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978-0-521-29318-1 - Continuity and Change: A Study of Two Ethnic Communities in Israel

Rita James Simon

Excerpt

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Introduction

There are two ethnic communities in Israel that for different reasons have remained outside the mainstream of Israeli society, although the members of both have deep roots in the soil of Israel. Most of the members of these communities are not new immigrants who have settled in Israel since the establishment of the state in 1948. Rather, they are the descendants of families who have lived in the area for generations and even centuries. The two communities are Israeli Arabs, and ultra-Orthodox Jews who trace their most recent spiritual and cultural heritage to the shtetls (Jewish villages) and cities of seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century Eastern Europe.¹

This monograph presents the results of two surveys conducted among members of each of these communities to find out whether the parents in these communities have succeeded in transmitting to their adolescent children the dominant values and themes of their cultures and life styles. We explore the extent to which the adolescents have internalized their parents' values and aspirations and the extent to which they have moved toward greater contact with the mainstream of Israeli society. Each community is treated separately, but the same questions are asked of both. The key question is: What is the likelihood for intergenerational change and for more extensive contacts with the larger society on the part of the younger Israeli-born generation?

Of the two ethnic collectivities, the Arab one is the larger. Israeli Arabs represent approximately 13 percent of the total Israeli population. They live mainly in small towns and villages in the northern part of Israel, in the Galilee. The ultra-Orthodox Jews, on the other hand, number in the thousands; they live primarily in Jerusalem, in B'nai Brak, a suburb of Tel Aviv, and on a few Orthodox kibbutzim (collectives) and moshavim (cooperative settlements).

This monograph does not provide a detailed ethnographic account of the complexities of day-to-day living in these communities. Neither does it attempt a comprehensive analysis of the status of these commu-

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nities and of their ties to the rest of Israeli society. It provides data and insights on specific characteristics and strains within these communities as perceived by respondents who represent two generations, and it offers some prognosis about the future of those communities vis-à-vis the mainstream of Israeli life and politics.

One of the most distinctive characteristics of Israeli society and a source of considerable pride to the state is the enormous success that it has had in integrating and assimilating immigrants with widely varied cultural and social backgrounds. Jews from the ghettos of Casablanca, Bagdad, and Tunis, from the Atlas mountains of Morocco, and from the villages of Yemen, and Jews from Vienna, Budapest, and Paris, from Bombay, and Johannesburg, from Buenos Aires, and Los Angeles have in one generation been transformed into Israelis who consider Tel Aviv, Beersheva, Haifa, or some kibbutz or moshav their home. They and their children dress differently, speak differently, work at different kinds of jobs, eat different kinds of food, and in general pursue a life style that is significantly different than that pursued by families of prior generations.

On the whole, the two populations that are the focus of this study did not participate in this massive resocialization program. The reasons for nonparticipation are different. The relative isolation and insulation of the ultra-Orthodox Jews from the rest of Israeli society is largely voluntary. Members of this community, although they are fully aware of their small numbers, have a deep and powerful belief in the superiority of their culture, religious beliefs, family structure, and indeed their entire way of life. At best, they look upon other Jews, especially Israelis, with pain and sorrow, at worst with scorn and disgust. They have a deep and seemingly unshakable belief in the timelessness of their culture and its values, and a realistic awareness of the precautions that must be taken to prevent assimilation into the larger culture by their younger members.

The Arab community has also remained outside the mainstream of Israeli society; but in its case the reasons are a combination of desire and lack of choice. The desire is most likely to be manifest among older members of the community who wish to maintain their cultural and religious identity. They wish, for example, to retain a distinctive language, style of dress, set of marital arrangements, and work and leisure patterns. In addition, however, Jewish Israelis have imposed barriers at the entryways of some of the more important institutions of

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the society, most notably the armed forces and various occupations, that make assimilation or integration extremely difficult.

As one looks ahead and considers the sources of potential discord within Israeli society, the role that these two communities are likely to play vis-à-vis the larger society takes on crucial importance. It is not daydreaming or wishful thinking to expect that Israel's relations with its Arab neighbors will one day improve, and that the Middle East will be a region of nations showing mutual respect for one another's sovereignty. It is also not wishful thinking to believe that "that day" may occur in the next generation. The cease-fire agreement between Israel and Egypt that has been in effect since the end of the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the more recently permitted exchange of visits among Druze families on the Syrian and Israeli sides of the Golan Heights may represent the beginning of a change in the relationship Israel will have with its neighboring Arab states. But what is less likely is that Israel's internal communal conflicts can or will be resolved in that same period of time. As one considers the most likely sources of internal tension and strain, differences that revolve around the religious—secular axis and the Jewish—non-Jewish axis rank high.²

Although the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community is small in number, its image has great importance to many Jews all over the world who live more or less secular lives. In commenting on police treatment of members of this community after the police had been called in to protect tourists who were being attacked by some of the more zealous members, the then prime minister, Ben Gurion, observed: "It is always more difficult when acts are prompted by a deep, religious belief . . . they represent a world most of us come from — they look like our grandfathers. How can you slap your grandfather into jail, even if he throws stones at you? . . ." (Leslie, 1971:146).

The term "they look like our grandfathers" is important. In their daily lives most Israelis do not participate in that regimen of prayer, dietary observances, dress, and study that regulates almost every hour and mood of an observant Jew's life. The Israeli lives a modern, secular life in which he has self-consciously discarded the sacred duties that preoccupy the ultra-Orthodox Jew. But at least half of the Jewish population in Israel have had Jewish grandfathers or great-grandfathers who have adhered to this pattern and have memories of these people that occupy special places in their consciousness. To even the most secular Israeli these memories of individual relatives are integrally tied

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to their memories of a whole people and a cultural past. That social or cultural memory is of Judaism and the Jewish people and their struggle for survival in what has many times been a hostile, dangerous Gentile world. Some of these grandfathers did manage to survive, and their survival is indivisibly bound to the survival of the entire people. These same secular Israelis may view that history with ambivalence, and they may ask of these relatives: Why did you live as you did in your ghettos, always fearful of the next pogrom or invasion; why did you not do as we did when we came and settled in Palestine in the 1910s and 1920s? But they are grateful, nevertheless; and they are respectful of the facts of survival. They credit that survival, perhaps grudgingly, to their grandfathers' faith, to their religious beliefs, and to the tenacity with which they held to the belief about their superiority.

Thus the secular Israeli today, when he confronts these transmitters of the faith of a culture, is often both angered and disgusted at the seeming inability of these people to make the necessary adjustments to their new environment, at their inability or unwillingness to recognize that life in Israel, a free and independent Jewish state, is qualitatively different from earlier Jewish experience since the destruction of the Second Temple. But hidden behind the disgust and the anger is the feeling that these people, after all, are "special"; they deserve to be treated in a special way, and one must "put up" with some of their demands. How many demands often becomes the crucial issue in parliamentary debates or encounters with the police.

Some measure of the success of this tiny, ultra-Orthodox community is manifested by the fact that there is no civil marriage or divorce in Israel; only the Orthodox Rabbinate is officially recognized; there is no public transportation in most of Israel on the Sabbath; and dietary laws are observed at all official functions. The ultra-Orthodox community has not been alone in insisting upon these controls. The Mizrachi Party, which is the largest of the religious parties, and indeed some Israelis who do not ordinarily vote for any of the religious parties, have also supported and argued for these measures.

For the sake of unity, during this period when external danger looms very large, most Israelis have argued against doing anything that would shake the structure and cohesion of Israeli society. Movements that would push for changes in the Sabbath observances, in the marriage and divorce laws, and in the monopoly over all religious functions by Orthodox Jewry, to name some of their most unpopular characteristics,

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might seriously disturb the balance at a time when severe internal conflict could be disastrous. The time for discussing basic internal changes and for insisting on these changes must follow a peaceful resolution of Israel's external problems. This argument has been persuasive for almost thirty years; it is likely to continue to be so. The ultra-Orthodox Jewish community is likely to maintain its influence on the less extreme religious groups or political parties, for example, on the Agudat, which in turn influences the Workers' Agudat, which in turn influences the Mizrachi to be certain that there is no weakening within the ranks and no internal pressures for change.

In sum, then, when one attempts to anticipate the future in Israel as far ahead as the next generation, the likelihood of internal conflict resulting in basic changes appears to be very much dependent on external affairs. Should peace come to the Middle East, it is likely to be followed by a significant increase in the amount of internal conflict and dissension between the ultra-Orthodox religious community and the rest of Israeli society. Based on the information collected in our survey, we have little doubt that the ultra-Orthodox religious community will be a formidable opponent.

The relationship of the Arab community to the rest of Israeli society and how changes in that relationship might affect the level of tension within the society involve a different set of assumptions and problems. In numbers the Israeli Arabs are a much larger and more visible community than are the ultra-Orthodox Jews. Most Israelis do not feel the same ambivalence toward them that they do toward the ultra-Orthodox Jews. The fact that Israelis did not have "Arab grandfathers" is certainly one aspect of the problem. Another, and most important of course, is the recent history of Arab-Jewish relations. In fact, whatever loyalties and sentiments Arabs living in Israel may have toward the Arab nations and toward the state of Israel, at best most Jewish Israelis are skeptical of the loyalty of Israeli Arabs to Israel. They believe that in a major conflict, if fighting were to occur within the pre-1967 boundaries, Israeli Arabs would support the Syrians, Egyptians, and Jordanians, against Israel. The fighting in June 1967 did not last long enough, and that in October 1973 did not occur on pre-67 Israeli soil or on inhabited areas; hence these expectations have not been properly tested. On the whole, over the past twenty-eight years, Israeli Arabs have engaged in relatively few overt acts of disloyalty – nor have they given much in the way of material or moral support to the Arab gueril-

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las who succeeded in gaining entry into Israeli territory. Nevertheless, Israelis' opinions about their own Arab community are very much tied to their beliefs about the prospects for peace with the neighboring Arab states. As those beliefs become pessimistic, their ambivalence toward the Israeli Arab community increases.

Formally, on most issues, the Arab community enjoys first-class citizenship. The most significant exceptions are exemption from the army (except on a special volunteer basis), exclusion from certain occupations in "sensitive" industries, and limitations on some types of travel. The latter restrictions have been significantly reduced since 1966. Today they are almost nonexistent. Informally, however, there is widespread segregation and isolation of Jews and Arabs, and education at the elementary school level is almost completely segregated. At the high school level this is less often the case but separate schools are still the more typical pattern. Geographical segregation is also the mode: Most Arabs live in villages or towns inhabited completely by Arabs. Those who live in urban settings live mainly in Arab neighborhoods. Inter-marriage is almost nonexistent.

If Israelis were to give candid responses to the question, "What in your opinion would be the optimal solution to the Israeli Arab problem?" many would say that they favor some type of equitable solution that would result in Israeli Arabs emigrating from Israel and settling elsewhere. But just as candidly they would also say that such a solution is politically impractical. A more realistic projection is that an Arab community will remain in Israel, will grow considerably over the next couple of decades, and will make greater demands on the state for more representation in the economic, political, and social spheres. If this projection is realistic, the crucial question is: How will Israel respond? And how Israel responds will significantly affect the stability and viability of the society.

The purpose of this volume is to report the findings of surveys conducted among members of both the ultra-Orthodox Jews and the urban Israeli Arab populations. The respondents were selected to represent two time perspectives: (1) the past-present perspective as represented by the parents and (2) the present-future perspective as represented by the adolescents. The major focus of the surveys was to assess the manner in which the older and younger members perceive the future of their communities both in terms of the communities' internal characteristics and their relations vis-à-vis the larger society.

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In the ultra-Orthodox Jewish population, we interviewed 100 fathers and unmarried sons between the ages of sixteen and twenty-one; and 50 mothers and unmarried daughters between the ages of fifteen and twenty. All of the respondents live in the Mea Shearim section of Jerusalem. Among the Arab population, we sampled only within urban centers and only those urban areas in which there are both Arab and Jewish communities. There are five such cities in Israel: Acco, Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, and Ramle; and we sampled respondents in each of them.³ In sum, 125 Arab fathers and sons (with the same age characteristics as the Jewish sample) and 50 Arab mothers and daughters were included.

In both the Arab and Jewish samples the parents either grew up in Israel when the country was still a British mandate, or had emigrated to Israel after spending their formative years in a shtetl or large city in Eastern Europe, or in an Arab country. But all of the children in the two samples were born and reared in an independent Jewish state.

The book is divided into two major sections. The first part provides a background and description of the two ethnic communities and compares them with communities in other parts of the world that have similar characteristics. The second part reports the result of the survey among the two communities. Chapters 1, 2, and 3 make up Part One; Chapters 4 to 10 constitute Part Two. Chapter 1 examines the ties that Israeli Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities have with the larger society, including their formal status as well as their informal contacts and associations. Chapter 2 describes the social and demographic characteristics of the two populations. It also reports the research plan and the obstacles encountered in collecting the data. Chapter 3 provides information about three institutions (education, politics, and mass media) that help to sustain and insulate the two communities from the larger society but that also provide bridges for the Israeli Arabs to establish contacts with the mainstream of Israeli society.

Chapters 4 and 5 provide profiles of the two communities based on the surveys. The profiles focus on the status that the parents and adolescents occupy and on the roles that each is expected to play within the two communities. Chapter 4 describes the Mea Shearim community, and Chapter 5 describes the Arab communities in the urban centers of Israel.

Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the similarities and differences in attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors that are a function of sex roles within the

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parents' and children's generations. Chapter 6 describes sex roles in Mea Shearim, and Chapter 7 describes sex roles in the urban Arab communities.

Chapters 8 and 9 are the heart of the study. They deal with the differences and the lack of them that are attributable to generation and to sex role within the two communities. Chapter 8 describes those characteristics in Mea Shearim, and Chapter 9 describes the same types of characteristics in the Arab communities.

Chapter 10 is the summarizing and concluding chapter. In it, basic questions about the future collective identity of each of these communities and their respective ties to the larger society are considered. The chapter also speculates about the implications of alternative modes of behavior for each of the communities as well as for the society as a whole.

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PART ONE

Chapters 1, 2, and 3 provide historical, theoretical, and demographic background and descriptions that should help make the results of the survey more understandable and more relevant for assessing the importance of the two ethnic communities to the future of Israeli society. The major values and leitmotiv of the two populations are described and contrasted with those of other communities that have been, or are today, in similar circumstances in other societies.

A brief description of Israeli social structure and organization is included as a prologue to a more detailed account of the place that these two communities occupy in the larger setting. Three major institutions – politics, education, and the mass media – are selected for a more detailed description because each of them performs significant functions within the ultra-Orthodox and Arab communities. Part One does not pretend to be a thorough sociological analysis of Israeli society; however, it should provide enough information about the major characteristics of the society and the manner in which it is organized so as to provide a better fit between the survey data and the rest of Israeli society.

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1. The Jewish ultra-Orthodox and the urban Arab communities: theoretical and geographical comparisons

This chapter considers the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community and the urban Arab community in Israel from the perspective of their relationships to the larger society. It asks how similar or how different are the ties that each community maintains to the dominant culture compared with the ties that other minority ethnic communities maintain in other societies. By ethnic community we mean essentially what Gordon did when he wrote:

the ethnic group . . . [is] a large subsociety, criss-crossed by social class and containing its own primary groups of families, cliques, and associations — its own network of organizations and institutions — in other words, as a highly structured community within the boundaries of which an individual may, if he wishes, carry out most of his more meaningful life activities from the cradle to the grave. (1964:234)

As stated in the introduction, and as will be reiterated several times in various parts of this book, a major reason for deciding to study these particular communities was the different stances each of them has assumed vis-à-vis the larger society. An additional reason for studying them is that each, in adopting a particular stance, will play an important role in determining the stability and cohesiveness of Israeli society.

The stance of the Israeli Arab community (throughout the book, this community refers only to Arabs in urban centers) is the one more typically taken by minority ethnic groups that have the opportunity or the choice either to draw closer or to stand back from the larger society. Like those of Italian, Greek, Jewish, and German extraction in the United States, the Israeli Arabs, especially those born in Israel, are willing and eager to partake of much that the larger society has to offer. As will become apparent in later chapters, as soon as the fighting that had broken out following the establishment of the state was over, the Arab minority chose to participate in most of the major institutions of the society. The Arab community in Israel represents a slightly larger