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Rethinking Athenian Citizenship

‘What I have to say about myself is, I think, the simplest and most just: that because I am born from *astos* parents on both sides and have received my *kleros* of the property and of the family, I am a citizen (*polites*).’¹

Euxitheos, in *Against Euboulides*, Dem. 57.46

In Athenian law, a citizen was someone born from citizen parents. Until the mid-fifth century, one parent of citizen birth, usually the father, sufficed for citizen status, but since Pericles’ Citizenship Law of 451/0 only those born from two citizen parents could participate (*metechain*) in the Athenian *polis*.² What did this *metechain* entail? Going through the rich documentation on classical Athens, we find many areas of public and private life where Athenians were active *as citizens*, usually organised according to gender and age. All the citizens, male and female, participated in religion in a wide variety of ways. For male citizens over eighteen, furthermore, participation in political office and its concomitant financial administration was an important domain of citizen activities, beside military duties. In sum, we find that descent is the fundamental qualification for citizenship in Athenian law, and that participation in religion and other fields are the typical ways of acting as a citizen.

¹ Dem. 57.46: λοιπὸν δέ μοι περὶ ἑμαυτοῦ πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰπεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἀπλοῦστατον οἶμαι καὶ δικαιοτάτον, ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων ἀστοῶν ὄντα με, κεκληρονομηκότα καὶ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ γένους, εἶναι πολίτην. This speech is dated shortly after 346/5. All dates are BCE, unless otherwise indicated.

² *Ath. Pol.* 26.3: καὶ τρίτῳ μετ’ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ Ἀντιδότου διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν πολιτῶν Περικλέους εἰπόντος ἔγνωσαν, μὴ μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως ὅς ἂν μὴ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστοῖν ἢ γεγονώς. ‘And in the third year after this, when Antidotos was archon, they decided owing to the large number of citizens on the proposal of Pericles that no one who was not born from both *astos* parents would participate (*metechain*) in the *polis*.’ Cf. Ael. *VH.* 13.24, Plut. *Per.* 37.3. For *metechain* in citizenship law, cf. Schol. Aeschin. 1.39. Coşkun’s arguments (2014) for a date close to 445/4, when a scrutiny of the citizen body took place in connection to a gift of grain by Psammetichos of Egypt (Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F 119; Plut. *Per.* 37.3) and for the law being retroactive, do not answer the many questions they raise, so I retain here the date, the text and the contents of Pericles’ Citizenship Law proposed in Blok (2009b).

When ancient historians discuss Athenian citizenship, however, strange things happen. Let me give one example, an article by John Davies entitled ‘Athenian citizenship: the descent group and the alternatives’ (1977).³ It is not very recent, but it is concerned precisely with the qualification of descent and it offers a lucid analysis of crucial moments when the Athenians debated how it should be used as a criterion for citizenship. Used and quoted extensively since its publication, the article expresses what is in many respects the prevailing view. Its first lines are as follows:

Classical Athens defined membership of its citizen body, and thereby its civic space, rigorously in terms of descent. Citizens were those who were male; were sons of a citizen father; were born from a woman who was the daughter of a citizen father; were born from a woman who was ‘pledged’ (ἐγγυητή); and had been accepted as members of their father’s (phratry and) deme.⁴

The statement in the first sentence is clearly founded in Athenian law. But why, having first correctly identified Athenian insistence only on descent, does he proceed with the *non sequitur* that ‘citizens were those who were male’? To understand this, we have to bring in a further text, Aristotle’s *Politics*, book III, the most extensive ancient theory of citizenship. Here, Aristotle states:

Who [or what], therefore, is a citizen (*polites*) is clear from these considerations: we can now say that he who is in a position to share in political or [and] judicial office, is a citizen of that *polis*, and a *polis* is a group of such people large enough in number to maintain a self-sufficient life, speaking generally.⁵

Aristotle does not claim that his argument in the *Politics* applies to Athens, nor to any other specific *polis*, although he observes that his definition of a citizen works best in a democracy.⁶ Nonetheless, many historians have used Aristotle’s *Politics* and in particular his definition of a citizen as a guideline in their analysis of real Greek *poleis*, notably of

³ Davies (1977).

⁴ Davies (1977) 105. On 106, Davies states that the rules on descent as laid down in Pericles’ law themselves are clear, but his handling of them shows that statement to be too optimistic.

⁵ Arist. *Pol.* 1275b17–22: τῖς μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ὧ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ (OCT: καὶ) κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἰκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. For ἐξουσία as ‘to be in a position’, Ostwald (1996) 55. ‘βουλευτικῆς’ means ‘deliberative’ rather than ‘legislative’, although presumably the former is seen as a component of the latter. In Aristotle’s definitions ἀπλῶς usually means ‘without further qualifications’ (see e.g. 1275a19 below), but here ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν is not a part of the formal definition.

⁶ Arist. *Pol.* 1275a33–1275b17.

Athens. This also applies to Davies's argument. The reason for his at first sight illogical phrase 'citizens were those who were male' becomes clear when he characterises citizenship as holding elected or allotted political office and the concomitant right to own property.⁷ Descent now turns out to be no more than the condition for and therefore the means of access to political office; the emphasis is entirely on the latter, and women, who do not share these functions of citizenship, are not even considered members of the descent group 'citizens' in their own right anymore, but are only 'daughters of citizen fathers'. This conception of citizenship is fundamentally at odds with the Athenian citizenship laws, which do not limit participating in the *polis* to political office and refer explicitly to both men and women as citizens by legitimate birth (*astos*, *aste*, with contrastive counterparts *nothos*, *nothe*), making legitimacy emphatically dependent on birth from a citizen woman.⁸ In fact, the Athenian laws approach the issue from the other side: male and female are both citizens when legitimately descended from Athenian parents, and this status is conditional for participation in the *polis* for both. Political office is not mentioned, let alone used as a means to conceptualise the rules of descent. Looking for the reason why Davies makes this fundamental turn away from the very laws the use of which he sets out to clarify, we find that he derives his conception of a citizen not from these laws, but from Aristotle.⁹

More examples of this use of the *Politics* in some of the best historical work on Athens will appear later in this chapter. It is remarkable that in all of them, as in Davies's article, the choice of Aristotle's definition as the leading concept by which to interpret the evidence is not really explained. One among several reasons might be that the passage from the *Politics* is virtually unique in the ancient Greek record in that it offers criteria on which citizenship is defined in general terms, abstracted from specific *polis*

⁷ Davies (1977) 105. He gives no references for this conception, but I assume that 'were sons of a citizen father; were born from a woman who was the daughter of a citizen father; and had been accepted as members of their father's (phratry and) deme' combines *Ath.Pol.* 42.1: 'Those who are born from *astos* parents on both sides share in the *politeia*, and they are enrolled in the demes when they are eighteen years of age', with *Ath.Pol.* 55.3, a part of the questions to the candidates for the archonship: 'Who is your father and to what deme does he belong, and who is your father's father, and who your mother, and who her father and what his deme?'; the phrase 'born from a woman who was "pledged" (*ἐγγυητή*)' is derived from citizenship law, *Is.* 6.47; law *ap.* *Dem.* 43.51.

⁸ *Is.* 6.47; law *ap.* *Dem.* 43.51; *Ath.* 13.577b; Schol. *Aeschin.* 1.39. For the full texts and discussion, see Chapters 2.1; 3.1; 6.1.

⁹ Davies (1977) 114: the difference between the inhabitants of the area or community and those 'who are citizens of that community in Aristotle's sense of sharing the holding of office and the administration of justice'. Also Whitehead (1991) 137–8.

laws.¹⁰ Such a use of general characteristics is what we expect a definition to be like. For some historians, furthermore, the relevance of Aristotle's *Politics* to Athens seems to be grounded not so much on the *Politics* itself, but rather on the *Athenaion Politeia* (henceforth *Ath.Pol.*). Written by an unknown author belonging to Aristotle's circle in the 330s and revised in the 320s as a part of the project of the *Politics*, the text contains both a historical and a systematic account of the *politeia* (societal and political organisation or 'constitution') of Athens. Here we need to ask if *Ath.Pol.*'s testimony on historical Athens was collected independently of the *Politics* or rather drafted with the conception of citizenship proposed in the philosophical work in mind.

Whatever the reason of their choice, Aristotle's focus on political office has led historians to take only, or primarily, this element into account when studying citizenship at Athens. No one will contest the importance of politics to the self-conception of the *polis* as a citizen community, but we may ask if other aspects were not equally important, if not more so. Surveying the evidence, one other essential aspect is the role of the divine world in the Athenian conception of the *polis* and of religion broadly conceived as central domain of the actions typical of citizens. Current scholarship, as I will discuss in more detail below, is investigating the *polis* as the platform of religion, but tends to underestimate religion as a crucial element of *citizenship*. Concomitantly, many activities of women taking place in the domain of religion have not been sufficiently understood as acts of citizenship, nor, on the other hand, have religious actions been sufficiently understood as integral to men's civic roles. Only when these elements are given their full due can we attain a more comprehensive understanding of what politics, in the sense of running the *polis*, really meant at Athens.

What means do we have to attempt a different approach to citizenship in classical Athens? Among the numerous texts documenting ideas about citizenship and the ways it was practised, some stand out for their length and wealth of details. One of them is a speech written by Demosthenes in or shortly after 346/5 (Dem. 57) for the defence of a certain Euxitheos, a man from the deme Halimous on the western coast of Attica who had been deleted from the list of citizens in his deme, because allegedly he was not of citizen descent on both sides. The speech is not a theoretical or

¹⁰ τῆς in the first line can be translated either as 'what?' or as 'who?', in the first case leading to a description of what a citizen *typically* does or is, and in the second case asking who fulfil this role. Both readings are possible: H. Rackham (Loeb ed.) 'What constitutes a citizen is therefore clear'; T.A. Sinclair and T.J. Saunders (Penguin Classics): 'From these considerations it has become clear who a citizen is.'

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historical account of Athenian citizenship, but it shows what Athenians expected a citizen to be and to do.

We begin our enquiry into Athenian citizenship by examining in greater depth the three contemporary ancient accounts introduced above – Demosthenes 57, Aristotle's *Politics* and the *Ath. Pol.* – to see what each of them tells us about what it meant to be a citizen and what the relationship between their conceptions of citizenship might be. To that end we need to break down the complex concept of citizenship into its major components by asking some fundamental questions. *What* was a citizen in the view of the author, that is to say, which activities or attitudes did the author identify as typical of a citizen? *Who* were the citizens, that is to say, what were the qualifications or criteria according to which one was a citizen? Some of the answers are stated explicitly in these texts, others are merely implied. This vocabulary will here serve only to chart the writer's perceptions of citizenship, but we need to look into the precise meaning of these words at a later stage. We begin with Demosthenes 57, Euxitheos' defence speech before the Athenian court.

1.1 Euxitheos' Appeal

In 346/5, the Athenian *polis* decided to hold a scrutiny (*diapsephismos*) of all its citizens. Details on the motives for this decision are lacking, but the pressure of the military conflicts with Philip of Macedon played an important role as in Athens itself tensions ran high, even if the peace of Philocrates in 346 gave a temporary relief. The *diapsephismos* created an ideal opportunity to settle old scores. The speech written by Demosthenes for Euxitheos is our main source for the procedure. In every deme a meeting was held of the demesmen – that is of those who had previously been recognised at age eighteen as having two citizen parents – and each individual demesman was re-examined to consider again whether both his parents did have good claims to citizen status.¹¹ Euxitheos was one among many who were ejected from the list of citizens in the course of this scrutiny.¹² He appealed to the people's court to revise the deme's decision.

¹¹ For the regular procedure of *dokimasia* (assessment) of a young adult male on entering the deme, *Ath. Pol.* 42.1.

¹² Cf. Is. 12 (*Euphiletos*) of 344/3; Is. 3.37 (*Pyrrhos*), the date of which is unknown, but the occasion referred to may well have been the same *diapsephismos* of 346/5; references in the speech to Diophantos of Sphettos (*LGPV* no. 54) and Dorotheos of Eleusis (*LGPV* no. 52) suggest a date in the 340s. Euxitheos himself refers to 'many who with justice have been expelled from all the demes' (Dem. 57.2), of course in contrast to himself, 'a victim of political rivalry'; note also his claim that many members of his own deme have been cast out unjustly (57.58), whereas several *xenoi* have bought their way in (57.59).

Much was at stake: if Euxitheos failed to convince the *dikastai*, he could be sold into slavery. His speech had to be cast in terms in which the *dikastai* would recognise their own conceptions and expectations. Only in this way could he win their understanding and sympathy.¹³

Demosthenes deploys several lines of argument to persuade the jury. First, he shows how the speaker himself and his witnesses acted in accordance with, and his opponents contrary to, the laws which the collective of citizens had to uphold and were read out aloud during the trial. Moreover, he appeals to the expectations among his audience as to what in all probability the conduct of plaintiff and defendant would be in situations with which the jury were familiar. Demosthenes encapsulates these arguments in compelling character sketches of plaintiff and defendant, a textbook example of Athenian forensic method.¹⁴ In this speech, Euxitheos is portrayed as the victim of a certain Euboulides, a man keen to harm his fellow citizens, who out of malice had manipulated his fellow demesmen to vote against Euxitheos, who presents himself as a man devoted to the common good. In sum, Demosthenes needed to convince the court that Euxitheos was indeed legally qualified to be a citizen, in terms of *who* he was and *what* he was and did. To do so he both brought arguments that directly bore on the legal criteria for citizenship (two citizen parents) and arguments that depended on matching Euxitheos' past behaviour to what the court would have expected of a citizen, and only of a citizen. Let us first look at the contents of Euxitheos' argument.

The accusations that Euboulides had put forward were false, and now it was up to him, Euxitheos, to tell what was true and just (*dikaios*) and to show that he was truly a citizen (1). Since the *dikastai* feel passionately about just claims to citizenship (1–3) and about the necessity to observe the *nomoi* (laws) and *dike* (justice; 4–6), they need to know that Euboulides' actions were motivated by malice, arising from Euxitheos' support of a woman previously prosecuted by Euboulides for impiety. (We may note here that Euboulides will have been fined 1,000 drachmae for this failed prosecution in what is bound to have been a high-profile case; the loss of face incurred in losing a trial like this was severe.) Now, Euboulides had used the *polis*'s scrutiny of its citizens – a legitimate exercise for the public good – as an opportunity to take his private revenge (8–16). No doubt had

¹³ On social knowledge involved in legal procedures Humphreys (1983a); Humphreys (1985); Humphreys (2007 (orig. 1985)).

¹⁴ References to the laws and witnesses are 'external' persuasive arguments, according to Arist. *Rhet.* 1375a21–1377b11, whereas the drawing of character is an 'internal' argument.

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ever been raised about whether any of his relatives had been true Athenians. Owing to his *eugeneia* (good birth) on his father's side, i.e. membership of a *genos* (23–8), he was elected by his fellow demesmen to be a candidate for allotment for the deme's priesthood of Heracles.¹⁵ Had he been selected by the lot, it would have been his duty to sacrifice on behalf of the very men who now tried to prevent him even from sharing sacrifice with them (46–7; 62). The schemes of his fellow demesmen and their unjust decision (59–66) were caused by his time of office as demarch, when he had pressed them to pay their overdue debts to the treasuries of the deme and of the sanctuaries (63). Finally, he performed a new scrutiny of himself, testified to his citizen status and ended with a passionate plea to be allowed to bury his mother in the ancestral tomb, and not to be cut off from the *polis* and his relatives, but to be buried in his fatherland (67–70).

After disqualifying the actions of the deme against him, Euxitheos devotes the largest part of his speech to persuading the *dikastai* of his citizen status. He does so with two strands of evidence. One aims at demonstrating the citizen status of his father and of his mother, and similarly of his grandparents. Euxitheos claims that although his father was born before the re-enactment of the law on citizen status and therefore only needed one parent of citizen birth to be a citizen himself (29–30), nonetheless his father was in fact an Athenian of citizen descent on both sides (23). The same holds true for his mother. Witnesses are produced to testify to all family relations on both sides (17–54). The other strand of evidence consists of showing that he himself, his parents and other relatives all participated in the group activities typical of Athenian citizens, namely the cults and religious rituals marking Athenian kinship. The two strands are tightly woven together, because participation in such rituals was a sign of being a born Athenian, i.e. citizen status. By going through all of these group activities, so familiar to his audience, the impression is reinforced that because Euxitheos' parents and he himself had always participated without anyone protesting, every one of them and he, Euxitheos, too, must have been truly qualified to do so. Crucial in demonstrating his status are the solemn giving-in-marriage of the women according to the law (54), the sacrifices with the *phrateres* (*polis* subgroup supervising legitimacy), sacrifice with his kin to Apollo Patroios (protector of patrimony) and Zeus Herkeios (protector of the *oikos* fence), and sharing ancestral tombs (*patroia mnemata*) with them (54). He had passed the scrutiny of

¹⁵ For *genos*, see Chapter 3.

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Athenian birth for offices (46). In other words, there never had been and could not be any doubt that Euxitheos was born an Athenian citizen.¹⁶

We must not only look closely at the arguments but also at the words and expressions (as crafted by Demosthenes) in which Euxitheos cast his plea to be acknowledged as a citizen. The first instance of such vocabulary occurs very early in the speech, where Euxitheos proclaims:

[There were many occurrences of injustice towards citizens who were victimised in this scrutiny and lost their status . . .] I will tell you at once what I consider to be just (*dikaia*) in these matters. I hold it to be your duty to treat harshly those who are proven to be *xenoi* (strangers), and who, without persuading you or asking for it, have come with stealth and violence to participate (*metechain*) in your *hiera* (things of the gods, cults and rituals) and *koina* (common things), but to help and save those who have met with misfortune and who demonstrate that they are *politai*.¹⁷

Here, a contrast is made between *xenoi*, who do not share the privilege of participating in the *hiera* and *koina* of the *polis*, and others who do. Implied in the latter group are *politai* who may seem to be *xenoi* but nonetheless can demonstrate their status. The speaker reminds the *dikastai* that the demesmen took their oaths on the *hiera* (sacrifices (26)) and recounts how he went to all the *hiera* (sacred places (54)) where only born Athenians were expected to be. Throughout the speech, Euxitheos' account of his sharing in the *hiera* of his family, of the deme and of the *polis* builds on this initial distinction between those who are members of the *polis* and those who are not, filling in the picture of himself as someone who from his youth participated in these *hiera* without anyone objecting. The implied conclusion is clear: he was a *polites*. The concept of 'sharing' recurs in the vocabulary used: *meteinaí tes poleos* (to be a member of the *polis*) occurs at the beginning (1), the middle (23) and three-quarters of the way through (55) the speech; and the same idea is present in *metechain tes poleos* (to participate in the *polis*), which occurs in a cluster at 51.6 and 51.10, soon followed by *meteinaí* in 55.

A frequently recurring verb (nineteen times) is *proseko*, 'it is befitting, it belongs to'.¹⁸ Demosthenes uses it to indicate that something should be

¹⁶ MacDowell (2009) 293: 'If in truth Euxitheos was not the son of Thoukritos, Demosthenes has shown great skill in obscuring the fact.'

¹⁷ Dem. 57.3: ... ἃ νομίζω περὶ τούτων αὐτῶν πρῶτον εἶναι δίκαια, ἐρῶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶμαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς τοῖς μὲν ἐξελεγχόμενοις ξένοις οὖσιν χαλεπαίνειν, εἰ μήτε πείσαντες μήτε δεηθέντες ὑμῶν λάθρα καὶ βία τῶν ὑμετέρων ἱερῶν καὶ κοινῶν μετεῖχον, τοῖς δ' ἠτυχηκόσι καὶ δεικνύουσι πολίτας ὄντας αὐτοὺς βοηθεῖν καὶ σῶζειν.

¹⁸ Dem. 57.1 (2x), 2, 4 (2x), 5 (2x), 6, 24, 25, 30, 32, 34, 36, 44, 46, 56, 69 (2x).

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the case, either because it is typical of a situation or person, or because something ought to belong to someone. He begins the speech with this word to make his client's position clear: the slanders of Euboulides do not 'befit' him, Euxitheos (1); instead, he is confident of showing that it befits him to belong to the *polis* (2). The *dikastai* should not take the deme's vote as a sign that membership of the *polis* would not befit him (6). Even if his father had only one citizen parent, it would still befit him to be a *polites*, because he was born before the archonship of Eukleides (30) – an implicit reference to an apparently well-known law on legitimacy.

In all these passages with *proseko* claims are made to everything that belongs to the status of a citizen, by drawing on what people know as a solid convention or what is to be expected considering what everyone knows, or on which the *polis* is entirely agreed and what therefore ought to be the case, but never to a notion that in modern terms is called a *right*. The string of *proseko* constructions throughout the speech weaves an argument strongly claiming that citizen status has been part of Euxitheos' life just as it has been of all who are like him – Athenian citizens – and that it ought to belong to him here and now and in the future. After hearing the witnesses testify to the legitimacy of his descent on both sides and his participation in the *hiera*, just over half way through his speech, he sums up what must be the clearest statement of his citizen status:

What I have to say about myself is, I think, the simplest and most just: that because I am born from *astos* parents on both sides and have received my *kleros* (allotted part) of the property and of the family, I am a citizen (*polites*).¹⁹

Note that Euxitheos calls both his parents *astos* (born citizen) and mentions that he has received his *kleros* (share in the inheritance) of property and family; receiving this *kleros* is presented as the ground for being a citizen (*polites*) and therefore serves as a sign of being one. Throughout the speech, 'citizen' is designated *polites* in case of a man and *politiss* of a woman, or *astos* of a man and *aste* of a woman.²⁰ To the exact meaning of these words we need to return at a later stage, but here we may note that being a *polites* means to belong to the *polis* with all that entails and *astos* indicates being born of citizen parents, unlike, for instance, someone made a citizen by a decree.

¹⁹ Dem. 57.46.

²⁰ Dem. 57: πολίτης male citizen, in sing. or plur.: 3, 11, 17, 20, 26, 29, 30, 44, 45, 46, 48, 51, 59, 61; πολιτῖς female citizen, in sing. or plur.: 30, 43; ἀστός male (born) citizen, sing. or plur. 24, 25, 30, 46, 54. ἀστή female (born) citizen, sing. or plur. 35, 36, 40, 43, 45, 46, 54.

Apart from a *polites*, Euxitheos calls himself an *Athenaios* (Athenian). The first time, he does so as a statement:

[What I hold to be just] I am going to demonstrate to you: that I am an Athenian, both from my father's and from my mother's side, and offer witnesses of all this, who you will judge to be truthful.²¹

This designation of himself and his father as *Athenaios*, one of eight occasions in the speech where 'being *Athenaios*' expresses their citizen status, resonates with the way the members of the court are addressed as *Athenaioi*, nineteen times in all.²² The implication, that he is an *Athenaios* as much as they are, is made explicit once he has produced all the witnesses and their accounts:

As to me, gentlemen *dikastai* (and by Zeus I beg you that no one starts shouting or being angry at what I want to say), I consider myself an *Athenaios* on the same grounds as each one of you, because I have from the beginning regarded her as my mother whom I present as such to you, and I do not pretend that I am hers while in reality I am not but someone else's. And the same holds true, gentlemen *Athenaioi*, for my father.²³

Now that it will come to a decision, Euxitheos makes a distinction (56) between the *dikastai* on the one hand, and the deme, the *boule* and the assembly on the other: only the decisions of the first are eminently concerned with *dike*. In this way, he conjures up the image of a group of *Athenaioi* consisting of the *dikastai* and himself, who by virtue of their commitment to justice distinguish themselves from the rest of the citizens.

Finally, when stating the grounds of his citizen status, Euxitheos uses the verb *kleronomeo*, receiving one's part (*kleros*) of the inheritance.²⁴ The noun *kleros* is the root of the verb *kleroo*, to allocate or select by lot. Euxitheos uses *kleros* words in relation to his birth and inheritance (46.6), and when he recounts he was elected to stand for selection by lot for the priesthood of Heracles (46.10). He returns to his qualification for allotment several times closely following on the same passage (48.3; 48.4; 49.3; 53.3; 62.9).

²¹ Dem. 57.17: δείξαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἑμαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὄντα καὶ τὰ πρὸς πατρός καὶ τὰ πρὸς μητρός, καὶ μάρτυρας τούτων, οὗς ὑμεῖς ἀληθεῖς φήσεται εἶναι.

²² Sing. Ἀθηναῖος: 17, 19, 22, 23, 27, 29, 50, 61; plur. ὡ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι: 6, 7, 8, 22, 30, 32, 35, 37, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 50, 56, 58, 59, 60, 62; used in other cases: 14, 31.

²³ Dem. 57.50: ἐγὼ δ', ὡ ἄνδρες δικασταί (καὶ μοι πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν μηδεὶς θορυβήσῃ, μηδ' ἐφ' ᾧ μέλλω λέγειν ἀχθεσθῆ), ἑμαυτὸν Ἀθηναῖον ὑπέλιθ' ὥσπερ ὑμῶν ἕκαστος ἑαυτὸν, μητέρ' ἔξ ἀρχῆς νομίζων ἦν περ εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀποφαίνω, καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρας μὲν ὧν ταύτης δὲ προσποιοῦμενος πατέρα πάλιν, ὡ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.

²⁴ He does so twice, once referring to his own inheritance (46), once concerning his mother's first husband who received an inheritance through an *epikleros* he could marry (41).