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Introduction

The Closing of the University Mind: The Military–University Gap and the Problem of Civic and Liberal Education

War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse. The person who has nothing for which he is willing to fight, nothing which is more important than his own personal safety, is a miserable creature and has no chance of being free unless made and kept so by the exertions of better men than himself.

– John Stuart Mill¹

The progress of our arms, upon which all else chiefly depends, is as well known to the public as to myself, and it is, I trust, reasonably satisfactory and encouraging to all. . . . Both parties deprecated war, but one of them would *make* war rather than let the nation survive, and the other would *accept* war rather than let it perish, and the war came.

– President Abraham Lincoln²

The inspiration for this book arose several years before either of us actually sat down to begin the research that led to its publication. It was born when we observed events that took place on American campuses in the immediate aftermath of al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Most of the campus ceremonies and “teach-ins” addressing the attacks that we read about in the press emphasized such things as counseling students to resist the impulse to fight back and to think hard about why America was responsible for bringing this action upon itself. Various versions of pacifism were espoused on many occasions. A ceremony on our own campus in Madison, Wisconsin, that drew an estimated twenty thousand witnesses on September 14 fit this pattern to a “T.”³

¹ John Stuart Mill, “The Contest in America,” *Fraser’s Magazine* (February 1862); later published in *Dissertations and Discussions* (1868), vol. 1, p. 26.

² Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address: <http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=38>.

³ “Gathering Remembers Victims of Terrorism,” *Badger Herald*, September 17, 2001: http://badgerherald.com/news/2001/09/17/gathering_remembers_.php. See also “Student Leaders, Professors Prepare Nationwide Peace Rally,” *Badger Herald*, September 20, 2001: http://badgerherald.com/news/2001/09/20/student_leaders_prof.php.

Along with many of our colleagues, we understood and appreciated these remarks, but we also felt that something was missing.

Our consternation should not be taken the wrong way. We duly respect those who question American policy, and we hold pacifists in high regard when their beliefs are genuine and when they accept the implications of their truths. Nor are we among those who deem America blameless for its actions in the world. Among other things, we are students of the political and moral realism espoused by such thinkers as theologian-philosopher Reinhold Niebuhr and international relations theorist Hans Morgenthau, who taught that no nation or individual is free of self-interest and dirty hands (sin, if you will). No nation or individual has a monopoly on virtue. We also realize that the moral calculus of foreign policy and military policy is complex, subtle, and unavoidably full of contradictions. We try to steer clear, to borrow words from Niebuhr, of the children of light as well as the children of darkness.⁴

But what troubled us at the ceremonies at Madison and elsewhere was the lack of recognition that a military response might be appropriate under the circumstances. Some type of military response is hardly presumptively irrational when a nation is attacked as the United States was, and when the enemy who perpetrated the attack continues to operate in a sanctuary or safe harbor that is identifiable. (To be fair, at the time of the ceremonies, it was not yet clearly established that al Qaeda was behind the attack. But many speakers' admonitions were not contingent upon who was responsible.) Most importantly to us, the lack of a military dimension was not simply a *policy* problem, but a *pedagogical* one as well. At a university, we are supposed to take seriously all ideas that are germane to the question at hand. So the failure or refusal to address the military question seemed to be an *intellectual* problem – and that is what should matter at a university.

With this observation, we embarked upon a long conversation regarding the relationship between the military and the university. As we conversed with students, we found that many of them harbored the same misgivings or second thoughts that we shared. They desired to hear the other side of the argument in order to be fully informed. To rephrase Allan Bloom, a kind of “closing of the university mind” seemed to exist regarding the military, at least in certain domains of consequence.⁵ Though universities pride themselves on being liberally minded and open to challenging ideas, this pride seemed less merited when it comes to the military, even though the military is one of the most important institutions in American society.

⁴ See, e.g., Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness: A Vindication of Democracy and a Critique of Its Traditional Defense* (Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1945); Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 3rd Edition (Alfred A. Knopf, 1965). On the ethical realism of both of these thinkers, see A. J. H. Murray, “The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau,” *Review of Politics* 58 (1996): 81–107.

⁵ Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students* (Simon and Schuster, 1987).

Accordingly, in this work we address an important yet vexing question in higher education, a question that has spawned intensifying national attention over the course of the last several years: *What is the appropriate role or presence for the military and military-related studies in American higher education?* Military presence on campus can take several forms, the most important of which are the operation of Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs and the provision of courses that deal with the military, such as military history and strategically oriented national security/defense studies. Though they differ in their respective objectives and approaches, ROTC and courses treating military and security issues are similar in one major respect: They provide knowledge about the military and war, to varying degrees. They are also similar for another reason: They are often embattled within American universities.

In the years since 9/11, however, activists have sought to return ROTC and related programs to schools that had turned their back on the military in the aftermath of the Vietnam War; most notably, this movement has challenged the retreat of ROTC from the Ivy League and such schools as Stanford University. A similar movement supported and publicized by documentary filmmaker Rob Roy and his allies has been brewing in Canada, which dropped the Canadian Officer Training Corps (COTC) nationwide in 1968 at the hands of a government initiative. Though these efforts have not met meaningful success in Canada as of this writing, they have elevated the issue to the level of national attention, occasioning a serious consideration of the issues raised by Roy and his allies.⁶ There has also been a concerted effort to enhance the status of military history as an academic discipline in the United States, a movement that has encountered some success after years of appearing to be a losing battle. More surprisingly, the pro-ROTC movement in the United States began to enjoy unexpected success as we were preparing to go to press in late summer 2011, as Columbia University, Harvard University, Yale University, and Stanford University had decided to bring ROTC back after having effectively barred the program for over forty years. Fortunately, we were able to capture this historically significant turn of events in Chapter 7 just before sending the book to the production process. These and other developments suggest that many domains of higher education are now striving to repair their relationship with the military. This advance has gathered force during the three and a half years that we have been researching and writing this book. We consider this book to be part of this ongoing process.

Whereas our consideration deals directly with the relationship between the military and the university, it also beckons a broader inquiry into the meaning of higher education itself. What are the ends of liberal and civic education, and how might – or might not – an appropriate military presence on campus contribute to these ends? We will argue that an appropriate military presence – including

⁶ On the revival of COTC, see Tim Johnson, “Will Universities Salute a New Campus Corps?” *University Affairs/Affaires Universitaires*, April 6, 2010: <http://www.universityaffairs.ca/will-universities-salute-a-new-campus-corps.aspx>. Also interview with Rob Roy, Head of “Seven Year Project,” Breakout Educational Network, October 2010.

appropriate physical presence of the military, course offerings, and faculty versed in military history – can indeed contribute to the civic and liberal education of non-military students, especially in the context of higher education today. The traditional justification for ROTC, for example, considers the positive impacts such programs have on the military and, by virtue of this, on society itself – that is, bringing the university to the military. Though we hold this rationale in high regard, our main question points in the opposite direction: *Can an appropriate military presence on campus contribute in itself to the education of non-military students?* In this introduction, we lay out the background from which this inquiry emerged and then discuss the format by which we will proceed.

Above and beyond these concerns are the crucial questions of civic equality and equal duty. One percent of the American population today bears the burden of fighting our wars, and, as we will see throughout this book, military representation and status at many prestigious institutions of higher education is marginal. Whether or not this status is harmful to the conducting of military policy and war, it certainly poses a problem for citizenship more broadly construed. As Columbia University sociologist Allan Silver – a leader in the pro-ROTC movement at that institution – has remarked on more than one occasion, this state of affairs amounts to “a corrosive civic scandal.”⁷ In addressing this problem, some students of civic life have seriously considered the propriety of reinstating the peacetime draft.⁸ We do not take this bait, accepting the fact that such a revival poses as many problems as it answers; absent genuine democratic consent or a national military emergency that would necessitate a draft, we are consigned to the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). But this position does not mean that a civic problem does not exist. An appropriate military presence on campus could provide one partial, yet meaningful, remedy to this predicament.

The civic scandal is a problem for universities, too, for their missions include commitments to fostering citizenship, equality, and diversity, all of which are deeply implicated in the questions we pose regarding the military. Most importantly, universities strive to expose their students to the problems and issues stirring in the world around them. As Jose Ortega y Gasset declares in his classic book *Mission of the University*:

Not only does it [the university] need perpetual contact with science, on pain of atrophy, it needs contact, likewise, with public life, with historical reality, with the present, which is essentially a whole to be dealt with only in its totality, not after amputations *ad usum*

⁷ Allan Silver, “The Military and Academe,” paper and talk presented at National Association of Scholars Conference, February 19, 2009: http://www.nas.org/polArticles.cfm?doctype_code=Article&cdoc_id=569&Keyword_Desc=NAS%20Conference%20Video.

⁸ See, e.g., James Fallows, *National Defense* (Vintage, Random House, 1982), ch. 5; William A. Galston, “A Sketch of Some Arguments for Conscription,” in *Community Matters: Challenges to Civic Engagement in the 21st Century* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 61–72. Congressman Charles Rangel has also spoken in favor of reinstating the draft. “Rangel Eyes Draft Return,” *New York Post*, July 8, 2010.

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Delphi. The university must be open to the whole reality of its time. It must be in the midst of life, and saturated with it.⁹

We will also deal with another matter that directly implicates civic equality: the effects of the congressionally mandated Don't Ask, Don't Tell (DADT) policy, which prohibited the open expression of homosexuality in the military. DADT has been the most prominent reason that many universities have resisted the military and/or ROTC. The policy violates principles of antidiscrimination and civil rights that Americans – especially those in higher education – hold dear, and we have consistently agreed with the opposition to it. In December 2010, Congress finally managed to repeal the policy, and President Obama's signature drove the final nail into its coffin.¹⁰ Pending the military's implementation of the repeal, the end of DADT has added one bookend to the civic equality shelf; finally opening the mind to the military completes the task. This said, disquiet regarding the military extends beyond the DADT issue in many quarters of higher education, meriting a broader inquiry.

We acknowledge that tension between the university and the military is only natural given the respective institutions' different natures. Universities are, at least as ideal types, the institutional heirs of the Enlightenment, in which the light of reason and progress holds sway over the endorsement or exercise of force, which appear retrograde. The realities of war and force are often either disavowed or relegated to the shadows of consciousness.¹¹ Universities have often stood in the forefront of antiwar and pacifist movements throughout history. (At the same time, however, they opened their doors to extensive military training, war preparation, and research during World Wars I and II and the Cold War.) As an ideal type, universities also pride themselves on free and creative thought, while the military – according to its ideal type – emphasizes hierarchy and command.¹² In discussing the politics of ROTC later in this book, we will witness many claims that “the military and the university are incompatible”

⁹ Jose Ortega y Gasset, *Mission of the University*, edited and translated by Howard Lee Nostrand (Norton Library, 1966), pp. 88–9. By “science,” Ortega means theoretical and academic knowledge, which includes the humanities, the social sciences, and the physical sciences.

¹⁰ For a good treatment of DADT, see, e.g., “‘Rum, Sodomy, and the Lash’: What the Military Thrives on and How It Affects Legal Recruitment and Law Schools,” panel remarks at 2006 Lavender Law Conference, September 8, 2006. In 14 *Duke Law Journal of Gender Law and Policy* 1143 (2007); “Colleges Rethink R.O.T.C. After ‘Don’t Ask’ Repeal,” *New York Times*, December 21, 2010.

¹¹ On how social theory has largely ignored questions of war and peace because of its inconsistency with academic sensibility, see, for example, Hans Joas, *War and Modernity* (Polity, 2003), ch. 7, “Between Power Politics and Pacifist Utopia: Peace and War in Social Theory.”

¹² For a thoughtful account of the fundamental differences between the military and the university that is duly respectful of each side, see Pat C. Hoy, “Soldiers and Scholars: Between Harvard and West Point, a Deep – and Dangerous – Cultural Chasm,” *Harvard Magazine* 98, 5 (1996). We will discuss Hoy's insights more fully in the next chapter. (Note that throughout this book, we do not always consistently provide page numbers for cited articles. Page numbers are provided if there is a quotation or if the idea or point discussed was from a distinct page or set of pages in the article.)

for these and related reasons. We certainly agree that universities should *not* be like the military, lest they risk losing their moral charter – their *raison d'être* – by becoming that which they are not. To guard against any militarizing impacts of ROTC on campus, universities must uphold their own standards of academic quality, academic integrity and freedom, and equal respect for all members of the campus community. Indeed, we will encounter many examples of such exertion of academic control in our chapters dealing with ROTC. But the key question for our purposes is whether a dialectically constructive relationship can exist that facilitates mutual advantage.

A PROBLEM FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER AND EDUCATION, AND THE CITIZEN-SOLDIER RATIONALE

In the normative framework we set forth, the state of affairs to which we have just alluded – quasi-benign neglect at best, outright hostility to the military and military affairs in the academy at the worst – is detrimental to the constitutional order, civic equality, and the civic and liberal education of non-military students. We join a large community of scholars, leaders, and citizens in maintaining that the constitutional order *requires* a civil–military relationship that protects military professionalism and appropriate military autonomy while also honoring the principle and practice of civilian control. Historically, the major worries about an inappropriate relationship between the military and civilian society (including disquiet about a military–society “gap”) have centered on three concerns: (1) the dangers of a military takeover – a worry that scholars rightly consider exaggerated (at the least) in the modern American context; (2) undue military interference with civilian strategic judgment that tilts the appropriate constitutional balance; (3) and uncooperative military–civilian interaction in the policy process, which can lead to bad policy decisions. These are obviously important considerations, and they are relevant to our inquiry; but they lie toward the periphery of our concern. Our emphasis is upon higher education, civic equality, and the learning process. In this vein, we believe that ignorance of the military and war can lead to four problems:

- Uncritical support of the military, often accompanied by what historian (and former Army lieutenant colonel) Andrew Bacevich calls the “new American militarism,” which entails an undue and unrealistic enthusiasm for military power and adventure.¹³ Such support is misbegotten because the military – like any institution or group, however noble and worthy of respect – is rife

Often the point made in the main text applies generally to the basic theme or themes in the entire article, so there is no need in our view to cite specific pages.)

¹³ Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War* (Oxford University Press, 2005). While militarism is a threat that arises when civil–military balance breaks down, it is a strong claim to describe American society as militaristic, the latter describing societies that value war in itself. While many may disagree with the ends of American policy, there are few reasons to believe that the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan reflect the United States fighting war for its own sake. Misadventure is not the same thing as militarism.

with conflicts and imperfections. Military leaders and soldiers make mistakes, sometimes egregiously so, and the politics of defense and defense spending is notoriously messy and laced with institutional and bureaucratic self-interest, as President Dwight D. Eisenhower accentuated when he warned against the shenanigans of the military–congressional–industrial complex in his famous presidential Farewell Address. As an Army lieutenant colonel with twenty-five years of service told us in an interview, “The military can have a significant bullshit problem.”¹⁴ A recent example is the military’s initial distortion (some claimed it was a cover-up) of the truth behind the killing of Army Ranger Pat Tillman in Afghanistan on April 22, 2004. The Army claimed that the former football star’s death was caused by enemy fire, and it was only after Tillman’s family publicly pursued the matter that the Army acknowledged the embarrassing fact that Tillman was killed by friendly fire.¹⁵ The university’s relationship with the military must be duly respectful, but also critical. As the great military sociologist Morris Janowitz wrote in a letter to a colleague in 1971, warning against what he called “unanticipated militarism,” “A new intellectual, critical, and truly academic relation between the universities and the military will have to be created – since such contacts will be essential for effective civilian control and a meaningful military policy.”¹⁶

- Endorsement of an opposite, antimilitary ideology that perceives the military as evil or as the “other.” As we will see in our section on the politics of ROTC, some students berate ROTC cadets as “baby killers” and similar embodiments of evil, or uncritically assume that universal peace would prevail if nations only laid down their arms. A healthy relationship between the military and civilians on campus should help to dispel negative stereotypes and myths about the military and the legitimate uses and abuses of the deployment of military force.
- A simple lack of knowledge regarding the military and strategic security matters, a lack that amounts to a failure of civic education and responsibility. National security and the appropriate use of force are vital matters of national interest, so understanding these phenomena constitutes an important aspect of citizenship. As former Democratic senator Russ Feingold and former Democratic congressman (and former vice chair of the 9/11 Commission) Lee Hamilton remarked in a 2009 editorial, “Protecting our national security

¹⁴ Interview with Rob Sayre, Army Lt. Col., October 2010. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Presidential Farewell Address, January 17, 1961: <http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/dwightdeisenhowerfarewell.html>. For an interesting portrayal of the historical institutional persistence of the military services’ conceptions of their self-interest, and how such interest is the primary source of national military policy, see Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

¹⁵ See Josh White. “Army Withheld Details About Tillman’s Death: Investigator Quickly Learned ‘Friendly Fire’ Killed Athlete,” *Washington Post*, May 3, 2005: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/03/AR2005050301502.html>.

¹⁶ Morris Janowitz letter, quoted in James Burk, “Morris Janowitz and the Origins of Sociological Research on Armed Forces and Society,” *Armed Forces & Society* 19, 2 (1993): 178.

is the most solemn responsibility of members of Congress, one that should transcend both partisan politics and the parochialism of the current appropriations process.”¹⁷

Bacevich detects a common denominator winding through all three of these postures. “Here we confront a central paradox of present-day American militarism. Even as U.S. policy in recent decades has become progressively militarized, so too has the Vietnam-induced gap separating the U.S. military from American society persisted and perhaps even widened. Even as American elites become ever more fascinated with military power and the use of force – Vice President Cheney, for example, is a self-professed war buff with a passion for military history – soldiering itself is something left to the plebs.”¹⁸ Bacevich’s concern points to the civic duty and equality aspects of the gap problem.

- The fourth problem concerns the military itself: the rise of an undue sense of moral superiority to civilian society. To some extent, this problem is inherent to the military. Competent soldiers engage in rigorous training that turns them into soldier-warriors who possess special skills and forms of courage that lie beyond the ken of the average citizen. (The need for courage, of course, depends upon the role a soldier performs, for not all military roles involve combat.) This disparity can engender a feeling of moral superiority that is detrimental to an appropriate relationship between the military and civil society. As Machiavelli relates at the beginning of *The Art of War*, a trained soldier wearing a uniform often finds it difficult to respect his fellow citizens who lack such accoutrements.¹⁹ A widening gap between the military and civilian society exacerbates this problem.

A productive relationship between the civil order and the military can be fostered in a number of ways, but one important vehicle involves the university. In many respects, the university is a microcosm of the relationship among the military, civil society, and the government. Student soldiers and non-military students can interact in ways that foreshadow their interactions in the political realm in their role as citizens, politicians, and members of the military. The model of the citizen-soldier, which is the primary rationale for ROTC, is predicated on this aspiration.²⁰ This rationale holds that exposing a host of future officers to the intellectual virtues of civilian universities improves and broadens the military mind, contributing to maintaining appropriate civilian influence and control. Our task is to understand how well the university contributes to broadening the

¹⁷ Russ Feingold and Lee Hamilton, “The Intel Committees Need the Power of the Purse,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 8, 2009, p. A19.

¹⁸ Bacevich, *The New American Militarism*, p. 28.

¹⁹ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, translated by Neal Wood (Bobbs-Merrill, Library of Liberal Arts, 1965), p. 4.

²⁰ The definitive work on the citizen-soldier republican rationale of ROTC is Michael S. Neiberg’s *Making Citizen-Soldiers: ROTC and the Ideology of American Military Service* (Harvard University Press, 2001).

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horizons of military and non-military students, and to discuss possible avenues for improvement.

THE “GAP”: A BROADER PROBLEM IN ACADEMIA?

As our inquiry commenced and widened, we noticed that we were not alone, as other observers had similar misgivings about the status of military-related ideas on campus. The reasons for the broader problem are many, and the posture toward the military portrayed in the preceding transcends the issue of DADT, raising broader questions about the military–university relationship.

To be sure, the picture that emerged as we progressed in our investigation was complex. On the one hand, military-related inquiry is present in many sectors of research and pedagogy, especially those dealing with national security. For example, international relations departments and programs offer courses treating the uses of force, and the field of civil–military studies (comprising primarily political science, history, and sociology) has enjoyed a “renaissance” in the post–Cold War era.²¹ Such research is a response to the fraying of the more typical cooperation that had prevailed between civilian and military leaders during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union reigned as a common enemy that compelled relative consensus in the strategic realm.²² Furthermore, a revival of interest in the attendance of veteran students and in ROTC has arisen on many campuses in just the four-year period during which we have been researching and writing this book – a phenomenon we designate the “return of the soldier” on campus. On the other hand, we came across consternation regarding such matters as the status of military history in leading history departments, a decline in attention given to military matters in the broader social sciences, and the continued exclusion of ROTC from many of the most distinguished institutions in American higher education. A few of these concerns merit attention in this introductory chapter.

ROTC Issues

First, we encountered a growing concern about the geographic distribution of military recruits and ROTC and regarding ROTC’s lowly status on elite campuses. As the military has become more separate from American society after the advent of the All-Volunteer Force, fewer young men and women from the middle and upper educational, social, and economic echelons of American society

²¹ See Peter D. Feaver and Erika Seeler, “Before and After Huntington: The Methodological Maturing of Civil-Military Studies,” in Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., *American Civil-Military Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), p. 87.

²² One theory of civilian–military leadership harmony is that cooperation is encouraged by agreement on external threats, breaking down when such threats go away. See Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment* (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

participate. As Gary Schmidt and Cheryl Miller pointed out in a recent essay in the *Wall Street Journal*, soldiers now hail from an increasingly narrow segment of American society geographically and culturally. Almost half of all Army recruits come from military families and close to half of the soldiers in all the services are Southerners. Meanwhile,

... the middle-class suburbs surrounding the nation's largest cities – New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Boston and Philadelphia – produce relatively few service members despite having a large percentage of the nation's youth population. . . . The homogeneity of today's military is partly a product of self-selection, as the services seek out the most eager volunteers. But it is also a product of green-eyeshade budgeting and policy decisions by the armed services and government.

ROTC is complicit in this problem, as its leaders have concentrated the program in less urban areas of the South and the Midwest, marginalizing highly populated urban areas. "In Virginia, for example, there are 7.8 million residents and 11 Army ROTC programs. New York City, home to over eight million people and America's largest university student population, has two Army ROTC programs. The entire Chicago metro area, with its 10 million residents, is covered by a single Army ROTC program, as is Detroit. Alabama, population 4.7 million, has 10."²³

Though the situation is more complex than many critics and apologists aver, evidence also supports the claim that a substantial gap has yawned between the military and many major institutions of higher education. Such schools as Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Stanford, Brown, and Cal Tech forsook ROTC, and the programs at such schools as Cornell and Princeton have garnered less-than-enthusiastic participation. As Yale professor David Gelernter remarked in Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer's book, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military – and How It Hurts Our Country*, "Here in academia, my colleagues seem determined to turn American soldiers into an out-of-sight, out of mind servant class who are expected to do their duty and keep their mouths shut."²⁴ Accordingly, we can discern at least three "gaps" that exist regarding ROTC: a gap between academics and student-soldiers, between elite and non-elite institutions, and a regional gap

²³ Gary Schmidt and Cheryl Miller, "The Military Should Mirror the Nation: America's Armed Forces Are Drawn from an Increasingly Narrow Segment of American Society," *Wall Street Journal*, August 26, 2010: <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703632304575451531529098478.html>. Schmidt and Miller are director and program manager of the American Enterprise Institute's Program on Citizenship. See also Cheryl Miller's widely cited new monograph, "Underserved: A Case Study of ROTC in New York City," American Enterprise Institute Report, May 5, 2011: <http://www.citizenship-aei.org/2011/05/new-aei-report-why-nyc-needs-rotc/>; Steven Trynosky, "ROTC and New York City," presentation at Columbia University conference "Service and Society," October 2, 2010. See also Lt. Col. Anthony G. Dotson, "Fixing the Reserve Officer Training Corps' Recruiting Problem," M.A. Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2003; and Greg Jaffe, "Urban Withdrawal: A Retreat from Big Cities Hurts ROTC Recruitment," *Wall Street Journal*, February 22, 2007, p. A1.

²⁴ Gelernter, quoted in Kathy Roth-Douquet and Frank Schaeffer, *AWOL: The Unexcused Absence of America's Upper Classes from the Military – and How It Hurts Our Country* (Harper Collins, 2006), pp. 48–9.