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
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# *Jordan in the 1967 war*

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## The decision-making process in Jordan

### **The position of leader in the Arab world**

In contrast with many Western nations where the political party plays a primary role in determining a nation's policies, in many Middle Eastern countries the personality of the leader is of over-riding importance. There are several reasons for the dominating role played by one individual, including the absence in the Middle East of a popular consensus on the nature of political processes, the close relationship between the ruler and the means of coercion, and the absence of a historical tradition of popular participation in political life. Historically, traditional Arab society has always reserved a place for a single dominating figure in social, political and religious affairs. Sharabi points out that the Arab world's tribal pattern of strong civil or political leadership was in existence before the birth of the Prophet Muhammad, who lived in the seventh century A.D.<sup>1</sup> The establishment of Islam strengthened this tradition through the institution of the Caliphate. The Caliph is the supreme leader of the Muslim umma or nation and combines in his person religious and political leadership. Even though the Caliphate died with the Ottoman Empire, the tradition of reverence surrounding the position of leader is still strong at every level of contemporary Arab society.

The assumption that there should be a leading figure in religious, civil and political affairs remains implicit in many Arab communities. In many countries of the Fertile Crescent, including Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, the mukhtar (village head) and tribal leader have positions of considerable authority.

This pattern of according a prominent role to religious and other leaders is not necessarily conducive to the development of nations. The Middle East is a patchwork of different ethnic and confessional communities, and the existence of parochial attachments is antagonistic to the development of loyalty to the state which transcends these. The tragic experience of Lebanon stands as an example of the destructive effect of numerous religious and ethnic groups, each with its own leader.

Although the position of leader in Muslim society is often the result of inheritance or descent from the Prophet, the influential leader must also prove

that he possesses the necessary qualities. Hudson points out that 'the leader must demonstrate his personal competence if he is to earn the traditional oath of allegiance'. Equally important is the fact that in such societies 'personal leadership plays a legitimizing role'. Accordingly, in all Arab monarchies, 'the king, amir, shaykh or sultan does not merely reign but rules'.<sup>2</sup> This point is particularly relevant to Jordan where the monarch is the supreme arbiter and chief executive. King Hussein explains: 'To me, rule was not merely a crown or a mace but an honourable service.'<sup>3</sup> King Hussein sees his role as not merely titular but one of responsible decision-making. Ever since Jordan came into being, the main feature of Hashemite leadership has been its highly centralized character and the monarch's role as the nation's chief executive.

Although some political theorists have considered monarchies an anachronism in the modern world, they are forced to observe that 'those that have survived in the Arab world have proved more resourceful and adaptable than political theory would indicate'.<sup>4</sup> Hudson points out that the most legitimate form of monarchy in the Middle East is that of 'an Islamic theocracy governed by the ablest leaders of a tribe tracing its lineage to the Prophet'.

The ruler should adhere to the ethics of Islam and patriarchal consultative procedures of tribal decision-making.<sup>5</sup> To some extent the Hashemites of Jordan meet this ideal type. They are direct descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, they profess adherence to the ethics of Islam, and they allow for patriarchal consultative procedures of tribal decision-making through the institution of the Royal Hashemite Diwan. However, while the Hashemites are accepted as the legitimate rulers within Jordan, these factors have failed to provide them with legitimacy in the region as a whole. This can be attributed to the following factors: neither King Hussein nor King Abdullah attempted to establish an Islamic state whose laws are based on those of Islam; many sections of society no longer regard blood descent from the Prophet as an authentic criterion of leadership; and many regard tribal patterns of decision-making as obsolete, archaic and irrelevant to the needs of a modern nation-state.

### **The decision-making elite**

A political elite is generally recognized as a group of people who either directly exercise or are in a strong position to influence the exercise of political power. In political theory the meaning of the term elite has been the subject of long debate. In this particular context the term refers to a small, identifiable group of people whose preference may sometimes prevail in cases of differences over key political issues. The share of power enjoyed by this group is considerably greater than that available to other groups within the state.<sup>6</sup>

The Jordanian political elite is made up of a principal decision-maker, a ruling elite and a peripheral elite.

*The principal decision-maker*

Jordan's principal decision-maker is indisputably the monarch, particularly in the spheres of inter-Arab affairs and foreign policy. This view is unanimously confirmed by Jordan's political leadership.<sup>7</sup> For example, Abdul Munim Rifai conceded 'without hesitation' that King Hussein dominates Jordan's foreign policy.<sup>8</sup> Since first ascending the throne the King's role as principal decision-maker has grown steadily. Nussaibah explains that 'up to 1957 and even beyond that to 1963-5 liberal democracy was developing and was extremely important. But then there was a definite shift in the location of decision-making in favour of the King'.<sup>9</sup> By 1967 the King's position as supreme decision-maker was a well-established fact. Before the departure of the British the King's role in the formulation of policy was limited. For example, King Hussein admits that until his Arabization of the army, every important decision taken by the ruler was made in close consultation with either Glubb Pasha, the British Ambassador or other British officials.<sup>10</sup> Nevertheless, even after the Arabization of the army, power was not concentrated in the hands of the King. Nussaibah describes how, during the Suez crisis of 1956, King Hussein ordered the army to march from Jenin into Israel in support of Egypt. However, 'the cabinet was then the centre of power and it refused to heed the King's order'.<sup>11</sup> The struggle between King Hussein and Prime Minister Nabulsi ended with the reins of power firmly in the grip of King Hussein, and by the 1960s he was involved in policy formulation at almost every level.

Hudson points out that while the office of monarch generates a certain structural legitimacy, where King Hussein is concerned, 'the performance of the incumbent is more important'.<sup>12</sup> In the Middle East the qualities which the leader should possess are an astute sense of the socio-political climate and a deductive capacity supported by an impeccable talent for synthesis and courage. Of these qualities the most prominent in King Hussein are those of courage and an ability to respond to the prevailing socio-economic climate.

From the start of his reign King Hussein has developed the image of a courageous leader who has no fear of death.<sup>13</sup> He frequently declares that since the timing of one's death is preordained there is no point in fearing it. For example, he explains that his grandfather taught him 'the unimportance of death and the inner peace granted to those who do not fear death'.<sup>14</sup> King Hussein demonstrated his willingness to place himself in physically dangerous situations by visiting the army camp of Zarqa in 1957, when rebellion was brewing, and by his many visits to the front-line during times of crisis. His love of exhilarating sports such as flying and racing adds to the impression that he is a courageous man. Such an image endears him to his subjects and has also impressed Westerners. Some of the decisions taken by King Hussein show that he also has the courage to make difficult decisions. His dismissal of Suleiman

Nabulsi's nationalist government in April 1957 and his confrontation with the PLO in September 1970 were actions which were bound to meet with fierce opposition from important sections of Arab society, but which the King felt had to be taken.

King Hussein's sensitivity to the demands of the prevailing socio-political climate is one of the factors which has helped him to stay in power. His desire to keep in touch with the prevailing popular mood has been particularly important. Nussaibah explains that throughout the King's rule 'even though public opinion and the factors that influence people are not formally included in the decision-making process, they are taken into account and are present. They have influenced every decision which King Hussein has taken'.<sup>15</sup> The King's willingness to respond to popular feeling was evident in his decision to dismiss Glubb Pasha and to Arabize the army in 1956; his recognition of the PLO in 1964; and his decision to form a military alliance with Nasser shortly before the June 1967 war. In each of these cases King Hussein recognized that failure to react positively to the popular mood would jeopardize the continued existence of the state.

Other factors have contributed to King Hussein's prominent position. He strives to make his rule appear as an expression of popular will by seeking to minimize the gap between himself and his subjects. For example, he prides himself on his close relationship with his soldiers<sup>16</sup> and does his best to appear as a person with few privileges. The title of one of his books, *My Profession as a King*, emphasizes that he regards himself as an ordinary man with a very special job. In it he describes how he makes his own tea and lives a life which is not so different from that of his subjects.<sup>17</sup>

King Hussein also used public speaking as a means of communicating with his subjects. Between January 1962 and December 1967 he delivered 154 speeches – an average of two per month. Of these only eleven were addressed to parliament; forty-six were delivered at public rallies and twenty-nine were broadcast on the radio. His speeches to the public generally seek to generate support and to reaffirm loyalty and allegiance to his person. They become significantly more frequent in times of crisis. For example, on average King Hussein speaks at public rallies about five times a year, but in 1963 and 1966 the number increased to twelve a year. These years saw the war of words against the Hashemites of Jordan by Syria, Egypt and the PLO. The increased number of speeches indicates that King Hussein responded by appealing directly to his people.

In these speeches King Hussein addresses the nation as 'his Jordanian family' and refers to himself as the custodian of the Jordanian people. This reflects his attempt to develop a populist ideology in which he portrays himself as the father of the nation who is responsible for the welfare of the Jordanian people. Hudson explains that, like other monarchs in the Arabian peninsula,

Table I *Speeches by King Hussein, January 1962–December 1967*

| Year of speech | Parliament | Location |       |      |                | Total |
|----------------|------------|----------|-------|------|----------------|-------|
|                |            | Rallies  | Radio | Army | Foreign policy |       |
| 1962           | 1          | 5        | 8     | 4    | 3              | 21    |
| 1963           | 4          | 12       | 5     | 3    | 4              | 28    |
| 1964           | 1          | 5        | 2     | 1    | 9              | 18    |
| 1965           | 2          | 9        | 5     | 3    | 8              | 27    |
| 1966           | 1          | 12       | 4     | 4    | 10             | 31    |
| 1967           | 2          | 3        | 5     | 5    | 14             | 29    |
| Total          | 11         | 46       | 29    | 20   | 48             | 154   |

King Hussein has sought to legitimize the monarchy through 'the tradition of Kingship . . . and an ideology emphasizing religious rectitude and kingship obligation'.<sup>18</sup> His use of a patriarchal style of authority is congruent with a culture in which 'the family is so central and revered and in which the father enjoys a high degree of deference from other members'.<sup>19</sup>

It is useful to utilize the concept of three circles to describe the three major areas in which King Hussein is actively involved in the Jordanian decision-making process. These are the local circle, the Arab circle and the foreign circle. According to Abu Odeh the monarch is invariably involved in both the formulation and implementation of policy decisions in each of these areas.<sup>20</sup> The extent of his involvement in the pre-decisional and post-decisional stages varies with each of the spheres.

In addition to the three circles, figure 1 shows four institutions which together form the inner executive group. These are the Prime Minister's office, the Royal Hashemite Diwan, the Cabinet and the Foreign Ministry. They are classified on the basis of their position and influence in the ruling hierarchy. The army is a separate category and its position and influence will be dealt with in the discussion of the subordinate institutional structure of the ruling elite.

#### *The local circle*

This is the area of internal affairs where theoretically the Prime Minister and his Cabinet have full control over the formulation and execution of policy. However, from 1957 onwards King Hussein's influence over policy formulation in domestic affairs grew considerably. By the 1960s policy formulation in the local circle was the result of consultations between the King, the Prime Minister and the King's advisers. However, policy implementation remains the sphere of the government of the day. One way for the King to exercise his influence over policy formulation is his Letter of Royal Decree, which is issued






Figure 1. The three circles

by the Prime Minister at the beginning of each new government's period of office. This Letter is the result of consultations between the incoming government and the King and lays down policy guidelines. In moments of crisis the King may also take direct responsibility for decisions in the local circle. For example, he states: 'In 1966 I took into my own hands the personal responsibility of administering the Jordanian government. No one else but me decided to close down the PLO offices in all of Jordan's districts'.<sup>21</sup> However, even this decision was taken in consultation with the Prime Minister of the time, Wasfi Tal. Thus, it would be true to say that in the local circle policy formulation is the result of a liaison between the King and his government. The extent to which each side predominates depends on the personality of the Prime Minister and the importance of the decision. Responsibility for policy implementation usually lies exclusively with the government.

The influence of the Prime Minister and his Cabinet over the army is almost negligible.<sup>22</sup> They have no institutionalized authority over it and are not permitted to interfere in its affairs in questions of policy, training or strategy. For example, the decision to allow an Egyptian General to command the Jordanian forces a few days before the June war was entirely King Hussein's. A similar situation prevails in relation to the security policy, although the executive is involved in the implementation of the King's decisions through the Ministry of the Interior.

#### *The Arab circle*

The nature of King Hussein's involvement in inter-Arab affairs is closely related to his status as a Hashemite. He sees himself as standing at the vanguard of 'the Arabs' great march in their sacred revolution under the leadership of their knight and pioneer Hussein Ben Ali'. He believes that 'from the minute that the martyr-builder King Abdullah raised his standard high in the sky this country became the focus of the aspirations and dreams for which the hearts of the Arabs have beaten over the years'.<sup>23</sup>

An Arab leader with such a strong sense of identity and such a belief in his heroic role must inevitably find himself and his regime actively involved in regional Arab affairs. This is reflected in the active role King Hussein took at the meetings of the Arab League and the summit meetings, which were the main forums for Arab affairs in the period between 1963 and 1967.

The extent to which King Hussein participates in the Arab circles depends on several factors. Abu Odeh points out that it is 'subject to variation depending on the nature of the issue with which he is dealing'. It also depends on the 'particular Prime Minister in power and the nature of his relationship with the King'.<sup>24</sup> According to Abu Odeh, in affairs relating to the Arab circle, the relationship between the King and his Prime Minister is 'more of an interaction than a one-way system' at both the pre-decisional and post-decisional stages. For example, while the decision to attend the summits initiated by Nasser in 1963 was exclusively the King's it was of direct concern to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet at the post-decisional stage. The summits saw Jordan's acceptance of the creation of a Palestinian entity (the PLO) and the Prime Minister, Bahjat Talhouni, became Jordan's representative at the follow-up committee formed to implement this and other summit decisions. Where policy decisions in the Arab circle relate to bilateral relations, the role of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet at the pre-decisional and post-decisional stages is generally greater.

The relationship between King Hussein and his executive in the Arab circle is highlighted by the experience of Wasfi Tal. In March 1967, as Arab-Israeli tension grew, King Hussein found it imperative to move closer to Egypt. At

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that time Tal was again Prime Minister. Since he represented an obstacle to the rapprochement with Nasser, King Hussein removed him from office, replacing him with Saad Juma'a who was more likely to be able to effect the required reconciliation. This example illustrates that if the Prime Minister is a strong figure he is allowed considerable influence over the Arab circle. However, at time of crisis it is the King who is the final arbiter.

### *The foreign circle*

According to Abu Odeh the area of foreign policy decision-making is 'almost entirely dominated by the King'.<sup>25</sup> The extent of his activity in this sphere from the 1960s onwards is illustrated by the fact that the monarch's foreign policy speeches between 1962 and 1967 outnumbered those of every other category (table 1).<sup>26</sup> One of the most important reasons for the emphasis King Hussein gives to the formulation of foreign policy is that as the head of the state his foremost concern is its survival. Since Jordan has always been heavily dependent on other nations, the survival of the Kingdom is closely tied to foreign affairs. Throughout his reign King Hussein has strived to maintain a dialogue with both Western and Arab nations, and to establish good relations with them. Since coming to the throne he has developed his role as a diplomat, and by the mid-1960s the international press referred to him as 'the official spokesman of the Arab world'.<sup>27</sup>

A second reason for the King's domination of the foreign circle is that his position as head of state since 1953 has allowed him to establish direct contact with leaders throughout the world. His long rule has resulted in an expert knowledge of foreign affairs and he is therefore in a better position than any Jordanian politician to pursue Jordan's foreign policy aims. Numerous foreign policy decisions stem directly from the King, including the decision to support Nasser in the 1956 Arab-Israeli war; the acceptance of American military aid in 1957; the calling in of British troops in 1958 following the revolution in Iraq; the decision to sever relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1965; and the acceptance of United Nations Resolution 242 in November 1967.

The period after the 1967 war saw King Hussein's foreign policy activity at its height. At that time the King believed that the only way in which he could hope to regain the West Bank was through diplomacy. Accordingly he visited twenty countries between the end of June and November 1967, travelling twice to Europe, twice to America, and three times to Egypt<sup>28</sup> with the aim of establishing a Jordanian foreign policy which would take into account the post-June war situation. His visits resulted in the formulation of five principles that constituted the basis of Jordan's foreign policy and played an influential part in the eventual formulation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242.

*The ruling elite*

Zaid Rifai explains that 'Jordan has a highly personalized system of government in which decisions are made by the King, through the influence of the King's advisers and in some cases by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet. It is not an institutionalized process. It is a fact of political life in Jordan that we do not have an institutionalized process of decision-making'.<sup>29</sup> One of the reasons for this is that, in general, Jordan's ruling elite has been composed of the King's most trusted friends and aides. The influence of the Jordanian elite is based not on office but on the personal influence its members have on the King. In Abu Odeh's view 'the Jordanian elite exercises the constraints that are usually exercised by institutions'.<sup>30</sup> Its members operate as advisers and thus have a constraining effect on the Jordanian decision-making process which is comparable to that exercised by parliament, pressure groups and Governmental agencies in the West. In Jordan the main institutions in which these people are found are the Prime Ministership, the Cabinet, the Royal Hashemite Diwan, the Foreign Ministry and the army. Each of these institutions is considered in turn below. The Crown Prince, the King's shrewd and well-educated brother, who belongs to this category since he is considered responsible for the country's economic and social development policies, is also regularly consulted by King Hussein and acts as Regent in the King's absence.

In Jordan the participation of the subordinate authority (the state organs) in the decision-making process is limited to providing information and advice in the pre-decisional stage and implementation in the post-decisional stage. Aides who are close to the King are generally influential at the pre-decisional stage. According to Marwan Al-Kassem, King Hussein debates the issue in question with his advisers, then gathers together the various points of view, evaluates them and finally decides what course of action to take.<sup>31</sup> The final and ultimate authority remains, all the time, with the central and dominant figure. King Hussein has initiated all of Jordan's major policies. Demands on the political system have been made directly to him and in general he has also fulfilled them.

Nevertheless, the ruling elite has considerable importance as an instrument of the state because of its ability to modify decisional outcomes through the control of information, its advisory role to the monarch and its influence as a result of a particular method of decision-implementation.

*The Prime Minister*

When King Hussein first came to the throne the Prime Minister had considerable influence over Jordanian decision-making. Prime Ministers such as Tawfiq Abul Huda, Samir Rifai, Ibrahim Hashim and Said Al-Mufti influenced the decision-making process at pre- and post-decisional stages. Since they played a vital part in the consolidation and preservation of Hashemite rule following the

assassination of King Abdullah, they were highly regarded by King Hussein. However, in the late 1950s the situation changed and the King played an increasingly influential role. By the 1960s key decisions were invariably made by him. This is not to say that from this time the Prime Minister's role was reduced to that of executor but that his influence varied according to his personality, expertise and the importance of the decision. There is little doubt that when Tal was Prime Minister his strong personality had a powerful impact on the decision-making process. In the 1970s and 1980s a number of people who had been the King's political advisers became Prime Ministers, including Zaid Rifai and Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf. Both these men had extensive experience in foreign affairs and consequently exercised considerable influence over policy formulation at the pre-decisional stage. For example, the close relations with Syria which were forged following the formation of Zaid Rifai's second Cabinet in November 1974 culminated in formal negotiations for union between the two countries. King Hussein and President Assad met several times and the two states decided to form a unified political leadership which would co-ordinate political, economic and military affairs. This development was strongly influenced by Zaid Rifai who sought to maintain the Hashemite's traditional role of promoting Arab unity.

One of the principal means by which the Prime Minister exerts his influence is the Cabinet Statement, which he delivers before parliament and which outlines the policies with which the government will concern itself. The more vital the decision the more likely it is that the influence of the King will be paramount. For example, in the spring of 1967 King Hussein became increasingly concerned that the Arabs were heading for a military confrontation with Israel. Accordingly, in April 1967 he placed in power a man who would pursue the foreign policy aims he desired. In a sense Juma'a gained office because of his willingness to implement the King's desire to bring Jordan back into the mainstream of Arab politics, which at that time meant aligning the nation with Egypt.

### *The Cabinet*

The paramount role of the King in the formulation of policy means that the role of the Cabinet is essentially executive. Its function is particularly curtailed in the sphere of inter-Arab affairs. This is illustrated by the decision that Jordan should join forces with Egypt at the end of May 1967. Nussaibah explains that in reaching this vital decision 'constitutional institutions played a minimal – almost negligible – role. If I remember correctly, the Cabinet accepted whatever was said to it without much questioning. Its members thought they were doing the right thing because they themselves were not properly briefed about the military situation or had perhaps been misled by false information, either deliberately or out of ignorance.'<sup>32</sup>

In the past, recruitment into the Cabinet was based on tradition. Apart from a brief period between 1956–7 and the early 1960s Cabinet members tended to be drawn from families which had always been prominent in the political, tribal and social spheres, and which had a tradition of loyalty to the monarch. At the time of Tal's first Cabinet in January 1962 this pattern changed to one based on merit rather than inheritance. Tal began to initiate into political life a number of young, specialized technocrats who often lacked political experience. They were brought directly into political life at the level of Minister by virtue of their specialized knowledge and skill. Their role was not one of policy formulation, which they had little control over, but one of policy execution. 'While they lacked the political expertise needed to formulate policy, King Hussein's directions to the Prime Minister were sufficient to set them on the right trail.'<sup>33</sup> Tal was particularly demanding and those who did not meet his requirements soon found themselves out of office. In August 1962 he reshuffled his Cabinet and four out of the ten newly appointed ministers were replaced by six different men. Both King Hussein and Tal showed a willingness to try out fresh personnel and their impatience with the pace of development in the departments of the outgoing ministers illustrates the emphasis they placed on achievement. Qualities of specialized knowledge and proven administrative ability were required, although candidates still had to demonstrate loyalty to the throne.

In the absence of political parties, those who are recruited into the executive branch of the government stay there because they accept their muted function in the formulation of policy. This ensures that at the level of the executive there is little conflict over broad policy outlines since its membership is not involved in their creation.

The relationship between the Cabinet and the Prime Minister varies according to the personality and status of the latter. The experience and strong leadership qualities of Prime Ministers such as Ibrahim Hashim, Tawfiq Abul Huda and Samir Rifai meant that their Cabinets enjoyed considerable influence over all aspects of policy formulation. This was accepted as normal by the monarch from the time of King Abdullah to the early years of King Hussein's rule. The new generation of Cabinet Ministers lacked the same experience in the field of foreign affairs, particularly when compared with that enjoyed by King Hussein. Consequently, from the early 1960s Prime Ministers tended to limit the role of their Ministers at the pre-decisional stage and instead concentrated on their executive function. This trend has helped to create a special relationship between the King and the Prime Minister on the basis of the latter's ability to offer the King advice at the pre-decisional stage in his individual capacity as a close adviser rather than as the representative of a collective body. This was the case with most Prime Ministers of the 1960s and 1970s, including Bahjat Talhouni, Sharif Hussein Ben Nasser, Wasfi Tal, Saad Juma'a, Zaid Rifai and Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf.

*The Royal Hashemite Diwan*

Political observers of Jordan usually fail to examine the Royal Hashemite Diwan, although it can be as influential as the Cabinet. No comparable institution exists in the West. The principal function of the Diwan is to monitor policy implementation in the local circle. It also plays an important 'mediating role between [the monarch] and the Cabinet'<sup>34</sup> and has an advisory function which is similar to that of the office of the White House Chief of Staff in America. Depending on the personality and experience of the Chief of the Diwan, advice may be offered on domestic and foreign affairs at the pre-decisional stage.

The role of the Diwan as an executive council in a vital sector of domestic affairs is one of its most important functions. The key personalities in the Diwan tend to belong to Jordan's traditional ruling families and are often drawn from prominent bedouin clans and tribes and social groups which ensures that the Diwan is an important source of support for the throne. Amongst the bedouin, King Hussein's image as patron-ruler has penetrated deeply and he continues to fulfil the role established by his grandfather as a 'super-tribal' leader, particularly over the tribal inhabitants of the East Bank. This is illustrated by the example of Talhouni who was Chief of the Diwan in the late 1950s. When Nabulsi's government challenged the status quo Talhouni brought together those groups which remained loyal to the throne in order to reaffirm their fealty to the King and to express their opposition to the nationalist pro-Nasser trend led by Nabulsi.

In order to facilitate this function the Diwan contains a department called the Tribal Council whose task it is to liaise between the monarchy and the bedouin. Its importance is reflected in the fact that for many years it was led by the King's brother, Prince Muhammad. Tribal leaders consult its officials as often as once a week and King Hussein pays many visits to the tribal districts. The Council serves to promote the loyalty of the bedouin and ensures that the Crown is in constant touch with events in the rural areas of the East Bank. Leaders of bedouin tribes also make frequent visits to the Diwan for various reasons. For example, they may want to reaffirm their allegiance to the King or make requests for assistance or greater government attention to their tribe or district.

The Diwan also allows the monarch to keep in touch with events taking place in rural areas and with the mood of important sections of the population. Ordinary people are also able to visit the Chief of the Diwan in order to talk about their problems, and they may even request an audience with the King. Generally, the Chief of the Diwan is available to anyone who wants to see him. Such people include individuals from all walks of life who may wish to talk about events in their sect, tribe or kin-group. As a result of this liaison the King has succeeded in establishing a special relationship with the rural population to

the extent that the inhabitants have an almost personal affection for him. This is reflected in the fact that many do not call the King by his name or title but by an endearing adaptation of the Islamic sobriquet 'Sayyidna', which may be translated into English as 'Sir'.

It is obvious from this that the position of Chief of the Royal Hashemite Diwan is influential since the incumbent is the main aide to the King. According to Abu Odeh 'the Chief of the Diwan acts as a bridge between the King and the Prime Minister'.<sup>35</sup> This means that he is in close contact with both men and forms a close relationship with them. He also gains insight into the role played by the Prime Minister. Consequently the Chief of the Diwan is always a potential candidate for the Premiership. Since the early 1960s most of those who have been Chiefs of the Diwan have gone on to become Prime Ministers and vice versa. This was the case with Bahjat Talhouni, Wasfi Tal, Saad Juma'a, Sharif Hussein Ben Nasser, Ahmed Louzi, Zaid Rifai, Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf and others. Each of these men played an influential role in the formulation of policy at the pre-decisional stage, particularly in domestic affairs. In some cases the Chief of the Diwan has extended his role into foreign affairs if he is particularly well qualified in that sphere. This was the case with Marwan Al-Kassem who had been Foreign Minister and Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf who had been Jordan's Permanent Representative at the UN.

It should be noted that the framework of the Diwan also includes the post of the Minister of the Royal Court. The occupant of this post is usually a member of the ruling elite who acts as a trusted and senior aide to the King. In this capacity he serves as the main political adviser to the King and carries out a certain amount of diplomacy as his delegate. He may carry important letters or messages to other heads of state. He is therefore an influential figure at the pre-decisional stage of policy formulation and is often concerned with foreign affairs.

### *The Foreign Ministry*

The Foreign Ministry of Jordan does not function as an advisory institution in the formulation of foreign policy but as an executive organ of the Government and the King. Zaid Rifai explains that Jordan depends on diplomacy for the formulation of its foreign policy and 'this is done through the person of the King. He is our chief diplomat and our foreign policy is dominated by him'.<sup>36</sup> According to Abdul Munim Rifai, who was Foreign Minister for a number of years, 'at the pre-decisional stage the King directs the Minister in the formulation of policy and the Minister then implements it'.<sup>37</sup>

The Foreign Ministry's limited role is reflected in the fact that in the critical years of the summits between 1964 and 1966 it barely participated in the major decisions. King Hussein was the most active participant and formulator of foreign policy. Many of his decisions were not the result of consultations with