Modern competition law was first employed by countries over one hundred years ago in order to address issues relating to restrictions of trade at the national level. Recent international economic integration has weakened the distinction between the domestic and the international in several fields of economic activity, and consequently the laws which regulate such activity, competition law included. Several attempts to address the paradox of adopting national competition rules to address international issues have been made at the international, regional and (lately) bilateral levels. This book discusses the international dimension of EU competition law and policy, and examines the position taken by the EU in four distinct categories of international agreements which are devoted to competition or include competition provisions. In particular, it analyses the EU’s position with regard to bilateral enforcement cooperation agreements, bilateral free trade agreements, plurilateral regional agreements and the long negotiations for the adoption of a multilateral competition regime.

Anestis S. Papadopoulos is a Partner of KPP Law in Athens and a teaching fellow at the University of Athens Law School.
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THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY

ANESTIS S. PAPADOPOULOS
This work is dedicated to the memory of my father,
Spyridon S. Papadopoulos
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# Abbreviations

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<tr>
<td>ABA</td>
<td>American Bar Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCC</td>
<td>Australian Competition and Consumer Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACFC</td>
<td>ASEAN Consultative Forum for Competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>African, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACPA</td>
<td>Antitrust Civil Process Act (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of South East Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
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<td>CACM</td>
<td>Central America Common Market</td>
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<td>CAFTA-DR</td>
<td>Central America Free Trade Agreement plus Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDC</td>
<td>MERCOSUR Committee for the Defense of Competition</td>
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<td>CFI</td>
<td>Court of First Instance</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>COTED</td>
<td>CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development</td>
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<td>CPDG</td>
<td>APEC Competition Policy and Deregulation Group</td>
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<td>CSME</td>
<td>CARICOM single market economy</td>
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<td>DIAC</td>
<td>Draft International Antitrust Code</td>
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<td>DoJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice (US)</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<td>ECN</td>
<td>European Competition Network</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Western and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>EFTA</td>
<td>European Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>EMMA</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean association agreement</td>
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<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>economic partnership agreement</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>free trade agreement</td>
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<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>FTAA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement of the Americas</td>
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<td>Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (US)</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>gross national income</td>
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<td>International Bar Association</td>
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<td>International Competition Network</td>
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<td>ICPAC</td>
<td>International Competition Policy Advisory Committee</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance</td>
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<td>ITO</td>
<td>International Trade Organization</td>
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<td>LAFTA</td>
<td>Latin America Free Trade Association</td>
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<td>LDC</td>
<td>least developed countries</td>
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<td>most favoured nation</td>
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<td>MLAT</td>
<td>mutual legal assistance treaty</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>partnership and cooperation agreement</td>
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<td>preferential trade area</td>
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<td>RBP Code</td>
<td>Restrictive Business Practices Code</td>
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<td>stabilisation and association agreement</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>TAIEX</td>
<td>Technical Assistance and Information Exchange programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDCA</td>
<td>trade, development and cooperation agreement</td>
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<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<td>TRIPS</td>
<td>Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights</td>
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<td>UNCTAD</td>
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<td>West African Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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