PART ONE

PROLOGUE

As each of the 15 sections of this *Survey* opens with an editorial introduction, the prologue is more limited in intention. I want principally to provide some justification for the selection of topics, regions and periods. In this respect, it is only proper to start with a modicum of modesty. Despite this being a very ambitious project, no one editor and no one volume can hope to encompass all the manifold aspects and all the major examples of human migration. It is simply too vast a subject. The description 'survey', rather than 'encyclopaedia', has been used to indicate that neither the publishers nor the editor claim complete comprehensiveness. At the same time, we *have* covered a good deal of ground. The *Survey* contains 95 contributions by 99 authors from 27 countries. The authors' home disciplines range across most of the humanities and social sciences. We can thus legitimately claim that this book provides the most representative and wide-ranging coverage of migration ever attempted in a single volume.

However, comprehensiveness alone was regarded as insufficient. We rejected the short anodyne entries typical of a one-volume encyclopaedia in favour of 'midi-sized' contributions (of 2000 to 5000 words) which allowed authors to develop an argument without being too prolix. This inevitably involved fewer, but more targeted, topics. How then were editorial decisions made? After wrestling with a number of alternatives, the overriding conclusion reached was that no single criterion for selection would work. In practice, to reflect the complexity of the phenomenon of migration itself, a number of organizing principles had necessarily to go hand in hand. I will discuss, in turn, issues of period, place, forms of migration and differing approaches.

Historical
Population shifts are present at the dawn of human history – the phenomena of hunting and gathering, transhumance (seeking seasonal pasture) and nomadism being as old as human social organization itself. Flights from natural disasters, adverse climatic changes, famine and territorial aggression by other communities or other species are also common occurrences. The biblical legend of the exodus of the Jews and Homer's epic poem of the wanderings of Odysseus are interwoven into western consciousness. We talk of 'a promised land' and 'an odyssey' without being particularly aware of the origins of these expressions. Other ancient civilizations uninfluenced by the Judaeo-Hellenist world – notably the Mesopotamian, Inca, Indus and Zhou empires – also generated their own migratory myths and their own population flows, often occasioned by the construction of immense monuments. The hanging gardens of Babylon, and the temples, palaces and pyramids of other cultures were built by subordinated peoples dragooned to work, often from long distances. Pre-modern trading diasporas of migrating merchants were established in Africa, Asia, across the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean.

Despite the existence and variety of these pre-modern forms of migration it seems sensible to begin a survey of world migration in the 'modern' period, marked by the flourishing of long-distance trade and the opening up of global lines of communication. In Wallerstein's (1974: 15) well-known formulation, 'In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, there came into existence what we might call a European world economy. … It was different and new.' It was different, he argues, in that, unlike the prior 'world economies' of China, Persia and Rome, the European-

1

dominated world system was dominated by trade, not by the construction of an empire. What is generally under-emphasized by the world system theorists, however, is that along the newly constructed trade arteries flowed not only commodities like gold, furs, spices and ivory but seamen, settlers, merchants and slaves. In particular, European mercantilism initiated the hitherto largest process of forced migration – the shipment of ten million slaves from western Africa to the New World. It was a difficult editorial decision not to include a separate section on African slave migration. However, I finally concluded that this terrible event has already been extensively chronicled by a prodigious and easily accessible literature to which a volume of this kind could add little.[1]

Slavery and indentureship were two predominant forms of migration in the first 300 years of the world system. After the collapse of slavery, indentured labour from China, India and Japan worked the plantations of the European powers. The entries in Part 3 of this *Survey* cover both Asian indentured and more voluntary colonial migration. The persistence of unfree migrant labour into the twentieth century – indentureship, for example, lingered on until 1941 in the Dutch East Indies – has led some authors (Cohen 1987; Miles 1987; Potts 1991) to conclude that it was an intrinsic part of the evolution of capitalism on a global scale.

European expansion was also associated with voluntary settlement from Europe, particularly to the colonies of settlement, the dominions and the Americas. There is considerable room for disagreement as to how much this movement was fuelled by local and personal decisions and how much, on the other hand, it was state sponsored. Certainly, all the great mercantile powers – Britain, the Netherlands, Spain and France – were involved in promoting settlement of their nationals abroad, as the contributions in Part 2 of this *Survey* demonstrate. Nationalists and imperialists in Portugal, Germany and Italy also sought to emulate their European neighbours, though German ambitions were thwarted by defeat in the First World War and Portugal and Italy both got off to a late start. Britain was the only mercantile power to have made an unambiguous success of colonial settlement – if we understand success to be the establishment of a hegemonic presence. Other than in Quebec the French abroad were never concentrated in sufficient numbers. Even in Algeria and Indo-China, where there were substantial settlements, they were driven out by powerful anti-colonial movements. The variable but often mediocre accomplishments of the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and German colonists are discussed in my introduction to Part 2. Essentially, this form of migration coincided with the period of European expansion and imperialism, and came to an end with the rise of the anti-colonial nationalist movements.

The next period of migration (covered in Part 4) is marked by the rise of the industrial power of the USA. Although it was already significant by the mid-nineteenth century, US manufacturing output dramatically accelerated at the turn of the century. The USA's share of world manufacturing moved from 14.7 per cent (1880), to 23.6 per cent (1900), to 32.0 per cent (1913), to a staggering 39.3 per cent in 1928 (Kennedy 1987: 202). Millions of workers from the stagnant economic regions and repressive polities of northern, southern and eastern Europe poured into the USA over the period 1880–1933. Thereafter immigration restrictions – directed particularly at Asian workers – and then the Great Depression significantly slowed the flow. Labour migration to the buoyant parts of Europe, like turn-of-the-century Germany (see the entry in Part 5), and to the economies like Brazil and Argentina (see entries in Part 7) also followed a similar rhythm and often drew workers from the same source countries.

The next major period of migration was after the Second World War. It is perhaps worth making the obvious point that voluntary international migration was much reduced in both world wars when borders became more impermeable (passport checks were only generally introduced in 1914), merchant ships were commandeered and nation states demanded conscripts and enforced exclusive loyalties on their citizenries. Naturally, wars also produce much involuntary migration, as minorities

whose loyalties are seen as suspect are victimized and populations seek to escape the path of marching armies and aerial bombardment. I will further discuss involuntary migration in due course. Meanwhile, we can note that by the end of the Second World War the strong propensity to migrate in search of work could now reassume its customary importance.

In the USA and in the victorious Allied states, powerful 'vents for surplus' were created as governments created hothouse consumer economies and provided massive extensions to social security, health and welfare services. The raw labour power to sustain these boom economies was provided by illegal and legal labour from many countries (see the contributions in Parts 8 and 9). In the defeated Axis powers similar economic imperatives were underpinned by internal rural labour in the cases of Japan and Italy, and by East German refugees in the German case, until that economy grew so fast that it could only be sustained by additional supplies of labour from Italy, Turkey and Yugoslavia.

By the mid-1970s the international migrant labour boom was over in Europe, though it continued until the early 1990s in the USA. Even where there was some sectoral demand for imported migrants, nativist movements ensured that governments could not sanction open, legal, international migration. By this time too, the engine-room of the global economy had begun to shift to the Asia-Pacific region. In Part 11, a number of contributions are focused on the patterns of contemporary legal and illegal migration to Japan and the other powerful Asia-Pacific economies. Even the Australian and New Zealand politicians, who had resisted Asian migration for generations, were forced into accepting the new geo-political realties.

As the twenty-first century approaches, migration flows are becoming more global in scope and more complex and diverse in character. For example, the post-cold war period triggered movements of displaced peoples and refugees on a scale not seen since the chaos immediately following the end of the Second World War. This complexity will gain discussion at a number of points throughout the *Survey*, but I need to turn now to the more limited question of how regional migration histories on the one hand remain distinctive or, on the other hand, relate to emerging global patterns. In other words, what are the geographical limits to world migration flows.

Geographical
All the world's major geographical regions are represented in the volume, but not in a mechanically egalitarian way. This is because it is important to give some weight to the salience as well as to the volume of the various migratory flows. If we start by considering intercontinental movements, Europe's historical centrality in the global picture becomes apparent. In the period from 1500 to 1914 somewhere between 60 and 65 million Europeans participated in international migration, compared with a combined total of about 15 million African and Asian intercontinental migrants (Emmer 1992: 5,6). Even in the period 1945 to 1975, when Europe became a major destination zone, the numbers leaving Europe for other continents probably constituted about half the global total of intercontinental migrants. This centrality is, of course, somewhat ironic as the nativist and racist movements that have mushroomed in European countries during the past decade seek to represent Europe as a timeless, stable, undisturbed continent threatened by hordes of restless foreign immigrants, particularly those with black, brown and yellow skins (Cohen 1994: 161–91).

Intercontinental migration from Asia across the Pacific was inhibited by fierce anti-Asian legislation in North America, dramatized by the Chinese Exclusion Art of 1882. The internment of Japanese-Americans in the Second World War also provided a brutal proclamation that the USA was still not ready to embrace Asian migration. In the past 20 years, however, the climate for acceptance of Asians in the USA and Canada has changed in a positive direction, particularly as the recognition of the Pacific basin as a crucial economic zone gained ground. As one writer puts it, Asians in America have been turned in one hundred years 'From a Yellow Peril to a Model

Minority' (Hu-DeHart 1992). This does not mean that xenophobic white Californians have suddenly become angels, but rather that they have had to recognize their place in the Pacific regional economy and are, in any event, currently directing their fire at other victims, principally undocumented Mexicans (see the contribution on this theme in Part 8). The possibilities and pressures to emigrate from Asia to North America are also now greater than in the period up to the 1970s, especially in one or two dramatic cases. For example, the thriving economy of Hong Kong is threatened by the restoration of the territory to China in 1997 and many Hong Kong professionals have sought a second chance (or at least a bolt hole) in cities like Vancouver and San Francisco in anticipation of this event.

If we turn to African intercontinental migration, from the fifteenth to the nineteenth century, much of it was of a forced kind. Now three forms of intercontinental migration are predominant. The first, from South Africa, has some similarity with the repatriate migration of French and Portuguese settlers at the end of their colonial empires (see Part 10) in that settlers of European descent are leaving in anticipation of violence following African majority rule. It is different, however, in that no one European power has responsibility for accepting South African repatriates and many are, in any case, skilled voluntary migrants leaving for countries like Canada, the USA and Australia. The second form of contemporary African intercontinental migration comprises black Africans fleeing from civil wars, political strife and governmental breakdowns. (The 'second diaspora' phenomenon in the USA is described by a contributor in Part 8 of the *Survey*.) The third important flow from Africa is from North (and, to a lesser degree, West) Africa into southern Europe. Although this is *stricto sensu* intercontinental migration one can, alternatively, follow Braudel's (1949) lead in his acclaimed book on the Mediterranean. He argues there that all the countries bordering on the Mediterranean, including those in North Africa, are part of a single economic and cultural area, with a vital, interdependent historical experience. In particular, the single Hellenic and Roman worlds, the Islamic penetration of Spain or, for that matter, Hannibal's invasion may all be historical pointers to explaining why it will ultimately be impossible in migration terms to affix southern Europe to the European Union while simultaneously detaching it from its intimate past association with North Africa, Turkey and the eastern Mediterranean.

The sections in the *Survey* on intercontinental migration from Europe, Asia and Africa are paralleled by studies of regional migration *within* each continent – Europe (Part 5), Asia and Oceania (Part 11) and Africa (Part 6.) These three regional sections are supplemented by sections on Latin and Central America (Part 7) and the Middle East (Part 12). It proved impossible to be a classificatory purist in establishing these regional sections. In the case of Europe between 1800 and 1950 we are dealing almost entirely with migration that originated and ended in Europe. This applies too, with some minor reservations, to the African section. But it would be absurd to consider Middle Eastern migration without considering the case of exogenous Zionist settler immigration to Palestine, a phenomenon indeed that our contributor links firmly to the model of European colonization and settlement considered earlier in the volume. Again, Latin and Central American migration history cannot be understood without reference to the European and Asian origins of many of the migrants. Finally, while it may now look odd in regional terms to have included a contribution on southern Europeans migrating to Australia in the section on Asia and Oceania, I wanted to give some recognition to Australasia's long-held identity as a European, particularly British, settlement zone. A more contemporaneous use of the expression 'Oceania' alludes rather to the Pacific islands *and* Australasia. This contemporary use, which I have adopted in the book, has the advantage of signalling Australasia's reorientation to the immediate zones around it and away from its traditional migration supply zones.

So what, geographically, is omitted? Unfortunately, all too much. Within each region, numerous eddies and currents that feed into the main migration flows have not gained recognition in this

volume. Even fairly significant flows could not find space. To take a few examples more or less at random: the intricate migration patterns of Polynesia, Micronesia and Melanesia are only considered *en passant*; the settlement of Manchuria by the Russians, the Japanese, then the Chinese – all largely for strategic reasons – has not found space; the enforced Europeanization of Siberia was significant in numerical and cultural terms, yet is not covered here; nor are the immense and complex rural–urban migrations within China and India, except as part of a general treatment on the urbanization of the globe (see the contribution in Part 15). However, an editorial decision had to be made as to the broad bias of the volume. This was made in favour of international and intercontinental migrations, while fully recognizing that internal migration is separated only by a thin and often permeable membrane from these other, characteristically more visible, forms of migration.

Forms of migration

It is perhaps useful to start a discussion of the different forms of migration with the distinction just mentioned between internal migration on the one hand, and international and intercontinental migration on the other. In the established literature a number of eminent migration scholars have sought to dispense with or minimize this distinction in favour of generalized typologies (Lee 1966; Petersen 1958), or theories of circulation (Zelinsky 1971). The earliest systematic studies of migration (Ravenstein 1895; 1889) were totally oblivious of the distinction. For those, like the present author, who wish to maintain that the separation is often important, it needs to be conceded straight away that in some circumstances it is irrelevant. For example, where state frontiers are imperfectly respected and policed or where particular ethnic groups are settled across boundaries, migration tends to go on in defiance or ignorance of the nation state. For this reason, for instance, migration flows in West or East Africa have had to be analysed with little reference to recognized polities (see the contributions in Part 6). In other circumstances it is virtually impossible to delineate whether we are observing internal or international migration. Take, for instance, the case of 'former Yugoslavia', as that infelicitous description goes. 'Why be a minority in someone else's country, when you can be a majority in your own?' This seems to be the only compelling logic in the multiple splits and shifts in boundaries following the collapse of the communist regime. Who is from Bosnia, Herzegovena, Croatia or Serbia, and therefore who is an internal or international migrant, is likely to depend as much upon the fortunes of war as upon strict definitions of citizenship and nationality.

Given all these objections and uncertainties, why do I insist on maintaining the division between internal and international migration? My reason for doing so is that the overwhelming number of states from the turn of the century, and increasingly at the end of the twentieth century, make enormous efforts to try to fence off their countries from unwanted foreign migrants. Some states (see the contribution on Soviet Jewish emigration in Part 14) even seek to control exit as well as entry policies. Without firmly grasping the importance of this political intervention into the international migrant market, one loses such important issues as the analysis of xenophobia and racism, the selectivity of certain migration channels, the determining influence of international migration on ethnic relations in the receiving country and the switch in destinations as one outlet for a migration stream closes or another opens up. In other words one is in danger of losing the *meaning* of migration by providing only a desiccated statistical profile of migratory movements. Throughout the *Survey*, therefore, our contributors have been invited to be sensitive to the international context of their studies, to interpret the consequences of migration for source and destination areas, as well as to describe the nature of migratory movements.

The paired contrast between internal and international migration is paralleled by five other dyads, which usefully summarize most of the forms of migration covered in the *Survey*. These are:

- forced versus free migration
- settler versus labour migration
- temporary versus permanent migration
- illegal versus legal migration
- planned versus flight migration

Again, there are many occasions when each side of these linked dyads merges with its opposite. If a migrant's economic circumstances are so adverse as to leave little opportunity for gainful employment or self-employment, in a sense that person's migration becomes impelled, even if legally 'free'. The dream of many nineteenth-century migrants going to the New World (and those now bound for Europe, the USA and the richer countries of the Asia-Pacific) was to establish themselves as independent proprietors, even if they had, in the first instance, to work for others. Were they settlers or labour migrants? Is intent the significant criterion, or outcome? How temporary is temporary migration? A legally binding contract may specify a limited period of residence and work, but an employer may extend a contract, new horizons could open out, and the migrant's situation may change in the country of origin. In other words, temporary migration could easily become long-term residence or even permanent settlement. The reverse process also occurs, though no doubt this is a rarer phenomenon. The distinction between illegal and legal migration is, on the surface, much easier to sustain, though even here there are many ambiguities. Because a migrant is undocumented does not make him or her illegal. States may choose to ignore long-established circulatory zones rather than invite controversy, expense or ridicule if they fail to police their frontier effectively. Amnesty programmes (discussed, for example, in the contribution on Mexican migration in Part 8) may suddenly and retrospectively make illegal migration, legal. Finally, even in the strong contrast between planned and flight (i.e. refugee) migration, some scholars (for example, Kunz 1973) have noticed strong regularities in apparently spontaneous movements.

These antinomies are therefore not to be regarded as pure categories imprisoning all reality, but are more akin to Weber's 'ideal types', which can be briefly defined as archetypes used for analytical, evaluative and comparative purposes.[2] One cannot judge how 'free' is 'free migration', or how 'illegal' is 'illegal migration' until the logical possibilities are established and the range of cognate phenomena described. Naturally, there were space limitations on how far all forms of migration could be covered in the *Survey* either as typology or as range, but a glance at the list of contents will indicate that there is a good sample of contributions in all the dyads I have highlighted.

I was particularly concerned to ensure that there was a good sprinkling of material on flight and refugee migrations in the light of the current political salience, extent and volume of this form of migration. Of course the definitions of 'refugees' or 'immigrants' assigned by the immigration authorities are here very important. When (as, for example, in turn-of-the-century USA) immigrants are positively welcomed, it mattered little to the authorities at Ellis Island whether the people presenting themselves were fleeing poverty in Ireland or pogroms in Russia. Later, when entry policies were determined by foreign policy, those escaping from Cuba's communist regime were deemed 'refugees' while those taking to leaky boats to evade Haiti's brutal dictatorship were considered 'economic migrants' (see the relevant contribution in Part 13). Currently, many western European countries are paying little but lip-service to the legal conventions they had signed compelling them to assess properly the claims of those demanding asylum.

Part 15 of the *Survey* has been used partly to pick up forms of migration that did not easily fall within the planned dyads as well as to spot new trends. Modern contract labour (a new form of 'unfree' labour), the migration of skilled transients, entrepreneurial migration and the new importance of women as independently motivated migrants are all given consideration in this section of

the volume. The emergence of trans-Pacific migration and an evaluation of the extent of illegal migration are also included.

An assiduous reviewer will probably catch me out on my next statement, but I can think only of three main forms of migration that, rather too late in the day, I felt should have gained separate treatment. The first is military migration, which is discussed in the contribution on Sikhs in Part 3, but might have gained specialized discussion in respect of the extraordinary importance of soldiers returning from abroad to the politics of their home countries. This point can be quickly underlined by pointing to the Labour Party's victory over the British war hero, Churchill, in the national elections in 1945, while Eisenhower's election to the US presidency and the role of ex-servicemen in the development of African nationalism provide further illustrations. The second is return migration. This theme gains considerable attention in the cases of Turkey and Puerto Rico, but receives little systematic treatment elsewhere. On the other hand the return of repatriates, a type of migration that is often overlooked, gets generous coverage. The remaining, glaringly omitted, form of migration is movement for religious purposes. The proselytizing religions of Christianity and Islam, in particular, sent priests, missionaries and imams out of their natal religious areas and often received pilgrims, crusaders and hadjis in return. The Black Stone (the *qibla*) set into the wall of the most sacred part of the Grand Mosque in Mecca now cannot be touched for fear that it might be worn away by the hands of the multitude of hadjis (nearly two million annually) who reverentially file past on their spiritual quest. However, religious migration to holy sites and to places like Lourdes shades rather uncomfortably into travel and tourism which, for fairly self-evident reasons, are not normally considered as migratory movements.

Differing approaches

As Richardson (1967: 3) has observed, migration has attracted the attention of all the social and human sciences: 'it has been studied by demographers and economists, by sociologists and anthropologists, by historians and political scientists and by psychiatrists and psychologists. Each has focused on a different aspect of migratory behaviour and utilized a somewhat different class of data.' This comment is inadequate only in that it *understates* the degree to which migration has been a subject considered by scholars in many disciplines. The most obvious omission to Richardson's statement is that geographers, particularly human or social geographers, have made fundamental contributions to migration studies. In addition, and more recently, international relations specialists have become concerned with migration in that 'south–north' migration and 'east–west' migration – especially to Europe – are perceived as threats to the social and political order of the rich nation states (see the contribution on population movements and international security in Part 15). Philosophers have also started to write on migration insofar as the vigorous attempts to exclude most forms of migration by state authorities have raised difficult moral dilemmas (see the contribution on the ethical problems of immigration control, again in Part 15). Finally, scholars in cultural studies have begun to make important connections between migration and emergent forms of identity (Bammer 1994; Chambers 1994; Gilroy 1994).

For the record, the disciplinary breakdown of the ninety-nine contributors to this volume is (in descending order) as follows: twenty-one sociologists, twenty historians, eleven geographers, ten general social scientists, nine political scientists, four economists, four general humanities scholars, three demographers, two anthropologists, two educationalists, two philosophers, one criminologist and one scholar of international relations. Nine scholars failed to disclose their home disciplines. No doubt some hidden biases in my selection of contributors can be discerned, but with one exception, they were not conscious. The exception is that I was reluctant to represent the work of a number of economists who, although engaged in important and relevant research, use algebraic formulae and

mathematical models that are not – 'as yet' they might say – accessible to most scholars in the humanities and social sciences.[3] I have, of course, included the work of other economists whose work is readily understood. I emphasize also that this self-confessed bias should not be seen as an attack on quantitative work as such: as the many tables and figures show I was only too pleased to include statistical and graphical material that was illustrative and demonstrative of the text.

More important to my selection than this disciplinary breakdown was my conviction that the study of migration confirms, *par excellence*, the newer emphasis in the social sciences and humanities on commensurability and mutual intelligibility across disciplines. This is witnessed in the increasing number of scholars who work comfortably across disciplinary divides. The emerging dialogue is best summed up in the expression 'unidisciplinarity' – a notion that goes well beyond the more conventional ideas of interdisciplinarity (essentially meeting on neutral ground) and multi-disciplinarity (attacking a problem from several sides, thus illustrating its multifaceted character). The limit to these two earlier notions is that the participants essentially remain in their backyards (or should that be 'back fields') except for the limited projects for which they are required to court danger.

The newer notion assumes that a consensus is emerging around social and cultural anthropology, law (dispensing with 'black letter' law), sociology, politics, philosophy, economics (where humans still matter), history, human and population geography, social psychology and other cognate fields too numerous to mention[4] – in short, around a list of established disciplines not unlike those represented by the contributors to this book. But, as I hope is demonstrated by our contributors, this new-found transparency should not be a licence for an 'anything goes' type of scholarship. Instead, systematic investigation, rigorous method, appropriate language skills, a combination of empathy for and critical distance from the subject, attention to sources and to related research all acquire a renewed importance.

Those of us who have the migration 'bug' recognize each other across disciplines and across nations, languages and cultures. We are part of the webbing that binds an emerging global society. This may be partly because many of the scholars interested in migration are international migrants themselves or the children of those who migrated. We have normally found that our research is inadequate without moving to history and to other social science disciplines with which we had previously been unfamiliar. Above all, perhaps, we recognize that the study of world migration connects biography with history and with lived social experience. The well-established (see Archer 1992: ix–x) dualism in social theory of agency versus structure, subjective versus objective factors, micro versus macro perspectives, voluntarism versus determinism, feeling free and also constrained – these contradictory tensions are rehearsed, reflected and occasionally resolved in the migration experience. As the editor of this volume I was pleasantly surprised by how many authors made insightful contributions to understanding the old dualism. This led me to conclude that much larger questions pertaining to the nature and variety of the human condition are tangibly grasped through the study of migration. I can only hope that our readers will also share this gratifying sense of serendipity and the feeling of empathy with migrants all over the world.

Notes

1. Among the more significant and representative works on the African slave trade and settlement in the New World are works by Anstey (1975), Bonnet and Watson (1990), Bush (1990), Curtin (1970), Inkori and Engerman (1992), Irwin (1977), Thompson (1987) and Unesco (1979).
2. The concept is discussed more elaborately in Gerth and Mills (1948: Chapter 8).
3. Particularly noteworthy in this group is Stark's (1991) book which is a useful state-of-the-art statement by a mathematical economist interested in migration.
4. I first saw the notion of 'unidisciplinarity' discussed in the *Bulletin of the Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilizations*, State University of New York, Binghamton. Although anonymously authored it was certainly the work of the redoubtable Immanuel Wallerstein, who has also carried articles on the theme in *Review*, the Center's journal. He has persuaded the Gulbenkian Foundation to fund a high-powered commission looking at the emerging intellectual disciplines of

the twenty-first century. The expression 'the historical social sciences' is the proposed grouping of the cognate disciplines I have listed.

References

Anstey, Roger (1975) *The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition, 1760–1810*, London: Macmillan

Archer, Margaret (1992), *Culture and Agency*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Bammer, Angelika (ed.) (1994) *Displacements: Cultural Identities in Question*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press

Bonnet, Aubrey W. and C. Llewellyn Watson (eds) (1990) *Emerging Perspectives on the Black Diaspora*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America

Braudel, Fernand (1949) *La Méditerranée et la monde méditerraneen à l'époque de Philippe II*, Paris: Colin

Bush, B. (1990) *Slave Women in Caribbean Society, 1650–1832*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press

Chambers, Iain (1994) *Migrancy, Culture, Identity*, London: Routledge

Cohen, Robin (1987) *The New Helots: Migrants in the International Division of Labour*, Aldershot: Gower
   (1994) *Frontiers of Identity: The British and the Others*, London: Longman

Curtin, Philip D. (1970) *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press

Emmer, P. C. (1992) 'European Expansion and Migration: The European Colonial Past and Intercontinental Migration; An Overview', in P. C. Emmer and M. Mörner (eds) *European Expansion and Migration: Essays on the Intercontinental Migration from Africa, Asia and Europe*, New York: Berg, 1–12

Gerth, H. H. and C. Wright Mills (1948) *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press

Gilroy, Paul (1994) *The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness*, London: Verso

Hu-DeHart, Evelyn (1992) 'From Yellow Peril to Model Minority: The Columbus Legacy and Asians in America', *The New World*, 3, Spring/Summer

Inkori, Joseph and Stanley L. Engerman (eds) (1992) *The Atlantic Slave Trade: Effects on Economies, Societies and Peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Europe*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press

Irwin, G. W. (ed.) (1977) *Africans Abroad: a Documentary History of the Black Diaspora in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean During the Age of Slavery*, New York: Columbia University Press

Kennedy, Paul (1987) *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York: Random House

Kunz, E. F. (1973) 'The Refugee as Flight: Kinetic Models and Forms of Displacement', *International Migration*, 7 (3) 125–46

Lee, Everett (1966) 'A Theory of Migration', *Demography*, 3 (1) 47–57

Miles, Robert (1987) *Capitalism and Unfree Labour: Anomaly or Necessity?*, London: Tavistock

Petersen, William (1958) 'A General Typology of Migration', *American Sociological Review*, 23, 256–66

Potts, L. (1991) *The World Labour Market*, London: Zed Press

Ravenstein, E. G. (1885) 'The Laws of Migration', *Journal of the Statistical Society*, 48, 167–235
   (1889) 'The Laws of Migration', *Journal of the Statistical Society*, 82, 214–301

Richardson, A. (1967) 'A Theory and a Method for the Psychological Study of Assimilation', *International Migration Review*, 2 (4)

Stark, Oded (1991) *The Migration of Labour*, Oxford: Blackwell

Thompson, Vincent Bakpetu (1987) *The Making of the African Diaspora in the Americas 1441–1900*, Harlow: Longman

Unesco (1979) *The African Slave Trade from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Century: Reports and Papers of a Meeting of Experts Organised by Unesco at Port-au-Prince*, Haiti 31 January–4 February 1978, Paris: Unesco

Wallerstein, Immanuel (1974) *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*, New York: Academic Press

Zelinsky, W. (1971) 'The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition', *Geographical Review*, 61 (2) 219–49

PART TWO

EUROPEAN COLONIZATION AND SETTLEMENT

The major European colonial powers were Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, France and Spain, but Britain was to prove the most successful by far in using the export of population to establish its imperial hegemony. As *Tinker*[1] notes, this was far from accidental, as popular myth held. Emigration to the settler countries was systematically planned as a solution to social problems at home and a means of expanding English (then British) interests abroad. This notion was first advanced in a state paper delivered to James I by Bacon in 1606. He suggested that by emigration England would gain, 'a double commodity, in the avoidance of people here, and in making use of them there' (cited Williams 1964: 10). The poor rates and overpopulation would be relieved and idlers, vagrants and criminals would be put to good use elsewhere.

Once established, the principle was extended laterally. Scottish crofters, troublesome Irish peasants, dissident soldiers (like the Levellers), convicts, victims of the Great Fire of London – all were shipped out to the colonies of settlement. Indigent and orphaned children also met the same fate. Under various child migration schemes, the first batch was sent to Richmond, Virginia, in 1617, while the last group left for Canada as late as 1967. The scale of these schemes can be indicated by noting that 11 per cent of Canada's population is derived from destitute British children (Bean and Melville 1989). The numbers from all sources (free and induced) were greater than in the case of any other European power, but just as significant was the intent of the emigration. A typical licence from the Crown, as in the case of the Virginia Company of London, granted 'all Liberties, Franchises and Immunities' to the settlers *and* their offspring 'as if they had been abiding and born within this our Realm of England' (cited Ringer 1983: 39).

The bulk of British migrants went to the USA, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Rhodesia and South Africa. In each case, British legal, social and political institutions became dominant while, just as the proponents of colonization had promised, trade and commerce with the motherland flourished. This great success story was slow to collapse. But, under slogans like the famous 'no taxation without representation', the nationalist bourgeoisie in each territory was ultimately numerous enough and powerful enough to assert, or try to assert, independence from the motherland and hegemony over the indigenous populations.

Unlike the British, the Dutch were unable to reap all the rewards of colonial settlement. The potential prizes were just as great and their trading network was extensive, but the Dutch had the misfortune to strike less temperate climes. As *Lucassen* shows, nearly half a million Dutch settlers and their allies died in the East Indies, while even the successful settlements were very thinly populated with free Dutch burghers. Before 1835, Dutch emigrants to the settlements in the West Indies and the Americas comprised probably no more than 25,000 people. Thereafter, both for religious reasons and in response to the favourable land prices in the USA, a significant number of Dutch farmers left for North America. However, the political and cultural die had already been cast: to all intents and purposes the Dutch were migrating to a country which could no longer be subordinated to Dutch hegemony.

Were the intentions of the British and the Dutch simply different? This is argued strongly by Frederickson (1981: 20ff.), who suggested that the English ideology of colonization implied the seizure

11