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Introduction

INTRODUCTION

Since the emergence of the modern state, the provision of security to its population has been regarded as one of its core obligations. In its ideal form, the social contract entails a government's agreement to protect the governed. The perceived authority and legitimacy of states thus largely depends on their ability to secure their boundaries and maintain public order.

In practice, however, prospects for a legitimate social contract are far-off for many people around the world. Instead, individuals and communities are compelled to purchase or provide their own security if they are to have any at all. Not only do governments routinely fail in their obligation to guarantee public order but some perpetrate widespread violence against their own population. In parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, public security providers are almost completely absent from the lives of people living in rural areas.

In this context, it is not surprising that scholars and policy-makers are revisiting certain fundamental questions about security provision in the 21st century: Who actually provides security, and under whose authority? What policies, activities, and technologies ensure that security is provided? Who are the beneficiaries of security provision, and who loses out? These are not esoteric, theoretical questions, but practical, empirical ones. The answers often lie in the multiple, overlapping, and hybrid security-promotion efforts adopted by governments and communities around the world.

The *Small Arms Survey: States of Security* draws attention to the changing balance of state security provision and alternative arrangements, be they commercial security provision or informal community-based solutions. Building on new analysis and field research undertaken by the Small Arms Survey and its partners, the 2011 edition of the *Survey* also considers some of the effects of the absence of state security provision on human and national security. In so doing, it shines a spotlight on the rapid rise of the private security industry in both fragile and stable environments. As always, the role of small arms is highlighted.

ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT: STATE SECURITY PROVISION

The provision of state security—and its absence—are influenced by a range of factors, including the quality and capacity of governance, resource distribution, and cultural and social norms. In many states, public safety takes a back seat to other concerns, including the protection of national assets, the preservation of a political regime, or the private interests of elites. In countries where the state is weak or predatory, public authorities may neglect their security obligations entirely.

A profound influence on a state's willingness and ability to provide security is the experience of armed conflict and chronic fragility. In 2010, about 25 countries were at war, some of them suffering from multiple low- and medium-

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intensity conflicts (UNDP, forthcoming, p. 11). The vast majority of these armed conflicts were internal, involving one or more non-state armed groups contesting state authority.

Yet the end of armed conflict is no guarantee of a return to widespread security. As previous editions of the *Small Arms Survey* have shown, the post-conflict period can give rise to new social tensions, increased criminality, and the deepening of shadow economies (Small Arms Survey, 2009, ch. 7); indeed, many post-conflict countries are among the most corrupt in the world (TI, 2010, pp. 2–3). Without the effective implementation of political settlements, peace accords, and the consolidation of the rule of law at war's end, disparities and resentment will probably persist, reinforcing mutual mistrust between state forces and civilians.

The international community has deployed significant resources to develop norms and assist states in developing and rebuilding effective, fair security systems. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates that in 2007 and 2008 multilateral and bilateral development agencies alone invested USD 800–900 million per year in restoring or strengthening security sectors (OECD, 2009, p. 16). The United Nations and the World Bank, bilateral agencies, and regional and non-governmental organizations all view the establishment of transparent, accountable, welfare-oriented security sectors as a core task and a precondition for good governance and development. Notwithstanding agreement on such goals, there is still no consensus on the best means of achieving them.

In fact, since early successes in Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, and Latin America, the outcomes of security sector reform (SSR) have not been heartening. This relatively poor performance in SSR reflects political resistance and weak capacity in certain settings. It also highlights the difficulties of securing commitment from a wide range of government actors (van de Goor and van Veen, 2010, p. 98). An increasing number of attempts have been made to implement SSR in conflict-affected areas, in the absence of any commitment to reconciliation or mutual coexistence. As a result, some security sector 'reformers' are suggesting a return to basics: locally led projects that are tied to tangible, community-specific gains (Ball, 2010, p. 41).

Contemporary Haiti is an important case for gauging the effectiveness of current approaches to SSR. The paradigmatic fragile state, Haiti has seen repeated investment in security promotion, particularly over the past decade. Recent security improvements documented in this volume (Chapter 8) contradict claims that SSR is a lost cause in Haiti. At the same time, analysts have begun to advocate alternative, informal security arrangements as a more effective route to providing safety and public order, thus side-stepping the persistent problem of weak governance (Colletta and Muggah, 2009). In the African context, one observer has proclaimed that the future of post-conflict security provision is 'non-state' (Baker, 2010).

FILLING A NEED: NON-STATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

In places where the state's presence is limited, alternative security arrangements proliferate. These range from organized tribal militias to private commercial security providers and informal community security arrangements. Some build on traditional structures that pre-date formal state or colonial administrations. Other, newer systems arise in response to specific failures of state security forces—or the threats they pose to populations.

State and non-state security arrangements are not necessarily separate; they may be authorized by some of the same entities or may involve some of the same security providers. As discussed in Chapter 5, 'hybrid' forces encompassing private as well as current or former state forces are not uncommon. In states affected by and emerging from

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war, including Afghanistan and Iraq, state functions are routinely supported, and in some cases substituted, by multinational and locally recruited and administered security service providers. As governments around the world cut budgets, including those relating to public security, core state functions—from policing to prison surveillance—are being outsourced, as described in Chapter 4.

The rise of private security companies has been accompanied by the growth of a bewildering array of localized forms of security promotion. Their legitimacy, authority, and capacity rest on complex social relationships that enable different groups to coexist and form alliances. In Côte d'Ivoire, for example, local security arrangements include vigilante groups, the *dozos* (traditional hunters), and patriotic militias—not to mention a burgeoning market in private security services. As discussed in Chapter 7, some of these groups are ethnically aligned and have become vectors of insecurity themselves.

While these local, often ephemeral, informal arrangements can provide substantial security benefits, their service distribution is inherently unequal. They provide security as a private 'club' good——available to members—and not as a public good available to all. Not all populations benefit, nor do those who benefit do so evenly. In some polarized societies, security for some spells insecurity for others, as when non-state forces are enmeshed in political, economic, or ethnic patronage networks. Despite such embroilment, however, they may be no worse than state forces in this respect.

Some analysts urge placing informal and private security forces under legal, transparent, and accountable state control. This approach is undoubtedly promising in settings where the government is able to absorb former competitors or enemies in this way. It is less realistic if the state itself is largely derelict in the provision of public security, as in the case of Madagascar, described in Chapter 6. Further, for some communities, the legitimacy of non-state security providers stems from the very distance they maintain from the state apparatus.

Non-state providers can be inefficient and corrupt, but they are a fact of life in practically every corner of the world. From Colombia and Jamaica to Afghanistan and Sudan, political leaders and elites draw on such networks to bolster their power and reward their followers. Despite the many problems they can generate, such arrangements are often legitimate in the eyes of local populations. Especially where formal security institutions are considered inept or predatory, local residents are unlikely to forfeit existing patronage or identity-based social survival systems for the promise of formal untested ones (de Waal, 2009, p. 2). It is important to recognize the role these systems play since communities are embedded in, and not detachable from, prevailing social structures.

CHAPTER HIGHLIGHTS

Seven of the nine chapters in the *Small Arms Survey 2011* examine various aspects of the theme of security—who provides it, who benefits from it, and how the modalities and consequences of varying forms of security provision differ, particularly if small arms are part of the picture. The first thematic chapter discusses the adoption of emerging weapons technology among Western police forces and implications for use-of-force doctrines (Chapter 3). The next chapter charts the growth of the private security industry worldwide and estimates the number of personnel and their weapons (Chapter 4). The following chapter highlights the use of private security companies by multinational corporations—particularly in the extractive sector—including implications for the misuse of small arms (Chapter 5).

Case study chapters this year focus on three states confronted with particularly difficult security challenges. In Madagascar, the public security apparatus—characterized by institutionalized abuse of power for personal enrichment—

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has reneged on any semblance of security provision (Chapter 6). In Côte d'Ivoire—a country divided since 2002 between government-controlled and rebel-controlled areas—the populations in both areas express little faith in their official security providers; meaningful reunification and democratic oversight of the two forces are a long way off (Chapter 7). Meanwhile, in Haiti, public confidence in the police as security providers has improved, despite deep weaknesses in the state's justice and security sectors (Chapter 8). The thematic section ends with a chapter reviewing legislative controls over civilian possession of firearms in 42 jurisdictions around the world (Chapter 9).

This edition also presents the 2011 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer and an estimate of the value of the annual authorized trade in light weapons (Chapter 1). In addition, it features an assessment of developments related to small arms control at the UN in 2010 and looks back on ten years of UN action (or inaction) on small arms and light weapons (Chapter 2).

UPDATES SECTION

Chapter 1 (Light weapons transfers): As part of the Small Arms Survey's multi-year project to estimate the annual value of authorized transfers of small arms and light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammunition, this chapter examines the global trade in light weapons, using sources that include information obtained directly from governments, the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, and the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

The chapter estimates the annual total value of international authorized transfers of light weapons at USD 1.1 billion, including USD 755 million for anti-tank guided weapons, USD 102 million for man-portable air defence systems, and USD 257 million for four other types of non-guided light weapons. This year's findings bring the estimated value of the annual trade in small arms and light weapons (including their ammunition) to nearly USD 7.1 billion. The multi-year study will be completed in 2012 with an examination of the value of the international trade in parts and accessories for these weapons.

Chapter 2 (UN process): A decade after UN member states adopted the Programme of Action (PoA), it is not clear whether the UN small arms process has had a significant impact on national practice. This chapter reviews some recent positive developments, including the start of negotiations on an arms trade treaty, but it also highlights several causes for concern. In 2010, there were few functioning points of contact for the PoA and its offshoot, the International Tracing Instrument (ITI), and little exchange of information on ITI implementation. Preliminary research suggests that only 50 to 60 states are taking their UN small arms commitments seriously. Although it is difficult to draw firm conclusions based on the limited information that is currently available, the UN membership's continuing reluctance to embrace independent scrutiny of PoA (and ITI) implementation suggests it has a case to answer.

STATES OF SECURITY

Chapter 3 (Emerging technology): The firearms used by Western police forces have not undergone significant technological changes in recent years. For innovation, police forces seek inspiration from emerging trends in the development of military weapons. This chapter reviews the procurement and use of new weapon types by police

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Definition of small arms and light weapons

The Small Arms Survey uses the term 'small arms and light weapons' to cover both military-style small arms and light weapons as well as commercial firearms (handguns and long guns). It largely follows the definition used in the *Report of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms* (UNGA, 1997):

Small arms: revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and light machine guns.

Light weapons: heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of less than 100 mm calibre.

The term 'small arms' is used in this volume to refer to small arms, light weapons, and their ammunition (as in 'the small arms industry') unless the context indicates otherwise, whereas the terms 'light weapons' and 'ammunition' refer specifically to those items.

forces in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, with particular emphasis on the adoption of so-called 'less-lethal' technologies. These cutting-edge weapons, already widely adopted in some countries, allow police to engage targets that are farther away, providing them more flexibility in the use of force. 'Less-lethal' weapons have their weaknesses, however, and appropriate police doctrine and training for them—sometimes absent or underdeveloped—are essential to maximizing their utility and avoiding their misuse.

Chapter 4 (Private security companies): The 'outsourcing' of security to private companies has increased dramatically in recent years. While this trend has been reported widely, the arms used by private security companies (PSCs) have received little attention. Based on a review of 70 countries, this chapter examines the scale of the private security industry at the global level, assesses the extent to which it is armed, and asks whether PSC equipment contributes to or threatens security. It finds that there are more private security personnel worldwide—between 19.5 and 25.5 million individuals—than police officers. But private security companies hold less than 4 million firearms compared to the 26 million held by law enforcement and the 200 million held by armed forces. Companies tend to be better armed in Latin America and in conflict-affected areas than elsewhere. While some private security companies have been involved in the illegal acquisition and possession of firearms, a lack of systematic record-keeping makes evaluating their management and use of firearms difficult. In general, the growth of the private security sector has outpaced regulation and oversight mechanisms.

Chapter 5 (Multinational corporations): Multinational corporations (MNCs) are important clients of private security companies, which they employ to protect personnel and assets in a wide range of countries. The diversity of security personnel in the employ of MNCs and the sources of the weapons they hold have implications for the safety and security of the communities in which multinational companies operate. Focusing in particular on extractive MNCs operating in high-risk environments, this chapter finds that multinationals sometimes hire individuals with poor human rights records in government security forces. The regulatory and oversight systems are generally weak at all levels, creating conditions for violence, including the excessive use of armed force, by private security contractors working for MNCs. In recent years MNCs have attempted to set standards of practice in the use of private security, but adherence has not been monitored and few penalties exist for failure to abide by them.

Chapter 6 (Madagascar): Since its independence in 1960, the island nation of Madagascar has remained deeply influenced by its colonial experience. After almost a century of resistance to occupation, Malagasy society emerged

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divided along clan and class lines. This colonial heritage—and the country's strategic location—have played a decisive role in preventing Madagascar from developing effective official security forces for the maintenance of law and order. This chapter analyses the historical roots of a security sector that is today characterized by severely underpaid regular forces and an inflated number of high-ranking officers pursuing their own political and economic agendas. The army, in particular, has been manipulated by successive heads of state and their entourages; it continues to be embroiled in the struggles over political power and access to the country's wealth of resources. Since the ousting of President Marc Ravalomanana in 2009, the precarious situation has been exacerbated by high rates of armed robbery, the presence of international criminal networks, and collusion of members of the security sector in the plundering of the island.

Chapter 7 (Côte d'Ivoire): Since 2002, the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire has been divided into a rebel-held area in the north and the government-run south. It has thus featured two parallel security apparatuses, two treasuries, and two administrations. Based on a national household survey, interviews, and focus groups conducted by the author in 2010, this chapter compares reported levels of insecurity and perceptions of security providers in the government-run and rebel-held zones. It finds that levels and types of insecurity are comparable across the zones, stemming primarily from banditry and resource-based violence. Public trust in official security providers in both zones is low, though slightly higher for the government forces in the south than for the rebel Forces Nouvelles in the north. As a result, civilians in both zones call on private security actors to fill the gap.

Chapter 8 (Haiti): After decades of political instability, dire poverty, and devastating natural disasters, Haiti is often portrayed as the archetypal failed state. But when it comes to security, at least, Haitians themselves are reporting certain improvements. Drawing on a series of household surveys fielded from 2005 through 2010, including three conducted by the authors, this chapter finds that security has steadily improved in Haiti over the past decade, most dramatically following the installation of an elected government in 2007. It also reveals that, despite media reports to the contrary, violence and crime were remarkably low immediately after the January 2010 earthquake. Although Haiti has one of the lowest ratios of police officers to inhabitants in the world and a police force with a sometimes brutal human rights record, following the earthquake more than two-thirds of the population said they would turn first to the police if faced with a threat to their person or property—a surprising level of confidence not previously documented. Haitians also report a lower level of gun ownership than is widely assumed outside the country; in 2010 just 2.3 per cent of Port-au-Prince area households acknowledged owning firearms. While the country undoubtedly faces many long-term development and governance challenges, these new findings offer reasons for optimism regarding the capacity and credibility of the Haitian National Police.

Chapter 9 (Civilian possession): Civilians own an estimated three-quarters of the world's firearms. What are the different approaches states take to regulate civilian access and use of these weapons? This chapter presents a comparative analysis of civilian possession legislation in 42 jurisdictions (28 countries and 14 sub-national entities). While variations abound, most of the jurisdictions adopt many of the same general measures, including prohibiting access to certain weapons they consider ill-suited to civilian use, such as larger-calibre, military-style weapons. Most have some form of owner licensing, as well as firearm registration or record-keeping; most also prevent certain civilians, such as criminals, from owning firearms. The specific approach states take to civilian gun control is influenced by cultural, historical, and constitutional factors, yet all but two of the countries under review regard civilian access to firearms as a privilege rather than a basic right.

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CONCLUSION

Individuals and communities around the world experience security provision in a variety of ways. While the state has the primary obligation to protect its population, it has never been the only security provider. The recent, global rise of the private security industry is being met with unease, yet the key question is whether security arrangements—be they public or private, formal or informal—are in fact enhancing rather than impairing security, not only for the principal beneficiaries of such arrangements, but also for those who are left unprotected.

Through its examination of trends in security provision around the world, and the role of small arms and light weapons in that equation, this edition of the *Small Arms Survey* seeks to extend our understanding of patterns and causes of armed violence, and the best means of responding to it. Future editions of the *Survey* will continue this task, in particular by assessing, beginning in the 2012 volume, more than a decade of national and multilateral efforts to address the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.

—Robert Muggah

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Members of a US Army mortar team fire on Taliban positions with a 120 mm mortar in Kunar province, north-eastern Afghanistan, in January 2010. © Brennan Linsley/AP Photo

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Larger but Less Known

AUTHORIZED LIGHT WEAPONS TRANSFERS

1

INTRODUCTION

While the Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifle has become the symbol of contemporary warfare, light weapons play just as significant a role. Anti-tank missiles can destroy even the most heavily armoured vehicles. Modern man-portable air defence systems can shoot down aircraft from distances of up to eight kilometres. In heavily populated areas, indiscriminate mortar attacks can kill or injure hundreds of civilians. Despite these potential dangers, the international trade in light weapons is significantly less transparent than the trade in small arms. This chapter sheds new light on international transfers of light weapons through an analysis of available data and the strengths and shortcomings of the sources from which this data is drawn.

This study is the third instalment of the Small Arms Survey's multi-year assessment of authorized international transfers of small arms and light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammunition, previously valued at USD 4 billion per year (Small Arms Survey, 2006, pp. 66–67). This chapter estimates the annual total value of international authorized transfers of light weapons at USD 1.1 billion. Combining this value with the revised estimate for authorized transfers of firearms (USD 1.68 billion[1]) and ammunition for small arms and light weapons (USD 4.3 billion) yields a running (incomplete) total of nearly USD 7.1 billion per year.[2] The *Small Arms Survey 2012* will assess international transfers in parts and accessories for small arms and light weapons. It will also provide an estimate for the entire annual international trade in small arms and light weapons, their parts, accessories, and ammunition. The main findings of this chapter include:

- The annual trade in light weapons is estimated to be USD 1.1 billion. This includes USD 755 million for anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs), USD 102 million for man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), and USD 257 million for four types of non-guided light weapons.[3]
- Despite recent increases in the number of countries reporting transfers of small arms and light weapons to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UN Register), the overall quality and amount of information on light weapon transfers remain low.
- The international trade in MANPADS appears notably small. Only 18 of the 74 countries under review imported any MANPADS between 2003 and 2009, and only 12 imported more than 100 units. Given data limitations, however, these figures are probably underestimates.
- The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have contributed to significant increases in the procurement of anti-tank guided weapons. For example, the UK's imports of Javelin ATGWs from 2005 to 2009 exceeded total imports for the years 2000 to 2004 by 5,331 units—a 4,000 per cent increase.
- The 2011 Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer identifies Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Serbia, and Romania as the most transparent of the major small arms and light weapons exporters. The least transparent major exporters are Iran and North Korea, both scoring zero.

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- In 2008 the top exporters of small arms and light weapons (those with annual exports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Italy, Germany, Brazil, Switzerland, Israel, Austria, South Korea, Belgium, the Russian Federation, Spain, Turkey, Norway, and Canada (see Box 1.1).
- In 2008 the top importers of small arms and light weapons (those with annual imports of at least USD 100 million), according to available customs data, were (in descending order) the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, France, and Pakistan.

The top three exporters in 2008 were the United States, Italy, and Germany.

This chapter begins by defining key terms and concepts. It then provides an assessment of transparency in the trade in light weapons, along with the annual update of the Small Arms Trade Transparency Barometer. The chapter then outlines the methods used to calculate an estimated annual value for light weapons transfers. The sections that follow present a detailed analysis of the data mined for six light weapons categories: non-guided light weapons—mortars, grenade launchers, recoilless guns, and portable rocket launchers—and portable missile systems (ATGWs and MANPADS).[4] The chapter concludes by reflecting on our current understanding of the global authorized trade in light weapons and the gaps in that understanding.

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

This chapter is based on a definition of 'light weapons' provided in *Small Arms Survey 2008: Risk and Resilience,* which is derived from the 1997 report by the UN Panel of Government Experts on Small Arms (UNGA, 1997).[5] The *Small Arms Survey 2008* modifies the 1997 definition by identifying specific weight limits for light weapons and their ammunition, by increasing the Panel's calibre threshold for mortars from 100 mm to 120 mm, and by adding man-portable, rail-launched rockets to the Panel's list of light weapons (Small Arms Survey, 2008, pp. 8–11).

The *Small Arms Survey 2010* further refines the definition to distinguish 'light weapons' from 'light weapons ammunition'. Specifically, it defines MANPADS, rockets in single-shot disposable launch tubes, and rockets fired from rails as light weapons rather than ammunition.

In line with these definitions, this chapter uses the term 'light weapons' to refer to the following items:

- mortar systems up to and including 120 mm;
- hand-held (stand-alone), under-barrel, and automatic grenade launchers;
- recoilless guns;
- portable rocket launchers, including rockets in single-shot disposable launch tubes; and
- portable missiles and launchers, namely ATGWs and MANPADS.

This list of light weapons excludes heavy machine guns and anti-materiel rifles, for which transfers data is often aggregated with small arms and is usually impossible to distinguish from that of other firearms. For the purposes of analysing transfers, the Small Arms Survey traditionally has treated these two types of weapons as 'firearms'—while the UN Governmental Panel of Experts lists them as 'light weapons'.[6] Improvised explosive devices are not covered in this chapter since the Small Arms Survey's definition of authorized transfers does not apply to most international transfers of these weapons (see below). To the extent possible, light weapons designed for or used exclusively on platforms larger than light vehicles are also excluded,[7] as are parts and accessories,[8] which will be addressed in the *Small Arms Survey 2012.*

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