

## Author index

---

- Aczel, J., 159  
Aizerman, M. A., 309, 310  
Arrow, K., ix, 3, 6, 225, 283, 290, 309  
Atkinson, A. B., 50, 52  
Aumann, R. J., 120, 136, 138, 155, 156, 157  
Banker, R., 157, 159  
Banks, J. S., 248  
Barbera, S., 263, 281, 282  
Baumol, W., 89, 99, 166  
Binmore, K., 66  
Black, D., 264  
Blackorby, C., 44, 57  
Blair, D., 298, 299, 300  
Blau, J., 298  
Bondavera, O. N., 96  
Borda, J. C., 6, 225  
Brams, S., 239, 315  
Brown, D. J., 293, 298  
Champsaur, P., 219  
Chernoff, H., 307  
Chun, Y., 62, 157  
Clarke, E. H., 203  
Condorcet, M., 6, 30, 225  
d'Aspremont, C., 7, 36, 40  
Deb, R., 298  
Debreu, G., 35, 44, 60, 88  
Demange, G., 172, 226, 279  
Donaldson, D., 57  
Dubins, L. F., 205  
Dummett, M., 248  
Dutta, B., 276  
Farquharson, R., 256, 276  
Faulhaber, G., 87  
Feldman, A., 7  
Fishburn, P., 231, 236, 239, 309, 312, 315  
Foley, D., 88, 180  
Foster, J., 7, 33, 50, 52  
Gaertner, W., 300  
Gevers, L., 36, 40  
Gibbard, A., 3, 256, 259, 263, 293  
Gillies, D. B., 94  
Gorman, W. M., 44  
Green, J., 7, 204, 205, 209, 210  
Greenberg, J., 270  
Groves, T., 203, 207, 213  
Guha, A. S., 293  
Hammond, P., 40  
Hardy, G. H., 50  
Harsanyi, J. C., 23, 120, 140  
Hart, S., 120  
Heaney, J. P., 109  
Hurwicz, L., 213  
Hylland, A., 263, 281  
Ichiishi, T., 7, 103, 114, 140, 276  
Inada, K. I., 300  
Kalai, E., 7, 63, 67, 70, 81, 120, 140, 267,  
    300  
Kaneko, M., 60, 180, 181  
Kelly, J. S., 230  
Kemeny, J., 312  
Kern, R., 116  
Kim, K. W., 279  
Kim, T., 213  
Kohlberg, E., 204  
Kolm, S. C., 7, 50, 52

328      **Author index**

- Laffont, J. J., 7, 204, 205, 209, 210, 211  
Lebreton, M., 271  
Ledyard, J., 213  
Legros, P., 136  
Lensberg, T., 76  
Littlechild, S. C., 111  
Littlewood, J. E., 50  
Loeb, M., 207  
Loehman, E., 108, 118  
  
McGarvey, D. C., 252  
McKelvey, R. D., 271, 276  
Malishevski, A. V., 309, 310  
Maschler, M., 79, 155, 156, 157  
Mas-Colell, A., 185, 188, 298  
Maskin, E., 211, 276, 277  
May, K., 225, 286  
Megiddo, N., 129  
Miller, N., 248, 254, 271, 272, 276  
Milleron, J. C., 166  
Mirman, L. J., 120  
Mirrlees, J., 22, 28  
Morgenstern, O., ix  
Moulin, H., 7, 157, 158, 162, 164, 165, 176,  
    179, 185, 188, 191, 193, 194, 198, 200,  
    205, 214, 216, 217, 220, 239, 248,  
    250, 252, 262, 267, 274, 275, 276,  
    277, 278, 280, 281, 302, 303, 313  
Moulin, L., 226  
Mueller, D., 7, 276  
Muller, E., 260, 267, 299, 300  
Myerson, R., 70, 77, 79, 81, 120  
  
Nakamura, K., 269, 296  
Nash, J., 61, 68  
Niemi, R. G., 276  
Nitzan, S., 311  
  
O'Neill, B., 157, 159  
Overleaf, B., 148  
Owen, G., 111, 269  
  
Panzar, J., 89, 99, 166  
Pareto, W., 14  
Paroush, J., 311  
Pattanaik, P., 300  
Peleg, B., x, 7, 116, 135, 275, 276, 277  
Perles, M. A., 79  
Peters, H., 62, 65, 67, 79  
Plott, C. R., 270, 316  
  
Pollack, R., 298  
Polya, G., 50  
Primont, D., 44  
Proudhon, P. J., 271  
  
Rawls, J., 16, 23  
Riker, W., 225, 230, 240  
Rob, R., 205  
Roberts, F., 310  
Roberts, K., 35, 44, 210, 221  
Rochet, J. C., 219  
Roemer, J., xii  
Roth, A., 7, 63, 82  
Roush, F., 279  
Rubinstein, A., 66, 271  
Russell, R., 44  
  
Samet, D., 120, 140  
Satterthwaite, M. A., 3, 256, 259, 260,  
    267, 299, 300  
Scarf, H., 88, 100, 101, 103, 189  
Schmeidler, D., 121  
Schofield, N., 271  
Schokkaert, E., 148  
Schwartz, T., 309, 316  
Sen, A., xii, 1, 7, 11, 21, 52, 293, 300, 307,  
    316  
Shapley, L., 82, 114, 119, 120  
Sharkey, W. W., 7, 89, 99, 100, 101, 105,  
    106, 116, 189  
Shepsle, K., 246  
Shorrocks, A. F., 7, 33, 52, 55  
Shubik, M., 88  
Smith, J., 237  
Smorodinsky, M., 67, 70, 81  
Sobolev, A. I., 135  
Sonnenchein, H., 298  
Straffin, P. D., 7, 109, 248, 256  
Suzumura, K., 7  
  
Tauman, Y., 120  
Telser, L. J., 99, 100, 101, 105  
Thomson, W., xii, 7, 62, 63, 70, 72, 74,  
    81  
Tideman, T. N., 204  
Tullock, G., 204  
  
Varian, H., 3  
Vilkov, V. B., 116  
Von Neumann, J., ix

**Author index**

329

- Wakker, P., 67  
Weber, R. J., 240  
Weingast, B., 246  
Whinston, A., 108, 118  
Willig, R., 89, 99, 166  
Wilson, R., 271, 291  
Wolinsky, A., 66  
Yaari, M., 24, 59, 65  
Young, H. P., xii, 7, 108, 117, 118, 131,  
139, 151, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 237,  
240, 310, 311, 312  
Zang, I., 120

## Subject index

---

- acyclic social welfare (ASW), 294, 313
- additive SCF, 79
  - of value operator, 118
- agreement, 160
- Aizerman axiom, 309
- alternative-vote method, 236, 248
- anonymity, 33, 34, 66, 117, 133, 135, 215, 216, 233, 240, 286, 303
- anticore, 193
- approval voting, 315
- Arrow independence of irrelevant alternatives (AIIA), 289, 290, 292
- Arrow's theorem, 290, 313
- Atkinson inequality index, 52, 55, 56
- Aumann–Shapley price, 120
- balanced family of coalitions, 103
- balanced TU cooperative game, 96
- balanced weights, 96
- Borda voting rule, 229
- Borda winner, 229
- Chernoff axiom, 307, 315
- choice function, 306
  - rationalizable, 306
- choice set, 285
- coalitional monotonicity of a value operator, 131
- collective utility function (CUF), 33
  - egalitarian, 18
  - median dictator, 40, 57
  - Nash's, 37, 56
  - rank dictator, 40, 46
  - separably additive, 43, 59
  - utilitarian, 21
- Condorcet consistent voting rule, 229, 249
- Condorcet winner, 24, 229, 231, 263, 264, 301
  - generalized, 267, 278
  - weak, 265, 301
- consistency, 160
- constant returns equivalent allocation, 187, 194
- continuity of a voting rule, 239, 240
- convex NTU cooperative game, 116
- convex TU cooperative game, 112
- cooperative game
  - balanced, 96
  - NTU, 102
  - superadditive, 95, 122
  - TU, 94
- Copeland voting rule, 233
- Copeland winner, 233, 252
- core
  - of cost-sharing game, 91, 158
  - of NTU game, 102
  - of private good economy, 174, 189
  - of public good economy, 172, 180, 185
  - of TU game, 95, 96, 100
  - of voting rule, 269, 273
- core stable voting rule, 269
- cost-sharing mechanism, 157, 160
- decentralizable cost or surplus sharing, 157, 164
- dictatorial social welfare, 290
- dictatorial voting rule, 259, 260
- domination
  - in SWO, 295
  - in voting rule, 269

**Subject index**

331

- effectivity function, 275
- egalitarian CUF, 18
- egalitarian equivalent allocation, 184
- egalitarian mechanism, 205
- egalitarian SCF, 66, 70, 72
  - relative, 67, 72, 81
- equal allocation of nonseparable costs, 109, 140
- equality-efficiency dilemma, 14, 26
- expansion, 307
- generalized Condorcet winner, 267, 278
- generalized majority relation, 302, 303
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, 259
- Gini inequality index, 53, 60
- Groves-Loeb mechanism, 207, 219
- head tax, 150, 162
- independence axiom, 3
- independent of the common utility pace (SWO or CUF), 40
- independent of the common utility scale (SWO or CUF), 44
- independent of the common zero of utility (SWO or CUF), 44
- inequality index, 52
  - Atkinson's, 52, 55, 56
  - Gini's, 53, 60
- inequality reducing (SWO or CUF), 46, 50
- interprofile axiom, 3
- intraprofile axiom, 3
- issue monotonicity, 69
  - restricted, 81
- knock-out elimination tree, 244
- land corn production economy (example), 111, 126, 137
- leveling tax, 150, 162
- leximin SWO, 17, 34, 150
- Lindahl price, 180, 193
- Lorenz curve, 47, 55
- Lorenz domination, 48, 58
- Lorenz optimal, 48, 49, 58
- majority relation, 301, 315
  - generalized, 302, 303
- majority tournament, 241, 243, 246, 252
- marginalist value operator, 117
- marginal pricing equilibrium, 182
- median dictator CUF, 40, 57
- minimal transferability, 65
- minority principle, 272
- monotonicity
  - of social welfare, 294, 299, 303
  - of voting rule, 235, 286
- multistage elimination tree, 246
- Nakamura number, 269, 296
- Nanson method, 249
- Nash's CUF, 37, 56
- Nash's independence of irrelevant alternatives (NIIA), 67, 72, 308
- Nash's SCF, 68, 82
- neutrality, 233, 240, 286, 294
- no-show paradox, 239
- no-subsidy principle, 90
- nucleolus
  - per capita, 129
  - of TU cooperative game, 120, 155
- oligarchy, 292
- parallel elimination rule, 242, 244
- participation, 239
- path monotone SCF, 81
- per capita nucleolus, 129
- Pigou-Dalton principle, 46, 47
- Pigou-Dalton transfer, 48, 52
- pivotal mechanism, 204, 214, 218, 220
  - and agent, 202
- plurality voting rule, 228
  - with runoff, 235
- population monotonicity, 71, 140
- positional dictator, 302
- private good economy, core of, 174, 189
- probabilistic voting, 262, 281
- production of a private good, 169
- proportional cost sharing, 149, 158, 198, 217
- proportional surplus sharing, 147
- provision of a public good
  - divisible, 169, 265
  - indivisible, 148, 205
- public good economy, core of, 172, 180, 185
- pure compensation, 199
- random dictator, 262
- rank dictator CUF, 40, 46

### 332      Subject index

- ratio equilibrium, 180, 192
- rationalizable choice function, 306
- ray-IRS cost function, 99
- reduced game, 135
- reduced-game property, 135
- reinforcement, 237
- relative egalitarianism, 64
- relative egalitarian SCF, 67, 72, 81
- Samuelson's condition, 170, 181
- scale independent (SWO or CUF), 37, 68
- scoring voting rule, 231, 240, 249
- separable cost- or surplus-sharing mechanism, 159, 164
- separable cost-remaining benefit method, 139
- separable SCF, 76
- separable SWO, 43, 57
- separably additive CUF, 43, 59
- Shapley value, 110, 113, 117, 119, 156
- Shur convexity, 50
- simple game, 287, 294
- Simpson voting rule, 233
- Simpson winner, 233
- single-peaked preferences, 264, 301, 303, 315
  - on tree, 266, 279
- Smith's consistency, 241
- social choice function (SCF), 65, 66
  - additive, 79
  - egalitarian, 66, 70, 72
  - path monotone, 81
  - relative egalitarian, 67, 72, 81
  - separable, 76
  - utilitarian, 77, 82
- social welfare, acyclic, 294, 313
- social welfare preorder (SWP), 288
  - dictatorial, 290
- social welfare quasi ordering, 292
- stand-alone principle, 90
- strategyproof mechanism, 203, 209
- strategyproof voting rule, 258, 263, 299
- strongly monotonic voting rule, 259, 260, 277
- subadditive cost function, 93, 99
- subgroup separability, 55
- subsidy-free price, 98, 99
- superadditive cooperative game, 95, 122
- supportable cost function, 99, 100, 105
- surplus-sharing mechanism, 157
- surplus-sharing problem, 147
- technological monotonicity, 189, 192
- top cycle, 253
- unanimity, 13, 14, 33, 34, 66, 290, 303
- uncovered set, 254
- user's fee (example), 111, 115, 128, 138
- utilitarian CUF, 21
- utilitarianism, 11
- utilitarian SCF, 77, 82
- value
  - of NTU cooperative game, 120
  - of TU cooperative game, 109, 117
- value operator
  - additivity of, 118
  - marginalist, 117
  - zero-independent, 132, 135
- vetoer in an acyclic social welfare, 298
- veto function
  - anonymous, 272
  - fractional, 281
  - proportional, 274, 279, 280
  - stable, 273
- voting
  - by successive elimination, 241, 244
  - by successive veto, 275
- voting rule, 258
  - Borda, 229
  - Condorcet consistent, 229, 249
  - continuous, 239, 240
  - dictatorial, 259, 260
  - plurality, 228
  - scoring, 231, 240, 249
  - Simpson, 233
  - strategyproof, 258, 263, 299
  - strongly monotonic, 259, 260, 277
- weak axiom of revealed preferences (WARP), 308
- weak Condorcet winner, 265, 301
- weak representation (of a SWO by a CUF), 35
- welfarism, 11
- winning coalition, 268
- zero-independent SWO or CUF, 36
- zero-independent value operator, 132, 135