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OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Volume 1

The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776–1865

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1. The Canvas and the Prism

In One Man's Lifetime

On June 17, 1775, an eight-year-old boy, led by his mother to a height near their home, watched the distant smoke of the Battle of Bunker Hill. There was no American nation, or even claim of one, until the next year. Thirteen British colonies, with a free population of about a million and a half, straggled near the Atlantic Coast from Passamaquoddy Bay to the St. Marys River.

The sole cluster of settlement far inland was in Kentucky. Only ten towns had more than 5,000 inhabitants, although 35,000 people lived in Philadelphia. In that city, second in size only to London in the British Empire, the boy's father was serving in the Continental Congress.

Three years later, John Quincy Adams sailed to Europe. During most of the rest of the Revolution he served as secretary to his father, in diplomatic service in Paris and The Hague, and to Francis Dana, an emissary sent to the court of Catherine the Great in a futile attempt to gain Russian recognition. In 1783, he returned to Paris, making a long overland journey, shortly after his father, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and Henry Laurens had signed the treaty that ended the American Revolution and provided the United States with a "great empire," nearly 900,000 square miles stretching to the Mississippi River.

After a short career at Harvard (he graduated Phi Beta Kappa after two years in residence) and a few years in law, young Adams turned to politics. He endorsed the Constitution, which, for the first time, provided the U.S. government with powers essential to effective bargaining in international affairs. Like his father, when parties emerged he became a Federalist, albeit an independent one.

In 1794, President Washington sent the younger Adams to Hol-

land as minister, then on a brief mission to London to tidy up loose ends connected with Jay's Treaty, the first major international agreement reached by the new government. During his father's presidency, from 1797 to 1801, he remained abroad, observing from the sidelines his country's undeclared war with France, the first of two occasions when the United States was drawn into the great wars touched off by the French Revolution. With Jefferson's accession, he lost his post.

Massachusetts Federalists sent Adams to the Senate in 1803. After an arduous carriage trip of three weeks, he reached Washington one day too late to vote on the Louisiana Purchase. All other Federalist senators voted against it, essentially because they feared that western settlement would cost their party power and influence. Adams himself believed the purchase unconstitutional, a not unreasonable position since Jefferson, though the buyer, more than half agreed that nothing in the Constitution authorized the government to annex territory. However, valuing national expansion and relieved to see France deprived of a lodgement on the North American continent, the new senator voted for the appropriations – about \$15 million – to complete the deal.

At about the same time, the war in Europe resumed after a short intermission. American commerce soon suffered severely at the hands both of the British and the French. Some of Adams's Federalist colleagues, particularly those from Massachusetts, let sympathies for Britain and hatred for Jefferson drive them to the verge of treason. Adams moved in an opposite direction, supporting resistance to attacks upon American interests and honor. In 1807, he served on the Senate committee that endorsed Jefferson's request for an embargo on foreign trade, though this was universally disapproved by other Federalists. "This measure," he said to a committee colleague, "will cost you and me our seats, but private interest must not be put in opposition to public good." The prediction proved accurate: Massachusetts elected a successor even before Adams's term expired. He promptly resigned from the Senate.

In 1809, after the Senate rejected his first nominee, James Madison named Adams minister to Russia. At St. Petersburg, where he became the first American minister formally recognized by the Rus-

sian government, Adams worked to secure good treatment for American commerce. He developed warm relations with Tsar Alexander I; they often strolled on the banks of the Neva together, talking all the while about every subject under the sun. Toward the end of his mission, he observed the defeat of Napoleon's invasion in 1812. "The politicians who have been dreading so long the phantom of universal monarchy may now rest their souls in peace," he wrote his father, referring to Americans who used the bogey of Napoleon to support their calls for close ties with England.

At the same time, he watched from afar, and with growing discouragement, the tangled and indeed disgraceful antics of American politicians seeking to reconcile the irreconcilable – peace, prosperity, and honor – in the face of British and French attacks upon neutral trade. When at last, in 1812, Britain relaxed assaults on American trade, Adams rejoiced. Within weeks he learned that, before this news reached Washington, Madison and the Congress had resigned themselves to war. Adams regretted the misfortune of war, believing that "its principal cause and justification was removed at precisely the moment when it occurred," but also considered it a perhaps necessary test of American republicanism.

Thus far, to his forty-seventh year, Adams had been on the fringes of diplomacy, an actor but not a major one. For the next sixteen years, he was to be the dominant figure, first as one of the negotiators of the treaty that ended the War of 1812, then as secretary of state for nearly eight years, finally as president. As secretary, among other things, he negotiated the Spanish treaty of 1819, which gained Florida for the United States and drove a western boundary through to the Pacific, and in the autumn of 1823 played a role not even second to that of the president in development of the Monroe Doctrine.


Adams's own presidency, from 1825 to 1829, was unhappy in all respects, primarily because, although he was the first chief executive to give up knee breeches for the modern dress of trousers, he was out of touch with the emerging spirit of Jacksonian America. His mismanagement of the central diplomatic issue, restrictions on American trade with Britain's Caribbean colonies, and the failure of his effort to buy Texas from Mexico, newly independent of Spain, merely conformed to the pattern of his administration.

Routed by Andrew Jackson when he sought reelection, Adams soon began a new political career in the House of Representatives, where, now a Whig, he served for seventeen years. Toward the end of this career, the expansionist surge called Manifest Destiny swept the nation. Adams had long been an expansionist, writing years before that the United States was destined to be "coextensive with the North American Continent, destined by God and by nature to be the most populous and powerful people ever combined under one social contract," but the old fire was gone. He supported the American claim to the entire Oregon country, citing the arcane legal and diplomatic record as well as the Bible to support it. On one occasion, he had the House clerk read from the Book of Psalms, "Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession," a clear reference, Adams thought, to the Americans, who were God's "chosen people." When President Polk settled the matter by compromise, however, Adams did not protest. He did strongly oppose the annexation of Texas and, as much as failing health would allow, the war with Mexico. In both instances, the abolitionist emphasis of his later career was the principal reason; he saw these expansionist drives not as national but rather as slavery-driven ones.

In February 1848, Adams suffered a stroke on the floor of the House of Representatives; two days later he died in the Capitol. "Where could death have found him," asked his former foe and recent ally, Senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, "but at the post of duty?" The very day that Adams collapsed, the president received word that Mexico had agreed, as the price of peace, to cede the Southwest and California. These acquisitions, and the Oregon settlement, increased the size of the United States to more than 3 million square miles, making it a continental empire with a white population of more than 20 million.¹

Thus events from 1775 on unrolled with amazing rapidity. The United States secured independence; created a constitution, which

¹ A small acquisition from Mexico, the Gadsden Purchase, rounded out the boundaries of the forty-eight states in 1853. Alaska and Hawaii, which became states much later, were acquired in 1867 and 1898 respectively.



The republican empire

made possible the wielding of national power; survived the dangerous years of the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; and, by negotiation and pillage, built the geographic base for its future as a world power. As Adams had feared, however, the annexation of Texas and the Mexican cession sundered the union he so much cherished; slave states and free vied to spread their respective systems into the new territories. It required a civil war, from 1861 to 1865, to confirm the American future.² In the years after 1865 the nation would add the industrial strength that was to be the largest component of its twentieth-century power, but the essential base had been created in little more than the political lifetime of John Quincy Adams.

Interests

The driving forces in American foreign policy both are and are not like those of other nations. They include the same emphasis on national self-interest, the same intrusion of the larger culture, the same distortions – sometimes minor, sometimes substantial – of the view of world events seen through a prism of national but not universal values. But each of these forces, or factors, also has a peculiarly American character.

At least since publication, in 1959, of William Appleman Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, the most influential contribution to diplomatic history in many years, historians (and polemicists) have adopted his thesis that the United States has always been "expansionist." In at least one sense, of course, this is a truism. Every nation serves first of all its own interests, even those which, like the United States after 1776, France after 1789, and the Soviet Union after 1917, profess to represent the aspirations of the entire world. Whereas some few have acknowledged limits on their power, most have sought to expand their sway when opportunity beckoned, puissant ones showing global ambition and lesser states seeking regional influence.

2 Fittingly, one of the primary actors in wartime diplomacy was Charles Francis Adams, John Quincy's son, who served Lincoln as minister to the Court of St. James, fighting doughtily to foil Confederate efforts to gain British support.

Americans, at least many of them, certainly were expansionists, before independence and after, even before most of them thought of “America” as more than a geographical term. And they were proud of it. In 1771, a young graduate of Yale, Timothy Dwight, published the first of many patriotic effusions that, along with sermons and works of philosophy, were to flow from his pen:

Hail land of light and glory! Thy power shall grow
Far as the seas, which round thy regions flow;
Through earth's wide realms thy glory shall extend,
And savage nations at thy scepter bend.
And the frozen shores thy sons shall sail,
Or stretch their canvas to the ASIAN gale.

In the succeeding century, similarly chauvinistic statements echoed Dwight. More to the point, his predictions largely came true. American dominion grew “far as the seas,” through to a Pacific coastline more than a thousand miles long. The Americans did force “savage nations,” Mexico and the Indian tribes, to bend to their scepter. They “stretched their canvas” over the globe. Whether they achieved worldwide “glory” or influence is problematic; they were both respected and scorned – worse yet, sometimes ignored – in other lands. Still, Dwight’s youthful effort laid out what would be the agenda of American diplomacy in the years before the Civil War.

In the nation’s early years, foreign commerce was an extremely important factor in the economy. Although what was essentially subsistence farming remained predominant, a market economy steadily developed, and foreign markets quickly became an important part of the system. At no other time has such a high proportion of the national product been exported, and the price level of many important commodities was essentially determined by export prices. At least until John Quincy Adams’s presidency, every chief executive devoted much of his attention to the fostering of trade and the vibrant merchant marine that carried it.

Even while they were colonies, and on the whole loyal ones, the Americans dissented from the mercantilism of the British Navigation Acts system, which in effect largely limited their trade to intraimperial exchange. They wanted freedom to trade with as many

nations as possible, whether in or outside British domains, in whatever goods they chose. Logically enough, their policies as a nation differed from those of other countries; in general, they sought to expand commerce by unshackling rather than directing it. Still, their basic purpose differed little from that of almost all nations at many times.

Territorial expansion began when Pilgrims took the first step off Plymouth Rock and Virginians pushed up the James River. As long as the colonials were British subjects, they strongly supported imperial expansion, urging London to displace the French, in particular, from territory they wished to exploit and develop. After independence, they continued the process. By 1865, America had expanded to the Pacific Ocean, and citizens often boasted that the nation had become an empire.

Such massive expansion into contiguous areas is not common. The nearest parallel is Russian expansion under the tsars, 'begun in the late fifteenth century and essentially completed in the nineteenth. In that long process, the Russian people spread out from their original center around Moscow, just as Americans moved westward from the Atlantic Coast. A central purpose, however, was to establish dominion over large non-Russian populations whose efforts could be exploited by the center. The Americans, on the other hand, did not seek to reduce native Americans or, for that matter, Mexicans to the role of laborers in their vineyard. To say this is not to exalt the Americans' morality: Their purpose was no less selfish; their methods, particularly in dealing with the Indians, were often cruel. However, they sought land and its resources, not a subordinate population. They would have been happiest if the Indians had simply disappeared, and it is no accident that the half of Mexico that was seized contained only a few thousand inhabitants. This kind of expansionism was unique to the United States.

Of Dwight's catalog, there remains only the category of "glory," of expanding influence and respect. The Americans considered themselves a model society, one destined to transform the world. As John Quincy Adams's father wrote in 1765, expressing what was already a widespread view, "I always consider the settlement of America with reverence and wonder, as the opening of a grand

scheme and design of Providence for the illumination and emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth." The success of the Revolution and the establishment of republican government increased such feelings, and most Americans believed, although historians still debate the degree of accuracy in their claims, that the French and Latin American revolutions, as well as the European revolts of 1848, confirmed the argument. Thus it was possible for Herman Melville to write, in his novel, *White Jacket*, published in 1850, "we bear the ark of the liberties of the world. . . . And let us always remember that with ourselves, almost for the first time in the history of earth, national selfishness is unbounded philanthropy; for we cannot do good to America, but we give alms to the world." From one end of John Quincy Adams's life to the other, Americans endlessly demanded that they be respected as a model for the world.

Before the Civil War, this thought usually was harmless arrogance; only occasionally, in happy contrast to later times, did a price have to be paid. Many other nations have phases of arrogance in their history, some of them nearly as long as the American. This last form of "expansion" is, like the others, a function of the inherent egocentrism of any nation's diplomacy. The American form differed; the central meaning did not.

Values

The form sprang, of course, from American cultural values. In all nations, those who make decisions are influenced not merely by the information at their disposal but by the values they bring to the consideration of that information. When the United States was born, and for many years thereafter, foreign policy decisions in most countries were made by and subject to the scrutiny of a relative few, at most of a legislature. George Canning, after he became foreign secretary of Great Britain in 1822, is considered the first European diplomatist who sought broader support from the political public as a whole. In the United States, things were quite different from the outset. Revolutionary leaders and, later on, government officials had to seek national concurrence in their policies; the policies had to coincide with or be justified in terms of national values. In sum,

from the beginning, “the cultural setting [was] less a backdrop than a vital cog in the workings of foreign affairs.”³

The core beliefs lasted so long – to our own time – and became so embedded in the American outlook that they seem unremarkable today. However, although drawn in part from the thinking of others, particularly in seventeenth-century England, they were radical departures from the dominant values of Europe at the time of the Revolution and for many years continued to be far more pervasive than in other countries. Moreover, they gained strength from the apparently confirming events of the years from independence to the Civil War. Indeed, it is impossible to understand American foreign policy without recognizing the profound, persistent impact of an ideology that emerged during the colonial and early national periods.

The most important belief was a commitment to republicanism, a striking departure from an otherwise nearly universal commitment to monarchy. Although Europeans might debate the proper extent of royal power, at least until the French Revolution (and in most countries the debate would continue for many more years), the stability provided by monarchical institutions was generally considered essential to political order.⁴

Largely as a consequence of lessons they rightly or wrongly drew from the pre-Revolutionary controversy, but also because their colonial experiments in local republicanism had been generally successful, the Americans rejected this concept. “By the eighteenth century,” Edmund S. Morgan notes, “the sovereignty of the people was taken for granted.” Of course, he adds, in practice, even in the most egalitarian colonies, elites dominated, but this was seldom discussed: “Popular sovereignty . . . became the prevailing fiction in a society whose government was traditionally the province of a relatively small elite.”⁵

3 Morrell Heald and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Culture and Diplomacy* (Westport, Conn., 1977), ix.

4 During the turmoil in France from 1789 to 1815, High Federalists often contrasted the stability of monarchical England with the mobocracy and then the Caesarism of England’s enemy, but even this small faction never considered abandoning republicanism, as they defined it, in the United States.

5 Edmund S. Morgan, *Inventing the People* (New York, 1988), 143, 148.

For a generation or more after independence, Americans worried about the fate of their experiment in popular government. Jeremiahs at one end of the political spectrum or the other frequently bewailed the failures of republicanism as currently practiced. Some feared that republicanism would be destroyed by demagoguery; others saw the looming shape of aristocratic control or Caesarism. Still, no true American suggested that the concept itself be abandoned, only that distortions be corrected. Americans agreed that republicanism – and the United States as its preeminent practitioner – represented the hope of the present and the future.

Closely allied with republicanism, ever more so as the nation progressed, was the concept of individualism, both political and economic. The predominance of individualism was the central theme – sometimes the object of praise, often of criticism – of the great commentary, *Democracy in America*, published by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835. Unlike French republicans after 1789, the Americans seldom talked of a “national will” transcending the views of individuals. Although government intervened in economic matters much more than is suggested by polemicists expressing reverence for the policies of the Founding Fathers, and although, too, cooperative economic efforts became increasingly important, individual free enterprise was the model form, as befitted the nation of farms and farmers that America was at its birth. As Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1815, uniting the themes of republicanism and individualism, America was a “model of government, securing to man his rights and the fruits of his labor, by an organization constantly subject to his own will.”

The virtually universal endorsement of republicanism and individualism by no means translated into unanimity regarding foreign affairs. Indeed, disputatious, sometimes violent disagreements over policy began well before the celebrated clash between Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian views in the 1790s and continued beyond the Civil War. However, differences over policy should not obscure the common body of beliefs shared by virtually every American, beliefs that deeply influenced both sides in all the debates and both gave impetus to and placed limits upon the rival policies put forward.

Their credo – one could call it their ideology, were not the latter

word so laden with negative implications; one could call it their ideals, were not that word so laden with favorable ones – meant that Americans and, to a very large extent, their presumably more sophisticated leaders instinctively distrusted monarchical, statist regimes. (John Quincy Adams's respect for Tsar Alexander is an exception proving the rule.) These beliefs also meant, with qualifications soon to be noted, that Americans welcomed and endorsed revolutions. In 1796, President Washington expressed a national outlook when he averred that his "best wishes were irresistibly excited whenever, in any country, he saw an oppressed nation unfurl the banners of freedom." Largely but not exclusively because noninterventionist ideas predominated, the Americans only very rarely even considered positive action in support of struggles against monarchy. But the wishes of Washington, Adams, and their countrymen were important, frequently coloring the policy of the United States.

The Prism

Every nation views others in the world through a prism shaped by its own experience. Even today, American statesmen, and those who record their actions, often overlook this simple, almost self-evident point. As Reginald Stuart observes, "Americans have historically found it difficult to step outside of themselves when judging others. And they have rarely realized how much their own values unconsciously smudged the lenses through which they viewed the world."⁶ The belief system, the product of experience, conditions the way in which Americans have viewed world developments and consequently how they have responded to them.

Every nation, of course, has its own prism – the Russian view of world events, for example, is warped by memories of the series of invasions from Charles XII of Sweden early in the eighteenth century through Hitler in the twentieth – but each is, like the American, unique. America's commercial policies cannot be explained if one ignores the nation's devotion to individualism; closed systems and

6 Reginald C. Stuart, *United States Expansionism and British North America* (Chapel Hill, 1988), xiii.

statist controls were by definition condemned, and "open doors" were preferable. America's drive for territory, in large part the product of greed, derived essential strength from the prism of cultural values, which allowed Americans to see themselves as bringing progress and improvement to Louisiana or Florida or Oregon or Mexico.

Similarly, the reaction of Americans to revolutions abroad was essentially a projection of their vision of their own. They had, they firmly believed, risen against tyranny, avoided sanguinary excesses and social turmoil, created a republic – such was God's path for the world. Thus they welcomed antimonarchical risings but, in a frequently repeated "cycle of hope and disappointment,"⁷ recoiled when revolutions went beyond the purely political sphere to repression, Bonapartism, and deep social change. The Terror divided Americans previously nearly unanimously in favor of the French Revolution. The "Springtime of Revolutions" in 1848, antimonarchical and nationalist explosions in half a dozen European countries triggered by a Paris rising, roused applause, but the radical violence that developed in France soon alienated many Americans. Between these dates, in 1830, still another French revolution, a move in the direction of liberalism but not even a republican one, earned praise from President Jackson because of "the heroic moderation which . . . disarmed revolution of its terrors." The contrast is instructive.

In reacting as they did, Americans too often failed to remember two special circumstances that had made their kind of revolution possible. Alexis de Tocqueville, perhaps the most perceptive foreign analyst of American society, drew attention to them 150 years ago. "Nothing," he wrote, "is more fertile in marvels than the art of being free, but nothing is harder than freedom's apprenticeship." Virtually self-governing throughout most of their history as colonies, they came to freedom with patterns of behavior and thought that made republicanism both logical and easy; they did not have to exorcise political privileges of rank or transform the economic order to create conditions in which republicanism could thrive. Others were not so lucky, and when they went past what Americans consid-

7 Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987), 97.

ered the proper boundaries of revolution, they lost American sympathies.

Because national egotism was strong, the inability of others to create individualist republicanism was explained in terms of their inferiority to Americans. Thus Jefferson wrote of the people in Europe in 1787, "A thousand years would not place them on that high ground on which our common people are now setting out." When revolution broke out while he was American minister in Paris, Jefferson at first considered limited monarchy rather than republicanism the appropriate solution for France, because the French were so ill-prepared for self-government. Years later, when the Latin Americans rose against Spanish rule, virtually every American welcomed the revolt but many, including Jefferson, rightly doubted that true republicanism would follow. "They have not the first elements of good or free government," John Quincy Adams asserted. "Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon their habits, and upon all their institutions."

These two apparently dissimilar reactions are in fact reflections of the same facet of the prism. Republicanism in the American style was the highest form of government. Those who compromised it might be inherently inferior as a result of their history, but in any event they sinned. Throughout their history, Americans have regarded foreign nations in this way.

A sentence in *Democracy in America* also encapsulates the second distortion provided by the prism. In a characteristic tone, Tocqueville wrote, "Their fathers gave them a love of equality and liberty, but it was God who, by handing a limitless continent over to them, gave them the means of long remaining equal and free." The Americans were blessed with abundant land and resources. There was of course poverty, perhaps most notably in the cities that burgeoned before the Civil War. There was slavery: One out of six Americans was a slave when the first census was taken in 1790, one out of eight – four million in all – when the Civil War began. For the great preponderance of Americans, however, conditions were much better than in other nations; in particular, the proportion of landowners was higher than elsewhere. Above all, although there were of course periodic slumps, a high rate of economic growth prevailed.

This eased the path to republicanism, contributed to national stability, and strengthened the devotion to individualism. "We supposed that our revelation was 'democracy revolutionizing the world,'" a historian has written, "but in reality it was 'abundance revolutionizing the world.'"⁸ In other nations, or at least many of them, political change evoked class conflict and rivalry over economic shares, creating what from the American point of view was unrepublican turmoil. Such tensions existed in the United States, but comparatively speaking they were muted. Americans simply could not understand "the contrast between [for example] the three or four Frances that tore at each other's throats and the one America that hustled its way into the future."⁹

The prism concept suggests one other line of thought. For years it has been fashionable among scholars to distinguish between ideals and self-interest as motives of foreign policy, to see them as polar opposites. In fact, mingling is the norm; conflict between national interest and national culture is the exception. And for this the prism is largely responsible. As Max Weber wrote many years ago, "Interests (material and moral), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the 'images of the world' created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept action going."¹⁰ In sum, material interests, culture, and the prism combine in a complex interplay that creates foreign policy.

There is no clearer illustration of the compatibility of the three factors than the devotion to isolationism. The Americans sought commerce with all the world, but they refused to become involved in the politics of other continents and, in particular, to align themselves with any other power. Sometimes compromised in practice, notably in the alliance with France, which was essential to the success of the Revolution, political isolation was an unvarying desire and increasingly became fixed dogma, even though the word itself

8 David M. Potter, *People of Plenty* (Chicago, 1954), 134.

9 Clinton Rossiter, *The American Quest* (New York, 1971), 12.

10 Quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 4th ed. (New York, 1967), 8.

was not used to describe policy until the twentieth century. Such a policy was obviously prudent: A state with all interests save the commercial confined to its own periphery was made stronger in that area by the width of the Atlantic Ocean. A power weak by world standards could only suffer from involvement in the wars of greater ones, and an uninvolved power could hope, at a time when the rights of neutrals were taken more seriously than later, to profit greatly from wartime trade.

At the same time, involvement in the sordid politics of Europe could be and was regarded by the Americans as contaminating, a descent to the level of court intrigues and amoral national selfishness contrary to the principles of republicanism. Involvement would force compromises of principle, expose simple but honest American diplomats to the wiles of cynically tricky Europeans, and, perhaps above all, dim the "beacon of liberty," the light to the world held forth by the United States. These beliefs in turn created the prism through which Americans viewed developments across the seas, an angle of vision that conditioned interpretations of actual developments and confirmed the mind-set that had created the prism in the first place.

The concerns and ideas just discussed, as we have seen, had roots in the colonial period. In a sense, there was an American pattern of behavior and thought before there was an America. Down to at least 1763, the colonists were able to reconcile their outlook with continued devotion to the British Empire. On the whole, they were happy, reasonably prosperous, and free. During the next century, they would carry their ambitions and their culture into an ever widening theater of action.