

I

Introduction

Roughly 3 percent of the world's population lives in a country other than the one in which they were born. Of these 200 million people, about one-third moved from a developing to a developed country, another third moved from one developing nation to another, and the last third moved from the developed world to the developing world. According to the United Nations (UN 2006), the 10 largest suppliers of international emigrants in 2005 were (in decreasing order) Mexico, China, Pakistan, India, Iran, Indonesia, the Philippines, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Sudan.

These 10 countries are mostly poor. More to the point, the leadership in each of these countries is astutely aware of the economic returns associated with emigration; indeed, most actively promote emigration as part of their broader development strategies. This awareness is founded on their own experiences with emigration, a burgeoning academic literature that links emigration and economic development, and a growing international effort to understand the economic effects of migration.¹

International migration is also being fueled by a growing awareness of the economic benefits it generates in the receiving countries, which are frequently at the other end of the economic spectrum from the sending countries. At the start of the second decade of a new millennium,

¹ For example, the UN Secretary-General and a number of governments launched a Global Commission on International Migration in 2003 (with a resulting report in 2005). The UN also held its first High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development in September 2006, resulting in the creation of the Global Migration Forum. The World Bank has also been very active on this front (World Bank 2006), initiating the International Migration and Development Research Program and its subsequent publications (Özden and Schiff 2006, 2007a). Most recently, the UNDP's 2009 Human Development Report focused on "Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development."

advocates tout the role that immigrant labor can play in satisfying critical economic functions in the developed world, whether harvesting the crops, shoring up a deficit in health care workers, staffing the technology front, or adding youth to ageing populations.

Although policy makers, international organizations, and academics are becoming increasingly aware of the economic effects of migration, we remain ignorant as to the potential political effects of rising emigrant stocks. We are beginning to understand how remittances are spent in local economies, but still have no idea about how (or even if) emigration spreads political capital. Although we are increasingly aware of the economic relevance of local hometown associations, we are oblivious as to when emigration can be a conduit for new political ideas and influences or when it serves as a venting device used to get rid of troublesome rabble-rousers. At a time when we are developing sophisticated international plans to deal with the economic costs of brain drain, we know nothing about its political equivalent. Most remarkably, in an era that celebrates “Democracy’s Century” (Freedom House 2000), we do not know whether emigration facilitates or deters democratization.

Consider the 10 labor-exporting countries listed in the opening paragraph. Although this group of countries shares a legacy of economic underdevelopment, they have very different political constellations. Neither does there appear to be any clear relationship between the absolute number of emigrants and a country’s level of political development. As shown in Table 1.1, the 2008 Freedom House Survey (and its component country reports) describes four of these countries (Ukraine, Mexico, India, and Indonesia) as free; the other six countries are characterized as being either partly or not free. The largest source country (Mexico) is listed as free, whereas the second largest (China) is not.

Given their economic situations, we can expect these countries to continue exporting workers in the foreseeable future.² The question we then need to ask is, How will emigration affect the political development of these source countries? Will continued emigration undermine or strengthen India’s democratic traditions? Does emigration from Pakistan encourage the growth of a nascent democratic culture and institutions, or does it flame the fires of jihad? To date, these questions have not even been asked, let alone answered.

² Whether other countries will continue to accept them remains to be seen in a world economy in turmoil. Yet the likelihood of accepting future immigrants turns on the anticipated effects of that migration, including the sort of political effects studied in this book.

Introduction

3

TABLE 1.1. *Sources of International Emigration, 2005*

	Avg. # Annual Emigrants (2000–5)	Emigration Rate per 1,000 Population	Political Rights Score	Civil Liberties Score	Freedom Status
Ukraine	140,000	2.9	3	2	Free
Mexico	400,000	3.9	2	3	Free
India	280,000	0.3	2	3	Free
Indonesia	200,000	0.9	3	3	Free
Philippines	180,000	2.3	4	3	Partly free
Pakistan	362,000	2.4	6	5	Not free
Kazakhstan	120,000	8.0	6	5	Not free
China	390,000	0.3	7	6	Not free
Iran	276,000	4.1	6	6	Not free
Sudan	104,000	3.0	7	7	Not free

Note: Kazakhstan's Freedom House scores are for 2007.

Sources: Freedom House (2008); UN (2006).

At one level, the lack of attention to this issue is understandable. For most of the postwar period we have lived in a world in which formal limitations on international human mobility were seen to be natural and long-standing. Large-scale international migration occurred infrequently, in the wake of extraordinary events, so that questions about the effects of this migration were often bracketed off as being irrelevant for mainstream economic and political analyses.

A rising tide of globalization at the close of the 20th century changed all this, and political economists and policy makers began to consider the effects of international migration on the receiving country economies, the sending country economies, and the international economy in general.³ What is remarkable about this expansive literature is that it remains

³ Obviously, this literature is enormous; Moses (2005a: 56–8, 2006: chapter 6) provide summaries. The first literature is most developed in the United States and is perhaps best captured by the influential work of George Borjas (1999), but it should not be limited to him. Other examples include Simon (1989), Smith and Edmonston (1997), U.S. Department of Labor (1989), and Böhning (1984). More recently, there has been a renewed focus on the positive impacts of immigrants in the host country; for example, Legrain (2006), Riley (2008), and Pritchett (2006). Similar efforts can be easily found in most other OECD countries. The growing literature on the economic effects of emigration on sending-country economies is surveyed in Özden and Schiff (2007a), World Bank (2006), and, most recently, UNDP (2009). For the global efficiency gains associated with international migration, see Winters (2002), Moses and Letnes (2004, 2005), Iregui (2005), and World Bank (2006).

focused on the *economic* motives and effects of emigration, even though most international migration is heavily channeled by political constraints and influences.

After all, today's potential migrants need to negotiate a number of political hurdles. In some countries, exit restrictions still prohibit emigrants from leaving. In most of the others, residents are now free to leave. Yet even if a potential migrant lives in a country that allows for free exit, not a single country is willing to accept immigrants with open arms. Instead, any potential emigrant faces a myriad of restrictions and qualifications, as richer states effectively filter out all but the wealthiest, the most (politically) repressed, those with family ties or desired skill sets, or the most diligent. In the Middle East, where many of today's international migrants are now headed, other political barriers channel these migrant flows. Few other types of international exchange are more politically determined, and yet much of the literature avoids explicitly political analyses!

This is not to say that political scientists are not interested in migration issues – only that their focus, like that of the economists until recently, has been trained on the effects found in the receiving countries of the developed world. There is a substantial literature that examines variations in migration control systems and their relative effectiveness⁴ and another that analyzes the political and social effects of immigrants in the developed world.⁵ By contrast, however, there is remarkably little work done on the broader political effects of emigration in the countries of origin. This book aims to fill that gap in the literature.

Toward that end, this introductory chapter has four tasks, the first two of which have now been completed. I have tried to convince the reader of the need for more awareness of the political effects of emigration. As

⁴ Most of this work focuses on receiving countries, where national controls regimes can be seen as part of larger nation-building projects (Torpey, 2000), the result of domestic interest group pressures (Money, 1998, 1999), the rights-based politics of liberal states (Hollifield, 1992a), state interests broadly defined (Weiner, 1995; Zolberg, 1981), or changes in the international system (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Hollifield, 1992b; Sassen, 1996). There are even some, such as Hayter (2004), who argue for the abolition of such controls. Yet there is another literature that examines the way in which sending states encourage or discourage emigration. See, for example, Inglés (1963), Dowty (1987), and some of the more recent work by Nancy Green (Green 2005; Green and Weil 2007).

⁵ These studies consider the effect of migration on assimilation, national identities, and conceptions of citizenship (e.g., Honig, 2001; Joppke, 1998, 2000; Soysal, 1994). There are also older studies that see migrants as a surplus pool of labor (an industrial reserve army) that is more exploitable politically, because it is unregulated, nonunionized, and cheap (Castles and Kosack, 1973; Piore, 1979).

international migration becomes a more common and visible consequence of globalization, it behooves us all – at both the receiving and sending ends of the migration chain – to have a better understanding of whether (and when) its political effects are benign or malignant. My second task has been to show that there is a curious lacuna in the migration literature around this subject. Whereas economists have become increasingly interested in the economic effects of emigration, the political effects remain largely unexamined, at least in any systematic way.

The very existence of such a gap in the literature might lead us to doubt the existence of a systematic relationship between emigration and political change. Indeed, policy makers in both sending and receiving countries do not seem to be aware of or concerned with the potential political effects of emigration. This brings me to this chapter's remaining two tasks: to show that there are sufficient grounds to expect political emigration to deliver political effects and to introduce a research design that can reveal those effects. These tasks are more difficult, requiring more elaboration, so the next two sections are committed to them.

MOTIVATIONS

I can think of three types of reasons for why we might expect emigration to affect political developments in the country of origin: The first is grounded in the role that migration has played in studies of economic migration; the second derives from an established literature that links economic and political development; and the third is evident in a couple of well-known historical events. The remainder of the book elaborates on these reasons; this section presents my motivations for embarking on this study.

Economic Arguments

Economists have long been aware that migration can play an important role in economic development: Demographic developments play a central role in explaining the conditions that can foster economic growth (e.g., the relative balance among land, capital, and labor costs), and migration can play an important role in affecting those demographic developments. Consider, for example, Robert Allen's (2009: 21) argument about why the Industrial Revolution began in Britain:

The path to the Industrial Revolution began with the Black Death. The population fall increased labour mobility by generating many vacant farms, and that mobility

undermined serfdom. The low population also created a high wage economy. The benefits of high consumption were not confined to people: sheep ate better as well, and their long wool was the basis for England's early modern worsted industry – the new draperies. The enormous export of these fabrics through the port of London led to rapid growth in the city's population and the rise of the coal industry to provide the capital with fuel.

This argument does not focus on migration per se, but migration lurks in the background of the story Allen tells. It is a fascinating narrative, one that explicitly recognizes the complexity of development: how development depends on concomitant changes along several fronts, the need to focus on the variability of relative costs, and the blend of political and economic factors that combine to explain development. In this narrative, the Black Death facilitated mobility (across farms and into cities), and this mobility affected the price of labor (relative to land, energy, and capital), thereby encouraging investment in labor-saving machines.

This focus on relative costs and productivity levels is familiar to students of Arthur Lewis's dual-economy approach to development economics. In an article from 1954, Lewis asks us to think of developing economies in terms of two sectors: a small capitalist (or industrial) sector and a large traditional (or agricultural) sector. Because productivity is much lower in the traditional sector than in the capitalist sector, economic development could be facilitated by moving labor out of the traditional sector and into manufacturing, where it could be employed more productively. To the extent that it is reasonable to place the traditional sector in rural areas, and the capitalist sector in urban areas, migration (from rural to urban areas) therefore becomes a key component for encouraging economic development. From here it is just a short step to extend this sort of argument to the study of international migrants.⁶

Yet the role of migration is also evident in more broad-based approaches to development, such as the capabilities approach associated with the Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen. For Sen (1999: 38), “[o]ne of the biggest changes in the process of development in many economies involves the replacement of bonded labor and forced work, which characterizes

⁶ Lewis's approach was subsequently applied in a study of international migration by Charles Kindleberger (1967) to describe the migration of surplus labor in the Maghreb countries of Northern Africa and Turkey as part of the postwar economic boom in the European Community. Although Kindleberger's focus is on the effects in Europe (the receiving area), not the effects on the (sending) Maghreb, I use it to launch an analysis of guest-worker programs in Chapter 6.

parts of many traditional agricultures, with a system of free labor contract and unrestrained physical movement.” Although Sen was probably referring to internal (domestic) restrictions on mobility and labor market participation, the same argument applies just as forcefully to global labor mobility.

My initial motivation for studying the political effects of emigration was found in this consensus among otherwise disparate economists. By examining different aspects of economic development, economists have pinpointed the important role that emigration can play (and has played) in affecting the relative costs of the relevant factors of production. These relative costs have important political corollaries, as we see in the next chapter.

Political Arguments

My second source of motivation comes from a wide body of work that links economic and political factors and effects. This work can be divided into two very different research traditions. The first draws on a well-established literature that links economic to political development, in which economic well-being is shown to increase the likelihood that a country will be able to transit to and sustain democracy (e.g., Lipset 1959). If international migration facilitates broad-based economic growth in the countries of origin, and this economic development encourages the growth of an independent working or middle class, then political development might be indirectly linked to emigration. In contrast, emigration could generate lopsided economic growth in the sending countries, with more pernicious political effects as a result. Perhaps remittances are encouraging the growth of smaller enclave economies that deter the organization of independent classes that can challenge corrupt or unjust political authorities. We simply do not know which scenario is more likely. Yet the established links that connect economic to political development suggest that we can expect emigration to have an indirect (and lagged) effect on political development (working through the effect on economic development).

The work from a second group of political economists provides grounds for expecting a more direct link between emigration and political development. This group collects around the work of Charles Tiebout and Albert Hirschman. Tiebout's (1956) work examines the way in which individuals (or consumer-voters) signal their political preferences by choosing to move from one political jurisdiction to another (within

a given country). Hirschman (1970) links this threat of exit with the capacity to voice support or dissent to explain how organizations can obtain important information necessary to stave off eventual deterioration. Neither one of these authors worked on international migration. Tiebout (and his followers) was skeptical of extending his argument to higher levels of analysis, and Hirschman's original work focused on firms and political parties. Yet both types of analyses can be extended to the study of international migration. As we see in Chapter 3, it is possible to employ this broad swath of political economy to establish a baseline set of expectations that link emigration – either directly or indirectly – to political development.

Historical Examples

In short, it is not unreasonable to think about the political effects of emigration as a sort of trailer to the economic growth effects that are now being documented in a burgeoning literature, and there are several good theoretical reasons to expect emigration to generate more direct effects on political development. However, there is a third reason to expect emigration to affect political development, and this reason can be seen in the lessons generated from three very different historical examples: the birth of the American Republic, the fall of East Germany, and the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

The American Magnet. When the United States declared its independence at the end of the 18th century, some of its most prominent thinkers asserted America's right to transform subjects of European monarchs into republican citizens, thereby freeing them from any allegiances and obligations to their erstwhile rulers.⁷ Migration played a central role in this struggle, and its political power was evident to authorities on both sides of the Atlantic.

At issue was the question of political allegiance. At the time, both the common law doctrine of "perpetual allegiance" and the law of nations recognized that the subjects of a given realm were obliged to follow its customs, laws, and reigning monarch. If America was to hold its own, it needed to break this perpetual bond between sovereign and subject. At the same time, America needed to provide its residents (no longer subjects) with a new way of thinking about allegiance and obligations.

⁷ In Moses (2009), I developed this argument in more detail.

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-19543-0 - Emigration and Political Development

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Excerpt

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9

The new state under construction could not draw on these traditional bonds.

Migration, and the recognition of a natural *right of expatriation*, was the device used to meet both these needs of the new country.⁸ Although we no longer think of changing one's home at will and acquiring a new nationality as natural rights, some of early America's most influential voices – including Samuel Adams, Tom Paine, and (especially) Thomas Jefferson – did. Indeed, these thinkers used the right of expatriation as a means to justify a new type of political community, one based on individual and truly voluntary consent.

In heralding this right of expatriation, America's founding thinkers focused the world's attention on the political power of migration. This focus has usually been trained on the role that migration plays in signaling allegiance (and consent) to the immigrant's host country, but it also entails significant political consequences for the sending countries as well. After all, by choosing to leave a given political community one is clearly (if tacitly) retracting one's consent for its underlying contract (or regal bond). Just as important is the realization that not leaving a community (when one can) has the effect of amplifying an individual's tacit consent for that community.⁹ Indeed, in the formative years that bracketed the American Revolution, Americans justified their own nascent political community by reference to the injustices of existing communities in Europe (a claim that was supported by the fact that people were fleeing them and thereby withdrawing their consent).

For the right of expatriation to function in practice, however, it requires the willingness of at least one state in the international community to welcome newcomers. America's willingness to play this role was evident from the very start of the new country's history. Less than two decades after independence, with the Naturalization Acts of 1790 and 1795, this right of expatriation was secured in legislation by the new Congress. For the first time in human history, a community explicitly declared that any alien can be considered a citizen of its nation.¹⁰

⁸ A right of expatriation implies a right to change one's home at will and a right to acquire a new nationality. See, for example, Borchard (1931).

⁹ This notion – that a sort of implicit consent lies embedded in the freedom of exit – has deep roots in Western political theory. In the closing passages of Plato's *Crito*, we find Socrates arguing eloquently for the role that freedom of exit plays in securing consent.

¹⁰ I hasten to point out that any alien “being a free white person” was free to join the new political community. Indentured servants, slaves, and (American) Indians were not included.

There is widespread recognition of the importance of the American model in inspiring the democratic wave that swept across Europe in the century that followed. Yet it is less well known that this influence went beyond serving as a source of inspiration. The very existence of the United States – an island of republican refuge in a sea of absolutist monarchies – proved a genuine threat to the established order. For the first time, dissatisfied subjects had a real opportunity to break their bonds as subjects to a sovereign and exploit their right of expatriation.

This *real* possibility to emigrate (secured now by a state that was willing to embrace immigrants) severely circumscribed the power of existing states to exploit and mistreat their citizens. As argued by the eminent French economist and statesman, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot (1778: 389), states in Europe would have to improve conditions or risk losing subjects to the new country:

The asylum which [the American people] opens to the oppressed of all nations must console the earth. The ease with which it will now be possible to take advantage of this situation, and thus to escape from the consequences of a bad government, will oblige the European governments to be just and enlightened.

In short, the United States' early experience provides us with another reason to expect that migration (or just the possibility of emigration) can affect the political development of countries on both ends of the migration chain. For receiving countries, immigrants provide new political input with explicit consent. For sending countries, the threat of emigration has the power to challenge the authority of unjust states, and emigration itself offers an avenue of recourse for the dissatisfied subject. Individuals found themselves with two powerful instruments for influencing government: the threat of emigration and the real possibility of political asylum in another country.

Turgot's comment proved prescient, as Europeans flocked to the New World in the 19th century. Europe experienced its first wave of democratic reforms in the wake of this political and economic exodus.

The Fall of East Germany. A more recent example can be found beneath the rubble that was the Berlin Wall. Throughout most of the postwar period, the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe maintained stringent controls on the movement of their peoples. For fear of ideological contagion, the new Soviet Man (or Woman) was kept at home by means of a complicated blend of internal and external passports. For the lucky few who were allowed to travel abroad, the Secretariat of