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978-0-521-18652-0 - Heroes and Legends of Fin-de-Siècle France: Gender, Politics, and National Identity

Venita Datta

Excerpt

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Introduction

The Fin-de-Siècle Cult of Heroes

The French entered World War I with staunch and grim determination in the summer of 1914. Unlike the often-told story of British soldiers, isolated and alienated from king and country, who continued to fight out of loyalty to their comrades in the trenches rather than a belief in national solidarity, French *poilus* (soldiers), in touch literally and figuratively with the home front, maintained their resolve due to an unshakable faith in the nation.¹ The unity of the French in war, however, belies the fragmented nature of French society during the preceding years, which were marked by political and social conflict. Violent industrial relations, the growth of radical political organizations on both the left and right, along with profound divisions in the body politic born of the Dreyfus Affair – in which a Jewish army officer was falsely accused of treason, culminating in the fiercely divisive separation of church and state in 1905 – all exemplified such disunity. The strong sense of national solidarity among the French during a time of crisis was in large part the result of the fin-de-siècle cult of the hero. Manifesting itself in all areas of national life, especially in the mass press and theater, this heroic cult allowed the French to overcome their differences and rally around the defense of the nation.

¹ Leonard V. Smith, Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau, and Annette Becker, *France and the Great War, 1914–1918* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003; 2008), 11 and 27–30. See a review of the book for *H-France* by Martha Hanna: 3, no. 119 (October 2003), and Jean-Jacques Becker, *1914: Comment les Français sont entrés dans la guerre* (Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1977). See also James Joll, who writes about the impact during the years preceding of “the history they [the French] had learnt at school, the stories about the national past which they had been told as children and an instinctive sense of loyalty and solidarity with their neighbors and workmates,” *The Origins of the First World War* (New York: Longman, 1984), 189.

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Born of defeat and civil war, the Third Republic faced challenges from the left and the right. Those threats coalesced in the Boulanger Affair, which represented an attempt by various political groups to forge unity at the fin de siècle. General Georges Boulanger first came to prominence as war minister in 1886, promoted by Radical politicians as a defender of the common man. Boulanger also appealed to those who desired revenge against Germany. He soon proved to be a huge embarrassment to his left-wing supporters when he nearly involved the country in war with Germany in 1887.² They were further chagrined by his negotiations with both monarchists and Bonapartists. When Boulanger won a seat in the Chamber of Deputies as a representative from Paris in January 1889, a coup d'état seemed imminent. At the last moment, however, Boulanger decided not to march on the Elysée palace. Republicans soon took advantage of Boulanger's missed opportunity, issuing a warrant for his arrest in April. The general fled to Brussels before the warrant could be executed and committed suicide on the tomb of his mistress in 1891 – resembling a two-bit player in a melodrama more than a real hero.³

The Exposition Universelle of 1889, which took place in the immediate wake of Boulanger's defeat, was another political attempt to forge unity. Marking the centennial of the Revolution, it was the first exhibition to be completely organized under the auspices of the republicans. It offered them an unparalleled opportunity to further links with the revolutionary past and to establish the legitimacy of the new regime. Nevertheless, this enterprise was fraught with difficulties because the moderate republicans and their more left-wing Radical colleagues could not agree on which revolution would be celebrated, that of 1789 or the more controversial Terror of 1793.⁴

² He was relieved of his duties as minister and posted to the provinces but not before receiving some 100,000 votes in a by election in Paris for which he was not a candidate.

³ The Boulangist movement, however, played an important role in opposition to the parliamentary republic during the years to come and marked the emergence of a radical revolutionary right as well as the evolution of nationalism from the left to the right. This new nationalism, unlike its left-wing revolutionary counterpart, was exclusive and defensive, as much interested in “internal” enemies as external ones. On Boulangism, see William D. Irvine, *The Boulanger Affair Reconsidered: Royalism, Boulangism and the Origins of the Radical Right in France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); on the revolutionary right, Zeev Sternhell, *La Droite révolutionnaire: Les Origines françaises du fascisme, 1885–1914* (Paris: Seuil, 1978). On nationalism: Raoul Girardet, *Le Nationalisme français, 1871–1914* (Paris: Seuil, 1983).

⁴ They concentrated then not on specific events or leaders, many of which and whom were divisive, but on the entire nineteenth century as a product of progress engendered by the Revolution: Pascal Ory, *Une Nation pour mémoire: 1889, 1939, 1989: Trois Jubilés*

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The Catholic Church offered its own version of national cohesion when it issued the 1891 encyclical, “Rerum Novarum,” in which Pope Leo XIII outlined the need for improving the miserable conditions of the working classes. In yet another encyclical of 1892, “Au Milieu des solitudes,” addressed to the bishops and people of France, he encouraged French Catholics to “rally” to the republican regime by declaring the church neutral with regard to political regimes.⁵ The *ralliement* seemed to signal – for a brief time – an end to religious and political strife. The tensions of the Dreyfus Affair, however, would put an end to this alliance and reinstitute the more familiar cry of “no enemies to the left.”

For their part, left-wing republicans like Radical-Socialist Léon Bourgeois also attempted to promote national unity – through the doctrine of Solidarism, which they viewed as a bridge between individualism and socialism. By 1900, Solidarism had become the semi-official ideology of the Third Republic, although it had not succeeded in overcoming national conflict.⁶ These largely political attempts to find unity were thus not always satisfying. Nor was the recourse to a real-life “hero” like Boulanger, especially when he could not live up to the ideals of heroism. Since such real-life figures did not inspire confidence and ultimately

révolutionnaires (Paris: FNSP, 1992), 159. The 1900 World’s Fair in Paris better succeeded in promoting national unity and progress, in large part because the Revolution per se was not the object of focus: see Debora L. Silverman, *Art Nouveau in Fin-de-Siècle France: Politics, Psychology and Style* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 288–293.

⁵ The Catholic *ralliés* held between thirty and forty seats in the Chamber of Deputies and were allied with such moderate republicans as Charles Dupuy, Alexandre Ribot, and Jules Méline, all of whom headed governments in the 1890s. Albert de Mun was the most visible of the *ralliés* politicians but more representative were Jacques Piou and Etienne Lamy, both of whom were not members of Parliament during these years: Maurice Larkin, *Religion, Politics and Preferment in France since 1890* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 7.

⁶ In common with the Catholics who supported the pope’s “new spirit,” the Solidarists were inspired by a fear of socialism as well as a recognition that extreme individualism was not sufficient to address the needs of modern industrial society. Léon Bourgeois succeeded Ribot and preceded Méline as prime minister (*président du conseil*), holding the post from 1 November 1895 to 21 April 1896. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1920. On Solidarism, see J. E. S. Hayward, “Solidarity: The Social History of an Idea in Nineteenth Century France,” *International Review of Social History* 4 (1959): 261–284, and “The Official Social Philosophy of the French Third Republic: Léon Bourgeois and Solidarism,” *International Review of Social History* 6 (1961): 19–48. Rosalind H. Williams rightly points out that it would be a mistake to view Solidarism in strictly political terms because it was also seen as a moral concept and applied to consumption as well: *Dream Worlds: Mass Consumption in Late Nineteenth-Century France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 270. See also its use to promote French national art: Debora Silverman, 174.

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disappointed, French men and women, yearning for cohesion in the face of internecine conflict, turned increasingly to heroes in the fictions of the theater and the press to find a unity “above” politics.

This book examines constructions of heroism during the *fin de siècle* (1880–1914), the thirty-five-some years preceding the First World War. Exploring the role played by male and female heroes in French society, it links the debates on heroism and gender to the question of national identity. Moreover, it aims to show how and why ordinary French men and women inserted themselves into myths around these national heroes.

Historians disagree about the use of the terms *fin de siècle* and *belle époque* to describe this era, with some preferring the former term for the earlier years, and the latter, to describe those just before the First World War. I myself have referred in this book to the entire period as the *fin de siècle*, but I do acknowledge that there was a change in atmosphere during the years immediately preceding the war. Not only were the French more united than previously, but they were also more self-confident. They had succeeded in putting an end to their international isolation by forging alliances with the Russians and the British, had successfully amassed a colonial empire, and moreover, had hosted three international world fairs that displayed both their might and innovation. To be sure, the same anxieties that had marked the earlier period – notably a fear of national decline – were still present. Nevertheless, the response to these fears was less morose, more defiant, and diffused with humor more than during the *fin-de-siècle* period.⁷

Following historians Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm, who have developed the notion of “imagined” national communities through the “invention of tradition,” I argue that the boulevard theater and the mass press were laboratories for the definition of conflicting views of national identity during this time.⁸ Both attracted the lower middle-class masses, who constituted the backbone of the Third Republic, as well as elites. Anderson has spoken eloquently of the function of the mass press

⁷ The term *fin de siècle* was used by contemporaries, whereas *belle époque* is a retrospective term, used in the aftermath of the Great War. Although some historians such as Eugen Weber place emphasis on the *fin-de-siècle* spirit as distinct from the ten years immediately preceding the war in *France Fin de Siècle* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), 2, others have grouped these years together, among them Roger Shattuck (*The Banquet Years: The Origins of the Avant-Garde in France, 1885 to World War I* [New York: Vintage Books, 1968], 3), calling them the *belle époque*.

⁸ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1991); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; Canto, 1992).

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in creating “imagined communities,” but the role of the boulevard theater, which had an enormous impact on the social, cultural, and political life of the fin de siècle, should also be illuminated. Recent work by Christophe Charle on the theater in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and London illustrates the importance of the theater in fin-de-siècle life, especially in France.⁹ Premieres of important plays were celebrated in the press as events of national importance, while leading actors and actresses were hailed as celebrities. Indeed, Lenard Berlanstein has argued that some actresses even became symbols of national identity.¹⁰ Questions of national importance were debated in the theater as were issues related to gender. The theater became a forum for discussions about women’s roles in French society as well as a place in which new roles could be enacted. The theater thus played an important part in French national life, both as a vehicle for creating national unity and as a motor for revolutionary change.¹¹

By examining the tensions among political, commercial, and gender concerns at the time, I argue that both the theater and the press were used by journalists, playwrights, actors, and at times, political leaders to forge national identity around consumption, in the first case, of the news; in the second, of plays. In an attempt to unite a public profoundly divided outside the theater walls, playwrights like Victorien Sardou, Emile Moreau, and Edmond Rostand sought to transform history into a spectacle to be consumed in the boulevard theater and amplified by the mass press. The three most popular heroes of the era – Napoleon, Joan of Arc, and Cyrano de Bergerac, played by the most beloved actors of

⁹ Christophe Charle, *Théâtres en capitales: Naissance de la société du spectacle à Paris, Berlin, Londres et Vienne: 1860–1914* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2008). During the late nineteenth century, Paris had more theaters and a greater number of seats available to be sold than the other three cities, 27. See also his “Les Théâtres et leurs publics: Paris, Berlin, Vienne, 1860–1914,” in *Capitales culturelles, Capitales symboliques: Paris et les expériences européennes*, ed. Christophe Charle and Daniel Roche (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2002), 403–420. See also Frederic William John Hemmings, *The Theatre Industry in Nineteenth-Century France* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) and *Theatre and State in France, 1760–1905* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). On the theater of the Ancien Régime, see Jeffrey Ravel: *The Contested Parterre: Public Theater and Political Culture, 1680–1791* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).

¹⁰ Lenard Berlanstein, *Daughters of Eve: A Cultural History of French Theater Women from the Old Regime to the Fin de Siècle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 169–175.

¹¹ Mary-Louise Roberts, *Disruptive Acts: The New Woman in Fin-de-Siècle France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Jean Pedersen, *Legislating the Family: Feminism, Theater, and Republican Politics, 1870–1920* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003); and Sally Charnow, *Theatre, Politics, and Markets in Fin-de-Siècle Paris: Staging Modernity* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan: 2005).

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the day – were heroes for a democratic age. These fictionalized heroes – the subject of three chapters of this book – were all too human and were accessible to fin-de-siècle audiences. In the same manner, incidents like the 1897 Bazar de la Charité fire, in which 125 people, mostly prominent women, were killed, and the 1907–1908 Ullmo treason trial – the focus of two other chapters – were transformed into melodramas by a mass press that often estheticized real-life events. The press turned these events into sensationalized news stories known as *faits divers*, thereby blurring the line between fact and fiction. Ironically, however, the efforts to present unifying figures “above politics” were only partially and temporarily successful, because visions of the hero remained embedded in the politics of the time. Nevertheless, during the years immediately leading up to World War I, public weariness of domestic political quarrels as well as the imminent external threat posed by Germany, which sparked a “nationalist revival,” increasingly made such unity independent of political ideologies possible.¹²

The construction of heroes and heroism, essential to an understanding of the emergence of modern French national identity and culture, has been examined by such French historians as Paul Gerbod, Jean-François Chanet, and Christian Amalvi. Their research, however, is largely focused on official celebrations and school manuals, and although they study such female heroes as Joan of Arc, little attention is paid to gender concerns.¹³ Similarly, the contributors to Pierre Nora’s *Les Lieux de mémoire* (translated into English as *Realms of Memory*), a seven-volume work that examines people, places, and monuments inscribed into France’s national memory, do not address the role of gender in the construction of national identity.¹⁴

My work builds principally on that of such historians as Edward Berenson, Rachel Fuchs, George Mosse, Robert Nye, and Karen Offen, all of whom have made important contributions to the field by developing a conceptual framework for the study of national identity through

¹² See Eugen Weber’s now classic work, *The Nationalist Revival in France, 1905–1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

¹³ Paul Gerbod, “L’Éthique héroïque en France (1870–1914),” *La Revue historique*, no. 268 (1982): 409–429; Christian Amalvi, *Les Héros de l’histoire de France* (Paris: Phot’oeil, 1979), and his *De l’art et la manière d’accommoder les héros de l’histoire de France: Essais de mythologie nationale* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1988); Jean-François Chanet, “La Fabrique des héros: Pédagogie républicaine et culte des grands hommes de Sedan à Vichy,” *Vingtième Siècle*, no. 65 (January–March 2000): 13–34.

¹⁴ Pierre Nora, ed., *Les Lieux de mémoire*, 3 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, Quarto, 1997; the volumes were originally published from 1984 to 1992).

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the lens of gender.¹⁵ Recent publications dealing with masculinity, my own earlier work and that of Christopher E. Forth among them, have concentrated on images of male heroes rather than female ones and have focused in particular on the Dreyfus Affair.¹⁶ While giving the Affair its due, I expand the debate about heroes beyond the Affair to other causes célèbres of the period. Although the Affair led to the articulation of two opposing visions of the hero, it does not encompass all aspects of the debate on heroism at this time, in particular, discussions about female heroism.

Historians of France have generally viewed this period as male dominated, despite the “crisis of masculinity” that many middle-class males of the time experienced. Yet as scholars of feminism have illustrated, the same years were instrumental for the feminist movement in France. These two discursive strands of French historiography need to be woven together for a more complete view of the period, as do the threads of political, cultural, and gender history. Some men expressed their fear of female domination in the public sphere in the form of a vociferous anti-feminist, and, at times, misogynist backlash, while others sought to democratize formerly aristocratic notions of honor and manhood. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence of new roles for women in French society and a tacit acceptance of the “female” heroic traits of self-sacrifice and devotion beyond their traditional associations with motherhood. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, women were increasingly rehabilitated and incorporated into a vision of the nation, both as symbols of national

¹⁵ Edward Berenson, *The Trial of Madame Caillaux* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); among her numerous works, see Rachel G. Fuchs, *Contested Paternity: Constructing Families in Modern France* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), and with Elinor Accampo and Mary Lynn Stewart, eds., *Gender and the Politics of Social Reform in France, 1871–1914* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995); George L. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Karen Offen, “Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France,” *American Historical Review* 89, no. 3 (June 1984): 648–676. With the exception of Edward Berenson, who has recently completed *Heroes of Empire: Five Charismatic Men and the Conquest of Africa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), none of these scholars concentrate specifically on heroes, although Robert A. Nye, whose research represents an important underpinning for my work, defines traditional notions of heroism at this time. See his pathbreaking *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

¹⁶ See my *Birth of a National Icon: The Literary Avant-Garde and the Origins of the Intellectual in France* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999); and Christopher E. Forth, *The Dreyfus Affair and the Crisis of Manhood* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).

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identity and as spectators of plays in the boulevard theater and readers of the mass press.

I begin my study of heroes by examining the historical context of the fin de siècle in which the cult of the hero emerged. Next, I proceed to explore fin-de-siècle notions of heroism in the theater and the press, focusing on the role of mass culture in forging national identity as well as that the culture of melodrama in shaping contemporary understandings of heroism.

I. The Nation and the Cult of Heroes

The nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which, truth be told, are but one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the possession in common of a rich heritage of memories; the other is active consent, the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the undivided heritage passed down. ... The nation, like the individual, is the result of a long past of efforts, of sacrifices, and of devotion. The cult of ancestors is the most legitimate of cults; ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory. ... This is the social capital upon which the idea of the nation is founded. To share past glories, a common will in the present; to have done great things together, to desire to do so again, here are the essential conditions for the making of a people. We love in proportion to the sacrifices we have taken on, the ills we have suffered. ... A nation is thus a great solidarity, constituted by the feeling of sacrifices made and those that lie ahead.¹⁷

Ernest Renan, "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" Lecture delivered at the Sorbonne, 11 March, 1882.

When the well-known philosopher Ernest Renan spoke these words, in the wake of the defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and the annexation of the two provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, he was addressing not only his audience at the Sorbonne but also his German audience across the Rhine. In opposition to such German thinkers as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, he was arguing for a nation defined not by race, religion, language, or economic considerations, but rather by a democratically constructed union created from common experiences and a sense of solidarity. In the atmosphere of what one historian has described as "the culture of defeat," Renan was essentially turning defeat on its head, arguing in favor of France's moral superiority over its German victor.¹⁸ In addressing his countrymen

¹⁷ An excerpt of this text is reproduced in Raoul Girardet, *Nationalismes et Nation* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1996), 137–139.

¹⁸ Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery*, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York: Picador, 2004), 125.

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and women, Renan exhorted them to unite around the newly established Third Republic, a regime born of defeat and the civil war of the Commune. For Renan, as well as his contemporaries, heroism in the past, present, and future played a key role in forging national identity. Great men (and some women) sacrificed themselves for the glory and survival of the nation, and, moreover, served as examples for the ordinary French men and women who shared in these sacrifices.¹⁹

The fin de siècle then was a formative period for the forging of French national identity. Modern French national identity, as we understand it today is a relatively recent phenomenon, a product of both the Revolution and especially the Third Republic, whose leaders sought to establish the new regime's legitimacy by forging links with the past, first and foremost with the French Revolution.²⁰ Accordingly, during the Third Republic's early years, its leaders instituted republican symbols – adopting the “Marseillaise” as the national anthem and establishing July 14 as a national holiday. They also sought to replace the influence of the Catholic Church, passing legislation on civil marriage; relegalizing divorce; and establishing secular, compulsory, and free primary schools. The schools, along with a massive (the Freycinet Plan) program of railroad and road building, as well as universal military service, and the concomitant emergence of mass culture, thereby transformed a nation of “peasants into Frenchmen,” a process brilliantly described by historian Eugen Weber.²¹

Another means by which the regime sought to establish its legitimacy was through the cult of heroes. In the years following defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, the cult of the hero gained great popularity in France. The contemporary exaltation of the army and the intense interest in both dueling and sports served to promote the heroic ideal. The cult of the hero manifested itself in the curriculum of the primary schools as well

¹⁹ As historian David Bell notes, there is no female equivalent for the term *grand homme* because “grande femme” means a big woman rather than a great one! David A. Bell, *The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 127. On the cult of *grands hommes*, see Jean-Claude Bonnet, *Naissance du Panthéon: Essai sur le culte des grands hommes* (Paris: Fayard, 1998).

²⁰ David Bell places the origins of the nation in the eighteenth century. National identity is, of course, always in flux. Nevertheless, the idea of an abstract identity, which means that one is French first and foremost, with personal affiliations of gender, religion, and ethnicity relegated to the private realm, is a legacy of the French Revolution.

²¹ Eugen Weber, *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1976). See also a critique of Weber's work in James Lehning, *Peasant and French: Cultural Contact in Rural France during the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

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as in literature and the arts. The search for heroes was the consequence of a widespread sense of national inferiority vis-à-vis Germany and a desire to promote heroes for the expansion of the empire, as well as the product of collective guilt with regard to the egoism and selfishness of modern consumer culture. Both these fears fueled the contemporary crisis of masculinity in France, which was further exacerbated by the decline in the national birthrate and the emergence of the New Woman, who challenged traditional gender roles.²² The close associations of the notion of honor and the culture of the sword also help to explain the particular resonance of military heroes. Certainly, civilian heroes were also celebrated, but it was the cult of the military hero that held sway.

In his study, *The Culture of Defeat*, Wolfgang Schivelbusch has described what he calls a “gender reversal” between France and Germany in the wake of the Franco-Prussian war, arguing that the loss in the war transformed France into a maiden in distress, while a united Germany thereafter assumed the male role.²³ Schivelbusch is undoubtedly right that France was henceforth seen as a maiden in distress, even by some of her own countrymen and women, but it is worth noting that France was associated with the so-called “feminine” influences of civilization long before the loss in the war. Nevertheless, it is true that the cult of the hero was deemed all the more necessary after France’s stunning defeat to the Germans. The hero provided a means by which to avenge France’s humiliation in the war. For her countrymen and women, France may have lost on the field of battle, but she still possessed a proud tradition of honor and glory.

The republican state as well as the Catholic Church, which were often at loggerheads, both promoted various figures, each establishing its own “Pantheon” of heroes.²⁴ The republican pantheon undoubtedly contained more men of letters like Victor Hugo, “pantheonized” in 1885,

²² See Nye, *Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor*, 225; and Berenson, *The Trial of Madame Caillaux*, 186–198. See also the important study by Annelise Mauge, *L’Identité masculine en crise au tournant du siècle, 1871–1914* (Paris: Rivages, 1987; Payot, 2001).

²³ According to Schivelbusch, before the Franco-Prussian war, Germany – in particular, Prussia – was celebrated by such nineteenth-century thinkers as Germaine de Staël as the representative of a literary and “feminine” culture, while France led by the Napoleonic armies was seen as a conquering male hero: Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat*, 120. It is true that the two countries are seen today, at least by Americans, as respectively male and female. A recent *New York Times* article discussed this gendering: Nina Bernstein, “For Americans, It’s French Sissies vs. German He-Men,” *New York Times*, 28 September 2003.

²⁴ Indeed, the Pantheon itself was the object of struggle between the republicans who claimed it for the republic, and Catholics, who viewed this appropriation as a desecration of the former Church of Sainte-Geneviève. The Pantheon reverted to the republicans