

This book is about the role that psychological impairment should play in a theory of criminal liability. Criminal guilt in the Anglo-American legal tradition requires both that the defendant committed some proscribed act and that he did so with a certain attitude such as intent, knowledge, or recklessness. The second requirement corresponds to the intuitive idea that people should not be punished for something they did not do "on purpose" or if they "did not realize what they were doing." Although intuitive, this underlying idea can be highly controversial in theory and in practice, especially in cases involving the insanity defense.

This important new book addresses the conceptual and moral foundations of these issues. Unlike many previous works in this area, it addresses the automatism and insanity defenses by examining the types of functional impairment that typical candidates for these defenses actually suffer. What emerges is a much wider conceptual framework that allows us to understand the significance of psychological states and processes for the attribution of criminal responsibility in a manner that is logically coherent, morally defensible, and consistent with research in psychopathology.

The book will be of particular interest to legal theorists and practicing lawyers, philosophers of law, psychologists, and criminologists.



# Automatism, insanity, and the psychology of criminal responsibility



# Cambridge Studies in Philosophy and Law

GENERAL EDITOR: JULES COLEMAN (YALE LAW SCHOOL)

Advisory Board

David Gauthier (University of Pittsburgh)

David Lyons (Cornell University)

Richard Posner (Judge in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Chicago)

Martin Shapiro (University of California, Berkeley)

This exciting new series will reflect and foster the most original research currently taking place in the study of law and legal theory by publishing the most adventurous monographs in the field as well as rigorously edited collections of essays. It will be a specific aim of the series to traverse the boundaries between disciplines and to form bridges between traditional studies of law and many other areas of the human sciences. Books in the series will be of interest not only to philosophers and legal theorists but also to political scientists, sociologists, economists, psychologists, and criminologists.

Other books in the series


Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton: Forgiveness and mercy Stephen R. Munzer: A theory of property

R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Morris (eds.): Liability and responsibility: Essays in law and morals



# Automatism, insanity, and the psychology of criminal responsibility A philosophical inquiry

ROBERT F. SCHOPP
COLLEGE OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA-LINCOLN



#### CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

**CAMBRIDGE** 

NEW YORK PORT CHESTER MELBOURNE SYDNEY



#### CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo

Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521401500

© Cambridge University Press 1991

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 1991

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data

Schopp, Robert F.

Automatism, insanity, and the psychology of criminal responsibility: a philosophical inquiry / Robert F. Schopp.

p. cm.-(Cambridge studies in philosophy and law)

Includes index.

ISBN 0-521-40150-X

1. Insanity-Jurisprudence. 2. Criminal liability-Psychological aspects. 3. Automatism. I. Title. II. Series.

K5077.S36 1991

345'.04 - dc20

[342.54]

90–27604 CIP

ISBN-13 978-0-521-40150-0 hardback ISBN-10 0-521-40150-X hardback

Transferred to digital printing 2006



For those who show us how to live: Frank C. Schopp Winifred Schopp



# **Contents**

Pr	page 1x	
1	Introduction 1.1 MPC offense elements 1.2 Defenses 1.3 Conclusions and plan	1 4 14 24
2	Problematic defenses: Insanity 2.1 The search for a satisfactory standard 2.2 The status of the NGRI defense 2.3 Summary	27 27 51 68
3	Problematic defenses: Automatism 3.1 The American approach 3.2 The British approach 3.3 Conclusions	71 72 75 84
4	Actions, reasoning, and offenses 4.1 Action theory 4.2 An action theory analysis of offenses 4.3 Action and practical reason 4.4 Summary and conclusions	86 86 94 108 128
5	Automatism 5.1 Introduction and context 5.2 Action theory analysis 5.3 Applications 5.4 Conclusion	132 132 136 150 158

vii



#### Contents

6	The	insanity defense	160
U			
	6.1	C	160
	6.2	Introduction and context	164
	6.3	Volitional standards	165
	6.4	Psychopathology and the NGRI	
		defense	176
	6.5	Psychopathology and practical	
		reasoning	188
	6.6	Issues regarding classification	201
	6.7	Conclusions	213
7	Moral foundations		218
	7.1	Context	219
	7.2	Free will as psychological capacity	226
	7.3	Moral and legal applications	243
	7.4	The action theory analysis, free will,	
		and the MPC	251
	7.5	Conclusions	260
In	263		



# Preface and acknowledgments

In the Anglo-American tradition of criminal law, the state cannot convict and punish people for serious offenses merely because they have performed proscribed conduct. Legal guilt requires both that the defendant engaged in illegal behavior and that certain psychological requirements were fulfilled. Traditionally, these requirements have been very difficult to describe and justify. Consequently, they have been highly controversial, both in theory and in application.

This book clarifies and justifies the psychological components of criminal responsibility. It adopts two methodological premises that differentiate it from many prior investigations of these issues. First, it directs primary attention toward the structure of offenses. Historically, many writers have concentrated on the insanity defense, either as an independent concern or as the central piece of the larger puzzle involving criminal responsibility. The book treats the structure of offense elements as the core of the problem, addressing the insanity defense as an ancillary aspect of the broader system of offense elements and defenses. Second, to the extent that psychopathology undermines attributions of criminal responsibility, the book looks to the available information regarding the nature of the dysfunction involved in that pathology in order to advance the analysis of responsibility.

This book is based on a doctoral dissertation submitted to the Department of Philosophy at The University of Arizona. Several individuals made diverse and valuable contributions



### Preface and acknowledgments

to that dissertation. I am particularly indebted to Joel Feinberg, who contributed both to the dissertation itself and to the educational preparation that preceded it through his direction, teaching, writing, and guidance. David Wexler helped me appreciate the complexities of the law, the myriad of interactions that occur both within the law and at its intersection with other fields, and the importance of approaching interdisciplinary studies with careful attention to the potential contributions and limitations of each discipline. Allen Buchanan, Bruce Sales, and Holly Smith each contributed substantially both to this project and to my preparation for it.

I am also grateful to Jules Coleman, who introduced me to the formal study of moral and legal philosophy and reassured me through example that one can do serious work without taking it too seriously. Michael Quattrocchi accompanied me in our first tentative attempts to explore what I now think of as the philosophy of law and clinical psychology, although neither of us realized at the time that this was what we were doing. Perhaps the greatest credit should go to Mary, Bill, and those they represent for providing the impetus sufficient to move even Mike and me. Unfortunately, it seems unlikely that they will recognize their contributions or benefit from them. Ed O'Dowd has participated in a seemingly endless series of prolonged conversations about many topics relevant to this book. Let us hope that it draws primarily on the conversations during which we made some progress. I am also grateful for helpful comments made by two anonymous reviewers from Cambridge University Press and for Ronald Cohen's editorial skills.

Finally, Joel Feinberg's prominent influence on this undertaking requires one kind word for Josiah S. Carberry. Although he contributed nothing to this project, neither did he detract from it. For some, perhaps, this is the kindest word that honesty will allow or history will record.

Robert F. Schopp Lincoln, Nebraska



# Preface and acknowledgments

#### Note to the reader on language

Previous drafts of this book were written in gender-neutral language. Unfortunately, the results were awkward, distracting, and sometimes confusing because the book contains numerous real or hypothetical actors illustrating a variety of concepts and situations. In order to avoid detracting from the substantive argument, I have reverted to the traditional practice of using male pronouns and possessive adjectives when making general statements. Identifiable actors are referred to according to their proper gender. My aim is to present the arguments clearly to readers without offending them.