Introduction

**Arivaca, Arizona, USA**: Presbyterian seminary student Luke Roske pushed through low-hanging branches in a dry creek bed that cut through the desert around this ranching community some fifteen miles north of the Mexican border. He paused and knelt, lighting a cigarette and peering silently up the wash. All around were strewn the signs of fresh migrant travel: empty food tins and gallon water jugs, discarded clothes, shoes, backpacks. Roske shrugged out of his own thirty-pound pack and let it fall to the ground. Inside were several half-liter bottles of water and perhaps a dozen “migrant packs,” the clear plastic bags distributed by members of the No More Deaths humanitarian patrol group. Each bag was stuffed with potato chips, Vienna sausages, crackers, cookies, an electrolyte drink – food to sustain those exhausted or lost in a harsh desert landscape that has claimed more than a thousand crossers’ lives in recent years. Roske tipped his straw cowboy hat back on his head, wiped sweat from his brow with a sleeve, and pulled hard on the cigarette. Nearby, but invisible in the brush, another volunteer called out to any who might be hiding around them: “Somos amigos.” “We are friends.” No one answered (author observation, July 2005).

**Tierra Blanca, Veracruz, Mexico**: In this city of 45,000 in Veracruz state on Mexico’s eastern coast, where thousands of Central American migrants pass through each day clinging to the tops of freight trains, a group of volunteers prepared for their nightly service. Bearing a massive pot of simmered beans, hot tortillas and coffee in a five-gallon bucket, they emerged from their alberge, or migrant shelter. Outside on the pavement, perhaps two dozen men sat or lay on make-shift beds of cardboard and blankets, waiting to be admitted for the night. The volunteers passed them and trudged, two per bucket, about three-quarters of a mile to the area around the rail yard. There, they set the food on a folding card table and broke out cups and plastic utensils as a crowd gathered, almost all men, and all waiting to transfer trains and continue their northward journeys. One volunteer, a local evangelical musician named Ignacio Lara, called, “Hermanos migrantes,” or
“migrant brothers,” and led them in a prayer. Then each lined up for a cup of beans, tortillas, and sugared coffee. “People here don’t have much, but what we have we try to share with those who have less,” noted Miguel Angel Ochoa Cruz, a founder of the *albuerge* and deacon of the local church that supports it (author interview, March 2007).

**Algeciras, Andalucía, Spain:** Isidoro “Padre Pateras” Macías Martin ducked out of the rain pelting a busy street in this working-class port city on the Strait into a two-story home with iron bars on each ground-floor window. He poked his head into a room off the main hallway and greeted the women and young children seated inside, all sub-Saharan Africans working on their Spanish by watching a daytime drama. Entering the kitchen at the end of the hallway, he greeted several more women with handclasps or quick kisses on the cheek, patting the babies that two of them held. All of the women had entered Spain by sea, making the oft-treacherous Gibraltar crossing in small boats while pregnant, hoping that having a baby on Spanish soil would permit them to remain in Europe. Macías, a brother of the Franciscan order of the White Cross, began working with unauthorized immigrants in Algeciras in the early 1980s (see De Russe 2003; Vallejo-Nágera 2004). By 1999, he had begun to see much larger numbers of economic fugitives arriving in the often rickety small boats, or *pateras*, including a number of pregnant women. The following year, he opened the home, which has since served hundreds of women and their children. Most face hard times once they land in Spain, even with the several months’ shelter provided by the home. Macías himself has faced pressure from some Spanish clergy, among others, for possible violations of laws against harboring unauthorized immigrants. “I only know one law,” he said. “That is the law of love. I do exactly what Jesus said to do. I don’t look at the color of the people. I just open the door” (author interview, March 2006).

**Naco, Arizona, USA:** “If your basement is flooding, you first stop the leak and then try to fix the problem,” noted Wanda Schultz, 68, a retired legal secretary from Houston, Texas, as she stood at her border vigil site. “My citizenship is becoming worthless with 3 million illegals coming through the border every year” (author interview, April 2005). Schulz was one of hundreds of Minuteman Project volunteers who converged on southeastern Arizona from sites around the United States in April 2005. After an opening rally at Minuteman headquarters in the Old West tourist town of Tombstone, Arizona, they set up vigil sites off Border Road, a dirt track running parallel to the four-strand barbed-wire fence marking the line between the United States and Mexico. There, equipped with walkie-talkies, and often with handguns belted...
on, they stood for eight-hour day or night vigils, reporting any suspicious activity to the US Border Patrol and fielding questions from global media, documentary filmmakers, and sympathetic public officials. “I think it’s an outrage,” one project participant said of the migrant flows, as he searched the parched brown hills on the Mexican side. “It’s a disgrace. I write e-mails to the president all the time telling him he’s supposed to be representing the people, and he’s not, because the people are all for what we’re doing here” (author interview, April 2005).

With one notable exception, the scenes above depict individuals who are reaching across national boundaries, or internal boundaries of differential citizenship, to aid individuals at risk from exposure, physical threats, or economic deprivation. As such, they are seeking to protect fundamental human rights. In the frame of this work, they are practicing some significant aspects of global citizenship. By contrast, the Minuteman group enacts a conception of citizenship or duty to others that is far more nation-centric. Its members fiercely claim the prerogatives of state sovereignty, especially a state’s presumed right to permit or deny entry as it chooses. At a more implicit level, the Minutemen espouse an “absolute ownership” view of state citizenship, where sets of compatriots are seen as possessing firm rights to determine their own distributive obligations to those outside their set.

I argue in this work for a global citizen orientation. I take as my departure point recent cosmopolitan thought, which views individuals, rather than states or other groupings, as morally primary. Cosmopolitans have offered important insights about injustices produced within the current global system, as well as about some possible state and individual duties obtaining within that system (Beitz 1999a; Caney 2005; Pogge 2008a; Brock 2009; see Shue 1996). The account here seeks to build on such insights and develop a more comprehensive approach to individual duties in the global context. I argue that crucial questions about the definition, distribution, and reliable discharge of such duties can be addressed by incorporating a specific, institutional conception of global citizenship into the cosmopolitan framework.

Theorists of citizenship per se have offered perhaps the most detailed guidance on individual duties within political community. Accounts of global citizenship have attempted to extend such guidance to the global sphere, though they have been primarily concerned with possibilities for promoting some form of human solidarity or global ethic, rather than with identifying packages of individual duties. The approach developed here views institutions as vital for the protection of human rights, because they have the potential to provide full coverage for all
individuals in a given set, and to obtain full compliance from all with duties corresponding to others’ rights. Thus global human duties are defined by reference to a set of institutions that would plausibly be able to protect the core rights of all persons. Identified are three categories of duties corresponding to such rights, and which are seen as incumbent on all.

The first category is that of **contributory duties**. Like the activists and humanitarians noted above, individuals in the current system can take significant steps toward closing gaps in rights protections for non-compatriots. They can make direct contributions of time, energy, and expertise, in addition to contributing personal resources for humanitarian assistance, development initiatives, and rights promotion and protection.

The second category is that of **accommodation duties**. In contrast to ardent nativists or immigration restrictionists, those discharging accommodation duties will be willing to shoulder the burdens of more expansive distributive regimes, and other moves consistent with securing core rights for all persons. They will also be willing to accommodate the adjustment pressures associated with expanded distributions of membership, in the form of more flexible immigration regimes or free movement across borders, as has developed within the European Union.

The third category is that of **institutional advocacy duties**. Non-elites within states routinely assume some types of advocacy duties, lobbying or protesting to promote reform in their domestic governing institutions. Likewise, those calling for their states to meet overseas aid goals are viewed here as discharging duties of *interstate* advocacy. Finally, and most significant for this work, those demanding reform in institutions of global governance such as the World Trade Organization are assuming vital *suprastate* advocacy duties. I argue that a fully realized conception of suprastate advocacy duties would include promoting the development of institutions capable of comprehensively protecting individual rights, at the regional and ultimately the global level. The resulting institutions would, over time, constitute a framework within which an actual practice of global citizenship could be realized. The current European Union represents an incomplete but potentially very important model.

The argument is structured around these categories or aspects of global citizenship practice. They are viewed as deeply complementary rather than discrete. Even individuals who do not consciously assume advocacy duties may, by their efforts to contribute to and accommodate others, engage in de facto advocacy for suprastate institutional reform. For example, the desert humanitarian patrollers in the No More Deaths
group can be seen as engaging in a form of direct-action advocacy. Their efforts to render aid to vulnerable noncompatriots highlight what they see as significant flaws in US immigration enforcement policy, while also filling gaps in rights protections for individuals. At a deeper level, they may be calling attention to institutional gaps in economic rights protections throughout the North American region that figure significantly in producing the mass northward migration and unauthorized penetration of the US border. The Minuteman civilian border patrol-lers also are engaging in a form of direct-action advocacy, but for a very different purpose. Their stated aim is to strengthen institutional protections for their own citizens by helping to exclude those who would illicitly compete for national resources, or who could pose some physical threat to compatriots. Their actions are designed to call attention to a perceived need for more institutional resources devoted to such exclusions, while contributing directly to enforcement.

Examining the actions, stated motivations, and moral beliefs of such individuals can give insight into how conceptions of both global and rigidly national citizenship are enacted in the current system. It can highlight some obstacles to promoting a global citizen orientation in each of the categories of duty identified. Findings from research conducted with the Minutemen, No More Deaths, and a range of other groups are woven throughout the text, along with findings from scores of interviews conducted with authorized and unauthorized immigrants, enforcement officers, diplomats, government officials, and others in the United States, Mexico, and Western Europe. All contribute to the construction of a more comprehensive view of the issues at stake in defining and distributing duties, as well as identifying ways of promoting the actual discharge of duties corresponding to human rights.

**Structure of the argument**

I begin by offering details on the specific conception of global citizenship advocated and situating it in the broader literature on cosmopolitan distributive and political justice. Global citizenship, I argue, can be understood as the fully realized form of individual cosmopolitanism. It provides a guide for individual action within a globally oriented but still individualistic moral frame. I consider some candidate approaches to global citizenship and offer critiques. A “good international citizenship” approach would be an important advance on the global status quo, but it may be too closely tied to the norms of a sovereign states system to reliably secure the rights of those within less-affluent states. Conceptions of global citizenship as global ethic likewise offer...
important insights into appropriate orientations toward the human community, but they give relatively little guidance on specific duties to be discharged or ensuring that individuals in that community will be protected. An institutional approach, in which duties are defined and to some extent distributed with reference to a defensible system of global institutions, offers greater definitional precision and a concrete route to enhancing rights protections.

Chapter 2 explores in detail why human rights protections are likely to remain insecure in a sovereign states system, and thus why duties and protective institutions should be conceived as extending to the fully global level. After detailing a conception of human rights based on vital human interests, I turn to recent thought on political obligation and legitimacy, where significant emphasis has been given to obstacles in the way of securing rights for individuals. I consider justifications for state coercion that are grounded in natural duties owed to all other persons, rather than in consent or with reference to benefits received. I argue that, while an emphasis on such natural duties gives strong reasons to support the creation of rights-protecting political institutions, we should not presume that the duties halt at domestic boundaries. In fact, because of specific biases that arise within a sovereign states system, the scope of rights-protecting institutions should extend well beyond current states.

In Chapter 3, the kinds of institutions that would most likely be needed to overcome the biases are detailed, as are the duties that would be incumbent on individuals within such institutions. I discuss ways in which duties in the current, far less integrated system, could be identified and distributed by reference to the fully integrated aim, and I consider and critique two prominent alternatives. One of these would argue for securing subsistence rights, but no more, for all individuals, while to some extent holding those within less-affluent states collectively responsible for their own poverty (D. Miller 2007). Such an approach, I argue, gives too little emphasis to the limited means which most non-elites have to affect such macro outcomes, especially in terms of decisions taken before their birth. Some of the same problems attend a cosmopolitan approach that would seek to distribute duties to the globally affluent according to harms they are said to perpetrate on the less-affluent (Pogge 2008a). Global duties, I argue, are more defensibly seen as natural and distributed according to ability to contribute, accommodate, and advocate, than according to a scheme that would attempt to hold all responsible at some baseline level.

That concludes the presentation of theoretical concerns in the first section of the book. The second section focuses on those organizations
already practicing aspects of global citizenship, as well as those enacting a nation-centric conception. In Chapter 4, findings are presented from field research among immigrant-rights activists in the US Southwest. Such activists, in particular those in the No More Deaths and related groups, are discussed as exemplar practitioners of global citizenship in the current system. Interview findings give insight into their justifications for action to aid the excluded other, often in the face of resistance from their own state authorities. They understand their work as defensible in an explicitly universalistic frame, whether Christian or secular, in which the need of the other exerts its own moral pull, and where all are seen as having duties to respond. Findings from Minuteman interviews reveal a more fundamentally group-centric view, where strong duties to members are understood to override most general duties to others.

Chapter 5 offers a novel way of thinking about advocacy duties and how rights-enhancing integration could be promoted. It presents an argument that unauthorized immigrants to such regions as Western Europe and North America are already practicing a concrete and mostly defensible form of trans-state citizenship, though not one identical to that of immigrant-rights activists. They are, as suggested earlier, engaging in de facto forms of global civil disobedience. They act in general fidelity to an emerging global normative charter grounded in state-transcendent rights, even as they violate laws against unauthorized entry. Mass street protests across the United States, and smaller but significant actions by undocumented persons in Western Europe, add a significant publicity dimension.

The actions and moral understandings of such border crossers help to point us to some agency-respecting ways of thinking about the duties of the globally less-affluent. In Chapter 6, I outline an approach that would view the global poor as morally co-equal agents capable of discharging a range of rights-protecting duties, rather than merely as the objects of other people’s duties overseas. I consider and critique some non-cosmopolitan approaches to the duties of the global poor. Those include accounts that make reference to ostensibly rigid empirical constraints – the prospect of looming famine – to justify claims that the poor have, for example, duties to submit to harsh population-control measures. Drawing on the fieldwork conducted in southern Mexico, I detail voluntary actions that individuals within less-affluent states are already taking to protect vulnerable others, including those who do not share their citizenship. I then discuss reasons for moving from a strict conditionalities framework in overseas development aid, where recipients are held to externally determined standards and action
requirements, toward a genuine partnership framework, in which they are treated as fully equal participants in cooperative schemes to improve their own circumstances.

The final section of the book focuses on existing trans-state institutions and some possibilities for transformation in line with institutional global citizenship. Chapter 7 examines the trans-state citizenship regime emerging across the still-expanding European Union. After sketching the evolution of actionable EU citizen rights over several decades, I consider how far EU citizenship can serve as a model, including in relation to “Fortress Europe” critiques focusing on the hardening of external borders as internal ones have opened. I discuss ways in which some tensions identified in the treatment of global civil disobedience are being manifested in the European context, and how some immigrant-rights groups are highlighting those tensions to try to extend rights protections. I close by considering some insights from the EU context that could be applied in the consideration of deeper North American integration.

Chapter 8 offers a proposal for moving in the near term toward a concrete practice of citizenship at the global level. Specifically, I argue for the creation of a World Trade Organization parliamentary body that would ultimately exercise co-decision powers analogous to those of the European Parliament. I begin by demonstrating that arguments against opening supranational institutions actually resonate strongly with past arguments for “elitist” forms of domestic democracy, and are vulnerable to the same critiques. I then detail a principle of democratic symmetry, according to which individuals would be afforded input on policy formation because of the increasing impact of WTO rules and the potential impact on them of exclusion from trade governance. Insights presented earlier, about the importance of empowering individuals to challenge possible biases, are shown to be significant in the WTO context. The argument could also inform democratic reform proposals for the United Nations and other suprastate institutions.

I close the discussion in Chapter 9 by considering some means of enhancing and expanding efforts at education for global citizenship, understood as one means of encouraging the discharge of global citizen duties in the current system. I discuss the increasingly prevalent efforts to move beyond state-centric citizenship in standardized curricula, as well as normative theoretical arguments for global education. I discuss salient findings from social psychology on ways in which some kinds of information about others in need can promote positive valuations of them and a willingness to aid. Findings are offered from fieldwork with humanitarian patrollers which highlight the importance of
similar information and valuation across barriers of citizenship. The discussion concludes with an exploration of ways in which such insights could inform expanded efforts at education for global citizenship, with emphasis both on experiential education and on interventions in academic and public discourse.

In sum, the full argument has three primary aims. The first is to develop a defensible conception of global citizenship to fill the theoretical space of individual cosmopolitanism. It is a conception grounded in duties corresponding to widely recognized human rights. Duties are defined and distributed in part through reference to ones that would be incumbent on all individuals in a global system capable of reliably protecting individual rights. Because of biases and related tendencies endemic to a sovereign states system, it can plausibly be presumed that the more cohesive, inclusive, and accountable a system of global institution is, the more effectively it will protect individual rights.

The second aim is to offer substantive guidance on how and why individuals act as global citizens in the current global system. In itself, the fact that so many are willing to make sacrifices of time, energy, and personal resources to protect vulnerable noncompatriots challenges any categorical view that strong group identification is necessary to motivate such sacrifices. Even if committed activists are viewed as taking action that borders on moral heroism, and thus could not be prescribed to all, they embody and exemplify a set of moral understandings that in fact could be widely generalized. They and like groups, intended here to include development NGOs, human rights NGOs, anti-corporate-globalization activists, and many others, also create myriad opportunities for individuals within states to make contributions consistent with a global citizen ethic.

The final, closely related aim is to highlight ways in which activists, NGOs, unauthorized immigrants, and those working on their behalf in receiving states, discharge vital advocacy duties. Few at present serve as direct advocates of the wholesale transformation and integration of the global system. By their daily actions, however, they call attention to deep moral tensions in the current system between individual rights and the sovereign prerogatives claimed by states. They help to create continuous pressure for the greater recognition of rights claims, and thus opportunities for the promotion of rights-enhancing institutional transformations at all levels. Were such activists to place more emphasis on transforming suprastate institutions, then “globalization from below” could become a powerful force for creating morally defensible institutions above.
Part I

Theoretical concerns