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C. D. BROAD

Edited by C. Lewy

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EDITOR'S PREFACE

This volume contains C. D. Broad's Cambridge lectures on the philosophy of Kant. Broad had lectured on Kant before, but the course in its present form was first given in the academic year 1950–51 and repeated, with some revisions, in 1951–52. As I mentioned in my preface to Broad's lectures on Leibniz,¹ he always wrote out his lectures fully beforehand, and the MS. on Kant is in a very good state. But his handwriting is small and close and in places difficult to decipher. I fear that in spite of all my efforts some words may have been misread.

I have tried to reproduce the text so far as possible as it is in the MS. But I have expanded Broad's abbreviations, and have introduced greater uniformity in punctuation, spelling, and the use of capital letters, italics and quotation marks. I have also supplemented Broad's references, especially to works other than the *Critique of Pure Reason*. My own references are in footnotes enclosed in square brackets.

So far as the *Critique of Pure Reason* is concerned, Broad's page references are always to the translation by Norman Kemp Smith. But it seems that the actual translations may have been Broad's own: at any rate, they often differ, at least slightly, from those of Kemp Smith.

I am grateful to the Editor of the Aristotelian Society for permission to include material which Broad published in the *Proceedings* of the Society, vol. 55 (1954–55).² For the greater part the relevant portion of the MS. is the same as the *Proceedings* article; but at certain points the article contains additions which I have incorporated in the text.

I am also grateful to the Editor of the Society for permission to make use

¹ C. D. Broad, *Leibniz: An Introduction*, ed. by C. Lewy (Cambridge, 1975).

² 'Kant's Mathematical Antinomies'. Copyright: The Aristotelian Society, 1955.

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of the material which Broad published, in an earlier version, in the *Proceedings*, vol. 26 (1925–26),¹ and vol. 42 (1941–42).²

I should point out however that the bulk of the present book has not been published before.

C. LEWY

Trinity College, Cambridge
June 1977

¹ 'Kant's First and Second Analogies of Experience'. Copyright: The Aristotelian Society, 1926.

² 'Kant's Theory of Mathematical and Philosophical Reasoning'. Copyright: The Aristotelian Society, 1942.