

I

American civilization: the impulse from Europe

Capitalism, like Christianity, is a pattern of human behavior endemic in Europe and the Americas and showing sufficient uniformities to justify its designation by a single word. In Christianity acceptance of the predominant importance of Jesus Christ – whether as historical figure or as savior and Son of God – forms in the broadest sense the defining characteristic. Capitalism is defined by the lodging of major economic decisions in private individuals or groups rather than in the State, and by the guidance to those decisions provided – whether to so-called owners or to a bureaucracy of managers – through a system of money and prices, by the goal of financial profit.

Capitalism in this sense, like almost all Western ideas, good and bad, came into the civilization of the Mediterranean and thence into that of northern Europe and North America from that peculiar *Gestalt*, that coincidence of geography and human skills, insight, and ambition that appeared in the Greek city-states after the Persian wars. Here a group of governments operating on a moderate scale – midway between family or tribe and empire, with property holders – landowners, slaveowners, and merchants – proved that, at least momentarily, it could hold its own against oriental despotism despite fierce rivalries among its member states. Here a partial separation between wealth and the state first became possible, and property rights could inhere in individual citizens rather than in clans, communes, temples, or the power of the god-king. Capitalism here, on a miniature scale, proved symbiotic with government where state power and wealth ownership were moderately dispersed. States were small and strongly influenced, though not wholly dominated,

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by numerous wealthy persons, and wealth in the form of money and mercantile stocks could escape the state, moving in a trading network across the eastern Mediterranean, creating colonies and trading posts wherever it touched. Greek capitalism had a form of state government and an inter-state mobility that allowed it to survive and flourish.

The capitalistic city-state bequeathed the concept of private ownership to the Roman Republic, and the Empire did not wholly extinguish it.¹ In essential form, as the British economic theorist J. R. Hicks pointed out in his foray into history, it reappeared in the widespread revival of the Greek spirit, thought, art, and learning in the Italian Renaissance.² From this revival the capitalism of the modern world traces directly its origins. The success of Hong Kong and Singapore in the world today shows that the spirit and organizational form of mercantile capitalism are far from dead.³ The ecology of the world economic order, which shelters the great land monsters of America, Russia, and China yet seems to have a niche for this

¹“[The] Graeco-Roman World was essentially and precisely one of private ownership, whether of a few acres or of the enormous domains of Roman senators and emperors, a world of private trade, private manufacture.” M. I. Finley, *The Ancient Economy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1973), 29. Finley goes on to argue the inappropriateness of a “market-centered” analysis of the ancient world. Having observed earlier that “there were no business cycles in antiquity; no cities whose growth can be ascribed, even by us, to the establishment of a manufacture,” (ibid., 23) he makes clear that in his own view the ancient economy was a non-capitalist or pre-capitalist system.

²“[The] point comes when it [expansion of trade] no longer absorbs the same energy, art can be pursued for art’s sake, and learning for the sake of learning. It was at the end of her period of commercial expansion that Athens became the “mother of arts”; it was after their commercial expansion was completed that Florence and Venice became the homes of the High Renaissance.” J. R. Hicks, *A Theory of Economic History* (Oxford University Press, 1969), 58–59. For a view critical of Hicks and his theory of economic history, and in particular the importance Hicks ascribes to the role of the city-states in the development of capitalism, see P. T. Bauer’s review article, “Economic History as Theory,” *Economica, New Series*, Vol. 38, No. 150 (May 1971), 163–179.

³The following table, giving the value of trade in millions of U.S. dollars, indicates in some measure the success of Hong Kong and Singapore:

	1963		1985	
	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>
Hong Kong	874	1,297	29,927	29,592
Singapore	1,135	1,398	22,817	26,286
India	1,626	2,477	8,510	15,092
Republic of Korea	87	560	30,283	31,135
Brazil	1,406	1,487	25,639	13,168

The two cities have outstripped India in value of trade, approaching or exceeding, despite their tiny size, the record of Korea and Brazil. *International Trade Statistical Yearbook*, Vol. 1 (New York: 1986), 194, 485, 506, 576, 868.

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smaller form of life, which like a flock of sparrows or a school of minnows, carries on an active, mobile, flexible economy, darting here and there in the quick search for profit. In the Italian city-states not only trade but finance became a source of profit, and from that there began to be effects in the organization of production itself, an intensification of the activities of guilds and craft shops, and some development of specialized industry for sale from manors and peasant households in the countryside.⁴

In Western Europe after the sixteenth century, the organization, financial technology, and legal forms of property and contract were carried over from the city-state proper to a somewhat larger geographical and political unit, the city with an appreciable hinterland, as in Venezia, Tuscany, Catalonia, and most spectacularly the Netherlands. Its half-democratic, half-oligarchic form of government, with commercial freedom at home and extensive connections abroad, flourished along the Baltic and North Sea coasts in the Medieval Hanse, at Antwerp and the Flemish cloth towns, and reached a peak in the Dutch Golden Age of the seventeenth century. And as in differing degrees in Athens, Venice, Genoa, Florence, capitalism in Amsterdam did not confine itself to the home city, but organized production in a rural hinterland; it extended financial and trading connections throughout Europe and established trade and political connection with settlements and trading posts of its own along the fringes of the oceans.⁵ The empire of seventeenth century Dutch capitalism stretched from Manhattan to Java. But the fate of mercantile capitalism in the European nation-states indicates the optimal scale on which, under seventeenth and eighteenth century conditions, it could be conducted and the optimal balance of international mobility and domestic productive and military strength necessary for dominance. The military and political techniques which established national kingdoms on the basis of loose feudal hierarchies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries allowed for a range in size and scale: Portugal, Spain, France, tiny Denmark with her Norwegian adjunct, the patchwork of German states held in precarious balance by outside force and the fear of mutual destruction (to a degree also, it must be owned, from exhaustion and indolence), the weak and unstable eastern European kingdoms, and the mass of Peter the Great's Russia. Capitalism survived and flourished best where distant trade formed an important part of the national wealth and polity; in their imperial experiences, Portugal, Denmark, Netherlands, England succeeded where Spain floundered and France failed. And

⁴B. Luzzatto, *An Economic History of Italy from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the Beginning of the Sixteenth Century*, translated by Philip Jones (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961), 102–108.

⁵J. de Vries, *The Dutch Rural Economy in the Golden Age* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

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among the colonial powers, England, it appeared, approximated most closely the ideal combination of size and mobility, a productive rural base and an aggressive and independent urban mercantile enterprise. The development of Western capitalism occurred on the basis of the international rivalry of these enlarged city-states, without the intervention of any notion of the mutual gains from trade or a widening market. What one gained, another lost. The sea power of England opened the world to English commerce and closed it to Spanish, French, and Dutch. It was only after that fact was clearly established that Adam Smith discovered the benefits of a free trade among the nations.

I

In this atmosphere of mercantile capitalism and competing national powers, the North American colonies were established. Their economic and political life before 1700 was experimental, tentative, fragile. Virginia found the path along which she was to travel after a quarter-century of uncertainty and high mortality. Tobacco export drew in planters, indentured servants, and black slaves; a planter class assumed the style of a landed gentry and dominated the politics of a restless society of large- and middle-scale farmers.⁶ In her sister colony, Massachusetts, the peculiar religious formation which guided the colony's establishment, as well as the poverty of agricultural resources, left capitalism for six decades under a shadow. Then, with the protection of the Navigation Acts, fishing, shipbuilding, and shipping were found by the early eighteenth century to yield high returns, and mercantile and landed wealth replaced Puritan virtue in the seats of power.⁷ The colonies between Massachusetts and Virginia waited for the influx of British and German settlers of the early and middle decades of the eighteenth century to gain a body of population that gave them a characteristic and regionally differentiated economic base.⁸ By mid-century, Philadelphia and New York were outstrip-

⁶E. S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: Norton, 1975), Chs. 4–9. Basic work on this topic has been done by Jacob Price, *France and the Chesapeake: A History of Tobacco*, Vols. 1 and 2 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1973), and in the recent fine study by A. Kulikoff, *Tobacco and Slaves: The Development of Southern Cultures in the Chesapeake, 1680–1800* (Chapel Hill: UNC Press of the Institute for Early American History and Culture, 1986).

⁷B. Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955).

⁸Not very many Englishmen came during these years, though a small continued influx added strength to the original colonial stock. The early Scots were lowlanders, followed by Highlanders after the unsuccessful uprising of 1715. Religious differences at home drove out many of the German groups, such as Moravians,

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ping Boston as centers of capitalist mercantile activity, and their back country, as far as the Allegheny Mountains, freed in 1763 of the menace of French and Indian attack, had begun an internal development.

The Revolution of these colonies from England was the first and most decisive expression of a common American attitude toward England and Europe at large. It was the first of the string of colonial revolts that has punctuated world history since 1776, and of them all, it is perhaps the most puzzling. Historians' difficulty probably lies in the fact that they have insisted on treating it seriously, almost solemnly, as a profound social event, to be attributed to profound social disorder. Its rhetoric is misleading, and even more misleading is its proximity to the cataclysmic Revolution in France and the series of continental revolutions from 1780 to 1917 which overthrew the agrarian and mercantilist political and social order. From a social or economic view, it appears to be a superficial revolution to which only superficial political causes need be assigned.⁹ As Pitt, Burke, and Fox all knew, it was not hard to conceive of a British policy by which the Revolution might easily have been avoided. Internally there was no feudalism in the colonies to overthrow, and class structures based on wealth, birth, and urbanity, fostered by the colonial development, easily survived the upheaval. The force of back country farmers and urban artisans is seen at points pushing events to a crisis, but the colonial aristocracy — except for the very thin layer of Tory merchants, tax collectors, and crown appointees — remained in the lead and in control.¹⁰ It was in some respects a very English affair; in Massachusetts, Inspirationalists, and Mennonites, who arrived in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Carolina between 1720 and 1740. M. L. Hansen, *The Atlantic Migration, 1607–1860* (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 48–50.

⁹Crane Brinton's view in his classic *The Anatomy of Revolution* is that "the American Revolution was predominantly a territorial and nationalistic revolution. . . ." Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, rev. and exp. ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf/Prentice-Hall, 1965), 24. Bernard Bailyn writes that the Revolution "was above all else an ideological-constitutional struggle and not primarily a controversy between social groups undertaken to force changes in the organization of society." *Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 1750–1776*, Vols. 1–4 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), Ch. 8.

¹⁰"The patriot leaders did not envision a new social order and the governments they created did not attempt to alter existing religious beliefs; the distribution of wealth; or the barriers of sexual, racial, and class status." J. A. Henretta, *The Evolution of American Society, 1700–1815: An Interdisciplinary Analysis* (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1973), 173. According to Henretta, the Revolutionary years did see a substantial reduction in the numbers of men with wealthy backgrounds within the legislative assemblies, due to a change in the basis of apportionment. The deference paid to the traditional leadership of wealthy men enabled these men, the original leaders of the independence movement, to retain control of the state governments (Henretta, 167–9). In a similar vein K. A. Lockridge in his *A New England Town: the First Hundred Years, Dedham*,

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sets it had the grim determination that had led the English Puritans to cut off Charles I's head a century earlier; in Virginia it resembled the revolts of turbulent Scottish clansmen and border country earls against Elizabeth. It is best understood not by Marxian models of class struggle, but in the simple model of parent and adolescent child. The colonies had thrived and grown under British protection and support. To the south the Spanish had been swept from the seas. To the west and north, French power had been destroyed. Within the Empire, the northern and middle colonies had grown as individual capitalistic city-states, with trade, money, private property, the common law, and the sort of democracy characteristic of the city-state, that is, the essential control through the assembly of free property holders. The southern colonies had grown up as planter-aristocracies contained in governmental institutions functioning with a day-to-day independence from the mother country, similar in degree though slightly different from their northern counterparts. Unlike the Caribbean planters, many of whose owners lived in England and voted there, none of the mainland North American colonies had even indirect representation of its property interests in Parliament. The doctrine held in the minds of many that the colonies were governed not by Parliament, but directly by the crown, through its royal institutions, the Privy Council and the Lords of (later Board of) Trade.¹¹ The coincidence, so unfortunate from a British imperial point of view, of a sense of independence and safety after 1763 in the colonies with a pettiness on the part of unusually stupid ministers in Britain was the Revolution's immediate cause. Its

Massachusetts, 1636–1736 (New York: Norton, 1970), 174, concludes that “the process of historical change bringing America toward the present was convoluted and ultimately cautious.”

¹¹In 1650 Parliament did pass an act declaring that the colonies “ought to be subject to such laws, orders and regulations as are or shall be made by the Parliament of England.” C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum*, II, 425–9, as quoted in L. W. Labaree, *Royal Government in America: A Study of the British Colonial System Before 1783* (New York: Frederic Ungar, 1930–58), 4, n. 1. Labaree writes, “But the very fact that it seemed necessary to make such a declaration at a time when the Crown was in abeyance lends emphasis to the general doctrine that the colonies were dependent on the King and not on Parliament.”

It was generally agreed that the Royal Colonies were ruled under the Crown's prerogative. The Privy Council and the Board of Trade, as agents of the Crown, did take the view that it was a right of the colonists as Englishmen to share in legislation and taxation and to do this the colonists could set up municipal bodies or legislative assemblies. But they took the view also that Parliament itself might pass laws and tax the colonists as it saw fit. Parliament's powers of taxation were indeed upheld by the attorney general and the solicitor general in a ruling deciding the status of Jamaica for revenue purposes in 1724. It was not, however, until 1763 that Parliament began to act upon this view (Labaree, 174, 175, 269, 270, and Chs. 5, 6, 7).

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explanation is in a real sense to be found in British rather than in American history. The colonies had grown as independent capitalistic commonwealths; what makes their history so unique and so fortunate was that they had done so under an enforced *pax Britannica*, without the ruinous civil or internecine wars that had afflicted their counterparts in ancient Greece, North Italy, and the North Sea. The American Revolution was not so much a revolt against England, whose laws, property rights, contractual agreements, language, and religion were all left intact, and many of whose political institutions and practices were ardently imitated. It was a simple assertion of what had in fact long been true: “that these colonies are, and of right ought to be, independent states.”¹²

It is remarkable that, as independent states, they did not immediately fall out at war among themselves. The comradeship of revolt against a common parent, the self-conscious differentiation of the Republic from monarchical enemies in Europe and – more important in the upshot, the presence of a common task – the expansion of power over a continent, a task city-states had never before encountered – these held the union of sovereignties together for eighty years, and when it broke, it meant that the rival sovereignties of North and South were city-states no longer, but rather inland empires.

The birth of the American colonies as mercantile city-states thus represented the first difference from the great kingdoms of Europe. In 1776, the colonies represented thirteen separate branches of eighteenth-century England. The squirearchy was in the South, the mercantile aristocracy in the

¹²C. M. Andrews argued that the events leading up to the Revolution were generated by the colonists’ assertion of their rights as Englishmen – fundamentally, the right to enact their own legislation in their own assemblies, for which they were quick to claim all the privileges and powers of the House of Commons. The exercise of these rights and their extension inevitably required a diminution in the authority of the parent body of Crown and Parliament, so that, as E. S. Morgan observed, “English Freedom meant, paradoxically, to be free as possible, from interference by England.” E. S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom* (New York: Norton, 1975), 143. Andrews argued that the political background and origins of the American Revolution are to be understood in the context of the growth and development of the powers of the legislative assemblies, on the one hand, and in the opposition offered to this growth by the Crown and its agents, on the other. This opposition resulted from the desire of the Crown and its agents to perpetuate a “system of colonial subordination and dependence in the interest of the trade and commerce of their kingdom,” to which “they adhered . . . with a tenacity of purpose which took no account of the growth to manhood of the colonies themselves, and which eventually resulted in the American Revolution and to the disruption of the British Empire.” C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Background of the American Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1924, 1971), 66. Bernard Bailyn has argued for greater study and recognition of what he calls the “political culture,” both in Britain and the colonies. B. Bailyn, *The Origins of American Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), Ch. 1.

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coastal cities, and along the rivers and passes and forest trails of the hinterlands lay lines of yeoman farmers. The differences were not far to seek: slavery in the South, the mix of German culture in the rich Pennsylvania valleys, the strange wild conditions of the backwoods, conditions not encountered in Europe since the migrations of the neolithic farmers of pre-history. But the ultimate difference was historical: European capitalism had evolved out of feudalism, by way of royal absolutism and religious and dynastic wars and in the presence of a fully settled and functioning manorial and peasant agriculture. American capitalism was “born free,” as Americans like to say, which is to say that it was “born dominant.” There were some struggles with an established church in New England, with remnants of feudal titles along the Hudson and in the proprietary colonies, but these were fragile barriers, swept away the more readily since the colonial revolution occurred in the ferment of French rationalistic and revolutionary thought. The U.S. Constitution was formed to join city-states and agrarian commonwealths in a federation whose system of checks and balances would ensure the safety of property and the freedom of contract and of religious belief against all enemies foreign and domestic. Foreign enemies seemed numerous, lodged mostly in the envious tyrannical empires and kingdoms of Europe. But there were few domestic enemies to the expansion into the lands north and west of the Ohio River which the states had ceded to the Confederation or, within thirty years, to the lands of the Louisiana Purchase and the Spanish and Mexican cessions.

This birth in freedom represented one of America’s fundamental differences from the capitalism of the Old World, but the difference created by the presence of an unsettled inland empire was at least equally fundamental. The experience of that settlement lies at the heart of all the American ambivalence toward Europe, of American dependence and independence, of self-conscious provinciality and equally self-assertive superiority, of the sense of isolation and the impulse to empire, of American self-deprecation and American boasting, of American wariness and America’s gambler’s luck, of American individualism and American susceptibility to smothering conformity, of American wildness and America’s superstitious respect for law and science, indeed, of most of the neuroses, contradictions, strengths, and excitement of American individuality. I trust I am not venturing too far beyond my discipline to suggest that all this bursts out of *A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court* and shimmers across the still surface of the central novels of Henry James.

The reason for these contradictory attitudes is not far to seek. Nineteenth-century America still owed an enormous debt to Europe, a debt that was not only not being repaid but was increasing as American development continued. Foreign loans for investment purposes began with the canals in the 1830s and reached a peak during the railway

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boom of the 1880s. The credits piled up in England by the sale of southern cotton and northern bonds went initially to finance purchase of textiles and simple iron wares, as well as the expensive travel and imported bric-a-brac of Mississippi planters, New York tycoons, and western beef barons. But increasingly in the railroad era, they went for English machinery and locomotives and later for German motors and coke ovens. As America's own manufactures, protected by the Republican tariffs, replaced European manufactures, the mix of imports shifted toward truly luxurious consumer goods and producer goods embodying high technology.¹³ But the stream continued to flow as, by 1900, the American account began to show an export balance in manufactures, and much new borrowing went to pay interest and amortization on the old.

The financial debt formed only the symbolic surface, the accounting residue of the profound cultural borrowing that continued to go on. Virtually the whole body of the agricultural and mechanical arts as it functioned in northern Europe in 1830 had been transferred by that date to the violently growing young nation – through migration of the farmers and craftsmen, through imitation of the exported products, through apprenticeship and book learning, and through simple theft. The money-

¹³The growth of American industry is reflected in the composition of imports, which shows a rising proportion of crude materials and a falling proportion of finished manufactures. The share of the former rose from 10.6 percent in 1830–40 to 30 percent in 1893–1903, whereas that of the latter fell from 49.7 to 26 percent in the same period. The last quarter of the century saw a fall in the share of crude and manufactured foodstuffs in exports. Crude materials fell from 66.1 percent in 1830–40 to 28 percent in 1893–1903, whereas there was a long-term rise in the share of finished and semi-finished manufactures from 5.3 and 9.4 percent at the beginning of the period to 10.7 and 24.3 percent, respectively, in the decade around the end of the century.

Between 1845 and 1875 the trade account generally displayed moderate to large deficits. The year 1876 saw the emergence of a large surplus in the balance of trade, which served to finance a large and increasing deficit in invisibles. Deficits on invisibles became the rule from the 1860s; though rising, they were initially offset by the inflow of capital from abroad. Payments on foreign indebtedness were a principal contributor to this deficit. These payments amounted to \$4.8 million in 1820, \$11.6 million in 1850, \$25.1 million in 1860, and \$125 million in 1890. Tourist balances began to be significantly negative from the 1850s, and immigrant remittances grew to be significant by the early 1880s. These figures are pieced together from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the U.S. from Colonial Times to 1957*, bicentennial edition, Part 2 (Washington: Bureau of the Census, 1975), Series 187–200, and two articles by D. C. North, “The United States Balance of Payments, 1790–1860,” and Matthew Simon, “The United States Balance of Payments, 1861–1900,” in National Bureau of Economic Research, Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, *Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1960).

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using, price-quoting, account-keeping technology of capitalist trade and production was also transfused into the new body and bloodstream of material life, along with legal forms, the partnership, the corporation, the law merchant; English precedent lay behind the decisions and the independence of the courts, and continental codes, deriving ultimately from Rome, helped shape the Constitutional structure. West Point was modeled on St. Cyr,¹⁴ and French military engineers trained many of the Army surveyors and engineers, who measured out the public domain on lines of a rectilinear model derived almost certainly from Rome.¹⁵ An even more critical inheritance was the complex of state and federal policies that formed the American counterpart to the mercantilism of the European states. A coinage, a state debt, tariffs, a state bank, subsidies to manufactures, and the promotional schemes of private entrepreneurs – all these

¹⁴The emergence of a formal structure of instruction at West Point during the second and third decades of the nineteenth century was due largely to the efforts of Sylvaneus Thayer, who was the ranking officer at West Point from 1817 to 1833. Prior to his appointment to West Point, Thayer and a Lieutenant Colonel William McRee were sent to France expressly to acquire European books on the art of war and to study the operations of the French military schools. Much of the shaping of West Point was based on what Thayer had observed at St. Cyr, some of whose graduates he brought to teach at West Point. S. E. Ambrose, *Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966).

¹⁵As reported on 7 May 1784 by a committee of Congress of which Jefferson was chairman, public lands were to be surveyed by compass and divided into “hundreds,” that is, plots of ten geographical miles square, and those again to be sub-divided into “sections” one mile square, numbered within each hundred in rows alternately from west to east and from east to west. T. Donaldson, *The Public Domain: Its History with Statistics* (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1970), 178, 576. Although the committee report cites no source, the two salient features of the plan – division by the compass and into “hundreds” (centuriation) – appear to have derived from Roman land-surveying methods. The details of the plan were worked out by Hugh Williamson, a Pennsylvanian mathematician, who was also a member of various scientific bodies in Utrecht. O. A. W. Dilke has conjectured that the origins of the Jefferson–Williamson plan can be linked to the Romans through Williamson and his Dutch connections. O. A. W. Dilke, *The Roman Land Surveyors* (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1971), Ch. 14. Dilke notes that the Dutch had been familiar with Roman rectangular surveying methods, as evidenced by the seventeenth-century land division in the Beemster polder east of Edam on rectilinear lines. Additionally, William Goess had published an edition of the *Corpus Agrimensorum*, the Roman land-surveying manual, in 1674. Dilke suggests that it is very probable that the Goess edition would be well known to a mathematician interested in astronomy, as Williamson was. “If the origin of the one mile squares is to be sought in a Dutch polder, at least the orientation by the compass points, and perhaps the basic idea, may go back to the *Corpus Agrimensorum*” (Dilke, 204). W. D. Pattison, *The Beginnings of the American Rectangular Land Survey System* (Chicago: 1957) makes the attribution of Williamson as co-author of the plan.