AN UNCOUNSELLED KING

Charles I and the Scottish troubles, 1637–1641

PETER DONALD

New College, University of Edinburgh

CONTENTS

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The king and his counsel

In a struggle deriving from alienation felt in church and in state the Scots offered a major challenge to kingship as Charles I understood it. At first they argued merely that the king was badly counselled – in general terms a line of criticism quite common in the Europe of the day, but a charge that could threaten far-reaching remedies. It was one that Charles I was singularly disposed to reject. A remedy pushed from below was to his mind more aggravation than cure. An assault on his authority deserved only the name of treason.

The challenge, which developed considerably through the period of his troubles, has attracted good attention in recent years from historians, although many questions undoubtedly remain. Charles's response has been less thoroughly dealt with, crucial though it was for the history of the period. How he managed in these crisis years is the principal concern of this study. Stability was no easy matter: built into the situation were problems of multiple-kingdom government undoubtedly relevant to the complex of troubles which Charles became obliged to face. His line towards the Scots illustrates clearly a style of operation which was ill-suited across all of his kingdoms at the time. The limited brief here of investigating the handling of the Scottish troubles has implications which range more widely.

The King of England, Scotland and Ireland enjoyed considerable authority in the early seventeenth century. If practically there were strangleholds on the effectiveness and range of policy, in name and presence the king was highly impressive. Because according to scripture the king was the Lord's anointed, changes in the course of government had to have royal assent. But was the king's will not to be questioned? The alienated Scots found it both politic and necessary to denounce evil counsellors, and bishops in particular, for their part in influencing the king's direction. Over a church policy seen as both unpopular and wrong they dared to suggest that Charles ought to consult a general assembly and parliament. The troubles burgeoned when the king despite everything denied that there was a problem.

The tensions of high politics in the early modern state lay often in the

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attempts by governments to enforce centralised rule and, not least, a single variety of religion. The consensus of their peoples, and the very means to effect their aims of government, were rarely assured. Programmes varied on the ideals appropriate to the national churches, as indeed on the desirability of interventionism in the localities.[1] In the three-kingdom situation after 1603 faced first by James VI and then by Charles I after 1625, the problems were multiplied and intensified. Matters of and around the church came to be of considerable significance – although this must be said without prejudice to the very real concerns in all three kingdoms over taxation, trade and other matters of social or economic policy. Nevertheless, the conversion of common dissent into major crisis requires explanation.

After the regnal Union of 1603 the Scots had been placed in the novel situation of having an absentee king, and this in the midst of a period already marked by radical social change engendered not least by the Reformation. Within the Protestant ecclesiastical settlement were further questions of a disruptive nature as committed standpoints on presbyterian church government lasted throughout and beyond the revival of episcopacy by James around the period of union; determined nonconformity was often the response to other ecclesiastical initiatives. The prominent opposition to the prayer book of 1637 arose out of this and it became entrenched to an extent well beyond expectations. The reaction of Charles I was uncompromising. From royal fury, the situation even came to war, and then back to an uneasy peace in 1641.

The kingdoms of England, Ireland and Scotland were united under one king in 1603 on the death of the childless Queen Elizabeth. James VI of Scotland, long since prepared, enthusiastically took up the wealth and power of the late queen's dominions. By this dynastic accident, problems of centuries past between Scotland and her strong southern neighbour seemed capable of being solved. The best possible means was now at hand to conclude good relations. Royal authority might equally be enhanced. There was a chance to curb effectively the history of border raids where the two countries joined; James wanted the area to be renamed the 'Middle Shires'. In a different part of the periphery, Ireland, only newly free from rebellion, could now be controlled with the best cooperation of both England and Scotland; the prospect for the Irish, as for all marginal sectors, was an ever fuller subjection to the king's writ.[2]

The Union of 1603, as has recently been argued, was a 'starting-point, a

[1] H. G. Koenigsberger, *Politicians and Virtuosi* (1986), pp. 1–25.
[2] T. W. Moody, F. X. Martin and F. J. Byrne (eds.), *A New History of Ireland*, vol. III (Oxford, 1978), pp. 140–1, 187.

basis, a *sine qua non*.[3] What actually was united by a single crowned head
was a subsequent political process. Residual hostilities between the kingdoms
were considerable, although there had been links – religious, economic and
cultural – long before 1603. A single king drew prestige and power. Scots
were proud that their king had gone south; James's pursuit of the title 'Great
Britain' indicated something of what he thought should accrue from a joining
of the kingdoms. Abroad he was happy to remain *rex pacificus*; the Union
offered extra security. At home his consuming vision was to promote the idea
and reality of union and amity between his peoples. But the potential tensions
of the situation were as great as its promise, and they became quickly
manifest.

The problems emerged through the opening years as the king cautiously
but insistently forwarded his project of union. At the earliest stage, provision
was made in the Scottish parliament to exclude laws and religion from the
brief of the Union Commission, for English takeover was feared. The Scots'
sensitivity to being trampled under the feet of the more wealthy and numer-
ous English was justifiable. James treasured the project of union, but it
foundered on both sides. English people for their part harboured distrust of
Scots from the past, and were all too prone to jealousies and arrogance in the
present. Lasting agreement on trade was elusive; even settlement on the
administration of the renamed 'Middle Shires' was not straightforward. On
a number of matters the king proceeded outside the parliaments, with mixed
measure of success. The flag called the Union Jack was never popular;
Calvin's case, to establish rights of the *post nati*, those born after 1603,
achieved the desired target of rights of naturalisation though raising import-
ant legal and constitutional points too, for allegiance due to the king and for
the sovereign status of Scotland in English law. James also reformed the coin-
age and did what he could to ease the disagreements on commerce between
the nations. Laws and the church were left for further action.[4]

A formal settlement of a union that would satisfy both Scots and English
was not achieved. The Scots wanted a more federal arrangement than the
English would allow. A well-developed sense of patriotic identity continued
to sustain Scottish independence feeling long after the first union schemes.
James himself had no wish to eliminate all Scottish distinctiveness, however
much he wanted it to be assimilable, in a unity of hearts and minds, to that of

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[3] B. Galloway, *The Union of England and Scotland, 1603–1608* (Edinburgh, 1986), p. 1.
[4] The best account is in Galloway, *The Union of England and Scotland*. See also M. Lee, Jr,
Government by Pen: Scotland under James VI and I (1980), pp. 34–8, 83–6; B. R. Galloway
and B. P. Levack (eds.), *The Jacobean Union*, SHS (Edinburgh, 1985); B. P. Levack, *The
Formation of the British State: England, Scotland and the Union, 1603–1707* (Oxford,
1987). For the 'Middle Shires', see C. M. F. Ferguson, 'Law and order on the Anglo-Scottish
border, 1603–1707' (unpublished University of St. Andrews Ph.D. dissertation, 1981).

the English. At least one dimension of it though was to be erased. The presbyterians of Scotland were forming their own sense of Scottish national identity. The British church vision that had fired some of the first-generation reformers was somewhat left behind, as alongside less influential English counterparts the Scots made criticism of the church as it was established in England. As an element which thus challenged the royal authority which upheld the establishment, they were eminently worthy of suppression.[5]

Without closer union, administrative separation – an expedient in 1603 eyes – lasted. England provided a seat for the monarchy and so became the centre of government. In all three kingdoms privy councils helped by handling administration – the putting out of orders, the hearing of petitions, the resolving of local disputes – with variable degrees of efficiency.[6] How much they advised is an important point. Only for English affairs could the king easily sit in person in his privy council and so hear their consultations. Advice written from a distance was less sure of success; the Scots sent delegations or representatives south over major issues. In practice James and Charles were also open to counsel from anyone who gained the necessary access to their persons, a personal dimension of government which was highly important. The chain of patronage stretched downwards from the king, who preferred and rewarded servants at his discretion. Court was the centre stage of national politics. The institutional machinery of government, because it was the king's, had limited room for sustained opposition to him. As positions and policy ultimately depended on the king, all politicking, statesmanlike or otherwise, hung absolutely on gaining his approval.[7]

The handling of 'British' policy was not straightforward, given the lack of any British machinery of government. With the diverse needs of the kingdoms, decisions over trade or foreign policy easily risked causing offence, particularly in the outlying kingdoms, Scotland and Ireland. Communication by letter achieved a measure of contact, but neither this nor the visits of individuals, officially or otherwise, to the king at Court could fully compensate for the problems raised by monarchy over a number of separate kingdoms. Predictably England became the measure for at least most things, but not without tensions. In Ireland, where anglicisation was equated with Protestantism and civilisation, advances were made despite a largely Catholic and

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[5] G. Donaldson, *The Making of the Scottish Prayer Book of 1637* (Edinburgh, 1954), pp. 4–23; A. H. Williamson, *Scottish National Consciousness in the Age of James VI* (Edinburgh, 1979).

[6] K. Sharpe, 'Crown, parliament and locality: government and communication in early Stuart England', *EHR*, 101 (1986), 321–50; P. G. B. McNeill, 'The jurisdiction of the Scottish privy council 1532–1708' (unpublished University of Glasgow Ph.D. dissertation, 1960); H. F. Kearney, *Strafford in Ireland, 1633–41* (Manchester, 1959).

[7] C. S. R. Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics 1621–1629* (Oxford, 1982), pp. 5–18; D. Starkey *et al.*, *The English Court from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War* (1987).

culturally variant people. Institutionally the subordination remained England-bound, despite the potential contribution Scotland could now make to the management of the situation there.[8] For Protestant Scots at home the anglicising tendency over the church and other policies tendered to them was a considerable source of aggravation.

The track towards integration by the awards of titles or office to non-nationals, for instance, was as muddied as any other. Protests over privilege were raised in the parliaments. Nevertheless honour was served in 1617 when, during the one visit he achieved after the Union, James had the Scottish privy council admit some English members nominally into its ranks. Charles repeated the gesture in 1626 and during his coronation visit of 1633.[9] Various Scots had been appointed to the English council, where they played a more active role than their English counterparts in Scottish affairs; since most were courtiers, they had the English council meetings readily at hand. On a more official note, Viscount Alexander was apparently admitted into the English ranks in 1629 in respect of his being the Scottish Secretary of State. He was mostly resident in London, and there had been a request from Edinburgh for early knowledge through him of the various matters that affected Scotland.[10]

The Court itself preserved a constant Scottish interest around both James and Charles. Many Scots could be numbered close to the royal person, in the Bedchamber or Privy Chamber. Such individuals kept up links with 'home' in Scotland despite their protracted residence in the south. The English resented the exclusion of themselves that resulted from the arrangement; however, with Court contacts so vital in the climate of the day, the Scots expected as much as they got.[11] Whatever the alienation by royal policies, the monarchy remained a unique force of patronage and mystique. Charles, acclaimed as the 108th king, touched for the 'king's evil' in Edinburgh during the coronation visit. The Earl of Rothes, surely contrary to his taste and yet surely understandably, held the sceptre while Charles took communion kneeling during that 1633 coronation. The equally puritan Earl of Eglinton was utterly committed to winning a place for his son in the Prince of Wales's Household which was to be settled in the 1630s.[12]

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[8] Moody, Martin and Byrne, *New History of Ireland, passim.*
[9] *RPCS*, 1st Series, vol. XI, pp. 136–7, 163–6, 169; 2nd Series, vol. I, pp. 248–50, vol. V, pp. 116–17.
[10] GD 22/3/785 – undated, but early 1629; *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, May 1629–May 1630 (1960), p. 26.
[11] N. Cuddy, 'The revival of the entourage: the Bedchamber of James I, 1603–1625' and K. Sharpe, 'The image of virtue: the court and household of Charles I, 1625–1642', in D. Starkey *et al., The English Court*, pp. 173–260; P. Heylyn, *Cyprianus Anglicus* (1668), pp. 377–9; GD 40/2/XV.4.
[12] Bod. Rawlinson Ms. D49, fols. 4–5; NLS Ms. 21183, fol. 73; Sir W. Fraser, *Memorials of the Montgomeries Earls of Eglinton* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1859), vol. I, pp. 236–7. In the event, Scots were denied places around the prince – W. Knowler (ed.), *The Earl of*

However, with the removal of the Court to England, a mighty vacuum had been created in Scotland. At a stroke the king had been released from the distinctively Scottish risks of personal attack, but his subjects were deprived of an outlet for the expression of frustrations and debate. Informal and proud of his own quality of debate, James had regularly met with his leading subjects. Scots now had to journey far if they were to see their king. James hoped that his privy council in Edinburgh would represent his person. How effectively it achieved this was another variable in the balance, for there could be contrary demands made on it. Even if Scots reckoned the privy council good enough, it was not automatic that the king would be content with its conduct.[13]

King James VI of Scotland as James VI and I managed as best he could to promote his sovereignty over kingdoms still in many respects divided. That his Scottish background shaped his reign after 1603 is a most persuasive argument concerning a king of England who has often been cricitised over-severely.[14] The Union was not bound to succeed. It is a measure of James's success that tensions were contained within reason, although it certainly was not solely his achievement. The link between administration in Scotland and a king who boasted in 'government by pen' was helped by responsible and efficient leading councillors who travelled regularly between Scotland and England. There was no shortage of difficulties, including notably on matters of the church. James's ineptitude with finance was a constant blot on a record generally of caution and moderation.[15]

More positively on the financial side, James for his part would at least have kept out of war. The outbreak of the Thirty Years' War near the end of the reign led to troubles he would dearly have avoided. The 'hotter sort of Protestants' would willingly have seen the British flag enter the fray against the armies perceived to be of the Roman antichrist. James's resistance had, among others, the support of the ecclesiastical faction which called such people 'puritans'. He died as the crisis was developing, but the church antagonisms only became more acute under the rise of the so-called Arminians. The war years exposed a number of serious areas of conflict between the king and various subjects in his three kingdoms. The costs of war

Strafforde's Letters and Dispatches (2 vols., 1739), vol. II, p. 167. On the importance of patronage, see K. M. Brown, 'Aristocratic finances and the origins of the Scottish Revolution', *EHR*, 104 (1989), 46–87.

[13] J. Wormald, *Court, Kirk and Community: Scotland 1470–1625* (1981), pp. 156–7, 192; R. Mitchison, *Lordship to Patronage: Scotland 1603–1745* (1983), p. 12; GD 124/10/97; *RPCS*, 1st Series, vol. IX, pp. 745–6.

[14] J. Wormald, 'James VI and I: two kings or one?', *History*, 68 (1983), 187–209.

[15] Lee, *Government by Pen*; Mitchison, *Lordship to Patronage*, pp. 1–21; Cuddy, 'The revival of the entourage'.

alone would have been disruptive, but there were ideological elements to the troubles. In Ireland, Charles antagonised the Protestant hierarchy, not to mention puritans everywhere, by contemplating major concessions to the Catholics in return for supply. In England, sensitivities about the role of parliaments were heightened as various non-parliamentary expedients were tried. Scottish loyalties were vulnerable when arguments could be made about foreign policy being decided upon without due reference to their national (and vested) interests. Across the kingdoms high-sounding political statements were made while locally hardship and non-cooperation marred the militarisation effort. Some of Charles's difficulties with armies in 1639–40 arose in similar fashion.[16]

Although the king would seek to restrict trouble for the sake of good order in government, conflict did not necessarily mean civil war. In normal circumstances, and in days without paid bureaucracies, central rule would be as reactive as initiating. In Scotland this was particularly true, though a long tradition of *laissez-faire* monarchy had begun to change in the sixteenth century as central demands for money, and a widening judicial system, penetrated into the localities. The other main sphere of active royal policy, church reformation, in origins had proceeded against the will of the Crown in Scotland, but it was James's battle from the earliest opportunity to assume the more common role of leadership.[17]

Scottish society in some ways underwent a rapid transition in the period before and after the Union. The coincidence of the Reformation and the increased rule of law was significant. The local authority of the magnates was still employed by the king, but the developments in civil law and the judicial experiments in the localities were incursions tending to undermine that. More significant still were the effects of the Reformation which, joined with the king's best efforts, helped to counteract blood feud and the organisation of followings by bonds of manrent. Protestantism awakened an active religious consciousness through all ranks of the population. The presbyterian organisation which evolved, alongside the changes in civil order, promoted the roles of the lairds and lesser men in society; the feuing of kirklands benefited especially the same group. Regular taxation from 1581 caused the standardisation of lairds' or barons' representatives from the shires being summoned

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[16] I summarise here very major points which are under controversy. K. Fincham and P. Lake, 'The ecclesiastical policy of King James I', *Journal of British Studies*, 24 (1985), 169–207; Russell, *Parliaments and English Politics*; C. Russell, 'Monarchies, wars and estates in England, France and Spain, c. 1580–1640', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 7 (1982), 205–20; M. Lee, Jr, *The Road to Revolution: Scotland under Charles I, 1625–1637* (Urbana and Chicago, 1985), pp. 79–83; R. Cust, *The Forced Loan and English Politics 1626–1628* (Oxford, 1987); R. Cust and A. Hughes (eds.), *Conflict in Early Stuart England* (1989); J. P. Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology in England, 1603–1640* (1986).

[17] Wormald, *Court, Kirk and Community*, pp. 20–6, 148–76; Wormald, 'James VI and I'.

to parliaments. Union with England made Scots even more want to disown a violent medieval past. The highlands, assumed to be areas of barbarism and lawlessness, were shunted roughly into isolation by lowland and government attitudes.[18]

Changes met problems, whether the newness originated from below or above. The social effects of the breakdown of familiar landmarks have not yet been fully assessed; but trouble came notably with the more energetic regime of Charles I. The victories of the lawyers and administrators, the 'new men' who wanted to govern society, faced conservative indifference if not opposition in the localities, and some tension where their ambitions were restrained by vested interests, usually of the king or the nobility. The leaders in the church were vociferous in denouncing the old order. Loudly they preached change, for the individual as for the established church. They too had their frustrations. Aside from lingering error and 'popery', as they would call it, the notion of the godly prince held by James and Charles embraced a wish for a control and obedience that was certainly challengeable.[19]

Royal supremacy in matters ecclesiastical was a topic of relevance all over Europe. Reformation in religion involved hopes for reformation in the state as a whole, in which case the role of the prince or the magistrate could be vital. He could be protector and benefactor of the reforming church; or his opposition might be a principal obstacle. The question of whether or not a prince might be resisted was raised in this context; and it sometimes had to be answered in practical action. Reformation was but rarely a purely spiritual issue.[20]

Given the origins of the Reformation in England, the royal supremacy had never seriously been challenged, but there had been large disagreements about the course of reform. Puritan critics who wanted more godly (purer) reform beyond matters of order and moderation made only limited headway. Some of these people stood on a presbyterian platform, for which they found scriptural justification; they first made headway in a time of anti-episcopal

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[18] Wormald, *Court, Kirk and Community*, pp. 148–94; J. Wormald, *Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of Manrent 1442–1603* (Edinburgh, 1985), esp. pp. 1–6; K. M. Brown, *Bloodfeud in Scotland 1573–1625* (Edinburgh, 1986); M. Sanderson, *Scottish Rural Society in the Sixteenth Century* (Edinburgh, 1982); M. Lynch, 'The Crown and the burghs, 1500–1625', in M. Lynch (ed.), *The Early Modern Town in Scotland* (1987), pp. 55–80.

[19] Wormald, *Court, Kirk and Community*, pp. 148–9, 165–6; Lee, *Government by Pen*, pp. 8–10, 42–4. See too A. I. Macinnes, 'The origin and organization of the Covenanting movement during the reign of Charles I, 1625–1641; with a particular reference to the west of Scotland' (unpublished University of Glasgow Ph.D. dissertation, 1988).

[20] R. A. Mason, 'Covenant and commonweal: the language of politics in Reformation Scotland', in N. Macdougall (ed.), *Church, Politics and Society: Scotland 1408–1929* (Edinburgh, 1983), pp. 97–126; G. Donaldson, *Scotland: James V–James VII* (Edinburgh, 1965), pp. 107–31, 157–70; P. Collinson, 'The monarchical republic of Queen Elizabeth I', *Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester*, 69 (1987), 394–424.

feeling in the 1560s but never managed to break through. By the 1590s they were in decline, and their opponents in controversy increasingly confident on *iure divino* arguments for episcopacy and positive arguments in favour of the ceremonies and liturgy the others hoped to reject.[21]

The terms by which royal and episcopal authority were justified tended towards being absolutist in response to the challenge that came from both puritans and Roman Catholics. The king had his power conferred directly from God and so strictly speaking was limited only by natural and divine law, and punishable only by God. Charles I distanced himself particularly from any suggestion that his church supremacy was subject to popular consent. He stood for a great deal belonging to him as God's viceregent on earth. The ideas of James VI and I were probably little different; but significantly they were tempered by moderation in practice.[22]

James's upbringing in Scotland lay in the shadow of his mother's enforced abdication in 1567, but he successfully left behind the threats of resistance theory. The prestige of the monarchy survived the upheaval of the 1560s and 1570s. James's greatest battle, it has been argued, came to be over the church and with the presbyterians who would limit his authority over it.[23] The local and national organisation of a presbyterian church battled for establishment by the godly prince, rightly critical of the ill-reformed episcopal bench, but was royally resisted because it radically claimed its full independence from the state.

James's own religious politics began to win the advantage in the closing years of the sixteenth century. In 1584 presbyterians had been persecuted by the so-called 'Black Acts', but in 1592 the king, again in parliament, passed the contrasting 'Golden Act' which upheld the presbyterian system. This political compromise marked a temporary resting-point. Episcopacy was never formally abolished, but it ceased for some time to have an ecclesiastical function. James's success in restoring it was gradual, the first move being to appoint individuals to the parliament for filling the first estate. Royal appointees were likely to be compliant. The presbyterians held out as best they could in the national or general assemblies. The general assembly held at Montrose in 1600 enacted that clerical representatives in parliaments were to be strictly accountable to general assemblies. However, by the time of the Glasgow Assembly of 1610 and the *selective* ratification of its conclusions in the parliament of 1612, diocesan episcopacy was fully restored. James had worked for his ends by attempting close control of the various representative

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[21] P. Lake, *Anglicans and Puritans? Presbyterianism and English Conformist Thought from Whitgift to Hooker* (1988); P. Collinson, *The Birthpangs of Protestant England* (1988).

[22] W. R. Foster, *The Church before the Covenants* (Edinburgh, 1975), pp. 125–6; Sommerville, *Politics and Ideology*, pp. 203–8.

[23] Wormald, *Court, Kirk and Community*, pp. 143–9.

meetings. After Glasgow, it was not clear that any future assembly would be called to meet.[24]

Arguments for presbyterianism by divine right derived from the reading of scripture, but were something of a second stage to deeply felt prejudice against ungodly bishops. There was more of a priority in the hoped-for creation of a new godly commonwealth – an all-encompassing vision, imbued with a sense of rightness that wished to hear no contrary voices. Sympathies to the godly prince, as the king might easily be seen to be, could be very conditional – and the royal imperatives that expected obedience as a matter of necessity less compelling.[25] Hard-line insistence on an unlimited royal supremacy could not simply rule the field.

The kings stood by bishops for political as much as religious reasons, although it is unwise to play too much on distinctions here. Possibly Charles was more committed to *iure divino* episcopacy than his father – but political rather than theological arguments justified the case for unity on the subject. The political advantage of bishops was emphasised in the opening proclamation on the church of Scotland issued by Charles.[26] Episcopacy complemented monarchy in a way that parity of ministers did not. No authority in the kingdoms was in theory to be outwith the control of the monarch – and certainly none potentially against him – yet some presbyterians dared to defend the convening of an assembly at Aberdeen in 1605 that James had prorogued. James insisted on having them pursued for treason for declining his authority. By isolating those he viewed to be extreme, he hoped to quieten the moderate majority. The problem was that the presbyterians did not accept his authority so to act. Regardless, the king had a statute passed in the parliament of 1606 which acknowledged him as supreme governor over all persons, estates and causes, both spiritual and temporal, within his realm of Scotland. It was to be a buttressing legal foundation for the royal claims.[27]

James's achievement over episcopacy owed its success to a number of factors. The politic management of the nobility, most notably by rewards in land, worked against a united alliance against him. It was probably a small number who were rigidly opposed to having bishops; scriptural evidence was not unambiguous on the subject. The caution with which the policy was

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[24] G. Donaldson, *The Scottish Reformation* (Cambridge, 1960); J. Kirk (ed.), *The Second Book of Discipline* (Edinburgh, 1980); D. G. Mullan, *Episcopacy in Scotland: The History of an Idea, 1560–1638* (Edinburgh, 1986).

[25] Cf. Donaldson, *The Scottish Reformation*, pp. 144–5.

[26] *RPCS*, 2nd Series, vol. I, pp. 91–2. Cf. [Charles I], *A Large Declaration*, STC 21906 (1639), pp. 424–5.

[27] Donaldson, *Scotland: James V–James VII*, pp. 197–207; Wormald, *Court, Kirk and Community*, pp. 143–9; Mullan, *Episcopacy*, pp. 87–113; Lee, *Government by Pen*, pp. 48–56; Fincham and Lake, 'The ecclesiastical policy'. See also M. J. Mendle, *Dangerous Positions* (Alabama, 1985).

advanced was exemplary, and typically Jacobean. However wide the discrepancy between legislation and what might have been preferred, an unintended but lasting compromise with presbyterian organisation minimised causes for grievance. At the local level, kirk sessions and presbyteries continued; bishops were more of an addition than an alteration to the church's constitution. The more secular dimension of episcopacy was tempered as ambitious individuals infiltrated only slowly into civil positions extra to their role in parliaments, where they were fully employed to royal advantage. Sensitive individuals like the Earl of Rothes were irked, but politics was at least half, if not more, of the battle. The contrast is to be drawn with Charles's reign.[28]

A battle won by James in practice did not put an end to argument by words, albeit by a particularly vocal minority. Episcopacy had its critics, at first even men who later accepted preferments, but subsequently amongst a small resolute hard-core. David Calderwood was one of the most prominent here; by several publications the debate was kept alive, and in measure answered by the other side.[29] What exactly might be bracketed under the royal supremacy was among the subjects disputed, despite the 1606 legislation, but it is noteworthy that even Calderwood in subsequent years dropped his challenge of the king's right to summon assemblies, as if to recognise the weakness of his ground on this point.[30] The issue resurfaced as it were with a vengeance in the Covenanting period – perhaps a predictable development of a new phase of confidence in presbyterianism, but one that powerfully indicates the shaping force of politics alongside ideas, and not one or the other in isolation.

Antipathies to anglicisation rumbled in the background of the troubles over James's policy for church government, but provocation was sought to be avoided. When in 1610 three Scottish bishops went to England for their consecration, the Archbishop of Canterbury was deliberately not involved, so as to avert suspicions of the English claiming superiority. In the same decade, when the Catholic Marquis of Huntly chose to conform whilst he was in

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[28] Foster, *Church*, pp. 11–36; D. Laing (ed.), *Correspondence of Sir Robert Kerr, First Earl of Ancrum, and his Son, William, Third Earl of Lothian* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1875), vol. I, pp. 35–8; Lee, *The Road to Revolution*, pp. 6–7.

[29] For example, [D. Calderwood], *The Altar of Damascus . . .* , STC 4352 ([Amsterdam], 1621); [D. Calderwood], *Quaeres Concerning the State of the Church of Scotland*, STC 4361.5 ([Amsterdam], 1621); D. Lyndesay, *A True Narration of all the Passages of the Proceedings in the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland . . .* , STC 15657 (1621); [D. Calderwood], *The Pastor and the Prelate . . .* , STC 4359 (n.p., 1628); E. G. Selwyn (ed.), *The First Book of the Irenicum [1629] of John Forbes of Corse* (Cambridge, 1923); [D. Calderwood], *A Re-examination of the Five Articles Enacted at Perth, Anno 1618*, STC 4363.5 (n.p., 1636).

[30] I owe this point to P. H. R. Mackay, 'The Five Articles of Perth' (unpublished University of Edinburgh Ph.D. dissertation, 1975), p. 36. I am grateful to Dr Mackay for permission to cite from his work.

England, the opportunity was not lost, but Archbishop Abbot took care to cover himself with the Scottish bishops.[31] James certainly valued the support of English bishops. In 1606 against the presbyterians and in subsequent years, Englishmen preached on behalf of the royal cause. English echoes of the new worship directives for the Scottish church in 1616 were indicative of the British dimension behind what technically were to be Scottish changes. James felt the need to persuade his Scottish subjects that some things English were good and to be recommended.[32]

These last-mentioned changes in worship, which were embodied in the so-called Five Articles of Perth, were undoubtedly more troublesome than the reintroduction of episcopacy. On the king's side, however, it seemed altogether undesirable to tolerate disparities across the kingdoms under his headship. Aside from theology the argument that he and his clergy should be respected in the ordering of the church worked for the sake of civil order; but the Scottish changes were expected to edify, or give spiritual benefit to the people. The element of anglicisation was to be incidental.[33]

There was a British problem in so far as discontent smouldered still in England over aspects of liturgical worship, including what was to be most contentious in Scotland, kneeling at the celebration of the Lord's Supper.[34] James would insist that scruples on matters which historically could be regarded at least as 'indifferent' had to be abandoned in favour of obedience to authority.[35] The difficulty was that, as like-minded efforts towards the Channel Islands had found, such changes met with strong opposition.[36] A principal argument in Scotland was that anything not explicitly warranted in scripture was to be avoided in worship, and especially lest it lead the ignorant populace back into the ways of superstition and popery. This had been a cardinal imperative of the Scottish Reformation. More specifically, some-

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[31] Foster, *Church*, p. 29; B. Botfield (ed.), *Original Letters Relating to the Ecclesiastical Affairs of Scotland* (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1851), vol. II, pp. 474–8; Lee, *Government by Pen*, pp. 158–9.

[32] Mullan, *Episcopacy*, pp. 98–103; Lee, *Government by Pen*, pp. 158–9; T. Morton, *A Defence of the Innocencie of the Three Ceremonies of the Church of England* . . . , STC 18179 (1618); J. Buckeridge, *A Sermon Preached before His Maiestie at Whitehall March 22 1617* . . . , STC 4005 (1618); L. Andrewes, *A Sermon Preached before His Maiestie at Whitehall, on Easter Day Last, 1618*, STC 623 (1618); W. Laud, *The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Laud, D.D.*, eds. W. Scott and J. Bliss (7 vols., Oxford, 1847–60), vol. III, p. 160; Botfield, *Original Letters*, vol. II, pp. 535–40. For James's speech in 1617, see CUL Ms. Ee.5.23, fols. 442–5.

[33] Foster, *Church*, pp. 192, 199–205; cf. P. Heylyn, *A Full Relation of Two Journeys* . . . (1656), pp. 363–423.

[34] For example, cf. Botfield, *Original Letters*, vol. II, p. 559.

[35] J. Craigie (ed.), *The Basilicon Doron of King James VI*, STS, 3rd Series (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1944, 1950) esp. vol. I, pp. 16–17. This was a minimal stance.

[36] A. J. Eagleston, *The Channel Islands under Tudor Government, 1485–1642* (Cambridge, 1949), pp. 128–45.