Index

ACG PSA, expenditures by, 233–34
Achncarry Agreement (“As Is” system), 205n. 33
Adams, Terry, 244–45, 254–55
Africa
petroleum reserves in, 202, 209
taxation in mineral-rich rentier states of, 332–33
Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company, 265, 265n. 15
Agricultural Development Fund (ADF), (Turkmenistan), 100–05
agricultural sector
in Azerbaijan, 237–42, 307n. 5
in Kazakhstan, 269–74, 305–06
in Russia, 149
in Turkmenistan, 90, 99–100
in Uzbekistan of, 90, 99–100, 110–14
Alekperov, Vagit, 24–25
Aleskerov, Valekh, 225, 244–45
Algeria, 207n. 37
Alyiev, Heydar, 222, 225n. 13, 227, 239–42, 241n. 16, 246–52
Alyiev, Ilham, 219, 249–50
Alt, James, 9n. 7
American Independent Oil Company
(AMINOL), 190
Amoco, merger with BP, 209n. 40, 252–53
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 205
Angola, petroleum industry in, 192, 201, 311, 311n. 11
Arabian Oil Company, 183n. 7
Aramco, Saudi Arabia contract with, 190, 196–97, 199n. 26
Arch of Neutrality (Turkmenistan), 104
ARCO oil company, 202–03, 203n. 31
Argentina, 326n. 2
Arkhangelskgeologia oil company, 131n. 11
Armenia, Azerbaijani war with, 236n. 29
Asanbayev, Yerik, 269
Asia Barometer Survey, 107–08, 110–14
Atyrau Bonus Fund Program, 274–81
authoritarian regimes. See also ownership structure; state-run government structures
mineral rents and, 32–33, 34–38, 43–44, 531–35
in mineral-rich states, 2, 327–30
resource curse thesis and, 123–27
societal expectations and, 58–70
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 81–87
Auty, Richard, 75
Azerbaijan
agricultural production in, 307n. 5
corruption in, 252–56
distributional conflict in, 107
expenditures in, 220–22, 233–37
foreign investment in, 202n. 30, 218–258, 219
hybrid fiscal regime in, 220–22, 226, 256–58
integrated pipeline systems in, 26n. 26
mineral sector taxation in, 226–29
nationalization of petroleum by, 219n. 1
natural resource fund in, 220–22, 227–29, 246–52, 331–32
non-mineral sector expenditures and taxation in, 229–33, 242–44
oil reserve estimates in, 25–26
ownership structure in, 19n. 14, 19–27
petroleum wealth in, 20–27, 24n. 22, 24n. 23
production-sharing agreements in, 138n. 33, 222n. 6, 222n. 8, 222–26

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Azerbaijan (cont.)
SOCAR expenditures in, 237–42
societal expectations in, 246–52
SOFAZ expenditures in, 237–42
state ownership without control (S2) in, 119–20, 123n. 1, 219–58
transaction costs, 244–45
Azerbaijani Charity Fund, 235
Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), 222n. 6, 222–26, 225n. 12, 226n. 14, 227n. 15
coercion and, 252–56, 254n. 49
expenditures by, 233–37
tax policy for, 227
Azerineft, 224–26
Azizbekov Institute of Oil and Chemistry, 24–25
Azneftkimiya, 224–26
Bagirov, Sabit, 244–45
“Baikalfinsgroup,” 131n. 12, 131–32
Baku oil fields, 221
history of, 24n. 22, 24–25
Balqimbayev, Nurlan, 260, 265–66, 295–96
banking reforms, Russian private sector growth and, 148–49
bargaining. See also explicit bargaining; implicit bargaining; obsolescing bargain theory
implicit vs. explicit, 71
lack of transparency in, 72
ownership structures and, 70–71
Rashneft oil company, 129–31
behavioral economics
state ownership with control and, 51–55
taxation costs and, 50n. 11, 50–58
Berdimuhamedov, Gurbanguly, 119
Berezovsky, Boris, 128–29
Blair, Tony, 181
Bolivia, 238, 262n. 2, 311n. 8
Bolshevik Revolution, history of petroleum production and, 24–25, 221
bonuses, in production-sharing agreements (PSAs), 191n. 16
boom and bust cycles
domestic private owners’ behavior during, 70
Dutch disease and, 327–30
excess profits taxes and, 67–68
fiscal regime stability and, 48–49
foreign investment vulnerability to, 208
Kazakhstan coercion of foreign oil companies during, 293–96
in petroleum industry, 20–21, 21n. 16
public spending and societal expectations and, 60–61, 64
in Russian gas sector, 172
Botswana, 123n. 1
developmental exceptionalism of, 3
economic growth in, 2–3, 330n. 7
“Boycott Shell” campaign, 200–01
Brazil, private domestic ownership in, 46n. 3, 121
Bridas oil company, 78n. 3, 82–83
British Gas/BG/Agip, 265–69, 274–75, 293
British Petroleum (BP)
in Azerbaijan, 219, 221n. 4, 224, 227, 247–48
coercion in Azerbaijan and, 252–56
corporate social responsibility and, 211
Enterprise Center established by, 233n. 22, 233–34, 235–37
expenditures in Azerbaijan by, 234n. 23, 234n. 24, 234, 235
foreign investment activities of, 182, 183n. 6, 201–02, 205
hybrid fiscal regime in Azerbaijan and, 256–58
international NGO collaboration with, 235–37
merger with Amoco, 209n. 40, 252–53
Russian investment by, 129–31
broad-based tax systems, revenue generation from, 34–38
Bromley, Daniel, 10
Browne, John, 247–48
brown fields, 261–63, 263n. 4, 265n. 5
Brunnschweiler, Christa N., 329–30
Buckee, Jim, 181
expenditures, 39–43
extrabudgetary funds and, 100n. 43, 100–05
foreign investment influence on, 208–15
implicit bargaining and, 114–16
in Kazakhstan, 266–69, 274–84
National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan and, 278–81
private domestic ownership and, 57–58, 66–67
SOCAR expenditures, 237–42, 240n. 35
societal expectations of foreign investment and, 200, 201–04
Index

SOFAZ expenditures, 237–42, 240n. 35
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan comparisons, 80–81, 88, 114–16
Bush, George H. W., 61n. 26
Business Development Alliance, 233n. 22, 235–37, 236n. 28
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPs), 117, 117n. 59–116

capital investment patterns
in mineral-rich states, 6
national oil companies and, 54–55, 55n. 19
CARE relief organization, 237
Caspian Basin, petroleum reserves in, 22n. 18, 22–23, 209
Caspian Development Advisory Panel (CDAP), 235
Caspian International Petroleum Company, 253–56
Central Asia Petroleum, 264
central bank financing, in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 95
central planning
in mineral-rich states, 6
retention in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan of, 96
Uzbekistani popular support for, 110–14
Chad-Cameroon Oil and Pipeline Project, 40, 215, 215n. 44
Chavez, Hugo, 54, 76
control of petroleum industry by, 54–55
Chernomyrdin, Viktor, 132n. 17, 132–34, 133n. 19
Cheung, S., 50n. 12
Chevron, 183n. 6
Kazakhstan investments by, 263, 266–69
merger with Texaco, 209n. 40
Chile, 2–3, 123n. 1, 182n. 1
China
foreign investment in petroleum by, 203
fuel subsidies in, 52
information asymmetry in, 71n. 14
mineral development delay and internal consumption in, 47
ownership structure in, 132n. 1
China National Offshore Oil Corporation, 293
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), 86–87, 203, 211, 263–64, 264n. 11, 293–96
claimant status
of domestic private owners (DPOs), 55–58
foreign investment and societal expectations and, 195–204
ownership structures and, 10
power relations and, 70–76, 204–15
societal expectations and, 58–70
of state ownership structures, 208
transaction costs and, 51–55, 189–94
CNPS-Aktobemunaigas, 292
Coase, Ronald, 50, 50n. 10
coercion
Azerbaijan and foreign oil companies, 220, 252–56, 254n. 49
Kazakhstan and foreign oil companies, 291–96
ownership structures and, 70–71, 204–15
collective action problem (CAP) in Azerbaijan, 252–56
in Kazakhstan coercion, 291–96
power relations in foreign investment and, 211n. 42, 211–12
power relations with foreign investors, 188–89
collusion. See intra-elite agreements
colonialism
domestic politics and ownership structures in, 300–01
ownership structure preferences and, 309–16
path dependency of ownership structure and, 315, 315n. 16
resource curse thesis in context of, 6–7
commercial banking, Russian oil sector privatization and, 127–32
common property resources (CPRs), resource curse thesis concerning, 27–28
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). See also Russia; Soviet successor states
countries in, 17n. 10
foreign investment in, 202n. 30
map of, 5
oil and gas production and proven reserves in, 17, 22–23
petroleum wealth and fiscal regime in, 16–27
Compañía Venezolana de Petróleo, 46n. 5
concession agreements
foreign investment in petroleum and, 190, 190n. 10, 191n. 14
independent petroleum contracts and, 206–07
private foreign ownership and, 305
Conoco oil company, 131n. 11
constitutional reforms
in Turkmenistan, 81–84
in Uzbekistan, 85–87
Index

Uzbekistan foreign investment and lack of, 87, 119–20
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), 17n. 12, 17–19, 118n. 62
in Kazakhstan, 296–98
cost oil
private foreign ownership and, 305, 305n. 4
in production-sharing agreements, 191n. 16
cotton exports
extrabudgetary funds and, 100n. 43
production quotas and price controls in, 90
in Turkmenistan, 88n. 30, 99–100
Uzbekistan reliance on, 89–90, 99–100, 116, 303–04
crude oil, commodity trading activity of, 23n. 19
cult of personality, Niyazov’s establishment of, 81–84
D’Arcy Concession, 190, 190n. 10
dataset characteristics
ownership structure in petroleum-rich countries, 309–16, 310n. 6, 310n. 8
ranking basis for countries, 357
resource curse thesis and, 323–27
wealth and path dependence and, 327–30
debt burden
mineral sector taxation and, 34–38
Russian expenditure reforms and, 145–46
debt service payments, extrabudgetary funds for, 100–05
decision-making by elites. See also governing elites; sovereign decision-making
Azerbaijan non-mineral sector expenditures and, 242–44
in Kazakhstan, 259–98
ownership structures and, 75–76
SOCAR expenditures and, 239–42
taxation costs and, 51, 51n. 13
deficit spending, Russian fiscal regime and, 135
demand
institutions as product of, 11–13
Democratic Republic of Congo, 52
democratization
absence in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan of, 118, 118n. 63
mineral-rich rentier states and, 331–35
resource curse thesis and, 323–27
revenue generation, 31–32
deregulation of business, Russian economic growth and, 148–49
developing countries
Index

domestic politics and ownership structures in, 300
history of foreign investment in, 190
international norms concerning involvement in, 206–07
mineral abundance in, 1–4, 75
ownership structure variation in, 345
private domestic ownership in, 70n. 33
societal expectations of foreign investment in, 195–204
sovereign decision-making criteria in, 311–12
direct distribution schemes, 208–15
direct taxation, 33–34, 34n. 3
Azerbaijan non-mineral sector, 229–33
constraints on state from, 34–38, 35n. 6
economic growth and state-owned enterprises and, 63
in mineral-rich countries, 37n. 9
rentier states and, 332–33
Russian tax reform and, 140–44
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 93
distributional conflict
international diffusion effect, 314n. 13
in mineral-rich states, 32–33
non-petroleum alternative revenues and, 312–13
ordinary least squares (OLS) model and, 316n. 19
ownership structure and, 301–09, 319–21
regime type and, 316, 316n. 18
in rentier states, 314–35
Doing Business in 2005, 117–18
Doing Business in 2006, 119n. 65, 232–33
Doing Business in 2007, 119n. 65
domestic constraints, absence in mineral-rich states of, 6
domestic private owners (DPO). See private domestic ownership structure (P)
Dubov, Vladimir, 166–67
Dunning, Thad, 334–35
Durán, Esperanza, 63
Dutch disease
effects in Russia of, 122–24
export collapse and, 2
National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan and, 278–81
SOFAZ expenditures and, 239–42
state ownership with control and, 63
wealth and dependence and, 327–30
Early Oil Project (Azerbaijan), 234
East Asian economic growth, mineral-rich states compared with, 75–76
“East Asian tigers,” import substitution and, 61n. 30, 316
economic development
Gazprom’s role in, 177
government legitimacy tied to, 75–76
human capital development, 34
Kazakhstan expenditures and, 274–81
mineral development delay and internal consumption and, 47
multistakeholder approach to, 208–15
natural resource funds and, 41–42
ownership structures and, 316
path dependency and, 327–30
resource curse thesis and, 3–4, 323–27
revenue generation and, 31–32
in Russia, 123n. 2, 140–44, 159, 174, 174n. 79, 178n. 83
state role in, 62–64
in Uzbekistan, 110–14
Ecuador
Amazon for Life campaign in, 195n. 24
democratization and petroleum wealth in, 326n. 2
foreign investment in petroleum in, 202–03, 203n. 31
fuel subsidies in, 238
rent-seeking behavior in, 64
education spending
Azerbaijan foreign oil company expenditures on, 235
by Gazprom, 169–72
Kazakhstan foreign oil company expenditures on, 274–81
by Russian oil companies, 164n. 69
in Uzbekistan, 102–04, 103n. 45, 104n. 46
Elchibey, Abulfez, 224, 224n. 9
employment
Azerbaijan expendiures outside mineral sector, 242–44
Russian expenditure declines and, 147
Russian public opinion concerning state role in, 159
SOCAR (Azerbaijan) labor productivity and, 238–39, 239n. 31
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 117–18, 119–20
energy rents
in Soviet successor states, 78–79
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan taxation on, 90
ENI/AGIP company, 183n. 7
Enron Oil and Gas Company, 57
investment in post-Soviet Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 78
Entelis, John, 53
Index

Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (ENI), 183n. 7, 206–07
enterprise bureaucrats in fiscal regime stability, 11–13
governing elites and, 11
in Soviet Union, 20
enterprise profit taxes (EPT) in Soviet Union, 19
state-owned enterprises and, 36n. 7, 36–38
Entrepreneurship Development Foundation (EDF), 247, 247n. 38
Entreprise de Recherches et d’Activités Pétrolières (ERAP), 206–07
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA), Azerbaijan’s societal expectations and, 251
environmental protection corporate social responsibility and, 68–69
foreign investment commitment to, 191–94
in Kazakhstan, 266–69, 289–90
Esso oil company, 205
Eurasia Partnership Foundation (EPF), 252n. 45
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 84, 86
socio-economic indicators from, 17n. 11
excess profits taxes on domestic private owners, 67–68, 70
on foreign oil companies, 193n. 19
Kazakhstan tax revenue from, 273, 273n. 21
Russian tax reform and, 140–44
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan reliance on, 93
exchange rate in Botswana, 2–3
export windfalls, 2
excise taxes in Azerbaijan, 231
in Uzbekistan, 88n. 30, 90
expatriates, personal income tax on, 230
expenditures. See public sector spending in Azerbaijan, 233–37, 242–44
corruption and, 293–96
fiscal regime stability and, 11–13, 18–31, 194, 195–204
foreign investment in petroleum and, 188–91, 194, 195–204
fuel subsidies in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan as portion of, 98–100
Gazprom public sector spending, state pressure for, 177
hybrid fiscal regimes and, 220–22
implicit bargaining in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan fiscal regimes and, 114–16
in Kazakhstan, by foreign oil companies, 16–27, 274–81, 291–96
Kazakhstan non-mineral sector expenditures and, 281–84
in mineral-rich and rentier-states, 331–35
national oil companies’ mismanagement of, 52–53, 60
ownership structures and historical patterns of, 13–16
in Russia, 144–52, 159, 169–72, 177–80
by SOCAR, 237–42
societal expectations and, 58–70, 60n. 23, 195–204
by SOFAZ, 237–42
in Soviet successor states, 16–27
taxation and, 31–44, 61n. 26, 61–70
transparency and, 32–33
in Turkmenistan, 95–116, 118–19
in Uzbekistan public opinion concerning, 95–116, 118–19
explicit bargaining defined, 71
fiscal regime strength and, 73
Russian fiscal regime and, 165–68
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan secrecy concerning, 114–16
explicit taxes, 34
in Russia, 134–36, 169–72
in Turkmenistan, 88
in Uzbekistan, 90
export revenues coercion in Kazakhstan concerning, 293–96
exchange rate and, 2
extrabudgetary funds and, 100n. 42, 100–05
for Gazprom, 174–77, 175n. 80
in mineral-rich and rentier states, 331–35
ordinary least squares (OLS) model and, 316n. 19, 316–19
ownership structure and, 319–21
path dependency and, 327–30, 328n. 4
petroleum wealth based on, 309–16
public spending and societal expectations and, 60–61
in Russia, 138–44, 139n. 34, 308–09
state ownership with control structure and, 47, 79–80
in Turkmenistan, 81–84, 82n. 9, 88, 90
Uzbekistan taxes on, 89–90
extrabudgetary funds (EBFs)
Kazakhstan expenditures outside the mineral sector, 281–84
Russian fiscal regime and use of, 135

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Index

SOFAZ expenditures in Azerbaijan and, 219–42
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 200n. 27, 200–01
Extractive Industries Review, 200n. 27, 200–01
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), 43n. 18
Azerbaijan membership in, 240n. 34, 252–56

British Petroleum in Azerbaijan and,
Kazakhstan reluctance concerning,
National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan and,
Exxon Corporation, 183n. 6, 201, 202.
See also Standard Oil of New Jersey corporate social responsibility and, 211
merger with Mobil, 209n. 40
social spending in Azerbaijan by, 235, 237

Federal Budget Law (Russia), 144–45, 177–80
financial reserve fund (Reservny Fond) creation in Russia of, 145, 146
Russian transparency concerning, 166
fiscal regimes. See also hybrid fiscal regimes; strong fiscal regimes; weak fiscal regimes in Azerbaijan, 220–22
expenditures and, 11–13, 38–43
explicit bargaining and, 165–68
foreign investment in petroleum and,
implicit bargaining in Turkmenistan/ Uzbekistan and, 114–16
institutions and, 3–4
in Kazakhstan petroleum industry, 259–98
in mineral-rich states, 31–44, 324n. 1
ownership structure and, 9–16, 74–76, 116–20
power relations and, 70–76, 206–15
private domestic ownership and, 48–49,
private foreign ownership and, 183–86
research methodology concerning, 1–4,
resource curse thesis concerning, 1–4,
27–28
in Russia, 121–22, 134n. 25, 134–36, 135n. 26, 152–80
societal expectations and, 58–70
in Soviet successor states, petroleum wealth and, 16–27

state ownership with control and, 48–49, 116–20
state ownership without control and,
tax systems in, 33–38, 87–94
transactions costs and, 50–58
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan comparisons of,
flat taxes, 38n. 11
Russian oil companies' support for,
foreign exchange regimes (FER), in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 90, 100–05
Foreign Investors Council (Kazakhstan), 291–96, 292n. 36
foreign oil companies (FOCs)
Azerbaijan expenditures and taxation and,
Azerbaijan hybrid fiscal regime and, 226
coercion of, 252–56, 291–96
corporate social responsibility and,
fiscal regimes and ownership structure and, 181–189
historical patterns of, 13–16
host government, contractual relations with, 42–43
international diffusion effect, 314n. 13
international norms concerning, 14–16
in Kazakhstan, 86
in mineral-rich states, 6
minimization of, in state ownership with control, 79–80
ownership structures and, 193–94, 215–184
regional diffusion effect, 314
in Russian gas sector, 132n. 15, 132–34, 133n. 18, 172
in Russian oil sector, 26, 129n. 9, 129–31, 155n. 55, 155–56
societal expectations and, 183–86, 195–204
state ownership with control, 48
state ownership without control and,
transaction costs and, 183–86, 188–89, 244–45
foreign oil companies (FOCs) (cont.)
in Turkmenistan, 25n. 15, 77–79, 78n. 3, 78n. 15, 114–16
foreign trade
Soviet successor state petroleum industry access to, 26, 26n. 16
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan taxation of, 93
former Soviet Union (FSU). See Soviet successor states
Freedom House Index, 118n. 63
Friedman, Thomas, 322
fuel subsidies
Azerbaijan tax revenue for, 228–29
coercion and, 293–96
for domestic private owners, 65–70, 66n. 32
governing elites’ use of, 52
in Kazakhstan, 282–83, 293–96
public spending and societal expectations and, 60–61
Russian economic reforms and, 149, 169–72, 170n. 76
SOCAR expenditures on, 228–29, 237–42
in Turkmenistan, 77, 98–100
in Uzbekistan, 98–100
Fund for Children’s Sports Development (Uzbekistan), 120
Fund for Settlements for Agricultural Products Purchased for State Needs (Uzbekistan), 116
G-77, formation of, 206–07
Gaidar, Yegor, 168
gas quotas. See also natural gas
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 98–100
Gazprom, 23, 56–57
formation of, 124
governing elites’ ties to, 174–77
lost assets of, 134, 134n. 24
media holdings of, 176, 176n. 81
monopoly structure of, 122, 173n. 77
pipeline network of, 134n. 22
privatization of, 132–34, 133n. 19, 133n. 20, 134n. 23, 168–77, 319–21
state takeover of Yukos oil company and, 133n. 12
undercapitalization and mismanagement of, 172
Gazprom Joint Stock Company, 124
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), Russian acceptance of, 166, 166n. 71
geographic isolation
democratization and petroleum wealth and, 326–27
foreign investment in petroleum and, 196–97
Gershenkron, Alexander, 1, 335
Giffen, James, 295–96
Global Witness, 200, 201–02
Goldman Sachs Energy Environmental and Social Index, 211, 254–55
goods and services
Azerbaijan foreign oil companies’ expenditure, 235
foreign investment as source of, 201–04
private property rights legitimation, 69
public spending in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan on, 100–05
Russian expenditure reforms and public spending reductions on, 150–51
Russian gas sector revenues for, 169–72
Russian privatization of, public opinion concerning, 157–65
state ownership with control and, 61–62
Goskomstat (Russian statistics collection bureau), 165–66
governing elites. See also intra-elite agreements; leadership structure; patronage networks
budget stability and transparency and, 66–67
coection and, 252–56, 291–96
distributional conflict and, 301–09
enterprise bureaucrats and, 11
explicit bargaining by ROCs and, 165–68
fiscal regime stability and, 48–49
Gazprom ties with, 174–77, 179–80
geographical distribution of petroleum wealth and, 186–87
implicit bargaining by, 72–73, 114–16
import substitution embraced by, 63
interviews with, 337–43
in Kazakhstan, 259–98, 281n. 29, 305–06
in mineral-rich and rentier states, 334–35
National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan and, 278–81
in national oil companies’ management structure, 48n. 7, 53n. 15, 53n. 16, 53
ownership structure preferences of, 21–22, 74–76, 301–09
power relations with foreign investors, 70–76, 204–15

Index
Index

private domestic ownership, 11–13, 47–49, 55–58
private foreign ownership and, 182n. 4, 182–89
resource curse thesis and, 319–21
Russian gas sector privatization and, 132–34, 133n. 18, 133n. 19, 133n. 20, 134n. 23, 174–77
Russian oil sector privatization and, 127–32
Russian public sector spending and, 145n. 43, 148, 160, 160n. 63
Russian tax system and, 134n. 25, 134–36, 135n. 26, 160–63
societal expectations of foreign investment and, 195–204
state ownership with control and, 46, 53–54, 301–09
state ownership without control and, 183n. 5, 183–89, 301–09
in Turkmenistan, 81–84, 82n. 8, 105–14
in Uzbekistan, 105–07, 113, 305
government borrowing, taxation and, 61–70
Guatemala, private domestic ownership in, 46n. 3, 121
Gulf of Mexico Foundation, 48n. 9
Gulf Oil, 183n. 6, 205
“Gulf-plus formula” for petroleum pricing, 204–05, 205n. 32, 205n. 33
Gusinsky, Vladimir, 176
Haber, Stephen, 326–27
health care spending
Azerbaijan foreign oil company expenditures on, 235
foreign investment commitment to, 191–94
private sector growth in Russia and, 130
Herb, Michael, 326–27
Herrera Campins, Luis, 54n. 17
Horiiuchi, Y., 323–27
host countries. See also specific countries, e.g. Azerbaijan
foreign investor contractual relations with, 14–16, 42–43, 194n. 22
IFI/INGO influence in, 208–15
obsolescing bargain theory and, 207–08
oil pricing controls of, 208
power relations of foreign investors with, 204–15
production-sharing agreements in, 191–94
societal expectations of foreign investment and, 195–204
transaction costs and, 189–94
housing subsidies, termination in Russia of, 167–68
human capital development expenditures on, 38–43
Kazakhstan government expenditures on, 283, 283n. 31
requirements for, 34
in Uzbekistan, 102–04, 104n. 46, 117–18
Human Development Index (HDI)
Kazakhstan government expenditures and, 283n. 31
Russian expenditure reforms and, 151
in Soviet successor states, 17, 17n. 9
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 117–18
Hurricane Hydrocarbons (Canada), 264, 266–69, 274–81, 292, 293–96
hybrid fiscal regimes
foreign investment in Azerbaijan and, 220–22, 226, 256–58
in Kazakhstan, 265–66, 296–98
Kazakhstan transaction costs and, 283–86
ownership structures and, 13–16
power relations and foreign investors, 210–15
Illarionov, Andrei, 167–68
implicit bargaining
defined, 71
information concealment and, 72
in private domestic ownership, 72–73
Russian oil and gas sectors and, 168–77
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 114–16
implicit taxes, 34, 38
for domestic private owners, 65–70
fuel subsidies as, 98–100
governing elites’ use of, 52
mismanagement linked to, 52–53
in Russia, 134–36, 169–72
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 88, 90
import substitution (ISI)
economic growth linked to, 62–64, 63n. 30, 315–316
human capital development and, 103–04
industrialization in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan and, 80–81, 96–97, 99–100
for private enterprise development and, 67
textile industry and, 97
in Uzbekistan, 80–81, 103–04
income inequality
Kazakhstan redistribution and, 284
Russian expenditure reforms and, 151n. 52
in state ownership with control, 74–76
income taxes. See also personal income taxes (PIT)
Azerbaijan revenue from, 228–29
in Kazakhstan, 269–74
revenue generation from, 37–38
independent oil companies, power relations and foreign investment by, 206–07
indirect taxation, 33–34, 34n. 3
Azerbaijan non-mineral sector, 229–33
visibility of, 68n.10n.5, 34–38
petroleum-rich states and, 332–33
Russian Tax Code and, 137–44
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 93
Indonesia
democratization in, 323–24
foreign investment in, 211–12
fuel subsidies in, 238
petroleum development in, 311n. 9, 311n. 10, 311
production-sharing agreements in, 191n. 15, 191–94, 192n. 18
industrialization
state sponsorship of, 62–64
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 96–97, 99–100
informal economy
in Azerbaijan, 231–32, 232n. 20
in Kazakhstan, 269–274
Russian tax reforms and, 138–44, 139n. 35
in Uzbekistan, 117n. 62, 117–18
information asymmetry
domestic private owners and, 72–73
power relations and, 70–76
Russian transparency concerning explicit bargaining and, 165–68
societal expectations of foreign investment and, 201–04
state vs. private ownership structures and, 71n. 34
transaction costs and, 50n. 10, 50–58
institution building
economic growth linked to, 3–4
government spending and, 38–43
negative economic/political outcomes and, 2
ownership structures and, 74–76
power relations with foreign investors and, 204–15
as product of supply and demand, 11–13
state ownership with control vs. private domestic ownership and, 48–49
transaction costs as incentives for, 50–58
internal energy consumption
Azerbaijan mineral sector expenditures and, 234
Gazprom production and, 174–77, 175n. 80
import substitution and, 63
in mineral-rich states, 47, 79–80
societal expectations for public spending and taxation and, 62
wealth creation and, 327–30
internally displaced persons (IDPs),
Azerbaijan mineral sector expenditures on, 235–37, 236n. 29
International Alert organization, 233n. 22, 235–37
international diffusion effect, ownership structure and, 311n. 11, 314n. 13
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 237
international financial institutions (IFIs)
in Azerbaijan, 220, 242–44, 246–52
export dependency advocacy by, 327–330, 328n. 4
foreign investment norms and, 14–16, 183–89, 208–15
government spending and, 38–43
in Kazakhstan, 285–86, 289–90, 295–96
model contracts and, 193–94
petroleum revenue management and, 215–18
rentier states and, 331–35
resource curse thesis and, 322–23
societal expectations and role of, 193–204
state ownership with control and private domestic ownership structures and, 48, 185–89
transparency goals of, 33
Uzbekistan taxation system and, 119–20
international loan programs
Turkmenistan oil and gas sector and, 84, 86
in Uzbekistan, 86, 95
international market conditions, oil prices and, 314–15, 315n. 15
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
on Kazakhstan tax revenue, 269–74
National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan and, 278–81
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs)
in Azerbaijan, 220, 235–37, 246–56, 252n. 45
coercion and, 252–56
export dependency advocacy by, 328n. 4
foreign investment norms and, 14–16, 183–89, 193–94, 208–15
in Kazakhstan, 285–86, 289–90, 295–96
Index

model contract and, 285–86
petroleum revenue management and, 215–184
power relations of foreign investors and, 14–16, 208–15
rentier states and, 331–35
resource curse thesis and, 322–23
state ownership with control and private domestic ownership structures and, 48
transaction costs and, 285–86
transparency goals of, 33
in Uzbekistan, 119–20
International Petroleum Company (IPC), 190n. 11, 201n. 29, 205, 206–07
International Rescue Committee, 235–37
intra-elite agreements
foreign investment influence in, 211n. 42, 211–12
local governments and Russian oil companies, 163–65
national oil companies and, 54
power relations and, 70–76
private domestic ownership and, 55–58
private foreign ownership and, 182–89
transaction costs in state ownership with control and, 51–55
investment decision-making
centralization in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan of, 96
by governing elites, 52–53
institutional influence on, 3–4
Russian economic growth and, 148n. 48, 148–49
Iran
independent petroleum contracts with, 206–07
petroleum production quotas in, 205
Turkmenistan pipeline agreement with, 81–84, 82n. 10
Iraq
independent petroleum contracts in, 206–07
IPC oil contract with, 190n. 11
Tripoli Agreement and, 207n. 37
U.S. influence on petroleum contracts in, 205n. 33
Iraqi constitution of 2005, Article 108, 10
Iraqi Draft Oil and Gas Law, 193
ISAR (NGO), 246–52
Ishanov, Khekim, 82–83
ITIC tax group, Kazakhstan transaction costs and, 285–86
Japan Export-Import Bank, 84, 86
JGC company, 86
Joint Stock Society Gazprom (RAO Gazprom), 132–34
joint ventures
in Azerbaijan petroleum industry, 224n. 10
foreign investment participation in, 205
state ownership with control and, 7–9
in Turkmenistan petroleum sector, 82–85
in Uzbekistan, 86–87
Jones-Luong-McMann survey, 110n. 56, 110–14
Kazakhstan societal expectations and, 286–91

Kamenev, Sergei, 110n. 56
Kamp, Marianne, 103
Karachaganak consortium, 295–96
Karimov, Islam, 77n. 2, 85–87, 118–20
public addresses by, 113–14
Karl, Terry Lynn, 1, 31
Kazakhgazprom, 261–66
Kazakhhoil, formation of, 264–65
Kazakhstan, 123n. 1
coercion of foreign oil companies in, 291–96
distributional conflict in, 305–06
emergence as petroleum-rich state, 20–27
expenditures within mineral sector, 274–81
fiscal regime in, 16–27, 281–84
foreign investment in, 86, 202n. 30, 211–12
fuel subsidies in, 98
history of petroleum production in, 240n. 23, 24–25
hybrid fiscal regime in, 265–66
mineral sector taxation in, 266–69
non-mineral sector expenditures and taxation in, 269–74, 281–84
oil reserve estimates in, 25–26
ownership structure in, 19n. 14, 19–27
petroleum quality and extraction difficulty in, 26
poverty reduction in, 151–52
private foreign ownership in, 259–98
private sector growth in, 148n. 47
production-sharing agreements in, 138n. 33, 224–26
public opinion surveys in, 110n. 56
societal expectations in, 286–91, 331–35
tax system in, 112, 227, 231n. 18, 232–33
transaction costs, 285–86
Kazakhstanmunaigas, 261–66
Kazakhstan Petroleum Association (KPA), 294, 294n. 39, 295–96
Index

Kazhegeldin, Akezhan, 260
KazMunaiGaz (KMG), 293, 293n. 38, 296–98
Kerb rate, in Turkmenistan, 90, 90n. 36
Khalk Maslakhaty (Turkmenistan annual presidential address), 108–10
Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 131–32, 158, 160, 166, 176, 179
Kiriyenko Sergei, 121
Komitek oil company, 129–31
Kuwait, American Independent Oil contract with, 190
Kuwait Reserve Fund, 100
Kyrgyzstan, 110n. 56
Larmag oil company, 78n. 3, 82–83
Latin America, democratization and petroleum wealth in, 323–27, 326n. 2
Law of Petropolitics, current paradigms concerning, 1–4
Law on Concessions (Turkmenistan), 82n. 11
Law on Energy (Azerbaijan), 225–26
Law on Foreign Investment (Kazakhstan), 263
Law on Hydrocarbon Resources (Turkmenistan) (Petroleum Law), 83, 83n. 14, 84–85, 106
Law on Petroleum (Kazakhstan), 263–64
Law on Property (Uzbekistan), 85n. 20
Law on Subsoil (Uzbekistan), 83–87
Law on Subsoil Reserves (Azerbaijan), 225–26
Law on the Protection of Foreign Investments (Azerbaijan), 225–26
Law on the Subsurface (Turkmenistan), 82n. 8 leadership structure absence of domestic constraints on, 6 in mineral-rich states, 6–9 revenue-cost relationships and, 301–09 legislation Azerbaijan production-sharing agreements and, 225–26 change in ownership structure and, 8n. 6, 8–9 foreign investor influence on, 211–12 Kazakhstan petroleum industry, foreign investment and, 263–64, 264n. 7, 264n. 8, 264n. 9
Levi, Margaret, 31
Libya independent petroleum contracts with, 206–07, 207n. 37 public spending from oil revenues in, 61n. 25, 65
Lieberman, E. S., 37n. 9
Life in Transition Survey (LiTS), 21–22
Azerbaijan societal expectations and, 246–52
Madelin, H., 71n. 35–72
Majors (“Seven Sisters”) of petroleum industry domestic politics and influence of, 300, 319–21 foreign investment by, 183n. 6, 190n. 12, 319–21 independent companies’ competition with, 206–07
Iraqi oil contracts and, 205n. 35 power relations in host countries and, 204–15
Malaysia, 2–3
Index

malhallas (community associations) in Uzbekistan, 102–04
Mangistaumunaigas (Kazakhstan), 264, 264n. 11, 292
Marathon oil company, 48n. 9
market-based reforms, in Soviet successor states, 17–19
Marubeni company, 86
Masimov, Karim, 298
McMann, Kelly, 110n. 56
McPherson, C., 239n. 31
means testing, for targeted public spending, 39–43, 40n. 13
Medvedev, Dmitry, 134n. 23, 177
Menaldo, Victor, 326–27
Menatep Bank (Russia), 128–29
Mexico
corporate social responsibility of private companies in, 68–69
governing elites’ mismanagement in, 52–53
mineral development delay and internal consumption in, 47
national oil companies in, 55
Middle East, taxation in mineral-rich rentier states of, 332–33
military intervention, foreign investment in petroleum and, 205–06
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), public sector spending in Azerbaijan and, 235
Miller, Alexei, 133n. 19
Mineral Resources Development Fund (Uzbekistan), 100–05
mineral wealth. See also petroleum industry in Azerbaijan, 226–29, 233–37, 246–52
corporate income taxes and, 36–38, 37n. 10
corporate social responsibility and, 210–15
dataset characteristics for, 309–16, 310n. 6
delayed development of resources and, 47, 79–80
democratization and, 323–27
distributional conflict and, 301–09
domestic private owners and, 65–70
economic development and, 1–4
fiscal regime-ownership structure link and, 74–76, 116–20, 181–89
foreign investment and societal expectations and, 195–204
IFI/INGO influence over, 208–15, 210n. 41
Kazakhstan taxation of, 266–69
“lock-in” of regime structure and, 314n. 1
national oil companies and, 46
ownership structure classification and, 6–9, 45–46, 46n. 2, 46n. 3, 181–89, 309–16
path dependency and, 327–30
politics and ownership structure and, 299–321
power relations and foreign investors and, 208–15
private foreign ownership and, 182–89
property rights issues and, 9–10
of rentier states, 32–33, 43–44, 331–35
in Russia, 138–44, 147, 161–63, 162n. 65, 179
SOCAR expenditures and, 237–42
societal expectations and, 58–70, 195–204
SOFAZ expenditures and, 237–42
in Soviet successor states, 16–27
state leaders’ decision-making and, 301–09
state ownership without control and, 183–89
taxation vs. expenditure and, 31–44
tax revenue dependence on, 88
mining subsidies, Russian tax revenues for, 144n. 41
Mobil Oil Corporation, 205
corporate social responsibility and, 211
Kazakhstan expenditures by, 274–75, 291–96
merger with Exxon, 209n. 40
production statistics for, 239n. 31
TengizChevroil (TCO) and, 263, 263n. 6
model contract
foreign investors and host countries, 189–94, 190n. 9
historical context for foreign investment and, 206
Kazakhstan transaction costs and, 285n. 33, 285–86
power relations and changes to, 204–15
taxation changes and societal expectations with, 208
Moldova, quasi-fiscal activities in, 98
moral hazard, transaction costs and, 30n. 11
Moran, Theodore, 205–06
multinational corporations (MNCs)
corporate social responsibility of foreign investment and, 199–204, 200n. 27
country bonuses from, 37n. 10
private foreign ownership and, 182
taxes on, 36–38
Mutallibov, Ayaz, 224n. 9

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Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-14808-5 - Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal Index More information
“mutual hostage taking”
domestic private owners (DPOs) and, 72–73
national oil companies and, 72
obsolescing bargain theory and, 207n. 38
Mynbaev, Sauat, 277
Nadymgasprom, 171
National Oil Academy (Azerbaijan), 233
national oil companies (NOCs)
in Azerbaijan, 224–29
bankruptcy of, 75–76
borrowing power of, 61–62
economic development and, 330
foreign investment and societal expectations and, 195–204
fuel subsidies as implicit taxes on, 98–100
Gazprom transformation into, 168–77
governing elites and, 11
hybrid fiscal regimes and, 226
implicit bargaining and, 114–16
information asymmetry and, 71n. 35–72
in Kazakhstan, 261–66, 291–96
management structure of, 48n. 7, 53n. 15, 53n. 16, 53
overreliance for economic development linked to, 62–64
pilfering during boom and bust cycles of, 61
power relations and, 70–76, 188–89
private domestic ownership and, 47–48, 48n. 6, 55–58
production-sharing agreements, 191–92, 192n. 18
public spending financing by, 60, 60n. 24
rent-seeking behavior and, 65–64
revenue inequalities of, 65n. 29
Russian transaction costs for, 134–36, 152–56
state ownership with control and, 46, 46n. 4, 197–99
state ownership without control and, 183n. 5, 183–89, 197–99
transaction costs and, 51–55, 134–36, 152–56
in Turkmenistan, 105–07, 114–16
in Uzbekistan, 79n. 6, 85–87, 105–07, 114–16
“national prestige” projects, 14
absence in Russia of, 148
Gazprom spending on, 177
Kazakhstan expenditures on, 278–81
in mineral-rich states, 32
national oil companies and, 52–53
as newfound wealth benefit, 80
in Soviet successor states, 17
in Turkmenistan, 104
in weak fiscal regimes, 87
Nations Energy company, 274–75
Kazakhstan taxation of, 266–69
natural gas industry
Azerbaijan production-sharing agreements for, 222n. 8, 222–26
extrabudgetary funds and, 100n. 42
in Kazakhstan, private foreign investment in, 261n. 3, 261–66
price fluctuations in, 23
in Russia, 122, 132–34, 133n. 18, 168–77
SOCAR expenditures and, 237–42
SOFAZ expenditures and, 237–42
in Turkmenistan, 79–80, 81–84, 88, 89n. 31, 98–100, 105–07, 106n. 47
in Uzbekistan, 98–100, 105–07
natural resource funds (NRF)
in Azerbaijan, 220–22, 227–29, 246–52, 331–32
budget stability and transparency and, 66–67
domestic private owners and, 65–70
excess profits taxes and, 67–68
foreign investors and, 187–89, 215–184
governing elites’ support for, 54–55, 57–58
Kazakhstan mineral sector expenditures and, 260–61, 278–81, 296–98
model contract as equivalent of, 206
in non-OECD countries, 123n. 1
power relations and foreign investors, 210–15
in Russia, 122–24, 144–54, 161–63, 331–35
SOCAR expenditures in Azerbaijan and, 239–42
societal expectations of foreign investment and, 199, 202–04
SOFAZ expenditures in Azerbaijan and, 239–42
tax relief and protection of, 68
in Turkmenistan, 100–05
natural resources extraction tax (TENR) (Russia), 138–44, 144n. 42, 147
Navoi Opera and Ballet Theater, 120
Neft Dashi (Oily Rocks) oil complex, 25–26, 224–26
“New Civilization” education program (Russia), 164n. 69
New International Economic Order, 206–07
Index

Nigeria
democratization in, 121–24
fuel and food subsidies in, 60
governing elites’ mismanagement in, 52–53
rent-seeking behavior in, 64
“wealth” curse in, 1

Nigeria-Sao Tome and Principe Joint Development Authority, 193n. 20

Niyazov, Sapurmurat
authoritarian regime of, 96, 118–20
cult of personality and, 81–84
death of, 119
fuel subsidies under, 77, 77n. 2, 101
lack of private sector growth and, 97
“national prestige” projects under, 104
oil and gas sector management and, 106n. 47
public addresses of, 108–10
secrecy in regime of, 114–16
tax system and, 88, 88n. 30
Nobel, Ludwig, 221

Nobel Brothers Petroleum Company, 221
Norilsk Nickel Company, 128–29
North, D., 31n. 1, 51n. 13
North Apsheron Operating Company (NAOC), 253–56
Norway, economic growth in, 3n. 4

obsolescing bargain theory, 14
coercion in Azerbaijan and, 252–56
 corporate social responsibility and, 15–16
foreign investors and strategies to counter, 188–89, 209
historical context for, 28
Kazakhstan petroleum industry and, 249–98
mineral-rich rentier states, 331–35
sunk costs and foreign investors, 207–08
Occidental Petroleum Company, 183n. 7, 206–07
Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating Company (OKIOC), 266–69, 274–75
oil. See petroleum
Oil and Gas Journal Database, 310, 310n. 6
oil prices
fluctuations in, 23, 23n. 19
international market conditions, 314–15
petroleum boom and bust cycles and, 20–21, 21n. 16
Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) (Russia), 124, 134–36, 144–52, 146n. 44
governing elites’ attitudes concerning, 161–63
restructuring of, 177–80, 178n. 86–179
Russian transparency concerning, 165–68

oligarchs
Russian governing elites and, 122, 179
Russian tax code reform and, 167–68
state takeover of Gazprom and, 174–77
Oliy Majlis (Uzbekistan’s legislature), 113–14
Onako oil company, 129–31
Oneksimbank (Russia), 128–29
Open Budget Index, 147
Open Society Institute (OSI), 200, 210n. 41, 246–52
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, hypothesis testing of ownership structure selection and, 316n. 19, 316–19, 317n. 20, 318n. 21
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
domestic politics and, 100
foreign investment competition from, 206–07
founding of, 14, 183–89
international diffusion effect, 314n. 13, 314n. 13
production-sharing agreements and, 191–92
reliance on mineral exports and, 16–17
rentier model and, 118–20
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan comparisons to, 80–81
ownership structure. See also specific ownership categories, e.g., private domestic ownership
characteristics in mineral-rich states, 6–9
codification status under, 10
coding for, 7n. 29–8
dataset characteristics of, 309–16
developing countries, variation in, 345
distributional conflict and, 309–16
domestic determinants of, 299–321
economic development strategy and, 315–316
fiscal regimes and, 9–16, 116–20, 181–89
foreign investment influence on, 193–94, 215–18
historical context of, 13–16, 182, 182n. 2
international diffusion effect, 314n. 13
international market conditions, 314–15
mineral wealth and, 6–9, 45–46, 46n. 2, 46n. 3, 181–89, 309–16
obsolescing bargain theory and, 207n. 38, 207–08
ordinary least squared model, 316–19
path dependency and, 315n. 16, 315n. 17, 315
power relations and, 70–76

Cambridge University Press
978-0-521-14808-5 - Oil is Not a Curse: Ownership Structure and Institutions in Soviet Successor States
Pauline Jones Luong and Erika Weinthal
Index
More information
Index

ownership structure (cont.)
regime type (polity) and, 316
regional diffusion effect, 314
in rentier states, 331–35
research methodology concerning, 28–30
in Russia, 121–80
social relations and, 9–11
in Soviet successor countries, 19–27
state ownership with control ($S_1$) vs. private
domestic ownership ($P_1$), 45–76
state ownership without control ($S_2$) vs.
private foreign ownership ($P_2$), 181–84
transaction costs and, 50–58
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan comparisons of, 77–120
variations in, 7–9
wealth development and, 6–9
Oxfam, 200

path dependency
mineral wealth and, 327–30
ownership structure and, 315n. 16, 315n. 17
resource curse thesis and, 323–27
patronage networks
in Kazakhstan, 305–06
state leaders’ decision-making and, 301–09, 302n. 2
“peak oil” premise, ownership structures and, 315n. 14
Pension Fund (Uzbekistan), 100–05
pension guarantees
in Kazakhstan, 296–98
Kazakhstan government expenditures on, 282n. 30, 282–83
private sector growth in Russia and, 150
Russian public opinion concerning state
role in, 159
in Turkmenistan, 101–02
per capita subsoil wealth measurements, 329–30
in Kazakhstan, 269–74
in Azerbaijan, 222–29
in Turkmenistan, 101–02
in Uzbekistan, 85–87, 86n. 25, 89–90, 114–16, 116n. 58
PetroChina, 55n. 19, 203, 211
PetroKazakhstan, 298
Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (PdVSA), 54, 54n. 17, 54n. 18, 61, 76
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), 46, 55, 60n. 24, 63, 68–69

petroleum industry. See also mineral wealth; natural gas industry
abundance vs. wealth in, 1–4, 309–16
in Azerbaijan, 222–29
boom and bust cycles in, 20–21, 21n. 16, 48–49
CIS oil and gas production and proven reserves, 17, 22–23
corporate social responsibility in, 210–15
in developing countries, 1–4
domestic politics and, 299–321
excess profits taxes in, 67–68
foreign investment and development of, 26, 26n. 26, 181–189
foreign market access in Soviet successor states and, 26, 26n. 26
history of changes in, 189–94
Kazakhstan private foreign ownership in, 259–98
mergers in, 209, 209n. 40
national oil companies and, 46
in Persian Gulf States and, 52, 52n. 14
private foreign ownership and, 182, 182n. 1
production-sharing agreements in, 191–94
property rights issues and, 9–10
quality and extraction difficulty in Soviet successor states, 26
rents allocation and, 20–27, 58–70, 78
reserve estimates for, 25–26
revenue management norms in, 200, 210–15
in Russia, 121–80, 139n. 34
in Soviet successor states, 16–27, 77–79
state-owned oil companies (Russia), 129–31
tax revenue dependence on, 88
taxation, in. 1
in Turkmenistan, 82–85, 88, 105–07, 106n. 47, 106n. 50, 114–16, 116n. 58
in Uzbekistan, 85–87, 86n. 25, 89–90, 114–16, 116n. 58

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Index

wealth vs. dependence in, 310, 310n. 6, 317–30
Petronas Carigali Overseas, 86–87
pipeline development
Azerbaijan taxation of mineral sector and, 227–29
foreign investment in Azerbaijan on, 234, 253n. 46
SOFAZ expenditures in Azerbaijan on, 239–42
Turkmenistan gas exports and, 81–84, 82n. 10
point source resources
revenue generation and, 34–38
weak institutions and, 2
Polar Lights Company (Russia), 131n. 11
policy failure, resource curse thesis and, 327–30
political action
distributional conflicts and, 301–09
governing elites’ mismanagement linked to, 52–53
implicit bargaining in Turkmenistan/ Uzbekistan fiscal regimes and, 114–16
ownership structure and, 299–321
petroleum rents and, 23
state leaders’ decision-making and, 301–09
polity data sets, regime type and, 316, 316n. 18
postcolonial analysis, resource curse thesis in context of, 6–7
poverty reduction
Azerbaijan government expenditures on, 235, 242–44
contractual agreements with foreign investors and, 188–89, 210–15
corporate social responsibility of foreign investors, 199–204
Kazakhstan government expenditures on, 284
ownership structures and lack of, 74–76
Russian expenditure reforms and, 151–52
Russian public opinion concerning state role in, 139
targeted public spending and, 39–43, 41n. 15, 41n. 16
power relations
coercion in Azerbaijan and, 252–56
foreign investment in petroleum industry and, 204–15
with foreign investors, 13–16
foreign investors vs. state leaders, power shifts between, 188–89
international diffusion effect and, 314, 314n. 13
model contract paradigm and, 189–94, 190n. 9
ownership structures and, 70–76
private foreign ownership and (P1), 183–86
regional diffusion effect, 314
research methodology concerning, 28–30
revenue-cost relationships and, 301–09
Soviet successor states’ ownership structure and, 20–27
state leaders’ decision-making and domestic politics and, 301–09
state ownership with control vs. private domestic ownership and, 48–49
state ownership without control and, 183–86
Prebisch, Raúl, 328n. 5
presidential public addresses
Azerbaijan’s societal expectations and, 246–52
Kazakhstan societal expectations and, 290n. 35, 290–91
Russian societal expectations and, 160–63
doctoral expectations reflected in, 21–22, 96
Turkmenistan societal expectations and, 108–10, 119
Uzbekistan societal expectations and, 113–14
price controls
foreign investors and world market price, 204–15, 205n. 32
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 90
private domestic ownership (P1) in boom and bust cycles, 68
corporate social responsibility norms and, 48, 68–69
fiscal regime stability and, 11–13, 48–49
foreign investor minimization and, 48, 48n. 7
governing elites and, 47–48, 319–21
historical context for, 13–16
implicit bargaining in, 72–73
in low-income countries, 70n. 33
in mineral-rich states, 331–35
mineral rights and shareholder majority and, 8
Natural Resource Fund and, 57–58
negative outcomes linked to, 74–76
petroleum-rich states adoption of, 46n. 3
power relations and, 70–76
property rights legitimation and, 68–69
public relations concerns of, 48n. 8
private domestic ownership (P₁) (cont.)
research methodology concerning, 28–30
in Russia, 121–80
societal expectations and, 65–70
in Soviet successor states, 19n. 14, 19–27
state leaders’ decision-making and, 301–09
state mineral sector regulations and,
65n. 31
state ownership with control (S₁) vs., 45–76
taxation and, 57n. 20, 57n. 21, 57, 65–70,
66n. 32
transaction costs and, 55–58
triadic relationships in, 11
private foreign ownership (P₂)
domestic politics and, 299–321
fiscal regime stability and, 11–13, 183–86
foreign investors and, 193–94, 215–184
governing elites and, 182n. 4, 182–89
historical context for, 13–16
hybrid fiscal regimes and, 210–15
in Kazakhstan, 259–98, 261n. 3
leadership preferences and, 301–09
in mineral-rich states, 331–35
model contracts and, 189–94
number of petroleum-rich states with,
46n. 2
path dependency of, 315n. 16, 315n. 17,
315
research methodology concerning, 28–30
revenue-cost relationships and, 301–09
societal expectations and, 193–204
in Soviet successor states, 19n. 14, 19–27
state leaders’ decision-making and, 301–09
state ownership without control (S₂) and,
181–84
transaction costs and, 183–86, 189–94
triadic relationships in, 11
private sector growth
in Azerbaijan, 232–33, 233–37
ownership structures and, 67
in Russia, 148n. 48, 148–49, 157n. 59,
157–65
social welfare spending and, 150
state control over, 9–10
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, comparisons
of, 97, 116–20, 119n. 65, 157
privatization
to domestic private owners, 65–70
foreign investment and societal
expectations and, 195–204
of Kazakhstan petroleum industry,
261n. 3, 261–66
popular support in Uzbekistan for, 110–14
in Russia, 121–80, 157n. 59
of Russian gas sector, 132–34, 133n. 18,
168–77
of Russian oil sector, 127–32, 168–77
Turkmenistan ban on, 84
production quotas
Azerbaijan petroleum sector taxation and,
226–29, 227n. 15
foreign investment imposition of, 205,
205n. 34
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 90
production-sharing agreements (PSAs)
in Azerbaijan petroleum industry, 222n. 6,
222n. 8, 222–26, 226n. 14, 227–29,
239–42, 244–45, 253–56
foreign investment in petroleum industry
and, 191–94
Kazakhstan petroleum industry and,
265–69
“local content” in, 192, 192n. 17
properties of, 191n. 16
in Russian oil sector, 129n. 10, 129–31,
131n. 11, 138n. 33
SOFAZ and, 239–42
state ownership without control and, 7–9
in Turkmenistan, 84n. 15, 84n. 18, 84–85
in Uzbekistan, 86–87, 119–20
profit oil
private foreign ownership and, 305,
305n. 4
in production-sharing agreements (PSAs),
191n. 16
property rights
domestic private owners and, 65–70
resource curse thesis concerning, 27–28
Russian societal expectations and,
157–65
social relations and, 9–10
societal expectations and, 58–70
tax system and protection of, 68–69
property taxes, Azerbaijan revenue from,
229–33
proxy states, foreign investors and, 188–89,
217–184
public opinion surveys
Azerbaijan societal expectations and,
246n. 37, 246–52
Kazakhstan societal expectations and,
286–91
Russian societal expectations and,
157n. 59, 157–65, 158n. 60
on Soviet successor states’ ownership
structure, 21–22
Turkmenistan societal expectations and,
107n. 51, 107–08
Index

Uzbekistan societal expectations and, 110–14
public ownership, role of the state and, 9–10, 10n. 8
Pudakov, Amangeldy, 105–07
quasi-fiscal activities (QFAs)
in Azerbaijan, 220–22, 226
energy subsidies and, 39–43
governing elites' preference for, 74–76
hybrid fiscal regimes and, 226
Russian economic reforms and reduction of, 134–36, 149, 170
SOCAR and, 238
societal expectations of foreign investment and, 197–99
SOFAZ and, 238
in Soviet Union, 20
transaction costs and, 54–55
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan reliance on, 80–81, 99
quasi-fiscal deficit (QFD), in Uzbekistan, 99
quasi-voluntary compliance, transaction costs and, 50–58
real exchange rate, in Kazakhstan, 278–81
Red Line Agreement of 1928, 205n. 33
refugee services, foreign oil companies' expenditure on, 235–37, 239n. 32
Regional Development Initiative (RDI), 235, 235n. 26
regionalism, state leaders' decision-making and domestic politics and, 301–09
regionally-based agreements
foreign investment in petroleum and, 206–07
regional diffusion effect, 314
regulatory structures
foreign investors' influence on, 211–12
state control and, 9–10
Relief International, 237
rentier states
defined, 6, 6n. 5
democratization and petroleum wealth and, 326–27
mineral-rich states as, 32–33, 43–44, 331–35
societal expectations and, 58–70, 60n. 23, 75–76
state ownership with control and, 77–120
Turkmenistan as example of, 80–81, 118–20
Uzbekistan as example of, 118–20
rent-seeking behavior
boom and bust cycles and, 64
distributional conflict and, 306
power relations and, 70–76
private enterprise development and, 67
state ownership with control and, 63–64
resource curse thesis
country exceptions to, 2–3
current paradigms concerning, 1–4, 27–28
democratization and, 323–27
fiscal regimes of mineral-rich states and, 31–34, 116–20
historical view of, 322–36
mineral wealth and, 1–4, 27–28, 322–36
ownership structures and, 1–4, 27–28, 74–76, 319–21
petroleum wealth dataset and, 309–16
postcolonial historical context for, 6–7, 28
research methodology concerning, 28–30
Russian fiscal regime strength and, 134–36
in Soviet successor states, 16–27
state ownership with control vs. private domestic ownership and, 48–49
retail turnover tax, in Soviet Union, 19
revenue generation
alternative sources for, 62, 62n. 28
Azerbaijan taxation of mineral sector and, 227–29
citizen detachment from, 65
claimant status and ownership structure, 10
corporate income taxes and, 36–38, 37n. 10
democratization and economic development, 31–32
foreign investors as source of, societal expectations concerning, 199, 199n. 25, 201–04
Kazakhstan non-mineral taxes as source of, 269–79
multiple revenue sources for, 34–38
by national oil companies, 62–64, 63n. 29
non-petroleum alternative revenues, 312–13, 331–35
power relations and, 301–09
production-sharing agreements, 192, 192n. 17
public spending and societal expectations and, 58–70

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Index

revenue generation (cont.)
from Russian gas sector, 169n. 73, 169–72, 170n. 75
Russian tax code reforms and, 137–44, 142n. 39, 152–56, 178n. 83
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and, 34, 34n. 4
in state ownership with control, 46, 79–80
taxation and expenditure in mineral-rich states and, 31–44
transaction costs and state ownership with control, 51–55
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan reliance on taxes for, 93
Revenue Watch Program (OSI), 210n. 41, 246–52
Road Fund (Uzbekistan), 100–05
road users’ tax, in Russian Tax Code, 138n. 32, 138–44
robber barons, in Russia, 122
Rodman, K. A., 206n. 36

Romania
private domestic ownership in, 46n. 3, 121
Standard Oil investment in, 196
Rosneftgas Corporation/Rosneft,
privatization of, 124, 127–32, 128n. 4, 128n. 5, 129n. 8, 131n. 12, 176
Royal Dutch Shell, 174–77, 182, 183n. 6
in Azerbaijan, 221
corporate social responsibility and, 211
in Indonesia, 311, 311n. 9
royalties
Azerbaijan revenue from, 228–29
Kazakhstan tax revenue from, 273,
273n. 20, 292
in production-sharing agreements (PSAs), 191n. 16
ruling elite, institutional constraints on,
3–4
rural poor, targeted spending for, 39–43, 40n. 14
Russian Federation. See Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Russia/Russian Federation
Russian Fund for Federal Property (RFFI), 129–31
Russian General Oil Society, 221
Russian oil companies (ROCs)
economic growth of, 174, 174n. 79
explicit bargaining by, 165–68
foreign investment discouraged in, 129–31
foreign investment increased in, 173–74
Gazprom and, 168–77
governing elites as representatives in, 160, 160n. 63
management restructuring of, 173n. 78, 173–74
Russian expenditure reforms and, 151
societal expectations and attitudes of, 163n. 66, 163–65, 164n. 67, 164n. 68
tax reform and, 122–24
transaction costs for, 134–36, 152–56, 153n. 54
Russia/Russian Federation
bankruptcy and insolvency regulations in, 155–56, 156n. 56
broadening of tax base in, 137–44
commodity crisis in, 136, 136n. 27
compliance rates for taxation in, 140–44, 142n. 38, 143n. 40, 158–59, 159n. 62, 331–35
democratization in, 321–27
distributional conflict in, 308–09
domestic private owners, 121–80
economic diversification in, 123n. 2, 140–44
expenditure reforms in, 144–52, 331–35
explicit bargaining in fiscal regime of, 165–68
fiscal regime strength in, 134n. 23, 134–36, 135n. 26, 152–68
foreign investment in oil sector of, 126, 129n. 9, 129–31, 131n. 11, 155n. 55, 155–56, 202n. 10
gas sector privatization in, 56–57, 132n. 16, 132–34, 133n. 18, 168–77
history of petroleum industry in, 24
integrated pipeline systems in, 26n. 26
oil boom in, 136, 136n. 28
oil reserve estimates in, 25–26, 202
oil sector privatization in, 127–32, 168–77
ownership structure in, 19n. 14, 19–27
petroleum rents as political weapon in, 23
petroleum wealth in, 26, 323–27
private domestic ownership in, 46n. 3
private sector growth in, 148n. 48, 148–49, 159–60
privatization potential in, 122
regional oil fields in, 24n. 21
shadow economy and tax reforms in, 138–44, 139n. 35
societal expectations in, 157–65
state takeover of oil sector companies in, 131n. 12, 131n. 13, 131–32
Index

tax reform in, 122–24, 134–36, 135n. 26, 212–33
transaction costs and fiscal regime, 134–36, 152–56
Sachs, Jeffrey, 322
safety regulations, foreign investor commitment to, 191–94
Sakhalin Energy Investment Company Ltd. (SEIC) (Russia), 174–77
Sakhalin Island oil reserves, foreign investment in, 26
Samruk, 298, 298n. 43
Saudi Arabia
Aramco contract with, 190, 196–97, 199n. 26
rent-seeking behavior in, 64
tax system in, 61–62, 62n. 27
Tripoli Agreement and, 207n. 37
SaudiAramco, 63n. 29
Save the Children, 200, 256, 322
savings funds, economic impact of, 41–42
Schlumberger, Turkmenistan oil and gas service agreements, 84
scope of tax base, in mineral-rich states, 33–34
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 166n. 71
Seko, Mobutu Sese, 52
shadow economy. See informal economy
Sharifov, Samir, 239–42
Sharalov, Sergey Dimitrievich, 121, 154, 166–68
Sibneft oil company, 128–31, 154, 174–77
Sidanco oil company, 128–31
Sinopec, 293
Slavneft oil company, 129–31
small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
Azerbaijan hybrid fiscal regime and, 245–58
Azerbaijan taxes on, 230, 231–32
Kazakhstan tax revenue from, 269–74
Russian tax reductions for, 137–44, 159–60, 177–80
targeting of Azerbaijan refugee population for, 237
tax system and, 34, 148n. 4
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan taxation of, 93, 116–20
small foreign oil companies, historical rise of, 13–16
Sobyanin, Sergei Semyonovich, 151
SOCAR (Azerbaijani oil company), 24–25, 224n. 10, 224–26, 225n. 13
coercion of, 242–56, 256n. 51
expenditures by, 237–42
internal energy consumption requirements and, 214
revenue generation from taxation of, 228–29
societal expectations concerning, 246–52
transaction costs for, 244–45
workforce size and labor productivity in, 238–39, 239n. 31
social infrastructure maintenance tax, in Russian Tax Code, 138n. 32, 138–44
social relations, ownership structure and, 9–11
social spending. See expenditures
social transfers, geographical distribution of petroleum wealth and, 186–87
societal expectations in Azerbaijan, 220–22, 246–52
corporate social responsibility of foreign investment and, 199n. 26, 199–204
domestic private owners and, 65–70
foreign investment influence on, 204–15
governing elites’ perceptions of, 74–76
historical evolution of, 13–16
in Kazakhstan, 286–91
in mineral-rich and rentier-states, 331–35
model contract and, 208
ownership structure and, 11–13
private foreign ownership and (P 2 ), 183–89, 195–204
research methodology concerning, 28–30
Russia’s fiscal regime and, 157–65, 168–77
in Soviet successor states, 20–27
state ownership with control vs. private domestic ownership, 48–70
state ownership without control and, 183–89, 195–204
in Turkmenistan, 107–14
Uzbekistan petroleum development and, 79–80, 107–14
Socony-Vacuum (Mobil), 183n. 6
Soninov, Nazar, 82–83
Sonangol (Angola oil company), 192
Sonatrach oil company, 53, 53n. 16
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), 253n. 46
Southeast Asia, petroleum reserves in, 202, 209
Soviet successor states. See also specific states, e.g., Russia/Russian Federation comparisons of petroleum wealth in, 18
democracy scores for, 323–27, 326n. 3
energy rents in, 78
lack of private sector growth in, 97
Index

420

Soviet successor states (cont.)
oil reserve estimates in, 25–26
ownership structures in, 319–21
petroleum quality and extraction difficulty in, 26
petroleum wealth and fiscal regimes in, 16–27
tax systems in, 87–94
Soviet Union. See also Russia/Russian Federation
gas sector production and revenues in, 169–72
history of petroleum production and, 24n. 23, 24–25
ownership structure in, 182n. 1
petroleum wealth in, 323–27
“Sow the Petroleum” proclamation (Venezuela), 197n. 23
stabilization funds, economic impact of, 41–42
standardization, transaction cost minimization and, 189n. 8
Standard Oil of California, 183n. 6, 205
Standard Oil of New Jersey, 182, 183n. 6
state formation
revenue generation and, 31, 31n. 1
social spending and, 58n. 22, 58–70
State Fund Finally, for the Development of the Oil and Gas Industry and Mineral Resources (SFDOG) (Turkmenistan), 100–05, 116, 118–20
State Investment Committee (Kazakhstan), 264–65, 265n. 12
transaction costs and, 285–86
state leaders’ decision-making.
See also decision-making by elites criteria in developing countries for, 311–12, 312n. 12
distributional conflict and, 301–09
transaction costs and, 51, 51n. 13
State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan Republic (SOFAZ), 227–29
expenditures by, 237–42
National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan and, 278–81
societal expectations concerning, 246–52
transfers to state budget from, 242–44
state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
Azerbaijan oil revenue for support of, 228–29
economic growth linked to, 62–64
enterprise profit taxes and, 36n. 7, 36–38
foreign investors and, 193–94, 215–184
governing elites’ revenue transfer to, 52
Kazakhstan expenditures and, 274–81
in mineral-rich states, 6
mineral sector taxation and, 14–38
normative bias toward, 27–28
oil sector shareholding and, 129–31
personal income taxes and, 36
power relations with foreign investors and, 206–07
revenue-cost relationships and, 301–09
Russian economic reforms and subsidy reduction to, 132n. 16, 132–34, 133n. 18, 133n. 19, 133n. 20
Russian mineral wealth privatization and, 124, 133, 161–63
Russian oil sector takeover by, 131n. 12, 131n. 13, 131–32
social relations and, 9–11
societal expectations and, 197–99
Soviet-era activities of, 164, 164n. 70
state ownership without control and, 183–89
transaction costs and, 50–58
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan comparisons of, 81–87, 116–20
Uzbekistan popular support for, 110–14
variations in, 7–9
state ownership with control (S1)
boom and bust cycles and, 60–61, 64
defined, 8
delayed development of resources in, 47, 79–80
domestic politics and, 299–321
economic growth linked to, 62–64
cal regime stability and, 11–13, 48–49, 116–20
foreign investment and, 48, 48n. 7
historical context for, 13–16, 28
internal consumption of resources in, 47, 79–80
Kazakhstan transition to, 296–98
leadership preferences and, 301–09
mineral development delay and internal consumption under, 47
national oil companies under, 46
negative outcomes linked to, 74–76
number of petroleum-rich states with, 46n. 2
in Persian Gulf States, 52, 52n. 14
petroleum-rich countries’ adoption of, 219, 219n. 2
power relations and, 70–76
private domestic ownership vs., 45–76
Index

privatization of Russian petroleum and, 124
relationships under, 11
research methodology concerning, 28–30
resource curse thesis and, 322–23
of Russian oil and gas sectors, 127–32, 168–80
societal expectations under, 58–70
in Soviet successor states, 19n. 14, 19–27
state leaders’ decision-making and, 301–09
taxation systems and, 61n. 26, 61–70
transaction costs and, 51–55
Turkmenistan authoritarian regime and, 77–120
Uzbekistan authoritarian regime and, 77–120
state ownership without control (S2)
defined, 8
domestic politics and, 299–321
fiscal regime stability and, 11–12, 183–86
foreign investment and, 193–94, 215–184
governing elites and, 183–89
historical context for, 13–16, 28
hybrid fiscal regimes and, 210–15
Kazakhstan petroleum industry and, 259–98
leadership preferences and, 301–09
in Persian Gulf States, 52n. 14
petroleum-rich countries’ adoption of, 219, 219n. 2
private foreign ownership and, 181–84
rentier-state expenditures and, 311–35
research methodology concerning, 28–30
resource curse thesis and, 322–23
societal expectations and, 195–204
sovereign decision-making and, 301–09
in Soviet successor states, 19n. 14, 19–27
transaction costs of, 183–86, 189–94
triadic relationships in, 11
in Uzbekistan, 119–20
StatoilHydro
Azerbaijan hybrid fiscal regime and, 256–58
coercion in Azerbaijan and, 252–56
corporate social responsibility and, 211
foreign oil company expenditures in Azerbaijan by, 235, 237
management structure of, 48n. 7
South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP) and, 243n. 46
St. John, Karen, 233–34
Stolichnyi Bank, 128–29

“Strategy for Turkmenistan Development to 2020,” 96
strong fiscal regime characteristics of, 11–13
emergence in Russia of, 134–36, 152, 177–80
oil and gas industries and presence of, 168–77
power relations and, 70–76, 204–15
private domestic ownership and, 320
societal expectations and, 58–70
state ownership without control vs. private ownership and, 188–89, 212
tax systems and, 121–24
Subsurface Law (Kazakhstan), transaction costs and, 28tn. 34, 285–86
sunk costs of foreign investment, obsolescing bargain theory and, 207–08
supply
domestic private owners and incentive of, 65–70
institutions as product of, 11–13
"supra-sovereign" constraints, 205, 205n. 33
Surgutneftegaz
“loans for shares program” and, 128n. 7, 128–29
as vertically integrated joint-stock oil company, 121, 127–32
Surowiecki, James, 45
Swarnim, W., 323–27
targeted spending, 39–43, 40n. 13, 40n. 14
Tasmagambetov, Imangaly, 269, 278–81, 291
Tatneft oil company, 129–31
taxation
in Azerbaijan, 220–22, 226–33, 252–56
broad-based tax systems, 34–38
coercion and, 252–56
composition of, 33–34
direct vs. indirect taxes, 33–34, 34n. 3
domestic private owners and, 65–70, 660. 32
economists’ view of, 33n. 2
expenditures and, 31–44, 61n. 26, 61–70
fiscal regime stability and, 11–13, 33–38, 74–76
foreign investor influence on, 183–86, 210–15

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Index

422
taxation (cont.)
implicit bargaining and, 114–16
implicit vs. explicit taxation, 34
institutional support for, 3–4
in Kazakhstan, 266–74, 285–86
in mineral-rich states and rentier states, 331–35, 334n. 9
multiple revenue sources for, 34–38
in private domestic ownership structure, 57, 57n. 20
production-sharing agreement revenues and, 192, 192n. 17
profit-sharing in, 14
in Russia, 122–24, 134n. 25, 134–36, 135n. 26, 137–44, 152–56, 153n. 33, 153n. 54, 157–65, 158n. 60, 169n. 73, 169–72, 170n. 75
scope of, 33–34
societal expectations of foreign investment and, 197–99, 201–04
in Soviet successor states, 19–27
state control structures and, 34–38
state formation and, 31, 31n. 1
transaction costs and, 50–58, 152–56, 153n. 54, 285–86
transparency and, 32–33
Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan comparisons of, 87n. 27, 87–94, 110–20
Technip company, 86
technology, ownership structures and, 314–15, 315n. 15
Tehran Agreement, 206–07
TengizChevroil (TCO), 263, 266–69, 274–81, 292–93, 295–96
Texaco oil company, 78n. 3, 183n. 6, 205 in Kazakhstan, 265–66
merger with Chevron, 209n. 40
Thomas, Marlo, 268
time horizons, societal expectations for public spending and taxation and, 62
transaction costs foreign investment in Azerbaijan and, 244–45
historical context of ownership structures and, 13–16
of information disclosure, 72–73
Kazakhstan fiscal regime and, 285–86
model contracts and, 208
ownership structure and, 11–13
private domestic ownership and, 45, 55–58, 122, 134–16
private foreign ownership and, 183–86, 189–94
research methodology concerning, 28–30

Russian fiscal regime strength and, 134–36, 152–56
of Russian oil and gas sectors, 168–77
Soviet successor states’ ownership structure and, 20–27
state ownership with control and, 45, 54–55
state ownership without control and, 183–86, 189–94
theory of, 50–58
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan fiscal regimes, 105–07
transfer pricing, Russian oil companies’ use of, 152–56
Transocean oil company, 48n. 9
transparency foreign investors and host countries relations and, 42–43
Natural Resource Funds and, 17, 41–42
tax/expenditure systems and, 32–33
triadic relationships fiscal regimes and ownership structure and, 181–189
historical evolution of, 13–16
national oil companies and, 46
in private domestic ownership structure, 47–48
private foreign ownership and, 182–89
in state ownership with control, 11
state ownership without control and, 183–89
Tripoli Agreement, 206–07, 207n. 37
Triton-Vuko oil company, 264
Tunisia, 328
Turkmen Foreign Exchange Reserve Fund (FERF), 88, 100–05, 116
Turkmengaz, 83–84, 105–07, 106n. 49
Turkmengeologiya, 83–84
Turkmenistan bribery and corruption in, 117–18
central planning in, 96, 96n. 40
consumer subsidies in, 101, 102n. 44
direct vs. indirect taxation in, 93
emergence as petroleum-rich state, 20–27
extrabudgetary funds in, 100n. 42, 100–05
fiscal regime and petroleum wealth in, 16–27, 87–120
foreign exchange regime in, 90
foreign investment in petroleum in, 25n. 25, 77–79, 78n. 3, 82–85, 84n. 15, 102n. 30
fuel subsidies in, 77, 98–100, 237–42
gas sector development in, 79–80
Index

implicit bargaining in fiscal regime of, 114–16
implicit taxes in, 90
“national prestige” projects in, 104
oil reserve estimates in, 25–26
ownership structure in, 19n. 14, 19–27
petroleum sector growth in, 78–79, 81–87, 82n. 8, 326n. 3
private sector growth limitations in, 97, 148n. 47
production quotas and price controls in, 90
public addresses as reflection of societal expectations in, 108–10
public opinion surveys in, 107n. 51, 107–08
public sector spending in, 95–116, 96n. 41, 118–19, 242–44
quasi-fiscal activities in, 80–81, 97–101
Russian expenditure reforms compared with, 144–52
societal expectations in, 107–14
state ownership with control (S1) in, 81–84
taxation in, 87n. 27, 87–94, 88n. 28, 88n. 30, 116–20
transaction costs of fiscal regime in, 105–07
value-added tax in, 88, 91n. 39, 91–93
Turkmenistan Central Bank, 100n. 42
Turkmenneft, 83–84, 84n. 16, 85n. 19, 105–07
Turkmenneftegaz, 83–84
Turkmenneftegazstroy, 83–84
turnover taxes in Kazakhstan, 269–74
in Russian Tax Code, 137–44, 138n. 32
Tyumen Oblast, 151, 151n. 51
Tyumenskaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya (TNK), 129–31, 154

Ukraine
natural gas delivery crisis in, 23
private sector growth in, 148n. 47
Turkmenistan gas exports to, 82, 82n. 9
UMID (NGO), 235–37, 256n. 27
UN Global Compact, 209
Unified Energy Systems (UES) (Russia), 170
unified social tax (UST), in Russian Tax Code, 135n. 26, 137–44
United Heavy Machinery, 174–77
United States
excess profits taxes in, 67–68
internal mineral and petroleum consumption in, 47
private domestic ownership in, 47–48
universal benefits
Kazakhstan non-mineral sector expenditures on, 282–83
Russian economic reforms and reductions in, 149–51, 150n. 50
societal expectations and, 58–70
state ownership without control and, 183–89
targeted spending vs., 39–43
Turkmenian societal expectations and, 108–10
Unocal oil company, 78n. 3
UN Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 10
Urengoi gasprom, 171
utility maximization, power relations and, 71
Uzbekistan
bribery and corruption in, 117n. 60, 118–20
consumer subsidies in, 102–04
delayed development of petroleum in, 79–80
direct vs. indirect taxation in, 93
distributional conflict in, 303–04
everse as petroleum-rich state, 20–27
energy rents in, 78
extrabudgetary funds in, 100–05
fiscal regime in, 16–27, 87–120
foreign exchange regime in, 90, 91n. 37
foreign investment rejected in, 25n. 23, 77–79, 78n. 3, 85n. 23, 85–87, 202n. 30
fuel subsidies in, 98–100, 237–42
history of petroleum production in, 24n. 23, 24–25
implicit bargaining in fiscal regime of, 114–16
implicit taxes in, 90
imports into, 79–80
informal economy in, 117n. 62, 117–18
internal petroleum consumption in, 21n. 14, 80–81
lack of private sector growth in, 97, 116–20, 119n. 65, 157
mineral development delay and internal consumption in, 47
ownership structure in, 19n. 14, 19–27
petroleum reserve estimates in, 25–26, 78
petroleum sector growth in, 78–79, 79n. 6, 79n. 7, 85–87, 86n. 25, 301–09, 326n. 3
popular support for state-owned enterprises in, 110–14
Uzbekistan (cont.)
production quotas and price controls in, 90n. 34, 90n. 35, 90
public opinion surveys in, 107–08, 110n. 56, 110–14, 159
public sector spending in, 95–116, 118–19, 242–44
quasi-fiscal activities in, 80–81, 97–101
Russian expenditure reforms compared with, 144–52
societal expectations in, 107–14, 246
state ownership with control in, 85, 225–26
state ownership without control in, 119–20
taxation in, 87n. 27, 87–94, 88n. 29, 116–20, 232–33
transaction costs of fiscal regime in, 105–07
value-added tax in, 88, 91n. 38, 91–93
Uzbekneftegaz, 79n. 6, 85–87, 90, 105–07
Uzneftegazpererabotka, 86

value-added tax (VAT)
Azerbaijan revenue from, 228–33, 232n. 19
increased reliance on, 35n. 5, 37, 38n. 12
in Kazakhstan, 266–74, 292
in Russian Tax Code, 135n. 26, 137–44, 140n. 36, 141n. 37
in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, 88, 91n. 38, 91n. 39, 91–93

Venezuela
democratization and petroleum wealth in, 326n. 2
economic decline in, 76
foreign investment in petroleum in, 195n. 23
governing elites’ mismanagement in, 52–53
national oil company management in, 54, 54n. 17, 54n. 18, 61
private domestic ownership in, 121
Venezuelan Investment Fund, 54–55

Vernon, R., 207–08
vertically integrated companies (VICS)
power relations in, 205
privatization of Russian petroleum industry and, 124
Russian government support for, 131n. 14
Russian oil sector reforms and, 127–32
Vakhirev, Rem, 172

Vostochnaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya (VNK) oil company, 129–31
voucher privatization
in Russian gas sector, 132–34, 133n. 18
in Russian oil sector, 127–32

Vyakhirev, Rem, 133n. 19, 133n. 21, 133–34
wages as state expenditures, Uzbekistan reliance on, 119n. 66
Waterbury, John, 37n. 9, 332–33
weak fiscal regime
characteristics of, 11–13
democratization and, 323–27
emergence of, 87–120
Gazprom restructuring and, 173
governing elites’ preference for, 74
Natural Resource Fund creation and, 54–55
power relations and, 70–76, 204–15
private domestic ownership and, 48–49
rentierism and, 43–44
resource curse and, 1–4, 27–28
societal expectations and, 58–70
in Soviet successor states, 19–27
state ownership with control and, 15–16, 48–49, 53, 188–89
in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 29, 80–81, 179
wealth curse
democratization and, 323–27
in Nigeria, 1
ownership structure and, 6–9
path dependency and, 327–30
petroleum abundance vs., 309–30
Weber, Max, 31
welfare spending
in Azerbaijan, 220–22
Azerbaijan non-mineral sector expenditures on, 242–44
governing elites’ benefits from, 74–76
Russian economic reforms and reductions in, 149–51, 150n. 50, 161–63, 162n. 65, 167–68
societal expectations and historical trends in, 58–70
wheat subsidies, in Turkmenistan/Uzbekistan, 99–100
“white elephant” public projects, societal expectations and, 52–53, 60
windfall profits taxes. See excess profits taxes
Woodward, David, 219, 227, 253–56
World Bank, 40, 200n. 27, 200–01
on Kazakhstan taxation, 269–74
National Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan and, 278–81
on SOCAR financial performance, 228–29
wealth and path dependence measurements, 327–30
Index

Yacimientos Proliferos Fiscales (YPF), 46
Yamburggazprom, 171
Yeltsin, Boris, 127, 135, 137, 148, 158, 160–61, 308–09
Yemen ownership structure, 315n. 16
Yew, Lee Kwan, 45
Young, Oran, 58n. 22
Yuganskneftegaz, 131–32, 176, 176n. 82
Yukos oil company, 25n. 24, 158, 160, 174n. 79

corporate social responsibility (CSR) in, 163–65, 164n. 69
state takeover of, 131n. 12, 131–32, 177–80
transaction costs for, 144
as vertically integrated joint-stock oil company, 121, 127–32
Yuzhneftegaz, 263, 274–75, 293–96
Zaire. See Democratic Republic of Congo

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