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Edited by D. M. Lewis, John Boardman, Simon Hornblower and M. Ostwald

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## CHAPTER 1

## SOURCES AND THEIR USES

SIMON HORNBLOWER

No guide comparable to Thucydides exists for the fourth century. This means that we have no firm framework for political and military events, and this lack is a serious obstacle to one sort of knowledge. Thucydides' mind, however, was limited as well as powerful, or perhaps we should say its limits were the price of its power; and in the fourth century certain types of history which he had treated only selectively, particularly social, economic and religious topics, can actually be better studied than was possible in the Thucydidean period. Xenophon, for instance, has glaring faults when judged as a political reporter but is a prime source for the modern historian of religion. In general, fourth-century literary sources (Xenophon, Aeneas Tacticus and others) are less preoccupied than Thucydides had been with the polar opposites, Athens and Sparta. This probably reflects the new multi-centred reality. But we should recall that Thucydides, especially in books iv and v, had allowed us peeps at the politics of Argos, Macedon, Thessaly and Boeotia. A history of the Peloponnesian War written by Xenophon might have told us more about second-class and minor city states than Thucydides did: compare the remarkable detail about the minor cities Sicyon and Phlius at Xen. *Hell.* vii.1–3. But a Xenophon with only Herodotus, not Thucydides, for a predecessor and model would have looked very different anyway.

Another important reason why history of a non-traditional sort, that is history of things other than war and politics, can be more confidently written for the fourth century, is the greater abundance of inscriptions on stone. This is especially true of places other than Athens.

For the years 403–362 there is only one surviving primary account, books ii.3 to vii of Xenophon's *Hellenica*. The first two books of that work have already been briefly discussed in an earlier volume (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 8). With the beginning of book iii Xenophon breaks away from Athenian affairs and moves to Asia Minor. Internal evidence however shows a clear break in composition somewhat earlier, at ii.3.10. This finding is the result of stylometric tests done before computers made such operations routine; but it carries such overwhelming conviction that it is not likely to be overthrown.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Maclaren 1934 (B 69); Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 65.

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Map 1. Greece and Western Asia Minor.

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The most striking characteristic of the section beginning at II.3.11, which we may call Part Two, is its parochial concentration on Peloponnesian affairs.<sup>2</sup> It is true that books III and IV cover Asiatic events, but that is the exception which tests the rule because Xenophon is interested in Asia only when there is Spartan activity there. We find for instance virtually no sign in the *Hellenica* of the great revolts of the satraps in the 360s (VII.1.27 may be an exception). This Spartan viewpoint has its advantages; for instance Xenophon has a better understanding of the Spartan military and political system than did Thucydides, who had complained of the secrecy of the Spartan constitution, Thuc. v.68.2. Xenophon had good Peloponnesian contacts and eventually settled at an estate at Scyllus in the Peloponnese (*An.*v.3). He is thus able to report such a dangerous and – for the Spartan authorities – embarrassing episode as the Cinadon affair (*Hell.* III.3; see below, p. 43). This was a massive attempted revolt by the Spartan helots or state slaves in c. 399. Xenophon also knows plenty of technical terms for Spartan institutions: the phrase ‘the so-called small assembly’ is mentioned at III.3.8 but nowhere else in Greek literature.<sup>3</sup> He knows about liberated helots, *neodamodeis* (III.1.4, compare already Thuc. VII.19.3 etc.), and about other groups halfway between full Spartiate and helot status, for instance, the *trophimoi*, boys reared with full Spartan children, and the bastard sons of Spartans, ‘men not unacquainted with the good things of the Spartan way of life’ (v.3.9). Above all, Xenophon understands and sympathizes with the system of ‘congenial oligarchies’ (in Thucydides’ brief phrase, I.19), support of which enabled Sparta to keep control of the Peloponnesian League. (But Xenophon is not the only focalizer behind the comment on ‘troublesome demagogues’ at v.2.7, said about Mantinea.) The exponent *par excellence* of the system was Agesilaus,<sup>4</sup> who was one of the two Spartan kings from 400 to 362, roughly the period covered by Xenophon’s Part Two. He was a powerful figure in the Greek world, and Xenophon’s benefactor in his long exile from Athens. As well as giving Agesilaus generous space in the *Hellenica*, Xenophon also wrote an encomium of him after his death, the first surviving Greek essay in biography. Another minor treatise, the *Constitution of the Spartans* (*Lac. Pol.*), is in effect an institutional encomium of the Spartan way of life.<sup>5</sup>

It has often been held that Xenophon in the *Hellenica* is biased towards Sparta and correspondingly antipathetic to Thebes who displaced her in so many respects. ‘Bias’ is however a slippery term: it can mean anything from outright falsification – with which Xenophon cannot seriously be

<sup>2</sup> Cawkwell 1979 (B 26) 23.      <sup>3</sup> Andrewes 1966 (C 274) 18 n. 7.

<sup>4</sup> Cawkwell 1976 (C 285); Cartledge 1987 (C 284).

<sup>5</sup> *Agesilaus*: Momigliano 1971 (B 82) 50–1 and 1975 (B 84). *Lac. Pol.*: Cartledge 1987 (C 284) 56; *contra*, Chrimes 1948 (B 30).

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charged – to the manifestation of those sympathies and contemporary preoccupations from which no historian is (or ought to be) free. Xenophon was overwhelmingly interested in Sparta, certainly, but that should not be confused with partisan bias in Sparta's favour.<sup>6</sup> In any case Xenophon was capable of censuring the Spartans, when they behaved irreligiously. For instance, his way of explaining the Spartan defeat at Leuctra in 371 was to treat it as divine punishment for the unjustified Spartan seizure of the Theban acropolis in 383: 'already the god was leading them on', he says at VI.4.3. The moral judgment on the seizure is made explicit at V.4.1: 'There are many instances from both Greek and barbarian history to show that the gods do not overlook impiety or irreligious behaviour.'

Anti-Theban feeling is discernible in, for instance, the sneer at Theban greed over the tithe to Apollo (III.5.5), which the Thebans claimed at Decelea at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Or there is the criticism of Theban 'medizing', that is subservience to Persia, in 367, Pelopidas being singled out (VII.1.33ff). In fact, Spartan medizing on this occasion was no less eager.

But Xenophon's omissions – of which that Spartan medizing is an example – are not a simple matter. The most conspicuous tend to be explicable in terms of his political sympathies. Thus, for instance, he fails to record the extent of Theban penetration into Thessaly after the battle of Haliartus in 395. The truth is inadvertently revealed in the list of Theban allies, including Thessalian Crannon and Pharsalus, at IV.3.3, and again at VII.1.28, dealing with 367, where he records a suggestion that some Sicilian troops should be used in Thessaly 'against the Thebans'. But for the full story of Theban ambitions in Thessaly we have to go to inscriptions or to a different literary tradition altogether (see further below, p. 10). Again, there is nothing in Xenophon about the battle of Tegyra in 375, admittedly a minor affair in itself but a Theban success which anticipated the smashing Theban defeat of Sparta at Leuctra four years later. Still on Boeotian topics, V.4.46 is the vaguest possible allusion to the reconstitution of the Boeotian Confederacy. But not all his omissions are straightforwardly explicable. At VI.3.1 it is surprising that he does not list Orchomenus among the places attacked by Thebes in the 370s, since this would have strengthened his general view of Theban bully tactics (Diod. xv.37, cf. Xen. *Hell.* VI.4.10.).

Xenophon is also very thin on the Second Athenian Naval Confederacy, whose foundation he does not record at all (Tod no. 123 = Harding

<sup>6</sup> This is stressed in what is now the best (excellent, thorough and thoughtful) recent study of the *Hellenica*, C. J. Tuplin, *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon Hellenica 2.3.11–7.5.27*, *Historia Einzelschrift* 76 (Stuttgart, 1993), 163 and *passim*. Schwartz 1956 (B 103) 167 detected in Xenophon some partiality for *Athens*, but Tuplin shows that even this is not consistently true. Rather, *nobody* stays in favour with Xenophon for very long (Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 47).

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no. 35 lines 9–11, cf. Diod. xv.29). Incidental allusions have been detected: at v.4.34 the re-gating of the Piraeus looks like a practical consequence of the new confederacy, and at vi.5.2 (cf. 3.19) he speaks of ‘decrees of the Athenians and their [?confederate] allies’.

Persia is another area of serious omission in Xenophon, as indeed it had been in Thucydides before his book VIII. A feature of the ‘Xenophonic’ period is the series of common peaces (*κοινὰ εἰρήνηαι*) ‘sent down’ to Greece by Persia.<sup>7</sup> After mentioning the first King’s Peace of 386 (v.1.31), which greatly strengthened Sparta in mainland Greece at the price of the abandonment of her claims in Asia, Xenophon systematically under-reports the Persian involvement in renewals of the original peace. His motive is presumably to downplay Spartan ‘medizing’. A clear instance is vi.2.1, the peace of 375: it is only from Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 151) that we learn that this peace was sent from Persia. (Cf. also above on his neglect of the revolts of the 360s.)

Xenophon’s own feelings about Persia and Persians were mixed, though not illogically so – nor even unusually so for a man of his time (see below, p. 69f). He admired many Persian qualities and the individuals who displayed them. But some of his writings, notably the *Agesilaus*, are undoubtedly characterized by political ‘panhellenism’, which means advocating that the Greeks should unite against Persia, if necessary enlisting dissident satraps. Where does the *Hellenica* stand? Panhellenism is there, but it is not virulent.<sup>8</sup> Panhellenism of a mild sort makes its appearance early in the *Hellenica*. Already in Part One Xenophon had written approvingly of the stand taken by the Spartan admiral Callicratidas, who was trying to get money from the Persian Cyrus but was kept waiting. Callicratidas said that the Greeks were wretched in that they had to flatter barbarians in order to get money, and that if he reached home safely he himself would do his best to reconcile Spartans and Athenians (I.6.7). There is a remarkable echo of this sentiment far on in Part Two, an implied criticism of Antalcidas by Teleutias (two prominent Spartans) for flattering anybody, whether Greeks or barbarians, for the sake of pay (v.1.17). Xenophon’s speeches<sup>9</sup> are not, however, simple statements of his own views, any more than are those of Thucydides. For instance, it would be naive to transfer to Xenophon, the author of the *Cyropaedia*, the opinion of Jason that in Persia everybody except for one man is educated to be a slave rather than to stand up for himself; while the inclusion of Antiochus of Arcadia’s

<sup>7</sup> For Thucydides, Andrewes 1961 (B 5); for the Common Peaces Ryder 1965 (C 67) and Bauslaugh 1991 (C 7) 182–255.

<sup>8</sup> Admiration for Persia: Hirsch 1985 (B 59); Tatum 1989 (B 114). Panhellenism of *Hellenica* not virulent: Tuplin, *Failings of Empire* 60, 67, 121 (Jason); cf. 104–8 (important reinterpretation of the ostensibly panhellenist speech of Callias at vi.3); 112 (Procles of Phlius). <sup>9</sup> Gray 1989 (B 49).

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remark, that ‘the famous golden plane-tree of the Persian kings would not give shade to a grasshopper’, proves only that Xenophon had a sense of humour (VI.1.12; VII.1.38). Certainly we can no longer accept the simple view of a century ago<sup>10</sup> that panhellenism was the key to the whole *Hellenica*; that is, that the aged Xenophon of the 350s was seeking to remove the enmity between his adoptive fatherland, Sparta, and the Athens where he was born and brought up.

In the present century the *Hellenica* has sunk in critical esteem: its author, it is said, cuts a poor figure as a historian by comparison not only with Thucydides but with the relatively recently discovered Oxyrhynchus Historian (*Hell. Oxy.*; on whom see below and *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 8 and 482). One, not wholly satisfactory, defence is to challenge the assumption that Xenophon intended to write ‘history’ at all: he was an explicit *moralist*.<sup>11</sup> There is something in this: it explains some odd exceptions to the general characteristics noted above. So, as we noted above in connexion with Leuctra, his admiration for Sparta was not blind (see also the problematic *Lac. Pol.* xiv). But nothing much is gained by denying Xenophon the title of ‘historian’, a technical term not yet invented when he wrote. Another, more subjective, reply would be to stress Xenophon’s great literary merits, which can be lost sight of in a positivistic preoccupation with his ‘omissions’ and so forth. An apt but temperate summing-up of Xenophon in the *Hellenica* is ‘not a pedantically accurate writer, rather an impressionist with a singular gift for vivid description’.<sup>12</sup> Certainly Xenophon has great strengths as a social historian, most evident in his glimpses of life in Persian Asia Minor (see below, p. 213). And we have already noticed his account of the Cinadon affair.

Of Xenophon’s other works, the *Agesilaus* and *The Constitution of the Spartans* have been mentioned already, and the *Anabasis* will be exploited in ch. 3. The *Cyropaedia* or *Education of Cyrus* is controversial. It is usually dismissed as ‘completely fictitious’ from the factual point of view,<sup>13</sup> and this is better than the other (perverse) extreme, which seeks to detect in it a source of otherwise lost Persian traditions about their own past.<sup>14</sup> Historians of the Persian empire continue to use material from the *Cyropaedia* without making it clear where they stand on the issue of the work’s status.<sup>15</sup> A more interesting approach is to see in it a precursor of the treatises ‘On Kingship’ which we know to have been a feature of the hellenistic age.<sup>16</sup> It is even more rewarding, since so little ‘Kingship’ literature actually survives, to compare the behaviour described or recommended in the *Cyropaedia* and *Hipparchicus* (or ‘Cavalry Com-

<sup>10</sup> Schwartz 1956 (B 103; originally published 1887) esp. 156, 160; but see Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*. <sup>11</sup> Grayson 1975 (B 50), criticized by Tuplin, *Failings of Empire*, 15–16.

<sup>12</sup> Andrewes 1966 (C 274) 10–11. <sup>13</sup> Murray 1986 (B 88) 198.

<sup>14</sup> Hirsch 1985 (B 59) ch. 4. <sup>15</sup> Briant 1982 (F 10) 175ff. <sup>16</sup> *CAH* vii<sup>2</sup>.1, 75–81.

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mander'; another Xenophontic treatise), with the actual tactics, stratagems and exercise of leadership attested for real-life generals of the later fourth century. This has been successfully done for the literary tradition about men like Eumenes of Cardia.<sup>17</sup> The latter falls just outside the scope of the present volume, but his was surely not the first career to demonstrate the *military* importance of Xenophon's writings.

Technical treatises (like that of Aeneas Tacticus,<sup>18</sup> see below, p. 679) abound in the fourth century, and the *Poroi* (otherwise known as *Vectigalia*; *Ways and Means*; *Revenues*) of Xenophon is a monograph on a topic in which the Greeks made little theoretical progress: economics. To the usual verdict that the *Poroi* exemplifies without redeeming that failure, it has been countered that Xenophon has again (cf. above on his intentions in the *Hellenica*) been misunderstood: his aim was political, the achievement of peace.<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless the *Poroi* is of particular interest for what it says about the Laurium silver-mines, on which much archaeological and epigraphic work has been done since the Second World War. Xenophon's suggestions here may be unrealistic; but in a valuable and detailed book about the Laurium mines, by a practising engineer who was Minister of Industry and Energy in the Karamanlis government of the 1970s, Xenophon gets credit for being a 'precursor of economic co-operation between individuals' and for 'stressing the interdependence of the different sectors of the economy'.<sup>20</sup> Finally, there is Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, which is about estate management (see further ch. 12d below, p. 662). As scholars begin to shift their attentions to the countryside and away from the city, it might have been thought that this treatise would earn their approval but no, 'he fails totally to describe the very real problems of all farmers in Attica . . . the practical value of this discussion is almost nil'.<sup>21</sup> For the student of the ancient economy, the *Oeconomicus* serves merely to illustrate landed attitudes (pious, hierarchical and amateur), and thus re-defined as a work of ethics<sup>22</sup> it regains a certain academic dignity. Its fate is thus not unlike some other Xenophontic treatises we have been considering. Its sections on the duties of wives (including a denunciation of make-up) are revealing, if only about the expectations of Athenian males at a certain social level.<sup>23</sup>

We may now pass to the literary sources other than Xenophon.

The other surviving narrative of the period to 362 is books XIV–XV of the *Bibliothēke* or 'library' (a universal history) of Diodorus Siculus.

<sup>17</sup> J. Hornblower 1981 (B 60) 196–211; cf. *CAH* VII<sup>2</sup>, 1, 45–6.

<sup>18</sup> Whitehead 1990 (B 131), bringing out well Aeneas' *general* value for the student of the Greek city state, cf. below p. 530. <sup>19</sup> Gauthier 1976 (B 42) with Cawkwell 1979 (B 27).

<sup>20</sup> Conophagos 1980 (I 26) 114.

<sup>21</sup> Osborne 1987 (I 115) 18. A commentary by S. Pomeroy is announced.

<sup>22</sup> Finley 1973 (I 36) 18. <sup>23</sup> e.g. Lefkowitz and Fant 1982 (I 96) no. 106.



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Diodorus wrote in Roman times (late first century B.C.); for his general working methods see *CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 7. He used one main source at a time;<sup>24</sup> there is nothing to be said for a recent attempt to revive an old view that he interwove two sources in book xvii, which is about Alexander.<sup>25</sup> Book xvi is problematic as we shall see; but there is no doubt that for at least the first four decades of the century (books xiv–xv and parts of xvi) his source continued to be Ephorus, as it had been for the fifth century in books xi–xiii.<sup>26</sup> Diodorus found Ephorus' moralizing tendencies congenial (cf. xi.46) but he got into difficulties reorganizing Ephorus' material; one famous blunder, an apparent confusion between the peaces of 375 and 371, may be due to a misplacing by Diodorus under 375 of an introductory discussion in which Ephorus anticipated his own later narrative of 371.<sup>27</sup> What was said above about 'one main source' needs some, but only some, qualifying to take account of Sicily. The qualification is a double one: not only does the separate Sicilian strand of material run alongside the main Greek narrative; but it seems that for fourth-century Sicily Diodorus *was* prepared to draw on two writers rather than one. Here too the principal source was Ephorus. The other was Timaeus, from Tauromenium and so like Diodorus a Sicilian by origin; but he lived and worked from c. 315–265 in Athens (*FGrH* 566). He is a figure of exceptional importance, the first great historian of western hellenism; we may note here that he was extensively used by Plutarch in his two fourth-century Sicilian *Lives*, those of Dion and of Timoleon.<sup>28</sup> Distinguishing 'Ephorean' from 'Timaeian' material in Diodorus is not an easy matter.<sup>29</sup> The better view<sup>30</sup> is that Diodorus drew primarily on Ephorus and supplemented him from Timaeus; so his approach in the Sicilian sections was different, but not all that different, from that in the main Greek narrative (see further below, ch. 5, p. 121). Behind parts of both Ephorus' and Timaeus' Sicilian material may lie the more shadowy figure of Philistus (*FGrH* 556).<sup>31</sup> Another qualification to the 'one main source' doctrine is required by Diodorus' regular insertions from the chronographic source. This source gives dynastic and other dates. These dates work reasonably well for e.g. the Persian and Hecatomnid rulers but there are serious problems about the Macedonian and Spartan dates; and one Bosporan ruler is killed off in 349 whereas an inscription shows

<sup>24</sup> Schwartz 1903 (B 101) = 1957 (B 104) 35–97; J. Hornblower 1981 (B 60); Sacks 1990 (B 98).

<sup>25</sup> Hammond 1983 (B 57) with Hornblower 1984 (B 61).

<sup>26</sup> For the fifth century, the correspondence Diod. xi.45 ~ *FGrH* 70 Ephorus F 191 is almost decisive on its own, despite Africa 1962 (B 2). For the fourth, see Diod. xv.5.4 and 32.1 ~ Ephorus FF 79, 210, and the direct citation Diod. xv.60.5 = F 214. <sup>27</sup> Andrewes 1985 (B 7).

<sup>28</sup> Westlake 1952 (G 321), Talbert 1974 (G 304). On Timaeus see Brown 1958 (B 19), done without knowledge of Jacoby's 1955 comm.; Fraser 1972 (A 21) 763–74; Momigliano 1977 (B 85) 37–66; Pearson 1987 (B 92). <sup>29</sup> Meister 1967 (B 74). <sup>30</sup> Jacoby Komm. IIC (Text) 529.

<sup>31</sup> Zoepffel 1965 (B 133).

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he was alive in 346 (Diod. xvi.52; Tod no. 167 = Harding no. 82). Some earlier views on the reliability of this source were too generous.<sup>32</sup>

Ephorus himself was briefly characterized in an earlier volume (*CAH* v<sup>2</sup> 7). It is essential to realize that behind Ephorus, who was the immediate source for Diodorus, lie yet other, ultimate, sources, of whom we may single out two who dealt, in part or whole, with the period 404–362. The first is the Oxyrhynchus Historian (see above p. 7). For the modern political historian of the fourth century this writer's best contribution is his account (ch.xvi Bartoletti) of the Boeotian federal constitution, an account which makes intelligible some stray hints in Thucydides.<sup>33</sup> But historiographically the most important thing about the Oxyrhynchus Historian is that he, who clearly represents a tradition independent of and preferable to Xenophon, seems to have been used by Diodorus/Ephorus. (For instance, Xenophon's and Diodorus' accounts of the 395 campaign of Agesilaus in Asia are irreconcilable. Xenophon has an open engagement, Diodorus an ambush, which is less glamorous and so probably right.<sup>34</sup> But *Hell. Oxy.* agrees with Diodorus, down to verbal correspondences e.g. *εἰς πλωθίων συντάξας* ~ *~ἐξ]ωθὲν τοῦ πλωθίου*, Diod. xiv.80.1 and *Hell. Oxy.* xi.3.) This means that in Diodorus we have a corrective to Xenophon on some points of detail and interpretation; though it cannot be said, as it can about Callisthenes (the next writer we shall discuss), that *Hell. Oxy.* may have offered a radically different picture of the age from that of Xenophon.

Another demonstrable source of Ephorus, to whom he seems to have turned for events after 386 when *Hell. Oxy.* ended, is a writer whose significance is greater than could be guessed from the small number (nineteen) of the surviving fragments of his *Hellenica*: he is Callisthenes of Olynthus (*FGrH* 124), the nephew of Aristotle.<sup>35</sup> The Christian authority Eusebius tells us explicitly that Ephorus drew on Callisthenes (*FGrH* 70 T 17); and it is probable<sup>36</sup> that Callisthenes lies behind some of Plutarch's *Pelopidas*, for instance the account of Theban penetration into Thessaly. Through the medium of Diodorus and Plutarch we can vaguely discern a tradition very unlike Xenophon, above all in giving proper space and significance to Thebes. For instance two fragments or quotations of Callisthenes by earlier writers (FF 11 and 18) mention Tegyra; see above for this battle, which Xenophon omitted completely. The most important piece of evidence for the general line taken by Callisthenes – much less pro-Spartan than Xenophon – is F 8. This

<sup>32</sup> Schwartz 1957 (B 104) 44: 'im grossen und ganzen sehr zuverlässig'; see however Hornblower 1990 (C 366) 74. Cf. below pp. 480, 495.

<sup>33</sup> Bruce 1967 (B 20) 157–62. The terminal date of *Hell. Oxy.* is less certain than is sometimes stated; see Hornblower 1990 (C 366) 73 n. 6.

<sup>34</sup> Cawkwell 1979 (B 26) appendix.

<sup>35</sup> Jacoby 1919 (D 200) and comm on *FGrH* 124; Schwartz 1900 (B 100) reprinted in Schwartz 1956 (B 103).

<sup>36</sup> Westlake 1939 (B 127).