

CONTENTS

Preface *page xi*

Part I. Introduction to the theory

1	Generalizing Neoclassical Economics: new tools and concepts	3
	1.1 Neoinstitutional Economics and the theory of production and exchange	3
	1.2 Neoinstitutional Economics and the rational-choice model	7
	1.3 Wealth maximization and positive economics: a search for criteria	10
	1.4 The cost of transacting and the allocation of resources	13
	1.5 Transaction costs and efficiency	20
	1.6 The quality dimensions of goods and the cost of measurement	25
	1.7 Transaction costs and equilibrium outcomes	28
2	Property rights, agency, and economic organization	33
	2.1 Property rights and their dimensions	33
	2.2 Attenuation and partitioning of property rights	38
		vii

viii	<i>Contents</i>	
	2.3 The theory of agency and its applications	40
	2.4 Property rights and contracting	45
	2.5 Competition and the costs of alternative economic organizations	48
	2.6 The filter of competition	55
3	Explaining the rules	59
	3.1 Positive theories of the state	59
	3.2 Information costs and political processes	62
	3.3 The logic of collective action and the free-rider problem	64
	3.4 The concept of equilibrium political institutions	67
	3.5 Ideology and the rational-choice model	73
	3.6 Can we explain the rules?	75
	Part II. Property rights and economic outcomes	
4	The economics of exclusive rights	83
	4.1 Introduction	83
	4.2 Common property	84
	4.3 The cost of producing property rights	92
	4.4 Conflicting uses and the cost of transacting	101
	4.5 Restrictions on the right to contract and dissipation of nonexclusive income	116
5	The ownership structure of firms and economic outcomes	125
	5.1 Introduction	125
	5.2 Rights, incentives, and production functions	125
	5.3 The open corporation and agency costs	130
	5.4 Various forms of business organization: corporations, partnerships, proprietorships, financial mutuals, and nonprofit organizations	138
	5.5 Regulated firms and economic outcomes	143
	5.6 Political firms	149

<i>Contents</i>	ix
Part III. Explaining economic organization	
6 The contractual nature of the firm	157
6.1 Introduction	157
6.2 The firm: What is it?	159
6.3 Coalitions of resource owners	162
6.4 The entrepreneurial function and measurement costs	165
6.5 Aspects of coalitions: specific investments, appropriable quasi-rents, unique resources, and dependence	170
6.6 The structure of firms in laissez-faire markets: competing forms of organization	175
6.7 A graphic model of the choice of organizational form	189
7 The logic of economic organization	193
7.1 Introduction	193
7.2 Market practices, measurement, and quality variation of products	195
7.3 Measurement costs and the organization of labor markets: forced labor	203
7.4 Transaction costs and contractual arrangements in agriculture	213
7.5 Money in a system of exchange	231
Part IV. Explaining property rights	
8 The emergence of property rights	247
8.1 Introduction	247
8.2 The naive model	249
8.3 When exclusive rights do not emerge	262
8.4 Extending the naive model: the interest-group theory of property rights	271
8.5 A digression on rent seeking	277
9 Property rights in stateless societies	281
9.1 Introduction	281
9.2 The origins of cooperation and the economics of institutions in stateless societies	284

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Table of Contents

[More information](#)

x	<i>Contents</i>	
	9.3 A digression on international property rights	311
10	The state in Neoinstitutional Economics	317
	10.1 Introduction	317
	10.2 Theory of the state: the model	319
	10.3 Theory of the state: applications	326
	10.4 The institutions of representative government and transaction costs	348
	<i>References</i>	359
	<i>Author index</i>	379
	<i>Subject index</i>	382