1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Athenian deliberative oratory

Political groups in all periods of history attempt in various ways to promote the interests and achieve the goals of the classes they represent, and political discourse is one of their most important tools. For our present purposes, political discourse is defined as oratory functioning in the context of a policy-forming institution. This kind of oratory corresponds to the second of the three types into which Greek oratory was divisible: forensic, deliberative and epideictic (Arist., *Rhet.* 1.3.3, 1358b). According to Aristotle, deliberative oratory included oratory in the Assembly and the Council.

Deliberative, or political, oratory from fifth- and fourth-century Athens is significant for us in more than one way. Rooted in particular moments, dealing with historically shaped and culturally representative problems, it gives us an idea of the shifts in the attitudes of Athenians to the past and the future, and of the idioms and the catchwords, the fears and hopes which they expressed; it thereby contributes to a better understanding of the processes of history. In Athens, democracy did not do away with economic inequality among the citizens, but mitigated the class struggle by restraining the power of the propertied class at the political and ideological levels. As political power – by which I mean actual participation in collective deliberation and decision-making – was not limited to the wealthy but was accessible to every citizen, the democratic process offered regular occasions for the reaffirmation but also the denial of democratic ideology. In addition, the mass meetings of the Assembly and the Council affected the public performance of the orators; they had to be prepared to provide full explanations and justifications of their proposals. The long-term consequence of this process of deliberation and decision-making was the formation of the people's social and political consciousness.

Fifth- and fourth-century deliberative oratory is less well known than forensic oratory of the same period. The historians Herodotos and in particular Thucydides, in reconstructing what was said in the Assembly on different occasions, provide an idea of the character of fifth-century political oratory in Athens. Dionysios of Halikarnassos (*Dem.* 3) quotes a considerable fragment from a deliberative speech, *dēmēgoria*, by Thrasymachos of Chalkedon and a longer piece from the thirty-fourth speech by Lysias. Many modern historians regard the speech [Her.] *On the Constitution* as a real speech from the year 404 B.C.[1] But beyond doubt two of the extant speeches of Andokides constitute the best surviving example of deliberative oratory from the late fifth and early fourth centuries.[2]

1.2 The limitations of the traditional, speaker-oriented approach

Traditional research into oratory has been limited to descriptions either of the orator's familiarity with the theory of rhetorical conventions, or of the complexity of his arguments or their appropriateness to the occasion.

Oratory as 'poetry'. Oratory has for a long time been the subject of stylistic studies. These studies have succeeded in establishing a standard for Greek prose,[3] in tracing its

[1] Wade-Gery (1958b) argued that the speech was written by Kritias between the surrender of Athens in April and the establishment of the Thirty in September 404. Russell (1983) dismissed this early date, unconvincingly, however: M. J. Edwards, *JHS* 105 (1985) 202.

[2] It is generally accepted that Andokides had his speeches published: Kennedy (1963), p. 205. Regular publication of political orations probably did not occur until the mid-fourth century.

[3] Dionysios of Halikarnassos began the history of prose with Antiphon and Thucydides, whom he grouped together with Pindar and Aischylos as examples of the 'austere arrangement', while Sophokles, Herodotos and Demosthenes were seen as the finest exponents of the 'mixed structure', and Euripides, Ephoros and Isokrates as the devotees of the 'smooth arrangement': *Comp.* 10.4, 12.12 and 23.9.

historical growth[4] and in tracing the evolution of the theory, techniques and art of public speaking.[5] For example, Kingsbury's study of the style of Andokides' speeches aimed at determining its essential features in order to locate it among the rhetorical trends of the period.[6] But it is also characteristic of these studies that they understand oratorical style as something poetical in the narrow sense of the word; they apply to it the categories of traditional stylistics based on the theory of tropes and offer appraisals in terms of 'expressiveness', 'forcefulness', 'clarity' and the like with regard to the orator's apparent familiarity, or unfamiliarity, with the theory of rhetorical conventions. Yet such terms do not greatly help us understand a speech as an important *vehicle of political interaction* between orator and audience, nor do they enable us to understand the effectiveness of a speech. Thus, although Andokides' familiarity with rhetorical technicalities had increased considerably between the time he delivered his speech *On his Return* and that entitled *On the Peace with the Lakedaimonians*, this improvement in technique did not prevent the failure of this last appeal.[7]

The role of the appropriate argument. For many people, the persuasiveness of a speaker depends on the appropriateness of

[4] For example, Jebb (1876) studied the lives, styles and writings of Antiphon, Andokides, Lysias, Isokrates and Isaios 'with a view to showing how Greek oratory was developed and thereby how Greek prose was moulded, from the outset of its existence as an art down to the point at which the organic forces of Attic speech were matured, its leading tendencies determined, and its destinies committed, no longer to discoverers, but to those who should crown its perfection or initiate its decay' (pp. lxviii–lxix).

[5] For the distinction between the art and technique of public speaking see Pearson (1976), p. v. His book on Demosthenes is 'an effort to discover and explain the artistry of Demosthenes', 'his command of persuasive argument and his skill in presenting a case in such a way as to give pleasure even to those who refuse to be persuaded' (p. iv).

[6] Kingsbury (1899).

[7] Kennedy (1958), p. 41, writes: 'the *De Pace* is most in accord with the instructions of the *Rhetorica ad Alexandrum* and the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle and most in the sophistic tradition'; see also pp. 42 and 43. In

his arguments to the occasion, or to the character of his audience. For example, Sokrates described oratorical ability, *psychagōgia*, as the speaker's ability to know what arguments to use with what type of man (Plato, *Phaidros* 271c–d). The appropriateness of the speaker's arguments to the situation or to the attitudes of his audience could be a successful technique in a one-to-one conversation or with a homogeneous audience or on any political occasion in a society where traditional authority is dominant.[8] However, as we move towards less clear-cut political relationships where more than one social group contends for power, we move towards a different kind of deliberation which is not the exclusive possession of the members of one dominant group nor limited by the authority of a leader. In consequence, in the context of less constricted rhetorical behaviour, orators commend or reject particular courses of action with the interests of their own group as a guideline. Similarly, the listeners' responses vary according to their own interests. What may be merely a statement of fact to some listeners may be a symbol evoking certain values in others; and what evokes in some a certain cluster of factual assertions, as well as value judgements concerning them, may simultaneously evoke another cluster of aversions and corresponding values in others. Moreover, given the variety of decoding processes at work in the audience, the orator's messages may recommend divergent resolutions to the different groups within it. For example, in the case of debates

a later paper, Kennedy (1959), p. 136, says that Andokides' *On his Return* in its failure indicates 'that directness, self-interest and services rendered were no longer the principal ingredients of successful oratory'. According to Thompson (1968), Hermogenes' opinion (*Peri Ideōn* B II) that Andokides does not have the quality of *gorgotēs* must have been founded on remarks about the speech *On the Mysteries*; in Thompson's view, the speech *On the Peace with the Lakedaimonians* is a *logos gorgos*.

[8] On the significance of formalization and appropriateness in speech acts in a traditional society where the type of power relations is not questioned see Bloch (1975).

before the Athenian Assembly, where a large audience[9] was to reach a decision through actual participation in the deliberative process, a very wide range of arguments was expressed, arguments promoting the different interests of the various social groups. For these reasons, I believe, the rhetorical situation in 391, with the division of the assemblymen into those who wanted peace whatever the conditions and those who did not accept the proposed peace terms, illustrates the limitations of previous studies, which have examined Andokides' speech without specifying criteria for the 'appropriate' argument.

Simple and complex arguments. It has also been asked whether arguments were simple or complex, that is to say, whether arguments were based on expediency alone or expediency in combination with, for example, necessity, practicability and justice.[10] Speeches have also been seen as systems of moral and emotional appeals and their persuasiveness traced to this source. However, Andokides' speech, despite the complexity of its argument and its frequent recourse to emotional and moral materials, did not carry the day in 391.

1.2.1 The assumptions of the speaker-oriented approach

The general starting-point of the traditional approach to political discourse is the assumption that the orator, in addressing a public audience, is posing as spokesman for his listeners and is trying to tell them what they really want to hear. Thus, H. A. Wichelns writes: 'Poetry always is free to

[9] Hansen (1976) has examined the evidence, literary and archaeological, and suggests that attendances of *c.* 6000 – more in the fourth century – could be accommodated on the Pnyx.

[10] Kennedy (1959) has constructed a contrast between fifth- and fourth-century oratory along these lines. A contrast between expediency and justice characterizes Thucydides' speeches, whereas the moral synthesis of arguments is established in Isokrates' works. According to Kennedy (1963), p. 205, Andokides' *On the Peace with the Lakedaimonians* 'consists of treatment of the topics of necessity (13), practicability (15), expediency (17–23), and justice (23), in a fashion not unlike the synthesis of arguments later used by Isokrates'.

fulfil its own law, but the writer of a rhetorical discourse, is, in a sense, *perpetually in bondage* to the occasion and *the audience*.'[11] With regard to the deliberation and decision-making process in Athens, it has been argued that a speaker in the Assembly, the Council or the lawcourts 'was unlikely to risk an argument seriously in conflict with the moral values accepted by a substantial part of his audience'.[12] With reference to Andokides, Jebb wrote: 'The main object of Andokides was to be in sympathy with his audience... His speeches were meant to carry hearers with them';[13] and Kennedy adds with specific reference to Andokides' third oration: 'The *De Pace*...shows...subtlety in maintaining the goodwill of the audience.'[14] All these points, however, as I will show, in fact have limited applicability to Andokides' speeches once those speeches are studied in detail.

The assumption that the political orator in the Athenian Assembly concentrated on how to acquire and retain public approval for his proposals is an element of the model according to which deliberation is usually analysed. In this model the orator is seen as the rational agent striving to exercise all his talents for the public good but also as dependent for success or failure upon the prejudices and passions of the audience. Indeed, the ancient sources, in particular Thucydides, Aristophanes, Plato, Isokrates and Aristotle, often express a lack of confidence in the decision-making capacity of the commons in the Assembly and tend to counterbalance the reasoning skills of the orator with the unbounded passions and prejudices of his audience.

For example, Thucydides, in his retrospective assessment of Perikles' statesmanship, assigns a subordinate role to the Athenians and in particular he emphasizes Perikles' ability to subdue the strong emotions (*hybris* and fear) of his audience (2.65.8–9).[15] In Aristophanes' *Knights*, 752–5, Demos, a sensible person in his domestic affairs, is compared to children waiting with their mouths open to catch figs 'once he sits upon

11 Wichelns (1925), p. 212 (emphasis added).
12 Dover (1974), p. 6.
13 Jebb (1876), p. 101; see also p. 106.
14 Kennedy (1958), p. 42.
15 See also Hunter (1986), pp. 428–9.

his rock (sc. in the Pnyx)'. While Plato frequently attributes to the people a total subordination to their leaders (see, for example, *Rep.* 565b–e), in the *Gorgias* Sokrates speaks of the orator as being exposed to the passions of the multitude; for Sokrates, the orator who wants to succeed and acquire power in the city will submit his reason to the passions and prejudices of his listeners (513a–e).[16] According to Isokr. 8.3–11, the popularity of the pro-war speakers is due to the fact that the Athenians themselves pay attention only to those speakers who set out to please them rather than to those who aim to give sound advice. In the following passage from his *Rhetoric* Aristotle maintains that in the case of the members of the people's Assembly and the law-court

> love, hate or personal interest is often involved, so that the listeners are no longer capable of discerning the truth adequately, their judgement being obscured by their own pleasure or pain. (*Rhet.* 1.1.7, 1354b)

Modern scholars have often followed the lead of the ancient authors in characterizing the Athenian *dēmos* as irrational. For example, like Thucydides (2.65.10–11), Edouard Will generalizes about the weakness of Athenian politics. According to him, the decision of the Athenians to undertake the Sicilian expedition was due not only to the absence of a statesman of authority but also to the passions of the crowd:

> Thucydide mettait le doigt sur une faille des institutions athéniennes qui faute d'un exécutif autonome et responsable, subordonnaient les décisions à l'influence de personnalités ou de groupes. Que l'objet des débats excédât la compréhension du grand nombre; que l'opinion se divisât en fonction de critères incertains laissant la porte ouverte aux passions; et qu'enfin nul homme d'État supérieur ne fût là pour imposer ses conclusions à la foule, l'on risquait dès lors que des votes engageant le destin de la cité ne fussent déterminés par d'imprévisibles impondérables.[17]

Laistner, also, writes: 'The Athenian democracy in the fourth century was often capricious and unwilling to trust the senior members of the executive after it had appointed them to office.'[18] For de Romilly, the large number of deliberators and

[16] Kallikles' contempt for the people is even greater than that of Sokrates: *Gorgias* 483b and 489c.

[17] Will (1972), p. 350.

[18] Laistner (1957), p. 359.

their unbridled passions and prejudices reinforced the irrational character of Athenian decision-making.[19]

However, as Finley suggests, such strong distrust in the responsibility of the Athenian *dēmos* may merely indicate 'a confusion of moral categories, between political responsibility in the sense of a systematic pursuit of accepted public goals within the contemporaneous moral framework and modern notions of decency and humaneness'.[20] Thus, given the common assumption that war springs only from irrational impulses, the decisively unpopular and finally rejected pro-peace policy of Andokides in 391 has done much to establish, among modern researchers, that orator's reputation for honesty and foresight, while incompetence, stupidity and miscalculation of risks have, explicitly or implicitly, been attributed by several writers to the Athenian Assembly.[21] Yet in studying pro-war or pro-peace policies we must consider the classes, social strata and groups which are represented by these policies and ask whether and to what extent their results would be beneficial to the majority of society. In short, a more complex relation exists between a speaker, his audience and the situation, and this demands more than the traditional speaker-oriented approach can offer.

1.3 A contextual and historical approach

In contrast to the model discussed above, by which an orator is seen as the rational and the audience as the emotional agent in the decision-making process, a second approach – and one which is followed in this book – conceives of deliberation as a human activity involving the rational faculties and the emotions of both the orator and the audience. Indeed, it can be said that all deliberating participants act rationally but their logic is quite different from that of the dialectician: men approve or disapprove of arguments as logical or illogical,

[19] de Romilly (1975b), in particular pp. 25–47.
[20] Finley (1983), p. 140.
[21] See, for example, Jebb (1876), pp. 84–7. The assessment of Andokides' statesmanship is also discussed below in ch. 7.

valid or invalid, with reference to their own internalized values and attitudes.[22] Hence, the political speech is seen as a response to an exigency, or crisis, determined by the interaction between the orator's perception of reality and his desire to modify or sustain it.[23] This approach rests upon the assumption that oratory must be seen as the social product of a number of historical factors. The production/delivery and reception of a speech are seen as complementary; that is, orator and audience alike come under rational and emotional pressures as to whether to make or not to make their attitudes congruent. The existence of such pressures frequently poses difficult choices between ideological and expediential considerations for both deliberating participants, the speaker and the decision-makers in the Assembly.[24] The audience questions the orator's motive in seeking to influence the outcome of the decision-making process, and, in consequence, the attributed motive functions as a causal factor on which the acceptability of a political statement depends to a considerable degree. In other words, an intrinsic feature of deliberation and of the decision-making process is that it is impossible for a person or a group to make recommendations and arrive at solutions on logical and empirical grounds alone. A constant interaction between a man's perceptions, attitudes and needs on the one hand and his socio-economic, political and ideological circumstances on the other shapes the conceptual setting into which rhetorical events are cast.[25] Indeed, it is the fact that the problems arising in a deliberative setting have a history and that the ideas behind the arguments are relevant to the social reality of the day that leads me to adopt a contextual and historical approach to deliberative oratory in Athens.

[22] Wright Mills (1939), p. 673.

[23] Bitzer (1968), p. 5.

[24] In ch. 2 I argue that the Athenian Assembly faced such a choice in 407 when Andokides delivered the speech *On his Return*, while I interpret And. 3 as a similar choice on the part of the orator.

[25] Cogan (1981), p. 200, also draws attention to both objective and subjective realities, the latter being 'much harder to recover'.

1.4 Andokides' deliberative oratory: a case study

Andokides' speech *On the Peace with the Lakedaimonians* is the earliest deliberative speech and the first genuine public address on war and peace that we have. It is not the only one nor the best on the subject; nor was it successful: it did not prevent the continuation of a war to which Andokides was opposed. Nevertheless it raises matters of significance which have been somewhat neglected. In general, Andokides' political oratory has been overshadowed by the speeches of two other fourth-century orators and ambassadors, Aischines and Demosthenes, as well as by the works of Isokrates. Nonetheless, Andokides' third speech is the most direct evidence of an attempt, albeit futile, to bring a war, in this case the Corinthian War, to an end.

My inquiry into Andokides' speech differs from previous analyses in various ways. In the first place, some earlier studies dwelled either on the organization, diction and style, or on the synthesis of moral and emotional arguments, with the object of placing the author in the development of rhetorical theory and conventions. Secondly, works in the wider fields of the social and political history of the period make numerous references to Andokides' historical examples and allusions or to his assertions on different political issues. Yet laying emphasis on concepts of interest in themselves, for example *koinē eirēnē*, has had the unfortunate consequence of diverting attention from the study of Andokides' speech as a whole and from the information it conveys about the choices open to the Assembly. In my view, any definition of a rhetorical event implies a dyadic system comprising a sender-orator and a receiver-audience, who depend on each other for their definition. We cannot define a sender without defining a receiver. Therefore, with the general assumption that the production/delivery and reception of a speech must be seen as complementary, I shall be turning to Andokides' deliberative speech *On the Peace with the Lakedaimonians* and attempting an elaboration of the contextual and historical approach to Athenian deliberation. Since we know the decision reached on