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052130444X - Conceptual Anomalies in Economics and Statistics: Lessons from the Social Experiment

Leland Gerson Neuberg

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

Contents

Preface	<i>page xi</i>
Introduction	1
I.1 The idea of a controlled social experiment	1
I.1.1 The historical origin of the income maintenance experiments	1
I.1.2 Two senses of “experiment”	3
I.1.3 The role of the income maintenance experiments in this book	4
I.2 The book’s structure	6
I.2.1 The argument by chapters	6
I.2.2 The reasons for formalization	8
I.2.3 Some recurring themes	9
I.2.4 Notation and proofs	11
PART I. STATISTICAL LOGICS	
Chapter 1. J. S. Mill and some philosophical underpinnings of controlled experimentation	15
1.1 Introduction: An ancient example	15
1.2 The method of difference	17
1.2.1 Mill’s concept of causality	17
1.2.2 Inconsistency and circularity	19
1.2.3 A role for theory	22
1.2.4 Counterfactual conditionals	25
1.3 A role for probability	26
1.3.1 Mill’s distinction between law and collocation	26
1.3.2 Two concepts of probability	27
1.3.3 Understanding a die roll	30
1.4 Summary and conclusion	32

vi Contents

Chapter 2. R. A. Fisher, randomization, and controlled experimentation	36
2.1 Introduction: Fisher and the emergence of the modern approach	36
2.1.1 Assessing Fisher's historical role	36
2.1.2 Fisher's account of randomization and Neyman's immanent critique	37
2.2 Randomization-based causal inference and its difficulties	39
2.2.1 The theory's assumption set and the first principle of equiprobability	39
2.2.2 Core of a theory of causal point estimation	43
2.2.3 Rediscovery of Neyman's dependency difficulty	45
2.2.4 Randomization-based testing of a sharp causal hypothesis	47
2.2.5 Randomization-based testing of the hypothesis of no mean causal effect	49
2.3 More randomization-based causal point estimation	50
2.3.1 The principle of blocked equiprobability and stratification's role in causal inference	50
2.3.2 The second principle of equiprobability and another extension of causal point estimation	52
2.3.3 Relaxing the perfect-reporting and no-technical-error assumptions	54
2.3.4 Causal univariate regression	56
2.4 Summary and conclusion	58
Chapter 3. Some special difficulties of controlled social experiments	61
3.1 Introduction: The nature of the object of inquiry and difficulties for causal inference	61
3.2 Impediments to causal point estimation in controlled social experiments	64
3.2.1 Social subject consciousness	64
3.2.2 The good and the true in conflict	67
3.2.3 Unbiased causal point estimation with disproportional stratified random assignment	71
3.3 Impediments to causal point estimation in the income maintenance experiments	73
3.3.1 Difficulties when the response variable is marital status	73
3.3.2 Sample selection difficulties	76
3.3.3 Disproportional stratified random assignment	80

Cambridge University Press

052130444X - Conceptual Anomalies in Economics and Statistics: Lessons from the Social Experiment

Leland Gerson Neuberg

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

Contents	vii
3.4 Summary and conclusion	83
3.4.1 The inferential difficulties	83
3.4.2 Remediating the inferential difficulties	85
Chapter 4. Hume's problem of induction in modern statistical inference and controlled experimentation	89
4.1 Introduction: Hume's problem in the modern approach	89
4.2 Meaning, reference, and some theory results in modern statistical inference	90
4.2.1 A classical situation and an objection	90
4.2.2 A limiting relative-frequency approach to the problem of probability's referent	92
4.2.3 A hypothetical approach to the problem of the normal probability distribution's referent	94
4.2.4 The Neyman–Pearson problematique	95
4.2.5 Some Neyman–Pearson theory results for the classical two-sample situation	98
4.3 Weakening the classical normality assumption	100
4.3.1 From normal to continuous distributions	100
4.3.2 From a normal distribution to a distribution with finite variance	103
4.3.3 An approximation theorem and an illustration of its use	105
4.3.4 From classical to consistent nonparametric regression	107
4.4 Summary and conclusion	110
Summary and conclusion of Part I	114

PART II. ECONOMIC LOGICS

Chapter 5. Problems with a rationalist account of classical mechanics	119
5.1 Introduction: Some philosophers on the logic of science and classical mechanics	119
5.1.1 From Mill to Popper	119
5.1.2 From Popper to Kuhn	121
5.1.3 Core of the theory: Newton's Second Law	122
5.2 Motion of earthly and heavenly bodies	125
5.2.1 One particle, no force: Newton's First Law	125
5.2.2 Two particles, no (net) force: the law of conservation of linear momentum	127

Cambridge University Press

052130444X - Conceptual Anomalies in Economics and Statistics: Lessons from the Social Experiment

Leland Gerson Neuberg

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

viii	Contents	
	5.2.3 Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation and Kepler's laws	129
	5.2.4 Falling bodies near the earth's surface	132
	5.2.5 The motion of a pendulum	133
5.3	Classical mechanical phenomena of atomic and subatomic origin	135
	5.3.1 The ideal-gas law	135
	5.3.2 The atom's nucleus and Rutherford scattering	136
	5.3.3 The hydrogen atom: a classical model	139
	5.3.4 Bohr's model of the hydrogen atom: toward quantum wave mechanics	140
5.4	Summary and conclusion	141
	5.4.1 The formalization	141
	5.4.2 Attachment difficulties	144
	5.4.3 Backward to Chapter 4 and forward to Chapters 6 and 7	147
	Chapter 6. Microeconomics striving to be a classical-mechanics-like science	150
6.1	Introduction: Addressing some possible objections	150
6.2	Microeconomic theory	153
	6.2.1 The consumer theory core	153
	6.2.2 Further demand-side theory	155
	6.2.3 The producer theory core and further supply-side theory	158
	6.2.4 A particular concrete, hypothetical, artificial example and a logical difficulty	161
6.3	Attachment difficulties	163
	6.3.1 Equilibrium and the identification problem and its solution in the particular concrete, hypothetical, artificial example	163
	6.3.2 The identification problem as a philosophical attachment difficulty	167
	6.3.3 Three further attachment difficulties	169
	6.3.4 Differences in individual tastes and intractable supply and demand equations	171
	6.3.5 The translog utility function: an actual example from microeconomic practice	175
6.4	Summary and conclusion	178
	6.4.1 The formalization	178
	6.4.2 Attachment difficulties	179

Contents	ix
Chapter 7. The income maintenance experiments: microeconomic science or scientism?	182
7.1 Introduction: Science and scientism in microeconomics	182
7.2 The theory of labor–leisure choice	184
7.2.1 The theory of labor–leisure choice without taxes	184
7.2.2 Adding taxes to the theory of labor–leisure choice	188
7.2.3 Family utility function and budget constraint in the theory of labor–leisure choice	192
7.3 The income maintenance experiments as tests of the theory of labor–leisure choice	196
7.3.1 The New Jersey experiment: “deduction” of a prediction statement	196
7.3.2 The New Jersey experiment: attachment and induction difficulties	200
7.3.3 The Seattle-Denver experiment: “deduction” of a prediction statement	205
7.3.4 The Seattle-Denver experiment: attachment and induction difficulties	214
7.3.5 The Gary experiment: “deduction” of a prediction statement in a first study	218
7.3.6 The Gary experiment: attachment and induction difficulties in a first study	223
7.3.7 The Gary experiment: “deduction” of a prediction statement in a second study	226
7.3.8 The Gary experiment: attachment and induction difficulties in a second study	232
7.4 Summary and conclusion	234
7.4.1 Weaknesses of deduction, induction, and particular utility function choice	234
7.4.2 Attachment difficulties, ad hoc theories, and the necessity of immaturity	237
Chapter 8. Microeconomics striving to be deontology	246
8.1 Introduction: Microeconomics as “normative science”	246
8.2 Microeconomic theory: an abstract version	247
8.2.1 Consumer theory again	247
8.2.2 Producer theory again	253
8.2.3 Equilibrium	255
8.2.4 The logical status of the abstract microeconomic theory	258
8.3 Welfare microeconomic theory	261
8.3.1 Pareto efficiency	261

Cambridge University Press

052130444X - Conceptual Anomalies in Economics and Statistics: Lessons from the Social Experiment

Leland Gerson Neuberg

Table of Contents

[More information](#)

x	Contents	
	8.3.2 An example	264
	8.3.3 The problem of the distribution of income	267
	8.3.4 Strengthening “is consistent with” to “leads to”	269
	8.3.5 Weakening assumptions	274
	8.4 Summary and conclusion	280
	Summary and conclusion of Part II	283
	Conclusion: Some possible barriers to controlled social experiments as science	287
	C.1 Introduction: The difficulties that may be barriers	287
	C.1.1 From Parts I and II to the Conclusion	287
	C.1.2 The problem of complexity	289
	C.2 The problem of behavior	291
	C.2.1 Atomization and individuality	291
	C.2.2 Consciousness and will	294
	C.2.3 Chomsky’s linguistics: a nonbehaviorist social science	298
	C.3 The problem of time	301
	C.3.1 Dynamics and equilibrium	301
	C.3.2 Time-dependent utility-production	303
	C.3.3 History	304
	C.4 Summary and conclusion	308
	C.4.1 Overall conclusion	308
	C.4.2 Social experiments as a basis for public policy	313
	Appendix: Proofs of theorems, lemmas, and propositions	317
	References	337
	Symbols and abbreviations	345
	Index	363