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


Work and politics

The division of labor in industry

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TO M., R., AND S.

Exemplary friends, teachers by example



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Preface

I conceived this book about social transformation with one set of questions in mind and wrote it guided by another. When the ideas set down here first took shape in the mid-1970s, the strike waves of the 1960s in France, Italy, and West Germany were fresh in mind; but so too was the impression that, measured by many of their explicit ambitions, these movements had failed to revolutionize factory labor. Why had millions of normally cautious workers gone into the streets? Why were they back at their jobs? To understand what happened, I decided to find out as much as I could about the structure of industrial jobs and the demands industrial workers make on them. The naïveté of the questions seemed both a reminder of my ignorance of industry and a way to keep an eye turned to the passionate drama of hope, desperation, and power that is played out in any large conflict.

Visiting factories and reading about them, I convinced myself that workers were neither a homogeneous class united in opposition to management nor a mass of individuals eager for their own reasons to cooperate, even in limited ways, with the bosses. Rather, it seemed that in factory after factory in different countries and times the work force was regularly split along skill lines into distinct groups, perpetuating themselves in different ways. Each had a characteristic definition of its prerogatives and ambitions and little comprehension of those of the others. Given the right provocation, furthermore, each group was capable of fighting for its claims and allying with the others to pursue them. Political doctrines were often the language these groups used to express their demands; but what the work groups wanted often corresponded loosely at best to the ideas of the political leaders.

These general ideas, I imagined for a time, explained both the broad pattern of industrial conflict during the nineteenth century

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and the apparently contradictory recent events that had initially drawn my attention. The partial overlap between the distinct ends of the different work groups and those of management helped make sense of the alternation of conflict and cooperation on the shop floor. The possibility of alliances between groups sharing a common political vocabulary shed light on those extraordinary moments of mass defiance that occasionally shake our societies. The fragility of those alliances, a consequence of the allies' different aims as well as of the gap between the political symbols and the workers' real demands, seemed in important ways to account for the ease with which the authorities could restore order in the factories by making no more than limited concessions and playing on the workers' divided ambitions. The more I studied the complex web of understanding and misunderstanding that binds work groups to bosses and to each other, the easier it became to see why there could be so much conflict and so little fundamental change in the factories. Almost without knowing it, and certainly with no pleasure at the thought, I came to accept the failure of transformative hopes as a proof that the existing division of labor was a fact and limit of social life.

But as I put these ideas in order, applying them to different industries, countries, and times, I began to feel as though I were building a sand castle in the line of an advancing tide. I was explaining the obstacles to change. Yet as I learned more about the early history of industrial capitalism, it became clear that at certain turning points in the history of mechanized production the division of labor might have gone down a path different from the one it followed. More puzzling still, research on the reorganization of work now under way in many of the most modern factories suggested that in the future the division of labor in some of the rich capitalist countries might take a road intersecting some of these foregone possibilities. And it was clear that social struggles, including shop-floor conflicts, played an important part in determining how work is organized, though not in the way I had implicitly imagined. Change often seemed to come not from direct concessions to straightforward demands, but from management's attempts to regain control over an unruly work force by introducing new machines and forms of industrial organization. Under the right circumstances, I found, the clash of worker strategy and management counterstrategy could lead to transformations that neither foresaw. Whereas my initial question led me to underscore the restraint and partiality of workers' demands, the questions arising from this new perspective led me to underscore their potentially revolutionary character. The division of



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labor came to seem not a limit to the possibilities of transformation but, looked at over long periods, the result of a complex clash of visions of society backed by economic and political power.

This book, then, is an attempt to weave these concerns together: to show how unpretentious claims for decency defined in various and sometimes conflicting ways can contribute to profound transformations in the structure of society. The example is the factory and blue-collar workers, because some of the most dramatic and consequential conflicts in our society are fought between capitalists and workers and because the division of labor is so often regarded as the cause, not the result, of struggle. But the point is more general. The overarching aim is to explore the relation between our barely articulated ideas of honor and justice—politics in the broadest sense—and their quietly revolutionary effect on the social order.

According to one current fashion, these prefatory remarks should end with a kind of playbill in which are listed those who made any contribution to the production at hand. According to a second fashion, this acknowledgment is a more or less provisional substitute for the author's unwritten Bildungsroman. In my book, at least, an acknowledgment is neither. It is, rather, a page from that ledger in which each of us notes those persons who out of love, friendship, or duty have so marked either our lives or our work that it is impossible to think of either without thinking of them as well. Herewith, then, I would like to do publicly what I hope to have done, unmistakably, privately, and acknowledge my debt to these people: Suzanne Berger, Donald L. M. Blackmer, Janis Bolster, Sebastiano Brusco, Vittorio Cappecchi, Abby Collins, Joshua Cohen, Daniel Dexter, Sheila Emerson, Charles Ferguson, David Friedman, Robert A. Gates, Peter Gourevitch, Richard Herding, Gary Herrigel, Helen Hershkoff, Hilary Horton, Carl Kaysen, Susanna Kaysen, Helgard Kramer, Burkhart Lutz, Charles Maier, Donata Meneghelli, Marina Monteroni, Hartmut Neuendorff, Claus Offe, Adele Pesce, Michael Piore, Daniel Raff, George Rosen, Michele Salvati, Maria Pia Seirup, Werner Sengeberger, William Sewell, Jr., Harley Shaiken, David Stark, Frank Stille, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Maurizio Vannicelli, Peter Weitz, and Jonathan Zeitlin. Different as they are to the world and to me, all are alike in this: Each is possessed of a kind of dignity that makes more plausible the dream of a better world.

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Charles F. Sabel