Introduction

This book compares Thucydides' presentation of warfare and war materials in the narrative portions of his *History* to Pericles' statements about Athenian warfare and war materials in the *History*. It argues that Pericles is an historical character in Thucydides' *History*, and that Thucydides does not share his views, but composed Pericles' speeches to display Pericles' character and views to the reader; moreover, it argues that Thucydides carefully introduced and surrounded Pericles' speeches with contrasting narrative illustrations.

One important reason to review the relationship between the two is that Thucydides is frequently identified with Pericles' intransigent imperialism. Many scholars hold that Pericles speaks for Thucydides, or that Thucydides was dependent on Periclean ideas.[1] Many hold that after Athens lost the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides rewrote his *History* to

[1] *TAI* 119: "[Thucydides'] work appears as totally dominated by Pericles' ideas" (cf. 110–155 passim). Finley (1942) had argued previously to de Romilly that Pericles spoke for Thucydides, especially in the Funeral Oration. Their view was typical of their age. Bayer (1948) 57 writes of "…the historian's self-immersion in the eternal validity of the Periclean accomplishment…" (…das Sich-Versenken des Historikers in die ewige Gültigkeit des perikleischen Werkes…), and Chambers (1957) lists a large number of similar views. These ideas were taken up (to give some examples) in Westlake (1968) 23–42, Edmunds (1975a) e.g. 41, Pouncey (1980) e.g. 36, Connor (1984) e.g. 50, Kallet-Marx (1993) e.g. 116–117, Dewald in *OCRST* 114–147, Balot (2001) e.g. 172–178, Wohl (2002) e.g. 31, 70–71, and Sonnabend (2004), and are represented in *CT* and *HCT*. The tone of scholarship has changed little. Wade-Gery in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1948 edition p. 904, 1970 edition p. 1069): Thucydides "had for Pericles a regard comparable to Plato's for Socrates, and an equal regard for Pericles' Athens." Sonnabend (2004) 76: "Perikles is painted in an idealising way similar to that used by the great historian, Theodore Mommsen, to paint Julius Caesar" (Der Perikles ist ähnlich idealizierend verzeichnet, wie es später der große Historiker Theodore Mommsen mit Iulius Caesar gemacht hat). Scholars have also argued the other side, however. Cf. e.g. Strasburger in *OCRST*, Flashar (1989), Rood (1998) 205–208, Pelling (2000) 90–105, Stahl (2003).

justify Pericles' policies.[2] Others argue that the first part of the *History* displays devotion to Periclean imperialism, but that the latter part of the book shows disappointment with this ideal.[3] All of these arguments condemn Thucydides to a longer or shorter association with Pericles' fundamental chauvinism: an attitude that Athens deserved to rule whatever lands and peoples she had won through acquisitive warfare. The ethical implications of this association have not gone unnoticed, and Thucydides has been associated not only with Pericles' imperialism, but also with his materialism.[4] Well-known scholars argue that Thucydides' monetary interests in Thrace made him a partisan of Periclean politics, or more broadly, that Thucydides was a defender of Athenian greed.[5]

[2] The view that Thucydides rewrote the *History* to defend Pericles is defended in *TAI* and many other standard sources. Cf. e.g. Westlake (1968) 23–42, Pouncey (1980) 80–82, or Kallet-Marx (1993) 204. For an overview of the origin and development of this argument, and a concise description of its effect on the scholarship, cf. Stahl (2003) 18–23. The idea originated with and has a long history in the German scholarship. It began with Ullrich (1846), was continued in Nissen (1889), Schwartz (1919), Vogt in *OCRST*, and most recently strenuously argued in Will (2003). This view has also had strong detractors. Cf. Strasburger in *OCRST*, Busolt [1902] (1967), or Stahl himself.

[3] Connor (1984) 27 wrote that the Archaeology argues for "the significance of … naval might and financial reserves in military matters, and of imperialism as a source of power and greatness" (cf. 28, 34, 47, 49), but that Thucydides shows a failure of imperialism and imperial materialism both at the end of the Archaeology and in the books on the Sicilian expedition (cf. 63, 74–75, 103, 161). This compromise position has stood since then. Cf. e.g. Kallet (2001) 3: "Earlier in the History, especially in books 1 and 2, the historian sets out to demonstrate the essential role of money in the creation of naval *arche*, to foster a positive reading of the notion of expense (*dapane*), and to imply the unprecedented success under Pericles of combining *periousia chrematon*, 'financial surplus,' *gnome*, 'acute judgment,' and leadership; in the last three books he systematically shows the dismantling or unraveling of this process" (cf. 24–25). Balot (2001) e.g. 166 and Wohl (2002) e.g. 71 see a similar division.

[4] The view that Thucydides is to be associated with immoral imperialism is expressed in a typically pithy way by Momigliano (1960) 59–60, who shares the view that Pericles speaks for Thucydides. "…the implicit conclusion of Pericles (Thucydides) is that the immorality of the Athenian empire is to be accepted and defended because it is related to the glory of sea-power" (cf. 66). For a comprehensive overview of the scholarship on Thucydides and Periclean imperialism, cf. W. Nicolai (1996).

[5] Will (2003) 224: "According to his ancestry Thucydides belongs among Pericles' enemies, namely among those who represented an oligarchical and conservative view. His interests in the northern border regions of the Athenian empire will have brought about his change of opinion and his approval for Athens' imperial politics…" (Seiner Herkunft nach gehört Thukydides ins Lager der Feinde des Perikles, in dasjenige der Vertreter einer oligarchish-konservativen Richtung. Thukydides' Interessen in den nördlichen Grenzregionen der attischen Arche werden seinen Kurswechsel und die Billigung der imperialen Politik Athens bewirkt haben…). Cf. also Balot (2001) 176: "Thucydides regretted Athens' increasing lack of prudence, but he also admired the products of its well managed imperialism. His *History* is in some sense a memorial to the glorious edifice whose foundations were Athenian greed."

A closely related point of view argues that Thucydides' attachment to Pericles made him incapable of assessing Athenian materialism.[6]

I argue that it is possible to separate Thucydides' views from Pericles' views, and that Thucydides wrote the *History* partly in order to show the price of Periclean materialism and imperialism. An analysis of the contrasting meaning of warfare and war materials for Thucydides and Pericles offers one way to capture the difference between the historian and the character he created. The contrast is easiest to understand in respect to weapons. In Thucydides' presentation, weapons have no intrinsic glory but are evaluated in each successive situation. Their use and the consequences of their deployment can be positive (e.g. the Greek navy fends off Xerxes). However, Thucydides emphasizes stories in which the aggressive deployment of armed force is unproductive or even counterproductive.[7] By contrast, in writing up Pericles' speeches, Thucydides showed that he shared with many other actors in the *History* a mistaken confidence in the power, significance, and glory of the instruments of force.

The present study therefore elucidates the contrast between Pericles' hopes for Athenian warfare and Thucydides' analysis of warfare. Thus, for instance, the introduction to Thucydides' *History* (commonly called "the Archaeology") shows that improving weapons make the human drive to expansion increasingly powerful and destructive. Hopes for profit and empire ensure that the greater destructiveness of warfare does nothing to discourage armed conflict; on the contrary, the Pentekontaetia, that is, Thucydides' account of the approximately fifty years between the defeat of the Persian invasion and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, shows that Athenian warfare against both Greeks and non-Greeks vastly accelerated once Athens had proved the power of her navy in the Persian Wars.

Athens thus found herself in an historical situation that was new to her, but not to the history of Greece as Thucydides tells it in the

[6] Hornblower (1987) 174: "Personal prejudice – the spell of Pericles and the nostalgia for Pericles induced by the experience of his less stylish successors – stood between Thucydides and a correct assessment of the moment at which *pleonexia*, which had been there from the Periclean period, and indeed from 479 and the beginning of the empire, began to have effects which would be fatal."

[7] In the first sections of the *History*, we find, for example, the stories of the conflict between Corinth and Corcyra, the Athenian siege of Potideia, and of the Theban and Spartan attacks on Plataea, all stories in which substantial resources were invested to little or no gain for the aggressor, and in general Thucydides' account of the stalemated first years of the war; in the latter sections of the *History*, we read most famously the story of the Athenian expedition to Sicily.

Archaeology: an acme of wealth and weapons increased both Athens' power and also her defensive capacity, and caused the aggressive pursuit of further acquisition. In response to this aggression, fear, hatred, anger, and a desire to resist dominated Athens' enemies. The progress toward the Peloponnesian War (as we call it) is tragic and its result is destructive, a fact Thucydides vividly and repeatedly records.

Pericles shares, supports, and creates the passions that led to the war. I shall therefore argue that however great Pericles' political insights may have been, and Thucydides was the last person to deny Pericles' talents and the first to record and praise them, Thucydides was not an exponent of Pericles' materialistic imperialism. Rather, Thucydides' speakers, Pericles included, illuminate Thucydides' narrative explanations by demonstrating the responses of characters imbedded in the action. Here we see human beings fully under the power of the passions their situation has produced. In the speeches, more and less impassioned speakers boast about their navy (Corcyra), suppress mention of their navy (Corinthians), fearfully list the ships, money, and resources of the Athenians (Archidamus), disqualify those same resources (Sthenelaidas, Corinthians at 1.121–122), or list, explain, and glorify Athens' war materials (Pericles). The reader is called upon to understand and assess their words in the context of the narrative of events. Since the narrative consistently shows that the fate of weapons and armies deployed in warfare is unpredictable, and that the deployment of armed force generates opposing unpredictable deployments, we are entitled to ask how this lesson reflects on those speakers in the *History* who advertise aggressive warfare as the means to greatness.

Thus the relation of speech and narrative is at the core of the analysis offered here. As was stated above, this book analyzes Thucydides' narrative treatment of warfare and war materials, and Thucydides' Pericles' treatment of these same topics in his speeches, so that the two can be compared.

In order to achieve the closest possible description of the juxtaposition between the author and his Pericles, this volume offers a reading of books one and two of Thucydides, up to and including book two, chapter 65, which contains Thucydides' famous assessment of Pericles' leadership. The decision to proceed in this way originates with the intention to argue against the widely accepted view that the initial sections of the *History* differ from the post-Periclean sections in that they show greater approval for imperialism (cf. note 4). Moreover, Thucydides' presentation of imperial materialism in the latter parts of the *History* is less

controversial, and in my view better understood. I cannot think of a scholar who would not accept the view that the Athenians succumbed to the temptations of imperialism for the sake of profit when they attacked Sicily. My aim is to describe Thucydides' portrait of the exemplar of this human weakness: an intelligent, devoted, and self-controlled leader who succumbed to a belief in the historical significance of Athens' empire and the armed force that made it possible.

The use of narratology in this reading follows the limited practice now customary among readers of the ancient historians.[8] Perhaps more important to explain, in reference to the present study, is the habit of reading references to material objects and elements of nature for their connections to the themes and plot of the narrative. In the following study, Thucydides' references to materials will be considered to have four main functions. First, and easiest, they characterize actors, as a material epithet might characterize the statue of a god. We might think of the linen robes and golden cicadas of the Athenian elders in 1.6.3. Second, and a bit more difficult, materials give clues to the nature of actions. In 2.2.1, Thucydides says that about three hundred Thebans entered Plataea at night "with weapons." The information provided in Thucydides' references to the weapons and the time of day allows us to conclude that this is an invasion, that is, to make inferences about the nature of the action in progress.

Third, references to materials respond to the reader. A very brief comparison to Herodotus is perhaps useful for understanding this point. The breadth of Herodotus' references to materials corresponds to the breadth of his account, and the objects he names and describes frequently respond to the reader's interest in religion and mythology, for instance, as well as in events. By contrast, Thucydides meets the reader's knowledge and interests by supplying illustrations that are drawn from a familiar and limited set of material references he repeatedly employs, and which corresponds in its limitations and thematic intensity to his focus on a single war. Despite the demands of this focus, Thucydides appeals to a humble and attentive reader.[9] An assumption that he shares a Periclean disdain

[8] On the promise and problems of applying narratological methods to reading ancient history, and Thucydides in particular, see Hornblower (1994) 131–166, Rood (1998) 294–297, and Scardino (2007) 126–154.

[9] Thucydides' conscious strategies for creating a relationship with the reader have received important attention in recent scholarship. Cf. Tsakmakis (1995) 63 (on the Archaeology): "…particularly worthy of mention is the creation of a relationship between the author and his readers that arises when the reader, as the author intends,

for the ordinary, the agricultural, the improvised, the traditional, or other such categories blinds us to the values of a narrative that repeatedly illustrates how the "modern" weapons characteristic of the Greeks' post-Persian War acme of wealth destroy both themselves and the stable values of Greek life.[10] Fourth, and as is implied in the main topic of this book, both the narrator's and the speakers' references to materials reveal their priorities, and these will be compared throughout the analysis.

One last point on reading references to materials: a crucial discipline for reading these references adequately is respect for the limitations imposed by the narrative context. As an example of the difficulty that ignoring the narrative context can cause, I provide the following description of the war materials referenced in the Archaeology: "En effet, la *flotte* permet le commerce. Le commerce apporte des *revenus*. Les revenues donnent naissance à un *trésor*. Le trésor, d'autre part, est lie à la *stabilité*, laquelle entraine l'éxistence des *remparts*. Et ces trois termes, flotte – trésor – remparts, permettent alors à un état d'en *grouper* d'autres, plus nombreux, sous sa domination, et d'acquérir la *force*" (1956A 261–262; her italics). (Thus the *fleet* enables commerce, and commerce brings in *revenue*. Revenue gives birth to a *standing reserve*. The standing reserve, for its own part, is related to *stability* such as implies the existence of *walls*. And these three terms, "fleet – standing reserve – walls," make it possible for a state to *gather* other more numerous states under its domination, and to acquire *force*.)

In this analysis, part of an important and much larger argument, de Romilly abstracts references to materials from their narrative context and builds a description of Thucydides' argument based on these abstracted references. Her description is vivid, but constructs a reliability of material resources that is ultimately unthucydidean (and therefore seems to agree with Pericles). For instance, a look at the Archaeology shows the stagnation in a continuous competitive struggle for survival of all naval powers except for Athens, whose failure, despite initial success, is the

makes the results and methods of the author's investigation his own" ("...besonders ist die Herstellung einer Beziehung zwischen dem Autor und seiner Lesergemeinschaft zu erwähnen, die durch die erstrebte Aneignung der Forschungsergebnisse und der Methodologie des Autors durch den Leser entsteht"). Cf. Dewald (2005) 15–16.

[10] I have supplied no definition of war materials in Thucydides, nor is one possible. In Thucydides, any material can become a war material e.g. mud (e.g. 4.4.2), or sacred objects (e.g. 2.13.4–5). Cf. Tsakmakis (1995) 42: "Under the concept παρασκευή Thucydides subsumes all material resources that can be useful in the framework of a war" ("Thukydides subsumiert unter den Begriff παρασκευή all materiellen Mittel, die im Rahmen eines Krieges von Nutzen sein können"). Cf. Allison (1989) 28–44.

subject of the *History*, and the survival of Sparta, which has no walls or navy and little money: the materials de Romilly mixed into a recipe for power are interrogated in Thucydides' historical analysis and found to be consistently destructive of long-term stability.[11] Close observation of the narrative context is therefore essential for reading and assessing Thucydides' references to materials. This is perhaps particularly true of references to war materials, which carried great emotional resonance for Thucydides' original readers, so that Thucydides was able to deploy his references to maximum rhetorical effect. The eternal reader (cf. 1.24.2) can recover this effect through close attention to the plot and consequences of Thucydides' narratives.

A final remark: this book is not an argument about Greek history per se, but about Thucydides' thought and writing. An important consequence of this is that the argument deals with Thucydides' Pericles, not the historical Pericles. Therefore it does not refer to sources such as later historians or epigraphical remains. On the other hand, since Herodotus was influential for the formation of Thucydides' view of the meaning of war materials and style of employing them in his narrative, references to Herodotus will be frequent; references to Homer constitute more tentative suggestions.

[11] Continuous references throughout the book will provide evidence of how much I have otherwise relied on de Romilly's insights, so that this example should not be taken to represent an entire argument, the importance of which could scarcely be overestimated.

1

War Materials and Their Glory in the Archaeology

The argument of Thucydides' Archaeology has often been cited as evidence that Thucydides and his Pericles shared a positive evaluation of imperialistic warfare.[1] It is certainly true that the Archaeology and Pericles' speeches treat many similar topics, warfare and imperialism among them. But is it equally true that Thucydides and Pericles agreed about these topics? Does the Archaeology, like Pericles in his speeches, display approval for imperial warfare and confidence in the value of imperialistic acquisition? In our approach to this question, we will pay

[1] Readings of the Archaeology often come dangerously close to enforcing an association between Pericles and Thucydides. Edmunds (1975a) 41 emphasizes the view that Thucydides and Pericles display a common materialism: "…here again in the case of *chremata* we see that Pericles' thought fits into an historical pattern already adumbrated by Thucydides himself. In the Archaeology, Thucydides traced the development of wealth and power from the earliest times in Hellas … sailing was the source of wealth and power … and the Athenian empire was based on *chremata* and the fleet … Thus Thucydides presents Pericles as the statesman whose policy and military strategy follow from historical insight." (For a brief discussion of this quotation, see Chapter 6.) Other authors find much broader agreement between the historian and the statesman. *TAI* 119: "…does not the whole theory attributed to Pericles form the basis of Thucydides' own analysis? Is it not the same which inspires the Archaeology?" For further expressions of the view that the Archaeology and Pericles substantiate each other, cf. Connor (1984) esp. 47–49 and 160, Flashar (1989) 437, or CT 229 or 232. The implications of this view for our understanding of the *History* had long since been drawn. Bizer (1968) 41 (with 46–47) and Pouncey (1980) 49–50 both argued that the *purpose* of the Archaeology was to justify Periclean power politics. Enmeshed in this conclusion, Crane (1998) 7 argued that Thucydides' effort to write history ultimately failed when the insights won from the synthesis of the archaeology and Pericles' speeches could not explain events: "…I think it as at least as possible [i.e. as dying] that Thucydides simply stopped [writing] because events diverged from both the vision of history that he articulates in the Archaeology – according to which, Athens, with its sea power, financial reserves, and clear-eyed ruthlessness, should logically destroy its atavistic foes – and the synthesis between public and private interest that Perikles develops in all three of his speeches."

close attention to the role of Thucydides' references to the tools of imperialism and warfare in the Archaeology.

At the same time, we will remain mindful that war materials are not the Archaeology's exclusive focus. Swords, money, ships, walls, and other materials necessary for warfare are prominent in the Archaeology, which is a history of continuous conflict. However, they are by no means the only material illustrations of Thucydides' analysis. This chapter will also attend to the evidence Thucydides brought forward to characterize the successive peoples of Greek history. This evidence is various, copious, and striking, ranging from loin clothes and golden hair brooches to the graves of Carian pirates and the (imagined) future ruins of Athens and Sparta.[2]

The Archaeology is therefore a text rich in narrated materials. Furthermore, it offers guidance for assessing their role. The first and most important standard for judging the role of narrated materials in the Archaeology is offered by the lessons learned from Thucydides' account of ancient events. Thucydides' stories of Greek warfare, for instance, display the usefulness or uselessness of war materials in each successive case. Second, in chapter 10, Thucydides offers overt guidance for the interpretation of material remains and their humble or glamorous appearances, and this advice can help to guide our analysis. Finally, Thucydides' arguments about glory are very revealing of his evaluation of war materials.

This last standard may at first seem surprising. As we shall discuss, however, in the Archaeology, Thucydides shows that the materials of warfare and imperialism are a frequent focus of admiration and glory. He shows that earlier men glorified the iron swords of pirates, that later men (and their poets) admired Agamemnon's fleet, and that men of his own time, and of all times, overestimate Athens' power because of her imperial buildings. In the first two cases, Thucydides demonstrates that the weapons men admired were destructive of societal stability both for

[2] While I do not pretend to have an adequate interpretation of every physical element and/or artifact in the Archaeology, no materials will be spurned and no passages will be considered digressions. The history of treating puzzling passages in the Archaeology as "digressions" begins (for us) with Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who famously considered the characterization of the Spartans and Athenians in 1.6, with its information on hair brooches and loin clothes, to be a useless digression (Dion. Hal. *De Thuc.* 16). Against this view, see Erbse (1970) 52–54 and Luraghi (2000) 232–233: "…these sparse details that disturbed Dionysius can only be understood as a part of the communication between Thucydides and his audience…" Cf. Hornblower (2004) 308, who argues against accepting the disqualification implied in the term "excursus."

those attacked and also for those wielding the weapons. By showing the disparity between the glorification of iron swords or Agamemnon's fleet and their actual destructive effect on society, Thucydides confutes the delusion that these weapons are glorious. As for Athens' imperial buildings, as the cause of an eternal error about the power of Athens, they are symbolic of the persistence of the human addiction to glory. I shall argue that Thucydides' analysis of our admiration for these buildings is a sign that he himself took a cautiously distant attitude to Periclean beauty and its effects.

Thus there is a generous amount of direct and implied discussion of war materials in the Archaeology. In fact, Thucydides' discussion and assessment of the materials of Greek warfare begins in the first sentence of the *History*. After announcing that he has composed a report about the war between the Spartans and Athenians, Thucydides observes that at the beginning of the war both Sparta and Athens "had reached an acme in respect to their entire preparation for this war,"[3] and that the rest of Greece was gathering to support one side or the other (1.1.1). These two factors, the acme of materials and the movement (κίνησις) of all Greece, even of mankind, are defining features of the greatness of the war.[4] It will be one of the aims of this book to follow Thucydides' presentation of this acme in the initial narratives of the *History*, and to show that this presentation is more important for the structure of book one than we have usually thought.

[3] This statement conflicts with oratorical descriptions of Sparta's poverty later in the *History* and has been questioned. Cf. Poppo, ad loc. 1.1.1: "The assertion seems controversial because of the things that Archidamus says at 1.80.3–4, but Krüger warns justly that the matter is rhetorically enlarged in Archidamus' speech" ("Res propter ea quae dicit Archidamus 1.80.3–4 controversa videtur, sed ibi oratorie rem in maius augeri recte monet Krüg"). Poppo seems to be saying that although Archidamus argues at 1.80 that Sparta has essentially no material acme, Archidamus is exaggerating, since his aim is to prevent Sparta from going to war with Athens. He might also have argued that Pericles' assertions about Spartan poverty in his first speech are equally rhetorical (cf. 1.141.3–5, 1.142.1, discussed in Chapter 4). Cf. 1.10.2, 1.18.1–2, and 1.19 for descriptions of Sparta's power from Thucydides' point of view.

[4] Cf. Tsakmakis (1995) 30–31 and 42: "…the Archaeology is a study of the two interconnected phenomena that make up the concept of κίνησις [disturbance]. Thucydides explores the possibilities of the ξύστασις [gathering together] into a large war party, and the origination of a large and various collection of military resources (παρασκευή) in the previous history of Greece" (…die Archäologie [ist] eine Studie über die beiden unter dem Begriff κίνησις zusammengefügten Phänomene … Thukydides erforscht die Möglichleiten der ξύστασις zu einer großen Kriegspartei und des Zustandekommens einer umfangreichen παρασκευή in der bisherigen Geschichte Griechenlands]. Cf. Monoson (1998) 291.