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Excerpt

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Introduction

The ultimate aim of the Zionist renaissance – the national rising of the Jewish people in its homeland – will ascend from the process of building the future Land of Israel. The Land of Israel will be a Jewish land insofar as the will and ability of the Jewish people will make it so. A Jewish state, a labor society, and Jewish–Arab cooperation are the three goals that conflate in the actions and aspirations of the Jewish worker in his land.¹

The “renaissance generation,” as the poet Chaim Nachman Bialik termed it, produced a colorful pantheon of personalities – including authors, poets, teachers, pioneers, and activists who were products of reading and who produced books as trees produce leaves. The Second Aliyah (wave of immigration of Zionists), which after many incarnations and augmentations would beget the State of Israel and was a manifestation, as it were, of Bialik’s poetry, used the term *renaissance* a great deal and saw itself as a practical revival movement. Secular Zionism at large grew accustomed to using the term *Jewish renaissance* to describe its endeavors.

One who speaks of Ben-Gurion has to note that his long life included different periods with different emphases and priorities. I cannot discuss all of them in this monograph. I will try to examine some of the issues that occupied him and mention several sobriquets that he adopted or that others proposed in order to define his motives and deeds. The first is the “man of the Jewish renaissance,” or “rebirth.” What does it mean? What were its characteristics? How is it understood today? The second is the “man of the Jewish state,” even as the father of an exaggerated role assumed by the state known at the time as “statism on account of voluntary efforts.” What is this “state,” and what role did the party occupy in Ben-Gurion’s theory and practice, in light of the history of his public life, including his resignation from the party that he founded and the bitter criticism that he leveled against it in his last years? How does this relate to his attitudes toward Jewish revival and renaissance? Third, some credit Ben-Gurion with special historical intuition, a “sense of history”

that characterized his leadership and explains his various demarches. If so, how does this sense of history blend with his own description of his generation as a “generation of rebirth” that ostensibly arose from history, as the necessary outcome of history, and that mobilized him as a servant and mouthpiece?

Ostensibly, a facile comparison of the Jewish revival movement with the European Renaissance is wholly out of place. The latter period was considered an era of cultural revolution, a psychological revolution in man’s relation to himself, and its best-known expression was in the arts, which flourished gloriously. The towns and cities of Eastern Europe – from which grassroots Zionism emerged by dint of the *Maskilim* (intellectuals influenced by the non-Jewish Enlightenment) and numerous strata of what is customarily called “the Jewish people” – did not reach outcomes similar to those produced in abundance by the cities of Italy, France, and Germany, each in its own manner, or by English cities during Shakespeare’s time. In the cities of Eastern Europe, a cultural and political upswelling did occur amid other areas of endeavor, but only by overstatement can one liken it to the movement that had swept Europe five centuries earlier. Despite the differences, however, there was a similarity in circumstances that requires analysis. An example is the return to classic Jewish sources – particularly the Hebrew language and the Bible – without the religious faith formerly attached to them. The exponents of the Renaissance discovered their own pre-Christian classicism, and the European continent rediscovered Roman law (England was an intriguing exception in this respect). However, they continued to inhabit a largely religious culture, even as some ventured into outright heresy, if not cynicism and corruption.

The Renaissance at its finest is recognized for its eruption of creativity, innovation, and seemingly unlimited resort to the values of the classical past. It is recognized for its appreciation of human beauty and the supremacy of the human spirit and potential, as befits a period that combined a variety of influences in an exceptional way unachieved by other ages. We shall therefore make do, at this stage, with defining the Renaissance, for our purposes, as a historical period inhabited by people who were capable of synthesizing values from the distant and recent past; acting unceasingly according to these values in the present, due to newly acquired strengths; and acting in a self-assured manner, free of self-examination and self-doubt, even though their successors neither wholly accepted nor even understood their feats.

When speaking of Zionism, however, a product conceived and born in the nineteenth century, one must immediately ask why it is of particular value to ponder what occurred in Europe during the Renaissance – the era that ended the Middle Ages – as an explanatory framework for the birth of a Jewish national movement hundreds of years later. Judaism succeeded in extending its own middle ages right into the modern age, with certain adjustments and variations (that in the eyes of important scholars were themselves deviations from traditional Jewish society in the Middle Ages), such as the rise of Lurianic mysticism, Sabbateanism and its collapse, and the rise of Hasidism.² In Ya’akov

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Katz's opinion, too, what was occurring was the adaptation of a traditional society to the needs of a changing present mediated by traditional terms and ideas. This, he concludes, explains the divided, polemical character of traditional Judaism ever since. Be that as it may, the changes that took place in Europe from the end of the Christian Middle Ages engaged Judaism much later – at the beginning of and during the nineteenth century – at the pace and under the unique conditions of the modern era.

Nineteenth-century European nationalism exhibited manifestations of rebirth and creativity but operated in another world, partly industrialized, influenced by scientific achievements that originated in the Renaissance, and possessed of political ideas and social experiments that had been accumulating since then. In the nineteenth century, there was no shortage of thinkers and exponents of culture who longed for the simplicity, charm, spontaneity, and creativity of the Renaissance. However, these characteristics, many of them believed, could no longer be revived. To their regret, the European Renaissance itself had already shown distinct nationalist tendencies alongside the universalistic and individualistic, and these coexisted, with a typically odd measure of harmony, with the rediscovery of Greece and Rome and the traditional religious framework. Thus, the European Renaissance marked the beginning of modern nationalism and the modern outlook on government and politics. These tendencies were not accepted by everyone of that period and ultimately, the reactions against them were incorporated into the Counter-Renaissance and Counter-Reformation – the Reformation that was, among other things, a product of the Renaissance itself.

Ironically, it seems, at least on the face of it, many participants in the East European Jewish renaissance adopted a trend of thought that was essentially naive, a blend of many cognitive inputs that were commonly espoused at the time, without really thinking them through beforehand. Not only had they not experienced the tribulations undergone by the Western nations from the Renaissance onward, but they had also not learned any lessons from these tribulations or from subsequent developments. Even so, it bears examination as to whether the Jewish renaissance shared other characteristics with the nineteenth-century-style European nationalism that developed in the wake of immense changes in Western and Central Europe, changes that affected the Jewish street in many ways. Yet Ben-Gurion was an exception in this regard. He took a keen interest in Western European, mainly British, models of governance and the role of the military in a democracy. At the same time, however, he tried his best to combine the old and new in Jewish history in a way that blended Renaissance-like intellectual liberty with a characteristic Renaissance-like interest in the “past before the past” for the purpose of achieving a better future. Anchored in a distinct Eastern European Jewish environment, this Zionist renaissance differed widely from the German-Jewish variety, which emerged as a result of the failure of the Jewish-German “symbiosis” and the cult of the European Renaissance by the end of the nineteenth century in Germany.³ There were some German inputs, mostly indirect ones, on Eastern European Zionism and also some grounds

for criticism of Ben-Gurion's Zionism by German-Jewish thinkers seeking to combine the concepts of certain German philosophers with their own visions of a Jewish renaissance, but this goes beyond the scope of the present book, except for some specific cases, to be discussed later.

One may say confidently that Ben-Gurion's Jewish renaissance acquired distinct classic characteristics of its own, foremost the revival of Hebrew, the rebirth of national poetry and literature, and the firm connection of these with Eretz Israel. The inception of this renaissance is a matter for further discussion. One may see its provenance in the *Haskala*, the Jewish enlightenment movement, which focused on the revitalization of Hebrew and scornfully rejected traditional Jewish *shtetl* life. One may claim that the rebirth of Hebrew as a spoken language far surpassed anything done in the European Renaissance. The proponents of Hebrew battled Yiddish and the many other spoken and written languages of the Jewish Diaspora, such as German, Ladino, and Arabic, and purposely dissociated themselves from those who spoke them and from their world. The consciousness of these acts renders them distinct from the accomplishments of the European Renaissance. One may view the Jewish renaissance as a singular phenomenon born in the 1860s, closely linked to the neo-Romantic, nationalist, and socialist thinking that developed in Eastern and Central Europe. This seemingly makes it difficult to liken the Jewish renaissance to the world of the European Renaissance.⁴

At issue are purveyors of culture such as Ahad Ha'am (Asher Ginsberg, 1856–1927), a major Zionist thinker, and artists such as Bialik, who began their work in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bialik, for one, though considered a classicist of the Zionist renaissance, was not free of doubts about the capacity of Jewish roots to be regenerated and also entertained modern-style angst. The pace and substance of life was different in Bialik's time and place. In Europe of the late Middle Ages and the dawn of the modern age, people's ways of thinking changed slowly. Eras were smooth and bounded, if only in the eyes of historians. They were governed by dominant states of mind and perceptibly affected by specific individuals. By the early twentieth century, however, the poet Avraham Shlonsky was applying modernist criticism to Zionist classics even during Bialik's lifetime, and the poet Uri Zvi Greenberg was producing a mixture of Walt Whitman's, European-modernist, and quasi-Fascist nationalist poetry of fantastical bent.

Both Shlonsky and Greenberg, though their paths diverged to opposite extremes, were political Zionists and activists in their own ways. They and their predecessors, such as Bialik, were almost of the same generation, which became mainstream not as a slow and direct outgrowth of historical processes and previous generations' ideas but by sprouting alongside other possible responses to the severe crisis that buffeted traditional Jewish society. This crisis included a retreat to ultra-Orthodox Diaspora traditions and a search for escape in Jewish territorial solutions outside of the Land of Israel, Jewish revolutionary Socialism in the existing East European Diaspora (Bundism), and assimilation. As a result, Zionism from its outset until the mid-1930s was a militant and

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ostensibly cohesive movement that struggled for its future and was maligned by its rivals. “Ostensibly” cohesive, I say, because Zionism did not lack for internecine tension that escalated into overt schism. The later victory of Zionism papered over the difficulties of the movement and underscored its status versus the alternatives that had presented themselves to Jewry at the turn of the twentieth century. It did this so effectively that we think of the Zionist leaders today as seasoned politicians who had been successful from the start by dint of their zeal and the political prowess that was intrinsic to people of their like. It is for this reason that any comparison between the Zionist leaders and Renaissance men seems artificial and vain.

Many of these leaders, however, defined themselves in Renaissance terms and displayed a vigor and vitality that powered their careers for a variety of reasons, including what they considered the Renaissance character of Zionism – a matter whose definition we will develop. Since Zionism was embroiled in controversy from the start and diverged into sometimes contradictory factions and customs, its leaders did become political creatures early on.

Indeed, what began as a political-cultural movement with an anti-Socialist bent in the early days of Theodore Herzl⁵ eventually – during the Second Aliyah – the second wave of Zionist immigration to Ottoman Palestine at the beginning of the twentieth century – metamorphosed into a multichrome Socialist settlement movement that emerged from small beginnings to place its decisive stamp upon events in Eretz Israel. It was anything but a monolithic movement; many of its leaders had been literati, thinkers, and writers in their youth. Thus, in order to determine to what extent they presumed to be Renaissance men, we must delve into and analyze their cultural and behavioral world. After all, the members of the Second Aliyah expressed, in their personalities and their actions, not only the dynamism and the supreme vitality of the Jewish renaissance in whose name they spoke but also the Jewish sociocultural crisis from which they had come and that they attempted to reconcile in their activities in Eretz Israel.

Their most prominent intellectual leader, Berl Katznelson, dealt with everything – social action, political activity, settlement, literary endeavor, and publicistic journalism – but for good reason was considered first and foremost a writer, according to one of his greatest admirers, Professor Dov Sadan.⁶ Another visible stalwart of the movement, Shlomo Tzemach, was one of the founders of Israeli agriculture. However, he engaged extensively in literature, literary criticism, and political criticism – which often abounded with overt doubts about the leadership of his townsman, David Ben-Gurion – and filled his diaries (which were concealed during his lifetime) with writing that reflected the jealousy and hatred that disturbed his peace of mind in his grim loneliness.⁷ Ben-Gurion himself engaged in the “sin” of literary and philosophical writing, to which we shall return. However, he became a pioneer and a farm worker, a Socialist leader and a statesman. For most of his life, he combined optimism and faith – in what we shall call “vision” – and for this purpose repeatedly used the term *Jewish renaissance*. His vision, however, was accompanied by doubts

and actions that aimed to surmount these doubts, which only worsened with time.⁸

Ben-Gurion's doubts arose due to the existential crisis of Judaism and the fears expressed by others and by him in his own way. That is, he offered a mainly optimistic vision while addressing the general public but expressed doubt and tough criticism of Jewish-Israeli realities mostly in closed meetings: specifically, that the Jews had no hope of standing on their own feet as a nation after the great calamity that had destroyed most of the Zionist hinterland in Europe. In what sense does this resemble the European Renaissance? The intention is not to find similarities at all costs; one must also take note of the dissimilarities and the historical uniqueness of different periods. One must also be mindful of the terms that this generation itself used and distinguish between them and the accepted scholarly terminology.

Ben-Gurion's generation made much use of the concept of *tehiya* – revival, rebirth, or renewal – in reference to the rebirth of the “people” and the “nation,” the “Jewish nation.” We must probe the essential character traits, the condition, the difficulties, and the risks of this revival, and decide what revival it was that certain members of the Second Aliyah had in mind and what Ben-Gurion was aiming for when he spoke of this renaissance at particular times. We should examine what the Holocaust wrought and study the concept of “state” – a “Jewish state” – that served as a political goal for the rehabilitation of the nation and its components or, as Ben-Gurion's critics claimed, that served him as a goal unto itself.

It is crucial to present these concepts at this early juncture and to widen the list to include others such as “citizenship” and “citizen” in a Jewish state, “voluntary groups” and other social networks, the “governance” of this entity and the form that said governance should take. These concepts are important if we wish to examine the way Ben-Gurion developed his “renaissance” terminology – as he himself called it – into systematic thought and action in these respects, and to elucidate the basis of his thinking at a very early stage. For the time being, it behooves us to show the points at which Ben-Gurion's Zionism was most critical and where it comprised a mixture of vision and doubt that only the work of a statesman and active public elements could enhance and reconcile with the complex world of the European Renaissance, if such reconciliation is at all possible:

Woe upon us, upon Jewish history, if after the external obstacles are removed [and we have a state] our inability is revealed. . . . A state is a framework; I shall explain. . . . It shall be revealed in all its emptiness, in all its weakness and haplessness, unless a pioneering spirit arises that has so far not arisen. . . . We will need to bring half a million Jews to Israel in a short time . . . and this mass of people will not be a reserve force. With the establishment of the Jewish state, Jews in the Diaspora will stop being a private reserve force for [various competing pre-state political groupings and rural-settlement movements]. They will be their own *raison d'être* and if the youth then do see themselves as their pioneering servants, they and we will fail. . . . These Jews, like all Jews in the Diaspora, have not been citizens in the past eighteen hundred years, for a person is a

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citizen only in his own state, in his own land. These Jews have no sense of citizenship, particularly the Jews who know what their countries did to them in Poland, Germany, Lithuania, and the other lands that became cemeteries.

The anarchist instincts that live within Jews are strong. Citizenship is a deep psychological characteristic. If the English have any greatness . . . it is their sense of citizenship, perhaps unmatched by any other nation in the world, and the sense of citizenship is not measured by whether people are willing to give their lives to protect their land. . . . Citizenship is when people pay taxes. . . . European Jews have no such sense. I am afraid that it does not exist in this room either. . . . In Europe, Jews only make demands, and rightly so. Who can ask anything of a person whose wife has been killed, whose children, whose parents have been exterminated? If they come here and view us as people who owe them something that they are demanding, we will have to bear it and get used to them, to understand them. . . . Unless we arm ourselves with love, we will not be able to work with them and will have to serve them. Imparting this sense of citizenship means that [the individual] should know first of all that something is being demanded of him, that the public has nothing but what the individual gives it.⁹

Some circles in pre-independence Israel did regard Jews in general, and Diaspora Jewry in particular, as a sort of reserve or human resource that various groups could use in the pursuit of their own affairs. Ben-Gurion considered this a serious problem from the outset of his activity in Eretz Israel:

I have seen this in all sorts of shapes and forms, throughout my forty-six years in this country. It started with the workers' kitchen in Petah Tiqva [one of the first Zionist settlements in Palestine] – did it belong to [some Labor Movement outfit] or to all the workers? Was it for the public or was it someone's private reserve? A youth movement is someone's private reserve, but there is something more important, and that is the public.¹⁰

Ben-Gurion made this situation in Eretz Israel part of his criticism of the Diaspora and blamed it on the importation of the Diaspora mentality. In one of his critiques of Israeli society not long after victory in the War of Independence (described by him as one of the greatest of all times), he spoke of

the worthless, malignant legacy that the Diaspora has bequeathed us – the legacy of divisiveness, clannishness, and strife that left its marks on the Yishuv [the pre-independence Jewish community in Palestine] as well. The inferior habits of thought and action that have clung to us over that long time [when we had] neither independence nor autonomous responsibility for our fate. We have not yet managed to wean ourselves of them even in these great times . . . of the renewal of our sovereignty. The curse of our submissiveness before world tyrants [referring to Stalin], our emotional and intellectual servitude . . . to foreign lights, imitations . . . are lethally poisonous to the State of Israel and to Diaspora Jewry.¹¹

Plainly, the “New Jew” – the creation of whom was Ben-Gurion's declared aim years before the establishment of the state – was supposed to be, among other things, a “citizen” in the British sense and not a Soviet-style “subject,” a devoted neo-Marxist, a neo-Kantian German-Jewish intellectual idealist, a

French-inspired existentialist, or a disciple of other uncritically imported foreign ideas, although Ben-Gurion himself strongly doubted the Jews' ability to become true citizens in the short time history had provided them. Hence, we should study the actions he took to surmount these doubts.

The Zionist personalities mentioned here adhered strictly – outwardly, in the main – to the idea of their being “mobilized” or “regimented” for the cause of change and revolution in the Jewish way of life. The great tension in their interrelations, which sometimes spilled into the public domain and required “rules of the game” – the public virtues of politics as a game played by rules – eroded this mobilization until it collapsed into overt accusations and rifts from the founding of the state onward.¹² Shlomo Tzemach continued to write lethal criticism (mostly for his desk drawer) of local and world events to the best of his understanding. Personal ardent interest in, and practical involvement with, literature and writers was an inseparable part of Tzemach's Zionist renaissance. Ben-Gurion criticized the Jews' ways of life on the basis of philosophical and practical reasoning drawn from Jewish virtues and values, secularized as they were, and the thought of other peoples. He strove primarily for the revision of these ways of life at the level of society in Eretz Israel, a revision that eventually led to internal political reform. Tzemach and those of like mind viewed all this with much skepticism and disapproval. From their standpoint, Ben-Gurion was a “tanner” (a term culled from Jewish sources that denotes the practitioner of an unpleasant but essential task), a man of action who found within himself the strength to do what others only spoke of, that is, to establish a state and an army and to win a war.

In Ben-Gurion's own eyes, however, his main accomplishment – establishing a Jewish state despite all the difficulties – was not enough. At this stage, he viewed the founding of the state as an arena for reforming the customs of a nation needing rebirth. When the Yishuv method of governance overshadowed the state without effecting the change that he felt essential, he resigned his public offices as prime minister and minister of defense and retreated to Kibbutz Sede Boqer for the first time, an act that will require study in due course. During his retreat, Ben-Gurion slowly formulated the principles of a comprehensive British-style governmental reform that we shall discuss later. However, the requirements of Israeli security, which always competed with his other priorities, induced him to return in stages to his two erstwhile portfolios one by one and to attempt to change the system of government on the basis of selected Jewish values that he culled from the spiritual corpus studied years before.¹³ Yet his attempt to implement that reform failed, ultimately furnishing one of the reasons for the brutal political struggle among the Israeli social-democratic elite – a struggle moral and ideological in nature, at least on the surface – that ended with his downfall.

Yet the very fact of that initial mobilization by the Second Aliyah generation had Renaissance-like fundamentals. That is, some of its conflated contents and values were taken for granted by that generation, which is why they could not

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be passed in the same form to subsequent generations. Among those contents and values were some that could only clash with the modern, modernist, and postmodern fundamentals that moved the founding generation and subsequent ones, as well as collide with the religious and traditional legacy. These issues require examination in depth.

Ben-Gurion began his career in Eretz Israel not as a statesman but as a “class-man,” a young man of the Jewish working class, which hardly existed in the territory to which he emigrated of his own volition and conviction. In time, he worked to deepen his Zionist ethos and rest it on two foundations. Since he had come from a traditional society in which the Orthodox studied only the Pentateuch and the Talmud and used Yiddish as their vernacular, he based his ethos, first of all, on those parts of the Bible that appealed to him. Toward the Talmud he developed a distaste that he maintained all his life, viewing it as a work of rabbinical legal discourse largely divorced, since sealed off, from an unceasingly changing reality. From the Bible, however, Ben-Gurion not only learned to love Eretz Israel but also developed a faith in the conceptual and behavioral autonomy of the Jewish people and its independence of political culture, which had protected the Jews in their homeland and in the Diaspora as well as possible.

This “autonomy of thought” was a significant matter to Ben-Gurion; apparently it even dictated extra caution against attempting to replicate the world of the Bible in our time. By studying the Jews’ autonomy of thought in political cultures, he learned that it had withstood the greatest powers of their periods – Egypt and Babylonia – immense cultures with vast accomplishments of their own. Throughout his life, such autonomy – which, while engaging with the great cultures of the day refuses to assimilate into them culturally, politically, or ethically – was the second central foundation of Ben-Gurion’s Zionism.¹⁴ However, it was necessary to choose ideas from religious values that would maintain this autonomy for the future. He made this choice in stages throughout his life, as our discussion will show.

Under the inspiration of the mentors of his generation, such as the philosopher Ahad Ha’am, the historian Simon Dubnow, and the philosopher-writer Micha Josef Berdyczewski, the adult Ben-Gurion declared that he had invested much soul-searching and thought to giving the clearest possible meaning to the concept of “Jewish cultural autonomy.” After all, following its stand against Babylonia and Egypt, Judea had to deal with the Hellenist culture, a universalistic *haute culture* that had a greater influence on humankind than its predecessors. Ben-Gurion tried to understand this struggle in its own right and also the Greek influence on Judea. “The ancient Jewish worldview,” he said, expressing his own worldview, “was intuitive and theocratic. During medieval times, Jewish sages made attempts . . . to meld theocratic Jewish thought with the philosophical Greek worldview that was prevalent among enlightened people in those times.”¹⁵ In other words, he drew a distinction here between “philosophy” – rooted in Greek intellectual inquiry based on empirical

observation of reality, for the purpose of doing good and attaining beauty – and “intuition,” which he further distinguished from theocracy. These three, especially the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy, blended in traditional Judaism but did so when few intellectuals such as the Rambam bothered to try to incorporate Greek philosophy into Judaism. Still, Ben-Gurion claimed, Jews gave humankind “the universal vision of redemption, the vision of peace, freedom and justice for all mankind.”

From Judaism’s dispute with Christianity and from his desire to defend its singularity in secular terms, Ben-Gurion suggested that the greatness of this vision was in its directionality, pointing to both past and future, creating constant hope and striving for what ought to be. Judaism offered a constant, active moral obligation, rather than the passivity in the Christian claim that mankind had already been saved and need do nothing but believe in salvation through Jesus – that is, to persist in a direction that leads to the past and dictates the present. The attempt to distinguish Judaism from its greatest historical enemy drew the adult Ben-Gurion toward Judaism’s other two great historical enemies in the classical era, Greece and Rome, which had given mankind the tools for contemplation and examination of reality in order to improve and beautify it, and had also given mankind “laws of state and rules of war.”

Ben-Gurion’s approach is evident both in his contemplation of and learning from other cultures and in his recognition of the “singularity” (*yihud*) and “destiny” (*yi’ud*) of the Jewish people – ideas that require clarification precisely because these terms sound pretentious, vacuous, and even ludicrous today. In the following chapters, we shall see that from the outset, secular Zionism aroused criticism that strongly resembles the current variety for its arrogance in regard to “destiny” and “singularity.” This may explain his valorous and indefatigable attempts to instill these concepts broadly.

Ben-Gurion’s third minister of education, B. Z. Dinur, Dinur’s successor, Zalman Aranne, and Ben-Gurion himself tried mightily to instill “Jewish consciousness” and a Zionist interpretation of Jewish history in Israeli students. This was easy enough in the early years of statehood, since many Israeli-born students were still familiar with the full range of Jewish literature, including accounts of Jewish life free of Zionist indoctrination – from Bialik’s autobiographical sketch *Safiah* (Appendix) to the stories of Yitzhak Leibush Peretz and Zalman Shneor and the warm, touching humor of Sholom Aleichem. They respected some fundamental Diaspora values and rejected others, for the Zionist syndrome that many of them had studied and mastered was equivocal, sending many different messages. Two of these accepted values were the veneration of martyred parents or ancestors – a core belief in Jewish Orthodoxy of all stripes – and the conviction that in the future Jews would no longer die this way.

Respect for tradition and its demands originated in the literature that they had read, including descriptions of the Spanish Inquisition in *Memoirs of the House of David*, *The Heroes of the Tower of York*, and similar works published by Am Oved, the Labor Zionist publishing house – depictions that fit