 101, 123, 125, 128, 162
self-reference lemma, 44; *see also* diagonalization
Selten, Reinhard, 2, 24, 26
semantic well-foundedness, 104, 108, 109, 155–6

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CAMBRIDGE

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-41269-8 - Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality
Robert C. Koons
Index
More information

semantics, 88; possible worlds, 14, 63, 86, 123; *see also* pragmatics; syntax
sense, Fregean, 86–7
sentence tokens, 85, 96, 99, 101, 111, 113, 161; anchored, 117, 121–2; maximal, 117, 134, 144
sentence types, 85, 99–100, 111
sentential operator, 13, 87–8, *see also* intensionalism; modal logic
set theory, 102, 123, 148, 161–2; non-well-founded, 100, 107, 123
Shubik, Martin, 32
situation, 102–3, 127, 137; actual, 103; Burgean, 108, 155–6; possible, 141
Sobel, J. H., 32
social science, 151–2
Sorensen, Roy, 22, 24, 39
states of affairs (SOA's), 102–3, 137–8
strategy: centroid, 31; dominated, 70–1; mixed, 24; noncentroid, 24, 29, 30, 34, 36; pure, 29
strengthened liar, *see* paradox of the liar
structural isomorphism, 140–1
subjective probability, *see* probability
subjective provability, *see* provability, subjective
subjunctive conditional, 27, 36, 127
substitution, 13
subtoken, 124–5, 131, 134
surprise quiz paradox, 16, 22
symmetry, principle of, 144
syntax, 43, 44

Tarski, Alfred, 1, 44, 59, 64, 85, 87, 163
Tarskian hierarchy, 81, 85, 99, 116 133, 161–2
Thomason, Richmond, 13, 14, 15, 43, 45, 52, 55, 59, 81, 86
thought, language of, 124, 137
thought tokens, 124, 142, 144–5
three-valued truth table, 91
tokens, *see* sentence tokens; thought tokens
truth, *see* many-valued logic; paradox of the liar; redundancy theory of truth; truth-value gaps
truth tables, *see* four-valued truth table; Kleene truth table; three-valued truth table
truth-teller proposition, 104
truth-value gaps, 88–9, 98, 114, 127, 135
Turing machine, 75
type-free theory, 92
type theory, ramified, 62, 86, 162

universe of discourse, 102, 111, 160; *see also* quantification
Ur-model, 140, 143
Ushenko, A. P., 95
utilitarianism: direct, 25, 151; indirect, 151–2
utility, 33, 34

Van Fraassen, Bas, 20
virtual belief, 71–7, 132–3

warrant, 65; *see also* data; evidence
weak equilibrium, *see* equilibrium, weak
Wilson, Robert, 29; *see also* Kreps, David

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