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Introduction

Pragmatic objects and pragmatic methods

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The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics defines pragmatics from different points of view, presenting the main orientations in pragmatic research of both wide and narrow scope, incorporating seminal research as well as cutting-edge state-of-the-art solutions. It addresses the question of rational and empirical research methods, the question of what counts as an adequate and successful pragmatic theory, and how to go about answering the questions that pragmatic theory identifies. *The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics* aims to offer accessible introductions that present the many different problems and approaches to be found in the current literature on pragmatics.

There is no doubt that acts of communication deserve methodologically sound pragmatic theories. The state-of-the-art studies of discourse practices, utterance interpretation and processing, and acts of speech demonstrate that a lot of progress has been achieved since the times of programmatic slogans of ordinary language philosophers, urging philosophers and linguists to focus on language use rather than on fitting natural languages into the mould of formal languages of logic. First, we have progressed as far as the unit of analysis is concerned; while Grice (e.g. 1975) talked about pragmatic inferences from an utterance, a pragmatic equivalent of the syntactic unit of a sentence (albeit not necessarily a linguistic equivalent: showing to one's interlocutor a picture or a clear gesture would do just as well), now we are equipped with sophisticated theories that take discourses as units of study. Second, we have progressed beyond observations that assertives are not the centre of pragmatics, which we owe to Austin (1962), Searle (1969) and other speech act theorists, to sophisticated analyses of non-assertive acts of communication. Next, and arguably most importantly, we have leaped forward to incorporate pragmatic theory into linguistics as a legitimate and even potentially formalisable level of analysis of language. At the same time, pragmatics remains the level that makes most use of rich and bidirectionally equally invaluable interfaces. The 'pragmatic turn' (Mey 2001: 4) is now definable not only as a manifesto that proclaims a shift from the focus on

sentence structure to the uses we make of sentences in communication as initiated by Peirce, Morris or Carnap, and nowadays generally associated with Wittgenstein's *Investigations* (1953). Instead, it is implemented as powerful pragmatic theories.

The message this collection sends out is that pragmatics is a well-established subdiscipline of linguistics and at the same time a progressive branch of philosophy of language. When Jacob Mey published his first edition of the *Concise Encyclopedia of Pragmatics* in 1998, he talked of pragmatics as a 'relatively young science', 'a truly catholic discipline' in view of being a descendant of philosophy and linguistics (Mey 1998a: xxvii). Judging from textbooks such as Levinson's seminal *Pragmatics* (1983), it was indeed so; notwithstanding its depth of argumentation, that textbook is still sometimes described by professionals as a collection of articles that define the scope of a new discipline. We hope the current *Handbook* will testify to the enormous progress on this front. We also hope to have demonstrated progress in pragmatic methods as well as a slight shift of emphasis since that presented in the excellent handbook by Horn and Ward (2004) several years ago. Cutting-edge research on the semantics/pragmatics interface led to the pragmatic turn orientation in the domains of the conceptualisation of syntax (Kempson), dynamic semantics and pragmatics (Zeevat), two-dimensional semantics and pragmatics (Brogaard), the study of presupposition (van der Sandt), meaning and truth conditions (Recanati), compositionality and intentional contexts (Jaszczolt), literal/nonliteral distinction (Carston), to name only a few conspicuous examples. In another dimension, the volume also engages with the progress in experimental methods for testing theories of discourse interpretation, and notably inference and automatic construal of intended meaning (Katsos, Giora, Allan, Haugh and Jaszczolt).

Yet another welcome area of change in the general orientation of pragmatics is the increasing integration of the Anglo-American and continental European pragmatics. While the first has always been firmly based on the philosophical foundations of ordinary language philosophy on the one hand, and the interface with grammar on the other, and has remained close to the philosophical outlook on conversation,[1] European researchers put more emphasis on the domains collectively called macropragmatics (see e.g. Verschueren 1999), including notably the domain of sociopragmatics and topics such as cross-cultural and intercultural communication and ideology. This integration is evident in several chapters in the volume (Kecskes, Haugh, and Terkourafi). Yet another dimension of integration is that of post-Gricean semantics/pragmatics disputes that adhere to the tool of truth conditions as for example in truth-conditional pragmatics (see Recanati 2004a, 2010 and this volume) and cognitive linguistics. Non-literal meanings can be understood as part of truth-conditional content (see also Carston, this volume, and Jaszczolt 2005, 2010c and this volume), at the same time exemplifying human tendencies toward certain kinds of conceptualisations.[2]

The *Handbook* is divided thematically into three parts. The first introduces problems and objects of study for pragmatics as well as the main current pragmatic theories. In accordance with the editors' assessment of the current progress in pragmatics, more attention has been given to the problems and methods identified and followed by post-Griceans, such as the role of inference and intentions. Part II focuses on applications of pragmatic approaches to selected phenomena that present a particular challenge for this subdiscipline and that produced cutting-edge analyses in the literature. Part III follows with the most seminal interfaces into which pragmatic theory enters, reviewing, among others, the semantics/pragmatics and syntax/pragmatics boundary disputes.

The content of the chapters is as follows. The current chapter introduces readers to the aims, objectives, and objects of study of pragmatics, pointing out seminal discussions in the literature concerning the focus, scope and methods of pragmatic analysis largely through a discussion of the contributing chapters. Next, Mira Ariel's 'Research paradigms in pragmatics' introduces the main orientations of Gricean inferential pragmatics, form/function pragmatics, and historical and typological pragmatics, also discussing the division of labour among them. For the most part, theories from different research paradigms complement each other, despite being in competition when they address the same linguistic phenomenon (e.g. the neo-Gricean versus Relevance-theoretic analyses of scalars and *and*). Ariel outlines three prominent research paradigms under the assumption that grammar is encoded and pragmatics is inferred. Grice's insight about the crucial role of inferencing for conveying the speaker's intended message has been adopted by all *inferential pragmatics* theories as a major ingredient in utterance interpretation. *Form/function pragmatics* uses naturally occurring examples to investigate a small subset of pragmatic meanings associated with constructions and discourse markers. Much *historical and typological pragmatics* research analyses the current grammar as pragmatically motivated. All newly formed form/function correlations are crucially context-bound as interlocutors exploit grammar to fulfil interactional goals. Once grammaticalised (conventionalised) cancellability no longer applies, nor is contextual support needed. Each of these approaches amends the classical code model of language. For inferential pragmatists truth-conditional codes cannot exhaust speakers' intended on-line meanings, because ad hoc contextual inferences are generated in addition. For form/function pragmatists, also, not all codes are truth-conditional. Finally, *contra* generative grammarians, historical/typological pragmatists argue that classical codes cannot account for possible versus impossible natural language grammars. Since each approach finds different flaws in the classical code model, they each enrich it, but differently. This is demonstrated in their different approaches to referring expressions. The conclusion is that all three paradigms are necessary for a complete picture of grammatical forms, and for what should be assigned pragmatic status.

In Chapter 3, 'Saying, meaning, and implicating', Kent Bach addresses Grice's notion of saying and the post-Gricean concepts of *what is said*, *explicature*, and *implicature*, remarking on some deplorable confusions in the literature such as conflating implicated and inferred meaning or endowing linguistic expressions, rather than speakers, with implicatures. It serves as an introduction to Grice's intention-based view of communication, his intention-based theory of meaning and his notion of implicature. A speaker can say something without meaning it or she can mean something without saying it, by merely implicating or impliciting it. This is possible because we rely on recourse to common ground (including the conversational maxims) when communicating and on the very fact that the utterance is made under that condition. Bach therefore distinguishes linguistic and speaker's meaning. He points out that Grice could usefully have invoked the Austinian differentiation of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts rather than requiring that to say something entails meaning it. This would have clarified his account of the speaker saying, meaning, and the resulting communicative effect. Implicature is explained with the help of the concepts of intention, inference in communication and a comparison with logical implication and is presented in the critical perspective of post-Gricean developments, including the disputes concerning the speaker's vs the addressee's perspective and the classification of implicit meanings. Like relevance theorists, Bach finds that the distinction between saying and implicating needs supplementing with *impliciture* (which overlaps RT *explicature*) for that part of meaning that is located between what is said and what is implicated. In brief, implicitures are cancellable expansions of what is said (such as *and* expanded to 'and then', *It's raining* to 'it is raining here and now'). Conversational maxims or what Bach prefers to call *presumptions* do not directly generate implicatures and implicitures but raise possibilities that the hearer should take into account when figuring out the speaker's message. A hearer does not necessarily have to infer the thing the speaker implicates but merely that the speaker implicates (means) it.

The confusions surrounding implicature are further discussed and relevant issues are clarified in the next chapter, in which Larry Horn, like Kent Bach, emphasises that *speakers implicate*, while *hearers infer*. The chapter 'Implying and inferring' offers a thoughtful analysis of the foundations of the Gricean programme and of the term *implicature*, with references to the history of relevant concepts such as Frege's defence of conventional implicatures ('andeuten'). Horn discusses the various meanings and uses of *infer*, *imply* and *implicate*, as well as the nouns *explicature* and *implicature*. He points out that so-called Gricean scalar implicature from *some* to *not all* was recognised by Mill as early as 1867, who pointed out that the use of the word 'some' is normally associated with the denial of the possibility of the use of a stronger word 'all'. This is an early refutation of those who contend that *some* simply means 'not all'. Horn discusses and compares the original Gricean maxims, his own Q and R principles, Levinson's three-way Q, I and M principles, and

the single Relevance theory principle of relevance. He holds to the Gricean view that conversational implicature arises from the shared presumption that speaker and hearer interact to reach a shared goal. He criticises Levinson for defining generalised conversational implicatures as default inferences, arguing that an implicature is an aspect of speaker's meaning, not hearer's interpretation – although many others too fail to make such a distinction. There are, of course, many who dispute that GCIs are defaults. Pragmatic enrichments that supply the conditions necessary to build truth-evaluable propositions involve what Recanati has called *saturation* and Bach *completion*. Horn argues that Bach's impliciture – constructed from what is said – such that *some N* (= what is said) implicitly communicates 'not all N' (= what is meant), but on a Gricean account this combines with what is said to yield 'Some but not all' such that impliciture includes scalar implicature and does not supplant it. Such scalar implicatures are challenged by Relevance theorists and relegated to pragmatically derived components of propositional content known as explicatures. As a confirmed Gricean, Horn finds explicature an unnecessary category of analysis.

In 'Speaker intentions and intentionality', Michael Haugh and Kasia Jaszczolt focus on the role of intentions in communication. They assess the link between intentions and the property of intentionality exhibited by relevant mental states and continue by discussing the explanatory function of various types of intentions identified in the literature, pointing out strengths and weaknesses of utilising intentions as well as the question of where intentions are located, contrasting cognitive, interactional and discursive perspectives. They put the intention-based theory of utterance meaning into a philosophical perspective of the intentionality of mental states which underlie communication (although allowing that cognitive pragmatics assumes that the recognition and attribution of communicative intentions underlies communication). They raise the question of how pragmatic theory can be soundly founded on the imprecise and empirically untestable notions of intentions and intentionality defined as the act of consciousness directed at an object. Haugh and Jaszczolt counter that the advantages outweigh this shortcoming, claiming for instance that intentionality better predicts speaker meaning as the means used to convey the speaker's intention than alternatives such as default rules of inference and the semanticised pragmatic relations between sentences postulated in dynamic approaches to meaning. Intentions in communication derive their theoretical status from the intentionality of consciousness, which is hopefully to be revealed by experiments in neuroscience. Speech acts have basic intentionality as externalisations of mental states, and also derived intentionality as linguistic objects, thus the same conditions of satisfaction pertain to the mental intention and to the linguistic intention. There is speaker intention as envisaged by Grice, but is this a private goal of the speaker or is it also the intention to achieve a social goal? Furthermore the intention in some cooperative endeavours is a *we*-intention and even an emergent co-constructed intention. Thus the notions of

intention and intentionality are productively deployed in many different ways in pragmatics.

Chapter 6, 'Context and content: Pragmatics in two-dimensional semantics', moves into the domain of context as understood and approached in two-dimensional semantics. Berit Brogaard explains the utility of David Kaplan's *content-character* distinction in accounting for indexical expressions, as well as the advantages of a formal notion of context, where context cannot be simply identified with a speech situation. She also discusses links between context-sensitivity and cognitive informativeness. Context figures in the interpretation of utterances in many different ways. In the tradition of possible-worlds semantics, the seminal account of context-sensitive expressions such as indexicals and demonstratives is that of Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics (the content-character distinction), further pursued in various directions by Stalnaker, Chalmers, and others. The two dimensions are (1) narrow content, which can take the form of linguistic meanings (e.g. functions from context to content) or descriptive Fregean contents, and (2) wide content, which is a set of possible worlds or a structured Russellian proposition consisting of properties and/or physical objects. This chapter introduces and assesses the notion of context-sensitivity presented by the various two-dimensional frameworks, with a special focus on how it relates to the notion of cognitive significance and whether it includes an intuitively plausible range of expressions within its scope. Three types of two-dimensional semantic frameworks are assessed in terms of how well they account for the connection between cognitive significance and the broader notion of context-sensitivity. It is argued that context-sensitivity and cognitive significance are, to some extent, inseparable. For example, linguistic strings have twin tokens with a different content that David Chalmers calls 'twin-earthable expressions'. When an earthling uses *water*, the term picks out H_2O; when this earthling's counterpart on Twin-Earth uses *water*, it picks out XYZ (to exploit a notion of Putnam's). Thus *water* has a variable character and is broadly context-sensitive, which helps explain the cognitive significance of sentences such as *water is H_2O*: the earthling may not know what determines the character of *water*, so being told that the character of *water* determines H_2O is informative. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects of using epistemic two-dimensional semantics to account for context-sensitive expressions in dynamic discourse.

In Chapter 7 François Recanati introduces the orientation of contextualism in the theory of meaning and defends it against some competing views. Among others, he addresses the issue of compositionality, context-dependent meanings in lexical pragmatics, and the contextualist concept of content modulation. His 'Contextualism: some varieties' reviews several different positions with respect to contextualism. In the modular position, to determine *what the speaker means*, pragmatics takes as input the output of semantics, but they do not mix, and in particular, pragmatic processes do not interfere with the process of semantic composition, which, based on

what is said, outputs the truth-conditions and ignores the speaker's beliefs and intentions. But some contextualists hold that pragmatic competence is involved in the determination of truth-conditional content because the semantic value of a context-sensitive expression varies from occurrence to occurrence as a function of what the speaker means. In addition, the content of an expression may depend on the speaker's context, e.g. whether *water* is H_2O or XYZ; therefore every expression is context-sensitive. So Recanati concludes that, at least for a contextualist, context-sensitivity is pervasive in natural language and that, rather than an algorithmic, grammar-driven process, semantic interpretation is a matter of holistic guesswork that seeks to make sense of what the speaker is saying. Nonetheless, the adjusted (called here *modulated*) sense of an expression *e* in a context *c* is the result of applying a so-called modulation function *mod (e, c)* that is appropriate for this context to its semantic interpretation *I(e)* – which is a moderate form of contextualism.

Next, in 'The psychology of utterance processing: context vs salience', Rachel Giora focuses on the process of utterance interpretation, considering the salience of the lexicon vis-à-vis context-dependent meaning and introducing her influential *graded salience hypothesis*, according to which contextually irrelevant lexical meanings are activated to a certain degree. She discusses a number of factors that shape utterance interpretation: salient/coded meanings, contextual information, and their unfolding interaction (or lack of it). Experiments show that salient meanings cannot be blocked, not even by a strong context. Such contexts do not facilitate non-coded, inferred or novel interpretations such as irony, but they do slow down ironic targets compared to more salient literal counterparts. Novel metaphoric items in supportive contexts take longer to read compared to their salient (normally literal) interpretation. Non-coded ironic utterances are always processed according to their most salient (often literal) meaning first, despite a strongly supportive context. The graded salience hypothesis posits that salient meanings are activated faster than less salient ones. In addition, suppression of contextually incompatible meanings is sensitive to discourse goals and requirements, allowing for contextually incompatible meanings and interpretations to be retained if they are invited, supportive or non-intrusive. Salience is a matter of degree: regardless of its degree of literality, a meaning is salient if it is coded in the mental lexicon and enjoys prominence due to cognitive priority, experiential familiarity, frequency or conventionality. *Contra* Grice, non-literal interpretations may be the default, even when innovative, free of semantic anomaly and context-less; for example, statements such as *He is not exceptionally bright* are assigned an ironic interpretation even outside a specific context. The psychology of utterance processing is a multi-faceted phenomenon, whose products may be surprisingly creative and even amusing.

In Chapter 9, 'Sentences, utterances, and speech acts', Mikhail Kissine revives Speech Act Theory, revisiting the concept of illocutionary force and the sentence–utterance–speech act links. He seeks to sort out the

interrelationships among sentences, utterances and illocutionary contents. He disputes Searle's view that any illocutionary act type IA can be matched with a certain sentence type *s* in such a way that IA corresponds to the literal meaning of *s*; i.e. that illocutionary force is directly derivable from sentence meaning. Kissine demonstrates that imperative mood does not necessarily signal directive illocutionary force and that entreaties such as *Have a nice day* are not indirect or non-literal speech acts. He argues convincingly that non-directive uses of the imperative mood are as literal and direct as the directive ones. Kissine takes up Grice's point that uttering a sentence amounts to its acquiring an illocutionary force. If the speaker wishes to express the belief that *p*, the utterance will be an assertive speech act; if it is that the speaker intends to bring about the truth of *p*, the utterance will be a directive. A speaker who is sarcastic does not say anything, but just makes (acts) as if to say something – which is counter-intuitive. A sarcastic utterance of *Of course, John is ready* is a full-fledged, contextually determined proposition and not just a propositional radical. The semantics of sentence-types constrains which locutionary-act types the utterance of sentences can potentially constitute and the locutionary act performed in turn constrains the range of direct illocutionary forces. Although a rational reconstruction of the steps leading to the recognition of the illocutionary point can be proposed, according to Bach and Harnish's standardisation thesis the illocutionary point of a conventionalised indirect speech act is automatically derived without going through the derivation of the primary, literal speech act. This is a good reason for not taking rational reconstructions of indirect speech-act interpretation as reflecting actual interpretive processes; especially since, well before the age of seven, children respond adequately to indirectness and produce conventionalised indirect requests, but have not yet mastered second-order mental state attribution such as is required for understanding irony and for lying efficiently. The hypothesis also allows that explicit performatives *can* be interpreted as assertions, notwithstanding the fact that, in most cases, explicit performatives *are not* interpreted as assertions.

Next, in 'Pragmatics in update semantics', Henk Zeevat introduces a group of formal approaches to meaning known under the umbrella term of *update semantics* and suggests looking at them as a way of formalising pragmatics. This is a natural way of approaching them because they stress the importance of the dynamism of discourse in that information states are regularly updated by new information. He focuses in this chapter on presupposition, implicature, speech acts and disambiguation, and concludes by emphasising the methodological advantage of the orientation in its power to test predictions. He regards update semantics as central to any theory of interpretation because it is a technical tool for being precise about what utterances do to information states involved in communication. A new utterance updates an existing information state and the basic formula is simple: the update of ϕ, written $[\phi]$ on an information state σ (written $\sigma[\phi]$) could be given as σ restricted to those worlds M such that $[[\phi]](M) = true$. Update semantics is

shown to be central to accounts of pronouns and presupposition. Update semantics is also useful in resolving issues with the communicative effect of, for example, *John has two pigs*: resolving whether this answers such questions as *How many pigs does John have?* or *What animals does John have?* or *Who has pigs?*. It can also seek to establish the relevance of an utterance and suggest that surprising information be questioned, doubtful information should be justified, and the background clarified if there is ambiguity. Update semantics offers a rigorous account of slow and continuous shifts in the meaning such as that from root to epistemic modality. Finally, Zeevat claims that the changes in information states captured in update semantics can be evaluated experimentally.

Jaroslav Peregrin's contribution 'The normative dimension of discourse' concerns an interesting but often neglected topic of pragmatism and normativity. He addresses the issue of a model of discourse as a rule-governed enterprise and discusses the, largely implicit, rules that allow people to engage in discursive practices. He introduces the latter following the views of Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom, starting with rules of material inference and ending with a normative use-theory of meaning, seeing the meaning of expressions as their *inferential roles*. He argues that discourse interacts with normative relationships among people, relationships such as *obligations* or *entitlements*. He explores the possibility that normativity is crucial for language: a certain kind of normativity is actively constitutive of our distinctively human mind (reason), founding our concepts and infiltrating the semantics of our language. If this is true, then normativity is a key ingredient of our speech acts. An underlying assumption is that language is not merely for transfer of information but foremost a means of achieving practical ends. His concept of meaning is distinctly pragmatic: an expression means something when it is correct to use it in this way, which gives rise to a set of rules. Such rules are social facts, a collective awareness of corresponding behavioural regularities in both compliance and deviation. A boundless number of meanings are acquired in the achievement of practical aims of communicating, such that lexical items are tools rather than 'codes'. For example, *This is a dog* means that 'this is a dog' because normally the speaker is *disposed* to use the word *dog* when referring to a dog. More often than not, this disposition does not provoke overt utterance. The link between referent and utterance is normative rather than causal: it is correct to utter *This is a dog* when a dog is in focus. It is for this reason that a rule is said to be a matter of a collective awareness of what is correct where something else is incorrect, leading to the appropriate behaviour. The correlation between *This is a dog* and its referent identifies a convention that identifies a kind of habit, but also a habit that is a norm because it identifies what is taken to be correct and appropriate behaviour. Applications to artificial intelligence are also discussed.

Chapter 12 moves to the domain of the lexicon. In 'Pragmatics in the (English) lexicon', Keith Allan focuses on the interaction of semantics and

pragmatics in the lexicon, accounting for frequency, familiarity and speakers' assumptions. He examines ways in which pragmatics intrudes on the lexicon, which is largely an addition to the semantic specifications; for instance, it is useful to identify the default meanings and connotations of listemes. Default meanings are those that are applied more frequently by more people and normally with greater certitude than any alternatives. Pragmatic components include encyclopaedic data such as the euphemistic status and the origin of *jeepers*, and non-monotonic inferences (NMI): in addition to the lexicon entry specifying the necessary components of meaning in the semantics for an entry, it should also specify the most probable additional components of meaning, which are accepted or cancelled as a function of contextual constraints (such as that *bull* typically denotes a bovine but when used of, say, a whale, this meaning is cancelled). A credibility metric is proposed for propositions and used to calibrate NMIs in the lexicon to correspond with the degree of confidence one might have in the truth of the inference (e.g. that *bull* will denote a bovine in an estimated percentage of cases). A review of collective and collectivisable nouns (denoting mostly game animals) reveals that whereas different interpretations for collective nouns arise from their morphosyntactic context (a fact that needs to be captured in the lexicon), nouns that are collectivisable occur under the pragmatic constraint that they are restricted to a defined set of contexts. Discussion of the much disputed semantics of *and* postulates a uniform semantics by which English *and* has the semantics of logical conjunction but there is a graded salience captured in an algorithm that assigns one of a set of non-monotonic inferences as supplementary meaning on the basis of context. A minimalist semantics is proposed for *sorites* terms; e.g. if baldness is defined as lack of a full complement of hair, two speakers, or the same speaker on different occasions, may differ as to what counts as 'not a full complement of hair' such that there is no single state of hair-loss for which it is invariably true of x that *x is bald* for all occasions and all speakers.

Next, in 'Conversational interaction', Michael Haugh introduces approaches to conversation, focusing on Conversation Analysis and stressing its view of conversation as emergent and non-summative, all of which is amply illustrated with insightfully analysed excerpts from dialogues. He emphasises that pragmatic phenomena cannot all be subsumed under emergent phenomena of the 'here and now': social and cultural factors also have to be given their due attention. Therefore, he supplements the discussion with *situatedness* in sociocognitive worlds of interlocutors. The framework for analysing pragmatic phenomena in conversational interaction is based on a tripartite distinction among pragmatic meaning, action, and evaluation, which along with investigations of the interactional machinery and the sociocognitive engine underpinning conversation, forms the basis of a programme for investigating the pragmatics of conversational interaction. A wide range of methodologies are used to elicit the properties of emergence and situatedness that characterise conversational interaction. While