

Kant's theory of freedom



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TO THE MEMORY OF ERIC



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An earlier version of much of Chapter 2 is contained in my paper "Empirical and Intelligible Character in the Critique of Pure Reason," which was presented at the Seventh Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter on Kant's practical philosophy at the Hebrew University in December 1985 and is published in the proceedings of that conference: Kant's Practical Philosophy Reconsidered. The basic argument of Chapter 3 is foreshadowed in "The Concept of Freedom in Kant's 'Semi-Critical' Ethics," which appeared in the Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. That of Chapter 11 was initially presented in "Morality and Freedom: Kant's Reciprocity Thesis," which was published in the Philosophical Review. Similarly, early drafts of portions of the argument of Chapter 12 are contained in "The Hidden Circle in Groundwork III," which was presented at the Sixth International Kant Con-



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gress and is published in its proceedings, and "Kant's Preparatory Argument in Groundwork III," which was presented in a conference on the Groundwork held at Sigriswil, Switzerland, in June 1986 and is published in Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein kooperativer Kommentar. Finally, I initially dealt with the issues discussed in Chapter 13 in "Justification and Freedom in the Critique of Practical Reason," which was delivered at the Stanford Conference on Kant's Deductions in April 1986 and was published in its proceedings: Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three "Critiques" and the "Opus postumum." All of this material has been substantially revised for the book and in some cases, particularly the last, my views have changed significantly. Nevertheless, I would like to thank the organizers of these conferences, specifically Yirmahu Yovel, Otfried Höffe, and Eckart Förster, for inviting me to participate and, together with the editors of the abovementioned journals, for their kind permission to reuse some of the material they initially published.



Note on sources and key to abbreviations and translations

Apart from the Critique of Pure Reason and the Lectures on Ethics, all references to Kant are to Kants gesammelte Schriften (KGS), herausgegeben von der Deutschen (formerly Königlichen Preussischen) Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 volumes [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter (and predecessors), 1902]. References to the Critique of Pure Reason are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and second editions. References to the Lectures on Ethics are to Eine Vorlesung uber Ethik, edited by Paul Menzer, Berlin: Rolf Heise, 1924. Specific works cited in the main body of the text are referred to by means of the abbreviations listed below. Those cited only in the notes are given with the full title. Kant's letters are usually identified by means of recipient and date, and citations from them are based on the translation of Arnulf Zweig, Kant: Philosophical Correspondence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970). The other translations used are listed in what follows and, except in the case of the Critique of Pure Reason, are referred to immediately following the reference to the volume and page of the German text. It should be noted, however, that I have frequently modified these translations significantly. Where there is no reference to an English translation, the translation is my own.

A/B Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KGS 3 and 4).

> Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp Smith, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965.

Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (KGS 7). Anthro

> Anthropology from a Practical Point of View, trans. Mary J. Gregor, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974

Diss De Mundi Sensibilis Atque Intelligiblis Forma

Et Principiis (KGS 2).

On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World (The Inaugural Dissertation), trans. G. B. Kerferd and D. E. Walford, New York: Manchester University Press, 1968

Ethik Eine Vorlesung uber Ethik.

Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981.

Gr Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (KGS 4).

> Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton, New York: Harper & Row, 1964.



SOURCES AND ABBREVIATIONS

KprV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (KGS 5).

Critique of Practical Reason, trans. L. W. Beck, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956.

KU Kritik der Urtheilskraft (KGS 5).

Critique of Judgement, trans. Werner Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett,

1987.

MAN Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaften (KGS 4).

Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. James Ellington,

Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.

MK₃ Metaphysik K₃ (KGS 28).

 ML_1 Metaphysik L_1 (KGS 28).

MM Metaphysik Mrongovius (KGS 29).

MrM Moral Mrongovius II (KGS 29).

MS Die Metaphysik der Sitten (KGS 6).

The Metaphysic of Morals, Introduction and Part II (The Doctrine of Virtue), trans. Mary Gregor, Philadelphia: University of Pennsyl-

vania Press, 1964.

MV Metaphysik Volkmann (KGS 28).

Proleg Prolegomena zu einer jeden Kunftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft

wird auftreten konnen (KGS 4).

Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, trans. L. W. Beck, Indiana-

polis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950.

R Reflexionen (KGS 17–19).

Rel Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (KGS 6).

Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene

and Hoyt H. Hudson, New York: Harper & Row, 1960.