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978-0-521-18725-1 - Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries
Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik
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PART I

THE PUZZLE

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I

Breakthrough Elections

*Mixed Regimes, Democracy Assistance,
and International Diffusion*

While democracy must be more than free elections ... it also cannot be less.

Kofi Annan¹

Eventful temporality recognizes the power of events in history ... and events may be defined as that relatively rare sub-class of happenings that significantly transform structures....

William Sewell²

From 1998 to 2005, a wave of electoral defeats of authoritarian leaders swept through postcommunist Europe and Eurasia. This surprising run of opposition victories began with the Slovak election in 1998, when Mikuláš Dzurinda, the candidate of the democratic opposition, succeeded in forming a government and thereby ended the assault on democracy mounted by his predecessor, Vladimír Mečiar. Two years later, the Croatian Democratic Union, which had relied on autocratic methods to govern Croatia since its victory in the first competitive elections held in that country a decade earlier, finally lost power to the democratic opposition. The electoral “virus” then spread to neighboring Serbia. Here, popular protests following the September 2000 election for the Yugoslav presidency forced the long-serving dictator, Slobodan Milošević, to respect the verdict of the voters and transfer power to Vojislav Koštunica, the candidate of the liberal opposition. Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 then joined the wave of electoral turnovers. All three of these elections featured developments similar to those that had taken place in Serbia – that is, popular protests in reaction to rigged elections and the empowerment of new political leaders and governing parties.

¹ Kofi Annan, quoted in Eric C. Bjornlund, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 31.

² William Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, ed. McDonald Tedrance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 262.

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PURPOSE AND PUZZLES

The purpose of this book is to analyze this remarkable run of democratizing elections in postcommunist Europe and Eurasia.³ These elections are of interest for both empirical and theoretical reasons. First, they were undeniably important political events. At the very least these electoral breakthroughs by

³ For other studies of this wave, see, for example, Mark Beissinger, "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 5:2 (June 2007), 259–276; Joshua Tucker, "Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions," *Perspectives on Politics* 5:3 (September 2007), 537–553; Joshua A. Tucker, "People Power or a One-Shot Deal? The Legacy of the Colored Revolutions Considered from a Collective Action Framework," paper presented at the annual meeting of the AAASS, New Orleans, LA, November 2007; Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," *Journal of Democracy* 16:3 (July 2005), 5–19; Michael McFaul, "Importing Revolution: Internal and External Factors in Ukraine's 2004 Democratic Breakthrough," in *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World*, ed. Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3–29; Amichai Magen, *Evaluating External Influence on Democratic Development: Transition*, CDDRL Working Paper No. 111, Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University (March 2009); Anders Åslund and Michael McFaul, *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); Joerg Forbrig and Pavol Demeš, eds., *Reclaiming Democracy: Civil Society and Electoral Change in Central and Eastern Europe* (Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund, 2007); Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine Is Not Russia: Comparing Youth Political Activism," *SAIS Review* 26:2 (Summer 2006), 67–83; Taras Kuzio, "From Kuchma to Yushchenko: Ukraine's 2004 Presidential Elections and the Orange Revolution," *Problems of Post-Communism* 52:2 (March/April 2005), 29–44; Taras Kuzio, "Civil Society, Youth, and Societal Mobilization in Democratic Revolutions," *Communist and Postcommunist Studies* 39:3 (September 2006), 365–386; Taras Kuzio, "The Orange Revolution at the Crossroads," *Demokratizatsiya* 14:4 (Fall 2006), 477–493; Taras Kuzio, "The Opposition's Road to Success," *Journal of Democracy* 16:2 (April 2005), 117–130; Taras Kuzio, "Regime Type and Politics in Ukraine under Kuchma," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 38:2 (June 2005), 167–90; Paul Kubicek, "Ukraine and the European Neighborhood Policy: Can the EU Help the Orange Revolution Bear Fruit?," *East European Quarterly* 41:1 (Spring 2007), 1–23; Paul D'Anieri, "Explaining the Success and Failure of Postcommunist Revolutions," *Communist and Postcommunist Studies* 39:3 (September 2006), 331–350; Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "International Diffusion and Postcommunist Electoral Revolutions," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39:3 (September 2006), 283–304; Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Bringing Down Dictators: The Diffusion of Democratic Change in Communist and Postcommunist Europe and Eurasia," paper presented at the Conference on Postcommunist Resilience, Dartmouth University, May 25–26, 2007; Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Promoting Democracy after Communism: Electoral Revolutions in Slovakia, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan," paper presented at the Conference on Transnational Actors and Postcommunist Politics, Syracuse University, September 30–October 1, 2005; Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Democratizing Elections in the Postcommunist World: Definitions, Dynamics and Diffusion," *St. Antony's International Review* 2:2 (February 2007), 64–89; Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Transnational Networks, Diffusion Dynamics, and Electoral Revolutions in the Postcommunist World," *Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and Its Applications* 378:1 (May 1, 2007), 92–99; Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, "Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions,"

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the opposition terminated a trend in all six countries of growing authoritarianism over time, and at most they produced a veritable leap from authoritarianism to democracy. These elections also influenced political developments considerably beyond the borders of the six countries where authoritarian leaders lost power. For example, many of the symbols and much of the rhetoric of Ukraine's 2004 Orange Revolution resurfaced in the huge demonstrations against Syrian control that took place in Lebanon in March 2005 and nearly three years later in both the campaigns preceding the Kenyan presidential election and the protests that followed.⁴ In addition, many of the strategies used by the opposition in Ukraine in 2004 and earlier by students in Serbia from 1998 to 2000 were deliberately redeployed by opponents of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe and by students in Venezuela opposing the 2007 constitutional amendments proposed by President Hugo Chávez.⁵ Protests against irregular elections in Togo and Ethiopia in 2005 and Mexico in 2006 also seem to have been influenced by the precedent and by some of the practices of successful challenges to official election results that took place in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine.⁶ Finally, the mass demonstrations against electoral fraud that broke

Journal of Democracy 17:4 (October 2006), 5–18; Lincoln Abraham Mitchell, *Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose Revolution* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Jonathan Wheatley, *Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union* (Aldershot, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005); Cory Welt, "Regime Weakness and Electoral Breakthrough in Georgia," in *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World*, ed. Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 115–188; Scott Radnitz, "A Horse of a Different Color: Revolution and Regression in Kyrgyzstan," in *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World*, ed. Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 300–324; Scott Radnitz, "What Really Happened in Kyrgyzstan?," *Journal of Democracy* 17:2 (April 2006), 132–146; Matthew Fuhrmann, "A Tale of Two Social Capitals: Revolutionary Collective Action in Kyrgyzstan," *Problems of Postcommunism* 53:6 (November/December 2006), 16–29; and Ray Jennings, *Serbia's Bulldozer Revolution: Evaluating Internal and External Factors in the Successful Democratic Breakthrough in Serbia*, CDDRL Working Paper No. 105, Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University (March 2009).

⁴ Julia Choucair, *Lebanon's New Moment*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Outlook (March 2005), <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/PO14.Choucair.FINAL.pdf>; Max Rodenbeck, "A New Lebanon?," *New York Review of Books* 52:7 (April 28, 2005), 28–32.

⁵ Neil MacFarquar, "Huge Demonstration in Lebanon Demands End to Syrian Control," *New York Times*, March 15, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/03/15/international/middleeast/15lebanon.html; Simon Romero, "Students Emerge as a Leading Force against Chavez," *New York Times*, November 19, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/11/10/world/americas/10venez.html; Choucair, *Lebanon's New Moment*; Michael Wines, "Grass-Roots Effort Aims to Upend Mugabe in Zimbabwe," *New York Times*, March 27, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/international/27zimbabwe.html; Michael Wines, "Tough on Togo, Letting Zimbabwe Slide," *New York Times*, April 10, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/international/27zimbabwe.html; and see *Izvestiia*, "Bashkiry privezli v mosvu 'oranzheviu' revoliutsiiu," *IzvestiiaRU*, August 4, 2008, www.izvestiia.ru/community/article1552736.

⁶ James C. McKinley, Jr., "In a Presidential Tone, Calderon Rejects Recount," *New York Times*, July 14, 2006, www.nytimes.com/2006/07/14/world/americas/14calderon.read.html;

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out in June 2009 in Iran following the presidential election bore a family resemblance to the postelection protests that took place in the postcommunist world from 2000 to 2008. In fact, Ayatollah Khomeini, a strong supporter of the incumbent and declared victor in that controversial election, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, drew an explicit parallel between the Iranian protests against electoral fraud and those that had brought an end to the Shevardnadze regime six years earlier in Georgia.⁷

These elections are also of interest because they pose some fascinating puzzles for specialists in comparative and international politics. Why and how did these electoral breakthroughs take place? While it can be argued that electoral defeat is always a possibility when authoritarian leaders allow competition for office, the fact remains that the norm in these countries, as more generally in mixed regimes, has been for incumbent authoritarians to win rather than lose elections.⁸ This is not surprising. Authoritarian incumbents command far more resources than the opposition, and oppositions in contexts that combine authoritarian politics and competitive elections tend to be divided, disputatious, and thus ineffective. At the same time, citizens in such systems tend to be either relatively supportive of the regime or, if not, unlikely to transfer their votes to the opposition. On the one hand, why bother to vote for the opposition if it cannot win power? On the other hand, why support opposition parties and candidates when they have shown themselves time and again to be more interested in bickering with each other, collaborating with the regime, running lackluster campaigns, and/or boycotting elections than in identifying issues of concern to the electorate and mounting collaborative, ambitious, and therefore credible electoral challenges to authoritarian rule?

A second and related puzzle focuses on the pattern of these electoral breakthroughs. Why do we see such similar developments in so many countries in one region within such a short span of time? Here, we are struck by the

Michael Kamber, "In an Untamed Tide of Violence, Bystanders Die," *New York Times*, May 5, 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/05/05/international/africa/05togo.html.

⁷ See Nazila Fathi, "Iran's Top Leader Dashes Hopes for a Compromise," *New York Times*, June 20, 2009, A1, A7.

⁸ See, especially, Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); and Andreas Schedler, "Sources of Competition under Electoral Authoritarianism," in *Democratization by Elections – A New Mode of Transition?*, ed. Staffan Lindberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 179–201; Marc Morjé Howard and Philip G. Roessler, "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science* 50:2 (April 2006), 365–381; Nicolas Van de Walle, "Meet the New Boss: Same as the Old Boss: The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa," in *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 50–67; Grigore Pop-Eleches and Graeme Robertson, "Elections and Liberalization in the Postcommunist World," unpublished paper, Princeton University and University of North Carolina, September 2009 and Philip G. Roessler and Marc Morjé Howard, "Post Cold War Political Regimes: When Do Elections Matter?," in *Democratization by Elections – A New Mode of Transition?*, ed. Staffan Lindberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 101–127.

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parallels between the cross-national spread of electoral challenges to authoritarian rule and the spread of popular protests in the same region a decade earlier that led to the collapse of communism. Is there something special about this part of the world that encourages popular mobilizations against authoritarian rule?⁹ This question leads in turn to a more basic issue highlighted by the geography and timing of the breakthrough elections. Was the clustering of these electoral shifts a matter of similar circumstances giving rise to similar, but nonetheless separate, political dynamics, or, as phrases such as “wave” and the “spread of electoral change” seem to imply, a more interconnected cross-national dynamic, wherein the defeat of authoritarian rulers in one country influenced similar electoral turnarounds in the neighborhood?¹⁰

Third, how can we account for the variations in democratic progress that followed the empowerment of the opposition? While these pivotal elections ended a dangerous episode of de-democratization in Slovakia, they had the different, but even more dramatic, effects in Croatia and Serbia of replacing nearly overnight long-standing authoritarian regimes with democratic orders. In Ukraine, democratic progress after the 2004 election was considerable but, as in Serbia, was accompanied by continuing conflicts among the winners, as well as between the winners and losers in the parliamentary and presidential elections that followed the pivotal 2004 election for the Ukrainian presidency.¹¹ Finally, the 2003 election in Georgia and the 2005 election in Kyrgyzstan, while leading to the removal from power of long-serving authoritarian leaders, produced a more checkered record with respect to improvements in civil liberties and political rights.¹²

A final puzzle requires us to look beyond our six pivotal electoral episodes and ask why these elections led to turnover, whereas other elections failed to do so – a contrast that it is necessary to explore if we are to develop a compelling explanation of why these electoral shifts occurred and why they moved from state to state. Here, two sets of instructive cases come to the fore. One is

⁹ For parallels and differences between these two rounds of democratic change, see Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, “A Regional Tradition: The Diffusion of Democratic Change under Communism and Postcommunism,” in *Democracy and Authoritarianism*, ed. Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 30–58.

¹⁰ See Mark Kramer, “The Dynamics of Contagion in the Communist Bloc and the Impact on Regime Survival,” paper presented at the Conference on Postcommunist Resilience, Dartmouth University, May 25–26, 2007; Lucan Way, “The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions,” *Journal of Democracy* 19:3 (July 2008), 55–69; and Valerie Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, “Getting Real about ‘Real Causes,’” *Journal of Democracy* 20:1 (January 2009), 69–73.

¹¹ McFaul, “Importing Revolution”; Sonja Licht, “Serbia between Autocratic and Democratic Transition: A Case Study,” paper presented at the Project on Democratic Transitions, Seminar II: Lessons Learned and Testing Their Applicability, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia, February 22–24, 2007; and Maurizio Massari, “Do All Roads Lead to Brussels? Analysis of the Different Trajectories of Croatia, Serbia-Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 18:2 (July 2005), 259–273.

¹² See, for example, Radnitz, “A Horse of a Different Color”; Welt, “Regime Weakness and Electoral Breakthrough”; and Mitchell, *Uncertain Democracy*.

TABLE 1.1. *Case selection*

Country	Date of Election	Type of Election	Result
Croatia	2000 ^a	Presidential	Turnover
Georgia	2003	Parliamentary ^b	Turnover
Kyrgyzstan	2005	Parliamentary ^b	Turnover
Serbia	2000 ^a	Presidential	Turnover
Slovakia	1998	Parliamentary ^c	Turnover
Ukraine	2004	Presidential	Turnover
Armenia	2003 ^a	Presidential	Continuity
Armenia	2008	Presidential	Continuity
Azerbaijan	2003	Presidential	Continuity
Azerbaijan	2005	Parliamentary ^b	Continuity
Belarus	2006	Presidential	Continuity

^a Both parliamentary and presidential elections were held in this year.
^b Parliamentary elections held in mixed presidential/parliamentary system.
^c Parliamentary elections held in parliamentary system.

the earlier elections that took place in our six countries – elections that often occurred in circumstances similar to those that had led to electoral turnover, but that had, with the exception of Slovakia, the invariable result of producing a defeat for the opposition. Just as analytically illuminating is another group of elections – that is, those in Armenia in 2003 and 2008, Azerbaijan in 2003 and 2005, and Belarus in 2001 and 2006. In all of these cases, authoritarian incumbents or their anointed successors won power despite striking similarities between these elections and those that had resulted in a transfer of power from authoritarians to democrats. For example, in these three countries as in Serbia in 2000, Ukraine in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan in 2005, regimes had become more repressive in the years leading up to the elections; oppositions had succeeded in forming coalitions in order to improve their prospects for winning office; and rigged elections had been followed by large-scale popular protests contesting the official results.

In the chapters that follow, we address these four questions by comparing eleven elections and the political and economic evolution of the nine regimes in which these elections took place (see Table 1.1). Our answers are based upon six years of research that involved conducting more than 200 interviews in Baku, Berlin, Belgrade, Bratislava, Ithaca, Kyiv, Lviv, Moscow, New York, Oxford, Philadelphia, Tbilisi, Washington, D.C., Yerevan, and Zagreb with participants in and analysts of both the elections that led to the defeat of authoritarians and those that failed to do so. Thus, we interviewed members of the U.S. and European democracy assistance community; U.S. ambassadors and their staffs; local academic specialists and journalists; and members of a wide range of political parties, social movements, and civil society organizations (a list of our interviewees may be found in the Appendix). In addition, we benefited from interviews conducted on our behalf by Sara

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Rzayeva in Azerbaijan, Michael Varnum in Zagreb, and Igor Logvinenko in Kyrgyzstan and from commentaries on these elections and our interpretations of them in roundtables organized on our behalf in Belgrade, Charlottesville, and Yerevan.¹³ Finally, we made use of a variety of other materials written by academics, policy makers, and journalists, along with public opinion surveys, statistical compendia, and other documents provided by political parties, civil society organizations, international organizations, and a range of private and public European and U.S. democracy assistance organizations. While all this written information was useful, it was the interviews that gave us the greatest insights into what happened, why, and how.

In the remainder of this chapter, we set the stage for our analysis of electoral continuity and change. We begin by identifying four major debates in comparative and international politics that we will address throughout this study. One involves competing views on the potential for democratic change in regimes that combine authoritarian politics and competitive elections. Another focuses on the controversial question of whether elections can serve as key sites for democratic change. Yet another highlights divergent perspectives on the cross-national diffusion of democracy, and a final debate concerns the question of whether the United States can and should promote democratic change abroad. We end the chapter by laying out our approach, defining key terms, and previewing the chapters that follow.

THEORETICAL DEBATES ABOUT MIXED REGIMES

The third wave of democratization has led to the proliferation of what have been variously termed gray, mixed, hybrid, electoral, or competitive authoritarian regimes, that is, regimes that have the distinctive profile in comparison to full-scale democracies and dictatorships of combining elements of both types of political systems.¹⁴ Depending upon the definition

¹³ We also benefited from reactions to our analyses of these events in talks given at the College of William and Mary, the University of Notre Dame, Harvard University, The University of British Columbia, University of California at Berkeley, Indiana University, University of Michigan, The George Washington University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Duke University, The University of North Carolina, University of Florida, Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins University – SAIS, Stanford University, New York University in Prague, and the American University in Baku, Azerbaijan, as well as at the Foreign Service Institute of the U.S. Department of State and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC; the University of Florence, Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy; the Jefferson Institute (Charlottesville and Belgrade); the Institute for the Social Sciences in Moscow; and meetings of the American Political Science Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies.

¹⁴ See, for instance, Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” *Journal of Democracy* 13:2 (April 2002), 21–35; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” *Journal of Democracy* 13:2 (April 2002), 51–65; and Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: The Evolution of Post-Soviet Competitive Authoritarianism 1992–2005,” paper presented at the conference Why Communism Didn’t Collapse: Understanding Regime Resilience in China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea and

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used, such regimes now constitute between 25 and 30 percent of all regimes in the world today.¹⁵

Although these kinds of regimes differ from one another in their precise mixture of authoritarian and democratic politics, they nonetheless share two core characteristics. One is that elections in such political settings are regular and competitive, but take place on an uneven playing field that favors authoritarian incumbents over opposition parties and candidates. The other is that these kinds of regimes are much more likely than either democracies or dictatorships to be located in weak states and to change regime types from one year to the next.¹⁶ Mixed regimes, in short, are notable for their instability.

Analysts of these regimes, however, disagree not just about what these kinds of politics should be called, but also about why they have become so prevalent, why they evolve in different ways over time, and whether they are best understood as temporary formations or regimes in their own right. All these issues will be addressed throughout this book because all of the elections of interest took place in such regimes. However, there is a final and more fundamental point of contention among analysts that needs to be highlighted here. This is the very different readings by scholars of what motivates authoritarian leaders to “decorate” their regimes with seemingly democratic institutions, and what these explanations imply in turn about the likelihood of more authentic democratic politics in the future. For analysts who focus on democratization and who specialize in regions of the world where transitions from authoritarian rule have produced at least some examples of fully democratic orders, the usual argument is that mixed regimes reflect an uneasy compromise between democrats and authoritarians in which neither side is sufficiently powerful to dictate its preferred rules of the political game. This “rough balance,” according to this view, in addition to the global diffusion of democratic norms and the decisions by international financial institutions and Western governments to tie aid to democratic progress, plays a role in “forcing” authoritarian leaders and their allies to risk their tenure in office and thus their control over the system by holding regular and competitive elections.¹⁷ Because of the gap between their democratic rhetoric and their often illiberal practices and because of their exposure to possible defeat as a result of electoral competition, therefore, authoritarian leaders in mixed systems are inherently vulnerable to challenges mounted by leaders of the democratic opposition. These considerations have led some scholars to conclude that the

Cuba, Dartmouth College, Hannover, NY, May 25–26, 2007; Marina Ottaway, *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003); and Roessler and Howard, “Post Cold War Political Regimes.”

¹⁵ Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes.”

¹⁶ Roessler and Howard, “Post Cold War Political Regimes”; David Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O’Halloran, “Democratic Transitions,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50:3 (July 2006), 551–569.

¹⁷ See, especially, Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism*, and Schedler, “Sources of Competition.”

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very existence of mixed systems indicates authoritarian weakness and that the institutions that go along with that weakness provide opportunities for subsequent democratic progress.¹⁸

A very different interpretation of these regimes, however, has been put forward by analysts who specialize in the study of authoritarianism and who focus on parts of the world where authoritarian regimes have been very successful in resisting the global shift to democratic governance.¹⁹ Rather than assuming vulnerability, these scholars proceed from the opposite assumption. In particular, they argue that authoritarian leaders in mixed regimes are in fact quite resourceful, that democratic oppositions and civil society groups are often relatively weak, and that the introduction of democratic reforms, such as competitive elections, reflects not so much growing domestic and international pressures on authoritarians to embrace some aspects of democracy as strategic decisions on the part of powerful leaders to enhance their control over the system. According to this analytical perspective, leaders add selected democratic features to the polity in order to expose, divide, and thereby weaken regime opponents; calibrate alliances; fine-tune patronage networks; and, more generally, solve the information problems that are built into the authoritarian political enterprise.²⁰ At the same time, democratic

¹⁸ Also see Roessler and Howard, "Post Cold War Political Regimes," and Pop-Eleches and Robertson, "Elections and Liberalization."

¹⁹ See, especially, James H. Rosberg, "Roads to the Rule of Law: The Emergence of an Independent Judiciary in Contemporary Egypt" (Ph.D. dissertation, Political Science Department, MIT, 1995); Ellen Lust Okar, "Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition," *Comparative Politics* 36:2 (January 2004), 159–179; Ellen Lust Okar, "Opposition and Economic Crises in Jordan and Morocco," in *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, ed. Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angriste (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005); Ellen Lust Okar, "Legislative Elections in Hegemonic Authoritarian Regimes: Competitive Clientelism and Resistance to Democratization," in *Democratization by Elections – A New Mode of Transition?*, ed. Staffan Lindberg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 226–245; Lisa Blaydes, "Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management: Theory and Evidence from Egypt," unpublished manuscript, April 2008; Pauline Jones Luong, *Institutional Change and Political Continuity in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Power, Perceptions, and Pacts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships," *Economics & Politics* 18:1 (March 2006), 1–26; and Peter Solomon, "Courts and Judiciaries in Authoritarian Regimes," *World Politics* 60:1 (October 2007), 122–145. And see the criticisms of the democracy "bias" offered by Jason Brownlee, "Low Tide after the Third Wave: Exploring Politics under Authoritarianism," *Comparative Politics* 34:4 (July 2002), 477–498; Marsha Pripstein Posusney, "Enduring Authoritarianism: Middle East Lessons for Comparative Theory," *Comparative Politics* 36:2 (January 2004), 127–138; and Lisa Anderson, "Searching Where the Light Shines: Studying Democratization in the Middle East," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006), 189–214.

²⁰ See note 19 and Ronald Wintrobe, "Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches," in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 363–396; and Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review* 87:3 (September 1993), 567–576.