


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BRENTANO AND INTRINSIC VALUE

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DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF
GEORGE KATKOV

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EDITORS' INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this series is to help to make contemporary European philosophy intelligible to a wider audience in the English-speaking world, and to suggest its interest and importance, in particular to those trained in analytical philosophy. The first book in the series was, appropriately enough, Charles Taylor's *Hegel and Modern Society*. It is by reference to Hegel that one may indicate most starkly the difference between the two traditions, for the analytical philosophy of the contemporary Anglo-Saxon world was in part developed in reaction against the idealism of the British Hegelians at the turn of the century. It is true that the British and American idealists had themselves diverged considerably from Hegel, but their holistic philosophy was Hegelian in aspiration as well as terminology. It was, to be sure, a different tradition, one stemming from Hume, that was most influential in molding the attitudes of the early analytical philosophers, but they too were influenced by European contemporaries to whose writings they explicitly appealed in repudiating Hegelianism. In particular, they admired two European philosophers who had very little sympathy for Hegelian-

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ism: Frege, whose work has been widely and increasingly admired, and Brentano, the subject of this volume.

The next book in our series, Raymond Geuss's *The Idea of a Critical Theory*, discussed issues that could be understood only by reference back to the thought of Hegel and Marx, which – in marked contrast to what happened in the English-speaking world – was absorbed and further developed in characteristic ways by the main trends of radical thought on the European continent. In England, on the other hand, philosophical opposition to “Establishment” ways of thinking was developed in opposition to Hegel rather than under his influence. The philosophical attitude it represents and which distinguishes it from the dominant European schools of thought is clearly expressed in the foreword to Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Remarks* of 1930:

This spirit is different from the one which informs the vast stream of European and American civilization in which all of us stand. The one spirit expresses itself in an onwards movement, in building ever larger and more complicated structures: the other in striving after clarity and perspicacity in no matter what structure. . . . And so the first adds one construction to another, moving on and up, as it were, from one stage to the next, while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same.

Both of the next two books, Karel Lambert's *Meinong and the Principle of Independence* and Robert Tragesser's *Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics*, discuss problems raised by philosophers deeply influenced by Brentano. The next volume in our series, Mary Tiles's discussion of the epistemology and philosophy of science of Bachelard in *Bachelard: Science and Objectivity*, brings into focus a slightly different aspect of recent European philosophy. It examines critically Bachelard's views on the

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importance of epistemological discontinuities in the history of science.

The important role R. M. Chisholm has played in introducing such phenomenological concepts as “intentionality” and “evidence” into the analytical discussion of the theory of knowledge is so well known as to require no further comment. In this work Professor Chisholm discusses Brentano’s theory of value, an element of Brentano’s philosophy that had a significant impact on such intuitionist moral philosophers as G. E. Moore and David Ross. At a time of increasing concern, both in Europe and the English-speaking world, with questions of the subjectivity or objectivity of ethical judgments, it is of considerable importance to reflect again on Brentano’s problem of the epistemological status of values.

We all know that the labels “analytical” and “continental” are in many ways unsatisfactory. There are philosophers in the phenomenological tradition working in America and Britain, and there are philosophers engaged in conceptual analysis in the Scandinavian countries, Poland, and Germany. Moreover, the universities in Europe that have not been influenced by the analytical tradition – nearly all of those in France and Italy and the great majority of those in German-speaking countries and Eastern Europe – have themselves by no means represented any unitary tradition. The disagreements or even lack of communication between, for instance, Hegelians, Marxists, phenomenologists, and Thomists have often been deep. But these differences are small in comparison with the barriers of mutual ignorance and distrust between the main representatives of the analytical tradition on the one hand and the main philosophical schools of the European continent on the other (schools that are also dominant in Latin America, Japan, and even some North American universities). These barriers are inevitably reinforced by the fact that, until very recently, even the best students from the

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universities situated on either side have tended to emerge from their studies with such divergent areas of knowledge and ignorance, competence and incompetence, that they are hardly equipped even to enter into informed discussion with each other about the nature of what separates them.

The books of this series are contributions by philosophers who have worked in the analytical tradition but who here tackle problems specifically raised by philosophers of the main traditions to be found in contemporary Europe. They are works of philosophical argumentation and of substance rather than merely introductory résumés. We believe that they may contribute to the formation of a richer and less parochial framework of thinking, within which mutual criticism and stimulation will be attempted and where mutual disagreements will at least not be based on ignorance, contempt, or distortion.

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