

### HARD CHOICES



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Decision making under unresolved conflict

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TO MY MOTHER,
EVA LUNENFELD LEVI
IN MEMORY OF MY FATHER,
ELIEZER ASHER LEVI



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#### Preface

For a long time, I have been interested in identifying the respects in which scientific inquiry is and is not value laden and have understood my ideas on this matter as a corrective to views advanced by Charles Peirce and John Dewey, in whose tradition I have located my own outlook. Dewey was also interested in the extent to which questions about values could be addressed in a manner exhibiting central features of scientific inquiry. In this volume, I have taken some first steps towards addressing this side of Dewey's concern.

I have had generous help and encouragement from many sources. Ruth Marcus read and commented copiously on an earlier version of what are now the first two chapters, inducing me to remove many errors. No doubt she will not be satisfied with the result, but I am very grateful for her help.

Norbert Hornstein read the entire manuscript and made several suggestions which, together with the comments of two referees for Cambridge University Press, led to a substantial reorganization of the contents of the book. I wish to thank him and the two referees (one of whom identified himself as Ned McClennen) for their kindness. Hornstein also suggested the title of the book. I am, of course, entirely to blame for accepting his suggestion.

Teddy Seidenfeld not only read a large portion of the manuscript, he participated in its construction through his encouragement and his positive contributions to the elaboration of the ideas contained therein.

I began work on this manuscript while on sabbatical leave at Cambridge University in 1980. I want to thank the members of the Faculty of Philosophy at Cambridge and the members of Darwin College for their kind hospitality. Special thanks are due to Hugh Mellor for his help and his attendance at the course of lectures I gave at Cambridge where I first elaborated the ideas which form the substance of this book.

I also thank those students who attended a recent seminar of mine at Columbia where I discussed the penultimate version of these ideas. Rebecca Berlow, Bruce Cooper, Yair Gutman, Melissa Mabon and Pinchas Ungvary were especially helpful.

Bruce Ackermann, Paul Lyon, Sidney Morgenbesser, Frederic Schick



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and Amartya Sen have all read parts of this essay or discussed its ideas with me. My debt to Sen in chapters 8 to 11 and to Schick in chapter 4 will be apparent, but I have learned from all of them.

The work done at Cambridge in 1980 was partially supported by a fellowship from the NEH and a grant from the NSF.

My wife, Judith, has been a gold mine of moral support. Without her encouragement, I would not have managed to see this or any other large project I have undertaken to a conclusion.

This book is dedicated to the memory of my father, Eliezer Asher Levi, whose passionate commitment to his values bred a model of integrity for me to emulate, and to my mother, Eva Lunenfeld Levi, whose love and support enabled me to stand on my own two feet.

New York City June 1985