

Traditional and analytical philosophy

LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE



ERNST TUGENDHAT

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TRANSLATED BY P. A. GORNER

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TO THE MEMORY OF MARTIN HEIDEGGER



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Preface

In so-called analytical or language-analytical philosophy there is little reflection on its own foundations, and today less than before. For the most part the problems treated are inherited problems which are not questioned. Partly this is due to a lack of historical consciousness. A way of philosophizing can only become a fundamental philosophical position by confronting it with earlier conceptions of philosophy. This reflection on foundations is not just an additional act of self-clarification. It is a condition of a philosophy's ability to perceive the task that has always been the genuinely philosophical task: the examination of existing questions, methods and basic concepts, and the development of new ones.

These lectures aim to provide an impetus in this direction. They therefore have the character of an introduction. By means of a confrontation with traditional philosophy's fundamental orientation to the subject—object schema they attempt to bring questions which already exist in analytical philosophy into the context of a specifically language-analytical fundamental question. As regards content they move in a field of investigation that is by no means new; and even in this field they take only a first step.

The book is directed at three different groups of readers. The reader whom it addresses directly in the form of lectures is the philosophical beginner, for whom it could serve as an introduction to the philosophical way of thinking. At the same time it is directed, if only in an oblique way, at the reader who is already well-versed in linguistic analysis. Above all, however, it is directed at those who, being more or less familiar with traditional philosophical modes of conception, miss in analytical philosophy a fundamental question which can be compared with the great traditional approaches. This book seeks to build a bridge for such readers, by trying to show that analytical philosophy contains a funda-



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mental question which can not only compare with the traditional approaches but actually proves to be superior to them.

This aim is a reflection of my own development, which started out from Heidegger and led to language-analytical philosophy. I became convinced that Heidegger's question about the understanding of 'Being' can only acquire a concrete and realizable meaning within the framework of a language-analytical philosophy. Although there is hardly any mention of Heidegger in these lectures I owe to him the specific mode of access with which I approach the problems of analytical philosophy. For this reason the book is dedicated to him.

It has its origin in lectures I gave in Heidelberg in the Summer semester of 1970. Although I have re-written and expanded the text it seemed to me sensible to retain the lecture-form.

Starnberg, March 1976.

E.T.



Translator's Preface

My aim throughout this translation has been to combine accuracy with readability, but at times the latter quality has had to take second place. Whenever possible long sentences have been broken down into several shorter ones, but in some cases to have done this would have significantly altered the sense of what is being said.

As for my translation of individual words the following require some comment. For Vorstellung I have used 'representation' rather than 'idea', for to have chosen the latter would have made it impossible to translate the verbal forms vorstellen, vorgestellt etc. I considered the more literal 'presentation', but in the end settled for 'representation' because of the currency it has acquired through Kemp Smith's translation of the Critique of Pure Reason. For both Bezugnahme, bezugnehmen and Verweisung, verweisen I have had to use 'reference', 'refer'. For the most part it is clear from the context which sense is intended, but where there is the possibility of confusion I have put the German term in brackets. For gegenständlich I have used the artificial 'objectual' because 'objective' would have been positively misleading. Gegenständlich means something like 'having the character of an object'. It has nothing to do with 'objective' in the sense in which, for example, a judgment may be objective (rather than subjective).

In translating quotations from Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen I have in the main followed J. N. Findlay's translation. In the case of Wittgenstein I have simply reproduced the standard English translations without making any changes.

I would like to thank Professor Tugendhat for the thoroughness of his comments at every of the translation, my friends Eric Matthews and Guy Stock for some very helpful discussions of points relating to the translation, and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) for enabling me to have two periods of study in Germany with consequent



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benefit to my knowledge of German philosophy and the German language. Finally, I wish to thank Professor Hans Werner Arndt of the University of Mannheim for having first drawn my attention to Professor Tugendhat's book.

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