

# RITUAL AND RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF HUMANITY

Roy Rappaport argues that religion is central to the continuing evolution of life, although it has been displaced from its original position of intellectual authority by the rise of modern science. His book, which could be construed as in some degree religious as well as about religion, insists that religion can and must be reconciled with science. Combining adaptive and cognitive approaches to the study of humankind, he mounts a comprehensive analysis of religion's evolutionary significance, seeing it as co-extensive with the invention of language and hence of culture as we know it. At the same time he assembles the fullest study yet of religion's main component, ritual, which constructs the conceptions which we take to be religious and has been central in the making of humanity's adaptation. The text amounts to a manual for effective ritual, illustrated by examples drawn from anthropology, history, philosophy, comparative religion and elsewhere.

**ROY RAPPAPORT** taught at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor from 1965 until his death in 1997. He was President of the American Anthropological Association from 1987 to 1989. Among his many publications are *Pigs for the Ancestors* (1968; revised edition 1984) and *Ecology, Meaning, and Religion* (1979).



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110

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# RITUAL AND RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF HUMANITY

ROY A. RAPPAPORT





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## **Dedication**

I dedicate this book to four anthropologists who have very much influenced the ideas expressed in it and who have been otherwise important in my life and career. In the order in which they entered my life, they are:

Robert Levy Eric Wolf Mervyn Meggitt Keith Hart

All of them have acted like elder brothers to me, even Keith who is many years my junior.



# Contents

	Foreword Keith Hart	page xiv
	Preface	xxi
1	Introduction	1
	The evolution of humanity	3
	Adaptation	5
	The symbol	7
	The great inversion	9
	The lie	11
	Alternative	17
2	The ritual form	23
	Ritual defined	24
	The logical entailments of the ritual form	26
	Ritual and formal cause	27
	Form and substance in ritual	29
	The first feature of ritual: encoding by other than performe	ers 32
	The second feature: formality	33
	The third feature: invariance (more or less)	36
	The fourth feature: performance (ritual and other	
	performance forms)	37
	The fifth feature: formality (vs. physical efficacy)	46
	Ritual as communication	50
	Self-referential and canonical messages	52
	Symbols, indices, and the two streams of messages	54
	Appendix	58

ix



#### x Contents

3	Self-referential messages	69
	On levels of meaning	70
	Variation and indexicality in the Maring ritual cycle	74
	Index, icon and number in the Maring ritual cycle	77
	Natural indices in the Maring cycle	80
	Ordinal and cardinal messages	82
	Quantification and the substantial representation of the	
	incorporeal	84
	The digital representation of analogic processes	86
	The binary aspect of ritual occurrence	89
	Ritual occurrence and the articulation of unlike systems	97
	Ritual occurrence and buffering against disruption	101
4	<b>Enactments of meaning</b>	107
	The physical and the meaningful	108
	Speech acts	113
	The special relationship between rituals and performativeness	115
	Ritual's first fundamental office	117
	Acceptance, belief, and conformity	119
	Performativeness, metaperformativeness, and the	
	establishment of convention	124
	Ritual and daily practice in the establishment of convention	126
	The morality intrinsic to ritual's structure	132
	Ritual and myth, and drama	134
	Ritual as the basic social act	137
5	Word and act, form and substance	139
	Substantiating the non-material	141
	Special and mundane objects	144
	Acts and agents	145
	Predication and metaphor	147
	Ritual words	151
	The reunion of form and substance	152
	The union of form and substance as creation	155
	Ritual, creation and the naturalization of convention	164
6	Time and liturgical order	169
	The dimensions of liturgical orders	170
	St. Augustine, St. Emile, time and the categories	170
	Temporal experience and public order	175



	Content	s xi
	Succession, division, period and interval	177
	Temporal principles	181
	The grounds of recurrence	188
	Schedules and societies	190
	The temporal organization of activities	193
	Regularity, length and frequency	196
	Sequence and space	209
7	Intervals, eternity, and communitas	216
	Time out of time	216
	Tempo and consciousness	220
	Tempo, temporal regions and time out of time	222
	Frequency and bonding strength	225
	Coordination, communitas, and neurophysiology	226
	Eternity	230
	Myth and history	233
	The innumerable versus the eternal	234
8	Simultaneity and hierarchy	236
	The Yu Min Rumbim	237
	Language and liturgy	251
	Analysis vs. performance	253
	Ritual representations and hyperreality	257
	Mending the world	262
	The hierarchical dimension of liturgical orders	263
9	The idea of the sacred	277
	Sanctity defined	277
	Sanctity as a property of discourse	281
	The ground of sanctity	283
	Axioms and Ultimate Sacred Postulates	287
	Sanctity, heuristic rules, and the basic dogma	290
	Sanctity, unquestionableness, and the truth of things	293
	Divinity, truth, and order	297
	The truths of sanctity and deutero-truth	304
10	Sanctification	313
	Sanctified expressions	317
	Falsehood, alienation, sanctity and adaptation	319
	Major variations in sanctification	324



xii	Contents	
	Sanctity, community, and communication	326
	The sacred, the sanctified, and comparative invariance	328
11	Truth and order	344
	Logos	346
	Logoi	353
12	The numinous, the Holy, and the divine	371
	Religious experience and the numinous in William James,	
	Rudolph Otto, and Emile Durkheim	374
	Order, disorder, and transcendence	381
	Grace	382
	Grace and art	384
	Ritual learning	388
	Meaning and meaningfulness again	391
	Belief	395
	The notion of the divine	396
	Illusion and truth	399
	The foundation of humanity	404
13	Religion in adaptation	406
	Adaptation defined again	408
	Adaptation as the maintenance of truth	410
	Self-regulation	411
	Religious conceptions in human adaptation	414
	The structure of adaptive processes	419
	The structural requirements of adaptiveness	422
	Hierarchical organization of directive, value, and sanctity	425
	Sanctity, vacuity, mystery, and adaptiveness	427
	The Cybernetics of the Holy	429
14	The breaking of the Holy and its salvation	438
	The natural and the unnatural	438
	Sanctity and specificity	440
	Oversanctification, idolatry, and maladaptation	441
	Adaptive truth and falsity	443
	Idolatry and writing	444
	Sanctity, power, and lies of oppression	446
	Breaking the holy and diabolical lies	447
	Inversion in the order of knowledge	449



	Contents	xiii
Humanity's fundamental contradiction		451
Dissonance between law and meaning		453
Post-modern science and natural religion		456
Notes		462
References		499
Index		519



### Foreword

Emile Durkheim published *Les Formes élémentaires de la vie réligieuse* in 1912, on the eve of the First World War. The war consolidated a process which had been building up for at least three decades and which we can now see laid the foundations for the kind of society familiar to our twentieth-century world. This society was organized by and for centralized states, staffed by a professional class of scientific experts. Durkheim himself, as the principal founder of the discipline of sociology, had taken the lead in establishing the new sciences of society which would underpin the activities of this class. Yet in *The Elementary Forms* he posed an immense problem for the future of humanity. Science appeared to have driven religion from the field as a serious intellectual ground for the organization of society; but it could not perform the function of religion. This left a huge hole in the spiritual existence of modern people which Durkheim knew must be filled, but he himself was powerless to imagine how.

Roy Rappaport's book, the result of more than three decades' investigation into the relationship between religion, society and ecology, is, in my view, the first systematic attempt to address the question which Durkheim left unanswered. As such, it deserves to be seen as a milestone in the anthropology of religion comparable in scope to his great predecessor's work. For Rappaport is attempting here nothing less than to lay the groundwork for the development of a new religion adequate to the circumstances humanity will encounter in the twenty-first century. His stated aims are more modest, namely to review the anthropological evidence which might allow for a more comprehensive understanding of ritual as the practical matrix of religious life. But the unity of this work derives from his implicit desire to inform future attempts to construct a

xiv



Foreword xv

religion compatible with the scientific laws ruling a world for which humanity is ultimately responsible, as that part of life on this planet which is able to think.

Religion belongs to a set of terms which also includes art and science. It is a measure of the declining intellectual credibility of established religions that science, which began as a form of knowledge opposed to religious mysticism, is now most often opposed to the arts. If science may crudely be said to be the drive to know the world objectively and art is pre-eminently an arena of subjective self-expression, religion typically addresses both sides of the subject-object relationship by connecting what is inside each of us to something outside. Religion, etymologically speaking, binds us to an external force; it stabilises our meaningful interaction with the world, provides an anchor for our volatility.

Durkheim's concept of religion was consistent with this formulation, but it contained some radically distinctive elements. He divided experience into the known and the unknown. What we know is everyday life, the mundane features of our routine existence; and we know it as individuals trapped in a sort of private busy-ness. But this life is subject to larger forces whose origin we do not know, to natural disasters, social revolutions and, above all, death. We desperately wish to influence these unknown causes of our fate which we recognize as being both individual and collective in their impact; at the very least we would like to establish a connection with them. And so, for Durkheim, religion was the organized attempt to bridge the gap between the known and the unknown, conceived of as the profane world of ordinary experience and a sacred, extraordinary world located outside that experience.

He recognized that we normally conceive of the sacred in terms of spiritual powers, summarized in the world religions as God. He proposed, however, that what is ultimately unknown to us is our collective being in society. We find it very difficult to grasp how our actions arise from belonging to others; and it is this property of collective life which is highlighted in the chief mechanism of religion, ritual. Through ritual, Durkheim argues, we worship our unrealized powers of shared existence, society, and call it God. Sometimes we objectify the spirit world as nature and worship that. This natural religion, associated at the time Durkheim wrote with the "totemism" of the Australian Aborigines, he considered to be the matrix of all systematic knowledge, including science. It was thus one of the tasks of *The Elementary Forms* to demonstrate that science springs from the same desire to connect the known and the unknown that spawned religion.



#### xvi Foreword

The chaos of everyday life, by this formulation, attains some stability to the degree that it is informed by ideas representing the social facts of a shared collective existence. Science, sociology for example, can help us to be more aware of this; but, in general, scientific knowledge and method undermine the coherence and stability of culture. Durkheim believed that the central task of ritual was to instill these collective representations in each of us. In a celebrated expression, he spoke of the "effervescence" of ritual experience. In a state of spiritual ecstasy we internalize the lessons which bind us to each other in social life. He did not elaborate on this rather important conception of the socialization process. Roy Rappaport's book, among other things, may be read as an extended treatment of this very point.

It is not the task of this Foreword to pre-empt the contents of what follows. Apart from anything else, Rappaport is unusually lucid in setting out his own agenda and sticking to it. Indeed I would argue that this book is as much a work in analytical philosophy as it is an essay composed within the anthropological discipline which acknowledges Durkheim as a founder. For the author is relentlessly precise in his use of words, a precision which is alleviated by the robustness of a prose which knows that it is borne along by the currents of an impressive intellectual tradition. The second chapter, for example, is as fine a review of what ritual has been taken to be as will be found anywhere. Moreover, Rappaport's own definition, starting from a parsimonious emphasis on formality, invariance and tradition, builds over no less than eleven chapters (out of fourteen) into an analysis of ritual which, for sheer comprehensiveness and consistency, has no parallel in the literature.

Roy Rappaport gives such rigorous and explicit attention to ritual because he finds in it the ground where religion is made. He is aware, as was Durkheim, that religion has not fared well in modern times, having been removed from the governance of society's leading institutions and left instead as an irrational palliative for the growing mass of the world's outsiders. He knows that, if the pattern of our own rotten century is repeated in the twenty-first, there will not be a twenty-second. This is because a pseudo-religion of money and commodity consumption is supervising the destruction of nature and society on a scale which is unsustainable in even the fairly short run. Rappaport believes that one possible answer to the world's crisis would be a religion founded on a postmodern science grounded in ecology, rather than astronomy – so that human society might be conceived of as being inside rather than outside life on this planet.



Foreword xvii

This is the meaning of the book's title. In Rappaport's usage, humanity is a personal quality, a collective noun and a historical project. The project of achieving our potential to be collectively human is, in a sense, barely begun. It is entailed, however, in our origin as a species, in the discovery of language and with it religion. The inclusive feature of religion is "holiness", a concept which embraces the sacred, the numinous, the occult and the divine. Holiness is whole (and cognate to healthy); religion, which is constantly being made and remade through ritual, is the means we have of getting in touch with the wholeness of things. Increasingly, we are becoming aware that human society has a unity defined by its occupation of a place in the life of this planet. That place has hitherto often been heedlessly destructive. The task is to assume responsibility for our stewardship of life as a whole. Religion is indispensable to that task and ritual is its active ground; hence the echoes of Durkheim's *la vie réligieuse*.

Between the two books lies almost a century of war, bureaucracy and science. Anthropology has in that time become a major academic specialization whose achievements underpin Rappaport's work. But he also looks to theologians, psychologists, ethologists and philosophers for the means of developing his arguments. In this he is true to the discipline's origins in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Immanuel Kant coined the term "anthropology" in its modern sense for a series of lectures (Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view) which was published towards the end of his life. In them he posed the question of how humanity might make a cosmopolitan society beyond the boundaries of states; and he found the answer in a comparative inquiry into cognition, aesthetics and ethics. For Kant, community and common sense were generated through social interaction; the aesthetic was primarily social, having its roots in good food, good talk and good company. This is the urbane source for Durkheim's emphasis on a more primitive conception of ritual; and Rappaport takes up once more, as Durkheim could not, the project of imagining how ritual might sustain a social life of planetary rather than merely national scope.

The universals of nineteenth-century anthropology have been discredited in our own century. And this was not difficult, since they were founded on Western imperialism's ability to unify the world as an unequal association of races governed by what was taken at the time to be the last word in rationality. Since then, another vision of world society has taken hold, a fragmented world of self-sufficient nation-states reflected in an ideology of cultural relativism which insists that people



#### xviii Foreword

everywhere have a right to their own way of life, however barbarous. This vision has become so central to the academic anthropology of our day that Rappaport's treatise will seem to be anomalous. Of late it has come to be held that big, closely argued books on universal themes are out-of-date. Minor essays on elusive topics, ethnography for its own sake and evasion of matters of general public concern are the norm. If this book does nothing else, it makes a claim that anthropology needs to be animated by more ambitious intellectual projects which look backwards, to be sure, but also forwards to the world we hope to inhabit in the near future.

Roy Rappaport's enterprise is made possible by social conditions at the end of the twentieth century. We are living through a communications revolution sustained by the convergence of telephones, television and computers. The progressive integration of global exchange networks since the Second World War has brought about an unprecedented capacity for movement and connection on a planetary scale. At the same time we are increasingly aware of the damage being done to the environment and of the obscene inequality which marks world society. The states in which Durkheim placed implicit confidence as the sole means of organizing society are now in disarray. No government anywhere commands widespread popular support, with the possible exception of Nelson Mandela's.

We know that we are at the end of something and on the verge of something else. Rappaport does not discuss the historical context of his arguments in any way; yet this book's remarkable integrity derives from his conviction that our twentieth-century world of nation-states must soon give way to a new one premised on the need for forging a common human agenda. In other words, we need new conceptions of the universal. Religion once provided such conceptions. Anthropology filled the gap when religion was driven out by science; but it is not itself religion, merely the means towards formulating fresh approaches to religion on the basis of sound knowledge of the human condition.

It might be argued that the world is full of religion at present, as indeed it is. But the vehicles for religious experience which predominate today, especially the so-called fundamentalisms of Christianity and Islam, attract the dispossessed masses; they offer a means of connecting with world society, but they do not yet influence the institutions which rule that society. And it would be tragic if they did, since they look backwards to the certainty of religions of the Book at a time when humanity's means of communication are fast moving in a new direction.



Foreword xix

Roy Rappaport does not engage at length with what many take to be religion's most distinctive and alarming feature, namely its capacity to fuel divisive conflicts. Instead, he focuses on the potentially constructive powers of ritual. For, as I stated at the beginning, he intends his book to be a sort of manual for those who would collaborate in the task of remaking religious life along lines compatible with the enhancement of life on this planet. It may or may not turn out to be that. What he has assembled here, however, deserves at the very least to set the anthropology of ritual and religion on a new course.

Emile Durkheim's dualistic conception of the religious life as a bridge between separate worlds, the sacred and the profane, the collective and the individual, reflected his assumption that society would continue to be defined by the impersonal institutions of the state and a market-driven division of labour. In such a world, the personal and the everyday have no meaningful connection with society and history; so that it is left to experts, sociologists and anthropologists, to discover how the abstract principles by which we live are reproduced in religious ritual. Rappaport's approach is strikingly different. His definition of ritual draws no hard line between the sacred and the everyday, between society and the individual or, for that matter, between culture and nature. And this reflects the changed circumstances of our late twentieth-century world, where faith in anonymous structures has taken something of a beating in recent years.

Rappaport's vision of the human universals appropriate to our day invites us to rethink the modernist movement which launched our century and has sustained the universities as a privileged enclave within it. In particular he insists that we find ways of reconciling science and religion, since their mutual antagonism is ruinous and their false synthesis, as in that latterday astrology, economics, is potentially even more so. The vast majority of his professional colleagues will probably be unmoved by his arguments, since they have long been committed to other ways of thinking and have too much at stake in the existing institutions. But, if there is to be a future for specialized intellectual enquiry, young anthropologists and other students of religion will be stimulated by Roy Rappaport's bold example to explore new regions of human possibility.

Keith Hart Cambridge April 1997



# **Preface**

This book, as all my friends well know, has been a long time coming. Some of its ideas came to me as early as the late 1960s, and I have worked on them in fits and starts ever since. I've lectured on ritual and religion during most academic years, and published preliminary versions of some of the book's elements in such essays as the Obvious Aspects of Ritual, and Sanctity and Lies in Evolution, both 1979. An earlier version of this manuscript was accepted for publication in 1982 with requests for no more than minor revisions. Upon rereading it at that time, however, I decided it didn't say quite what I wanted to say, so I put it aside "until I had time" to revise it to my liking. But I was about to go off to do field work and when I came back I was elected to the presidency of the American Anthropological Association, an office which engaged virtually all time left over from my full-time position at the University of Michigan. And then there have always been, as for most of us, requests for articles and essays that one expects to take a week to write, but usually take me a couple of months. And so, although I made some progress on the manuscript, it was slow going. This didn't make me happy, but I was given some comfort by the feeling that my revisions were better than what I had done originally. By and large I think this is true, although the book still doesn't say quite what I would like to say, or doesn't say it as well as I would like.

In April 1996 I was diagnosed with lung cancer. To paraphrase Dr. Johnson, there really is nothing like a diagnosis of non-curable carcinoma to concentrate the mind wonderfully on what one takes to be one's priorities, what one takes to be of great significance, and, unsurprisingly, such a diagnosis encourages an ever-growing sense of the need for closure, to get it done. I walk away from the manuscript feeling that

xxi



#### xxii Preface

many passages could well have used more work. At any rate, they - all those passages - have come off their back burners and have, for better or worse, been front and center since the diagnosis.

I have been fortunate with my disease. So far, I've suffered no pain. My chief symptoms have been weakness and fatigue which have kept me from working more than two or three hours at a stretch. This may be a good time to thank the people most directly involved in keeping me alive and in working order over these past months: Doctors Robert Todd, James Arond-Thomas, and Michael Shea and two magnificent infusion nurses, Annkarine Dahlerus and Jennifer Welsh. Judy Federbush has not only kept me alive but reasonably sane not only during the last year but during previous periods when the manuscript and other committments were tying me in knots. I don't think I would ever have gotten done without her support.

The most crucial person in keeping me alive and functioning has been my wife, Ann. I realize that expressions of this sort are clichés in prefaces and acknowledgements, but I simply cannot imagine how anyone can get through a year or so of cancer, even with symptoms as mild as mine, without some loving support constantly there. Her support has been beyond the call of love or duty and so has, more intermittently, the help of my daughters, Amelia and Gina Rappaport.

At some point, and it might as well be here and now, I want to express my thanks to my institution, the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts of the University of Michigan, and to its Anthropology Department for providing the additional material support I've needed during this past year. I am very grateful to Dean Edie Goldenberg and Associate Dean John Cross, and to two very effective chairmen of the Anthropology department, Richard Ford and Conrad Kottak. The funds they have provided have made it possible to engage the services of Susan Else Wyman, who has overseen the production of the manuscript, and Brian Hoey, who checked the bibliography.

I am also deeply grateful for the honor bestowed upon me several years ago when I was nominated Mary and Charles Walgreen, Jr. Professor for the Study of Human Understanding. This honor provided me with additional time to work on this manuscript.

I finally can turn to acknowledgments of intellectual assistance, aid, and stimulation, a much more difficult task, given the many years I've been thinking about this material. And with all that space and time I couldn't possibly name everyone who contributed. There have been many generations of students who have heard some of this, and it seems



Preface xxiii

to me that there has been at least one student in each generation who has asked a question or made a comment so penetrating that it has caused me to rethink key points.

There are many less anonymous acknowledgments to make. In the early days of this enterprise, discussions with Gregory Bateson were especially illuminating, and a leave at Cambridge in England gave me opportunities to spend time with Maurice Bloch and to talk at length with Meyer Fortes. There were also opportunities for important conversations with Eric Wolf, who was on leave in London at the time.

Robert Levy and Mervyn Meggitt gave very close readings to the early chapters of this book's early drafts, and their detailed comments were instrumental in transforming early drafts into the final work. They have both been cited in the book, but unacknowledged traces of their thought are ubiquitous in the work. Others who read portions of the manuscript and made valuable suggestions include Aletta Biersack, Ellen Messer, Sherry Ortner, and Aram Yengoyan. A Wenner-Gren Conference on Ritual and Reconciliation at Burg Wartenstein years ago, convened by Margaret Mead and Mary Catherine Bateson and attended by, among others, Roger Abrahams, Barbara Babcock, and Fehean O'Doherty was a break-through moment for me and I am deeply grateful to the Wenner-Gren Foundation's president at the time, Lita Osmundsen.

Since the onset of my illness, my most generous and helpful assistance has been offered by Keith Hart, who has visited twice from Cambridge, England, to help me give final shape to the text and, finally, to write a penetrating Foreword. That this book was concluded was as much due to Keith Hart's efforts as to mine. Finally, I am very grateful to the staff of Cambridge University Press, especially Jessica Kuper, the Anthropology editor, who in recognition of the condition of my health, have abbreviated and accelerated their review and production procedures.

Roy A. Rappaport

Ann Arbor

July 1997