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Index

[More information](#)

## Index

- Ações Integradas de Saúde* (AIS), 53, 58
- actors, institutional. *See* change-agents
- agency, 12, 25, 89, 164, 170, 181, 217
- in authoritarian regimes, 140, 163
- autocratic, 138
- ambiguity, 22, 68, 139, 170, 181, 188
- and conflicts over the authoritative interpretation of rules, 176
- of formal rules in political “games”, 169
- in Indonesian politics, 155, 156
- of military-civilian balance in the New Order, 163
- of opportunists’ preferences, 26
- and opportunities for institutional change, 11, 12, 17, 18, 21, 27, 96, 169, 170, 171, 181, 193, 199
- of Pancasila, 142
- as a permanent feature of institutions, 9, 11, 216
- of rules in the House of Representatives, 197
- Amien Rais, 161
- Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI), 142, 149, 153, 154, 155, 159, 160, 161
- despotic power of, 145
- dominance of, 148, 149, 153
- factionalism in, 142, 162
- infrastructural power of, 143, 145, 147
- loss of despotic power, 155, 160
- personalization within, 150
- power vis-à-vis Golkar, 149, 151–152, 157–159
- public criticisms of Suharto from within, 153
- relationship with PKI, 143
- and September 30 coup, 143
- Asian financial crisis, 141, 161
- Assistance Fund for Rural Workers (Brazil). *See* Fundo de Assistência ao Trabalhador Rural (FUNRURAL)
- authoritarian institutions, 26, 141, 143, 163, 164
- gradual change in, 132–141
- organization of power in, 134
- purpose of, 134

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-11883-5 - Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power

Edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen

Index

[More information](#)

226

Index

- authoritarian institutions (*cont.*)  
 stability of, 164  
 Suharto's grip on, 153  
*See also* authoritarian regimes;  
 despotic institutions;  
 infrastructural institutions.
- authoritarian regimes, 133, 136, 140  
 bossism, 134, 138, 152  
 in Brazil, 49, 57  
 civilian institutions in, 135  
 decision-making procedures, 134  
*See also* despotic institutions;  
 infrastructural institutions.  
 dynamic stability of, 137  
 enforcement infrastructure of,  
 134  
 junta, 134, 138, 146, 147, 150,  
 152  
 machine, 134  
 personalization of, 148, 164  
 rationalist accounts of, 137  
 robustness of political institutions  
 in, 132  
 strongman, 134, 138, 143, 149,  
 152  
 typology of, 133–136
- authoritarianism, 9, 132, 134, 140  
 challenges to, 140  
 distinction from autocracy, 134  
 and institutional complexity, 133
- autocracy, 152  
 displacement of oligarchy, 148,  
 160  
 distinction from authoritarianism,  
 134
- Brazil, 26  
 authoritarian state penetration of  
 society in, 40  
 constitutional reform of 1988, 39,  
 40, 55, 58  
 political liberalization in, 50  
 social security. *See* health care  
 (Brazil)
- Brazilian Center of Health Studies.  
*See* Centro Brasileiro de  
 Estudos de Saúde (CEBES)
- Brazilian Communist Party (PCB),  
 48
- British House of Lords  
 gradual institutional change in,  
 1–2
- Burma, 164
- Bush, George W., 94
- Cannon, Joseph, 199  
 Cannon Revolt, 171, 194–198,  
 200
- Carter, Jimmy, 120
- causal processes, slow-moving, 3
- Centro Brasileiro de Estudos de  
 Saúde (CEBES), 48
- change-agents, 31, 97, 170, 181  
 affinity with particular modes of  
 institutional change, 4,  
 22–27  
 alliances among, 29–31  
 cognitive limits of, 12, 126  
 constraints on, 12, 168, 170, 180,  
 181, 182  
 creativity of, 11, 12, 152, 161,  
 168–170, 173, 181, 183, 184,  
 185, 186, 188, 192, 216  
 as central to American political  
 development, 198  
 and institutional context, 125,  
 171, 181, 192–193, 198  
 as ongoing, 172  
 inequalities among, 24, 200–201  
 mobilizational power of, 209, 215  
 multivariate preference functions  
 of, 211  
 power to make and break rules,  
 170–171

## Index

227

- relationship to political context
  - and institutional form, 15, 18–22, 28–29
- short- and long-run strategies of, 22
- strategies of, 182 *See also*
  - conversion; displacement; drift; layering
- See also* insurrectionaries; opportunists; symbionts; subversives.
- China
  - advance of market-oriented institutions in, 16
- complex institutions. *See* institutional complexity
- con men, 25, 66, 69, 70, 71, 76, 79, 88, 90
- Congress, United States, 12, 13, 21, 172, 174, 200
  - 1st, 173, 174, 175
  - 25th, 174
  - 47th, 185
  - 51st, 190
  - 61st, 194
  - 110th, 177
- Article I powers of, 187
- in the broader context of
  - American political development, 199
- conditional party government
  - model of, 180
- conservative forces in, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 119, 120
- role in Social Security, 108–125
- See also* House of Representatives; Senate.
- conversion, 15, 139, 182, 183, 185
  - definition, 15–18
  - and enforcement discretion, 21
  - of Golkar, 146
  - of OAA, 115
- and opportunists, 27
- and subversives, 26
- and veto possibilities, 19
- critical junctures
  - in Brazil, 39, 40
  - definition, 7, 67, 89
  - and insurrectionaries, 24
  - limits for explaining institutional change, 40, 56, 58, 67, 89, 163, 205
  - See also* exogenous shocks.
- Cuba
  - advance of market-oriented institutions in, 16
- democratic institutions
  - purpose of, 134
  - stability of, 164
- Democratic Party (Kenya), 86
- Democratic Party (U.S.), 111, 120
- Democrats, 111, 120, 185, 186, 188, 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196
- despotic institutions, 134, 146, 164
- despotic personalization, 152, 157
  - See also* New Order; Suharto: personalization of power.
- despotic power, 134, 141, 143, 145, 147, 148, 151, 158, 160, 162, 163, 164
- dictatorships
  - diversity of, 132
  - See also* authoritarian regimes.
- disappearing quorum, 183, 190, 192, 193, 200
  - elimination of, 171, 190–192
  - origin of, 189
- displacement, 5, 15, 22, 116, 118, 147, 182
  - definition, 15, 16
  - distinction from layering, 16
  - and enforcement discretion, 22
  - and insurrectionaries, 24, 27, 28

- displacement (*cont.*)  
 and subversives, 25, 27  
 and veto possibilities, 19
- drift, 15, 182  
 definition, 16, 17  
 and enforcement discretion, 21  
 and parasitic symbionts, 24, 27, 69  
 of property rights in Kenya, 25, 65, 67, 78, 90  
 and subversives, 26  
 and veto possibilities, 19
- Eastern Europe  
 transition from communism in, 30
- exogenous shocks, 67, 70–71, 205  
 limits for explaining institutional change, 2, 3, 7, 64–65, 67–68, 86, 89, 97, 104  
*See also* critical junctures;  
 institutional change;  
 punctuated equilibrium  
 model of.
- Falleti, Tulia, 26, 30, 31, 218
- fiscal conservatives. *See* Social Security: and activist fiscal conservatives
- France, 27, 214, 218
- Fundo de Assistência ao Trabalhador Rural* (FUNRURAL), 43, 44, 46, 57
- Geisel, Ernesto, 46, 50
- Germany, 57, 214, 218
- Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA), 83, 84
- Golkar, 142, 143, 147, 148, 149, 151, 156, 159, 160, 162, 163  
 civilianization of, 152, 153–154  
 consolidation of, 147  
 denouncement of ABRI's domination, 153  
 Executive Board, 154  
 power vis-à-vis ABRI, 149, 151–152, 155, 157–159  
 Suharto's power over, 154, 156, 159
- Goulart, João, 43, 44, 47, 48
- gradual institutional change, 3, 152  
 in authoritarian institutions, 132–141, 163  
 in the Brazilian health care system, 38–40  
 in property rights, 63–67  
 theory of, 1–32  
 in the U.S. House of Representatives, 168–172  
 in U.S. Social Security, 94–98  
*See also* conversion; displacement; drift; layering.
- Habibie, B. J., 158, 159, 162
- Hall, Peter, 8, 29, 32
- health care (Brazil)  
 bureaucracy, 42, 49, 52, 54  
 Canada, similarities with, 57  
 and federalism, 38, 50, 53, 55, 57–58  
 financing of, 43, 52  
 impact of reforms, 58–59  
 inequalities in the provision of, 38, 42, 43  
 Ministry of Health, 50  
 Montes Claros project, 50  
 municipalization of, 38, 46, 47, 51, 58  
 National Ministry of Health, 41  
 private sector role in, 38, 39, 41, 43, 45, 46, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57  
 public sector role in, 39, 41, 45, 46, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59  
 role of military in, 39, 40, 41–46, 57  
 sanitarias, 40, 46–56, 57, 58

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-11883-5 - Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power

Edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen

Index

[More information](#)

## Index

229

- Single Health System, 54
- Unified and Decentralized Health System, 54
- and unions, 41, 42, 43, 44, 54
- universalization of, 38–40, 46, 51, 58, 59
- historical institutionalism, 4, 8, 24, 32
- compatibility with rational choice institutionalism, 8, 32, 205–206, 214–216, 220
- compatibility with sociological institutionalism, 8, 32, 206, 216–219, 220
- and instrumental beliefs, 207
- view of institutional change, 4, 6–7, 205
- view of institutional stability, 96
- House of Representatives, United States
- agenda control in, 188, 197, 198
- complex institutional features of, 171
- and constitutional privilege, 186, 195, 196
- dilatory motions in, 184–188, 191, 199
- embeddedness in larger context of American politics, 172, 183
- majority empowerment in, 184, 187–188, 193
- minority empowerment in, 184–185
- minority obstruction in, 185, 187, 189, 191, 199
- See also* disappearing quorum.
- piecemeal expansion of rules in, 173–175
- power of recognition, 176
- precedents in, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 180, 184, 185, 187, 192, 193, 196, 198, 199
- rationalist approach to. *See* rational choice
- institutionalism: approach to Congress
- speaker, decline in the power of, 197
- special orders in, 187, 188, 193, 200
- strategies of change in, 182–184
- Ways and Means Committee, 108, 115, 117, 118, 119, 121
- See also* Cannon Revolt; disappearing quorum; Reed's Rules; Rules Committee.
- Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), 158, 159, 160, 161
- as counterweight to military, 158
- “real ICMI”, 158
- increasing returns, 7, 9, 29, 97, 103, 213
- See also* path dependence; positive feedback.
- India, 141
- Indonesia, 133, 136, 137, 138, 217
- 1945 constitution, 143
- civilian institutions in, 139, 145, 147, 148, 163
- Guided Democracy, 143, 144, 145
- martial law in, 142
- military institutions in, 136, 145, 146
- organized social forces in, 138, 141, 142, 143, 147, 161
- See also* Golkar; Muhammadiyah; Nahdlatul Ulama; New Order: challenges to; PKI; PNI.
- parliament, 138, 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 155, 162
- parliamentary democracy, 142
- September 30, 1965, 143

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-11883-5 - Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power

Edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen

Index

[More information](#)

230

Index

Indonesia (*cont.*)

social diversity of, 141

*See also* New Order; Suharto.Indonesian Armed Forces. *See*

Angkatan Bersenjata

Republik Indonesia (ABRI)

Indonesian Association of Muslim

Intellectuals. *See* Ikatan

Cendekiawan Muslim

Indonesia (ICMI)

infrastructural institutions, 134,

146, 164

infrastructural power, 134, 143,

147, 151, 163, 164

institutional breakdown, 2, 6, 16,

67, 70, 218

institutional change

agents of. *See* change-agents

and ambiguity

*See* ambiguity: andopportunities for institutional  
change.

and beliefs, 25, 66, 69, 71, 76, 77,

86, 88, 205, 207–208,

210–211, 214, 215, 216

and coalitions, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14,

18, 206–207, 214, 215, 216,

217, 218, 219

*See also* change-agents: alliances

among; institutions: and

dominant supporting

coalitions.

and collective action problems,

208–209, 215

and scope conditions, 206

continuous. *See* gradual

institutional change

as a coordination game, 210

*See also* rational choice

institutionalism.

creativity and constraint in, 171,

172, 173

*See also* change-agents:

constraints on; change-agents:

creativity of

de facto, though formal rules

intact, 13

and distributive issues, 211

*See also* institutions:

power-distributional

implications of.

endogenous causes of, 2, 5, 6, 7,

10, 14, 67, 68, 70, 89, 96, 97,

105, 125, 126

*See also* gradual institutional

change.

existing institutions' effect on,

215

exogenous causes of, 5, 6, 7, 10,

67, 70, 89, 96

*See also* critical junctures;

exogenous shocks.

experimental character of,

218

gradual. *See* gradual institutional

change

incremental. *See* gradual

institutional change

link to institutional origins, 98,

126, 127–128

link to institutional stability, 7–10,

89, 98, 105, 164, 207–208,

214, 219

modes of, 17–18

*See also* conversion;

displacement; drift; layering.

multidimensional effects of, 211,

215

and organizational setting,

208–209

over time. *See* gradual institutional

change

punctuated equilibrium model of,

3, 6, 67, 96, 104

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-11883-5 - Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power

Edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen

Index

[More information](#)

## Index

231

- See also* critical junctures;  
exogenous shocks.
- relationship between endogenous  
and exogenous causes of, 70
- relationship to political context  
and institutional  
characteristics, 18–22
- as an unintended by-product of  
distributional struggles, 23
- institutional collapse. *See*  
institutional breakdown
- institutional complexity, 133, 137,  
138, 141, 148, 163, 164, 170,  
183, 198
- and agency, 138, 139, 140
- as avenue for political contention  
from below, 140, 160, 162
- causal role of, 133
- in the House of Representatives,  
171, 172, 173, 177, 182
- as inherited, 133, 152
- institutional continuity. *See*  
institutional stability
- institutional decline, 63, 68, 90.
- See also* institutional breakdown
- institutional defenders, 17, 18, 28,  
29, 30, 31, 96, 124, 125,  
127
- See also* institutions: dominant  
supporting coalitions.
- institutional development. *See*  
institutional change
- institutional equilibrium, 10
- See also* institutional  
reproduction; institutional  
stability; positive feedback.
- institutional losers, 14, 16, 22
- institutional origins, 8, 98, 127, 163
- institutional persistence. *See*  
institutional stability
- institutional reform. *See* institutional  
change
- institutional reproduction, 5, 6, 17,  
89, 140
- See also* institutional stability;  
path dependence; positive  
feedback.
- institutional stability, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,  
13, 14, 25, 64, 67, 90, 96, 98,  
102, 103, 127, 137, 204, 205,  
207, 214, 217, 219
- and mutualist symbionts, 24
- institutional winners, 14, 22,  
70
- institutions
- ambiguity in. *See* ambiguity
- approaches to. *See* historical  
institutionalism; rational  
choice institutionalism;  
sociological institutionalism
- as causes, 2
- and compliance, 4, 10–14, 20,  
24
- contradictory potential of, 65, 67,  
70, 88, 89, 90
- definition, 4, 204
- dominant supporting coalitions,  
65, 68. *See also* institutional  
defenders
- and lock-in. *See* path dependence
- macro-level, 99, 100, 104, 111,  
125
- power-distributional approach to,  
4, 7–10, 14
- as self-reinforcing, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9,  
10, 68, 69, 70, 96, 125
- See also* institutional  
reproduction; institutional  
stability; path dependence.
- as unambiguous, 12, 67, 89,  
216
- Instituto Nacional de Assistência  
Médica da Previdência Social  
(INAMPS)*, 45, 51

- insurrectionaries, 23, 133, 140, 147, 162, 182  
 and alliances, 30  
 definition, 23–24  
 and displacement, 24, 27  
 and enforcement discretion, 28  
 and veto possibilities, 28
- Integrated Health Actions (Brazil).  
*See Ações Integradas de Saúde* (AIS)
- Jacobs, Alan, 12, 31, 208
- Kenya  
 Change the Constitution Movement, 83  
 democratization in, 64, 65, 67, 86, 88  
 settlement schemes in, 72  
 state capacity, 66  
*See also* land documentation (Kenya).
- Kenya African National Union (KANU), 82, 85, 86, 87, 88
- Kenyatta, Jomo, 72, 74, 75, 83, 84
- Kihika Kimani, 79, 82, 83, 85, 87
- Kopkamtib, 145, 149, 150, 157
- land buying companies (LBCs), 67, 71, 78, 90  
 Gatarakwa Farming Company, 80, 84  
 as instruments for raising money for political actions, 80  
 Ngwataniro Land Buying Company, 79, 81, 82, 85  
 origins of, 78–79  
 political uses of, 79–88  
 and “vanity shares”, 80
- land documentation (Kenya), 25, 63, 64  
 colonial origins of, 64, 71–73
- decline in the efficacy of, 64, 65, 71  
 defense of the sanctity of, 66, 74, 75, 88  
 definition, 71  
 dominant constituencies of. *See* institutions: dominant coalitions  
 Ministry of Lands, 71, 86, 87  
 parasitic exploitation of, 75–88, 90  
*See also* land buying companies (LBCs); symbionts: parasitic.
- layering, 15, 22, 40, 139, 182  
 definition, 15, 16–17  
 and enforcement discretion, 22  
 and subversives, 26, 27  
 and veto possibilities, 19, 20
- Liberal Democratic Party (Japan), 17
- Mahoney, James, 65, 96, 126, 134, 147, 169, 170, 182, 183
- Malari disaster, 150, 152, 153
- Malaysia, 164
- Masyumi, 142, 144, 161
- Megawati Sukarnoputri, 161
- Michuki, John, 79, 82
- Moerdani, Benny, 150, 151, 155, 157, 159
- Moi, Daniel arap, 74, 81, 83  
 attack on LBCs, 83–86
- Muhammadiyah, 141, 142, 161
- Murtopo, Ali, 146, 149, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158
- Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), 141, 142, 143, 149, 160, 161
- Nasution, A. H., 143, 150
- National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG), 44, 45, 46, 57



Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-11883-5 - Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power

Edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen

Index

[More information](#)

## Index

233

- National Institute for Medical Assistance in Social Security (Brazil). *See Instituto Nacional de Assistência Médica da Previdência Social* (INAMPS)
- network externalities, 213
- New Deal, 21, 97, 116, 123
- New Order
- challenges to, 133, 136, 140–141, 149, 153, 160, 161, 162, 163
  - civilianization of power in, 133, 141, 146, 153–154, 158
  - coalitional tensions in, 150
  - collapse of, 140, 141, 162–163
  - origins of, 144–148
  - personalization of power in
    - See* Suharto: personalization of power.
- Norris, George, 171, 196, 197, 198
- Ntimama, William ole, 87, 88
- Old Age Assistance (OAA), 111, 124, 126
- conversion of, 114–115
- Onoma, Ato, 13, 25, 183, 216
- opportunists, 23, 124, 133, 138, 140, 144, 164, 182
- and alliances, 30
  - and conversion, 27
  - definition, 26–27
  - and enforcement discretion, 29
  - and veto possibilities, 29
- Pancasila, 142, 156, 161
- parameters, 6
- path dependence, 3, 6, 121, 133, 136, 212–214
- limits for explaining institutional change, 96–97, 102–104, 125, 137–138, 163, 164
- PDI (Indonesian Democratic Party), 148, 161
- personalization, techniques of
- circumvention, 136, 141, 148, 150, 152, 154, 155, 157
  - packing, 136, 141, 148, 150, 152, 154, 156, 159
  - rigging, 136, 141, 148, 152, 154, 156
  - See also* Suharto: personalization of power.
- Pierson, Paul, 3, 9, 30, 213
- PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), 141, 142, 143, 144, 150
- PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), 141, 142, 161
- policy feedback, 98, 100
- distinction from self-reinforcement, 104, 181
- political entrepreneurs. *See also* change-agents: creativity of political entrepreneurship, 152
- positive feedback, 63, 64, 65, 73, 75, 89, 104, 125, 127
- and exogenous shocks, 64, 67
  - in programmatic institutions, 102–104
  - vulnerability to parasitic groups, 68–70
- PPP (United Development Party), 148, 149, 153, 156
- Prabowo Subianto, 159, 162
- Program of Internalization of Health and Sanitary Actions. *See Programa de Interiorização das Ações de Saúde e Saneamento* (PIASS)
- Programa de Interiorização das Ações de Saúde e Saneamento* (PIASS), 50, 51, 52

- programmatic institutions, 95, 97, 118, 125  
 constraining effects of, 99–102  
 definition, 99  
 distributive implications of, 102  
 historical development of in Social Security, 104–111  
 influence on actors' long-term choices, 103  
 policies as, 98–99  
 susceptibility to change, 102–104
- quasi-parameters, 6
- rational choice institutionalism, 4, 216, 219  
 affinity with coalitional approach, 206–207  
 approach to Congress, 172, 180  
 and collective action problems, 208–209  
 compatibility with historical institutionalism, 8, 32, 205–206, 207–208, 210–211, 214–216, 219–220  
 compatibility with sociological institutionalism, 32, 219–220  
 and compliance, 10  
 definition of institutions, 6  
 and multivariate preference functions, 212  
 view of institutional change, 5–6, 204–205, 206, 210, 218  
 view of institutional stability, 204–205, 207
- Reagan, Ronald, 121
- Reed, Thomas Brackett, 171, 181, 183, 198, 199  
 and the disappearing quorum, 189–193  
 political skills, 192, 197  
 on rule breaking, 180  
 and the Rules Committee, 184–188  
 structural authority of, 192–193  
 Reed's Rules, 171, 191, 193, 197  
 Republican Party (U.S.), 108, 187, 190, 191  
 Republicans, 111, 120, 185, 187, 188, 192, 194, 195  
 Rodriguez Neto, Eleutério, 52, 53  
 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 12, 95, 106, 108, 111, 113, 115  
 coalition-building strategies, 110–111  
 long-run policy concerns, 106–110, 118, 126
- rules  
 breaking, 170, 183, 184, 189, 193, 198, 200  
*See also* disappearing quorum.  
 conflicts and contradictions  
   among, 170, 183, 184, 187, 191, 198, 200  
 conversion, 182–183, 185, 198, 200  
 creative combination of, 183–184, 188, 198, 200  
 dual nature of, 168–169, 181–182  
 legitimacy of, 182  
 reform dilemma, 194
- Rules Committee, 118, 192, 200  
 and the Cannon Revolt, 171, 193–198  
 expansion of, 196  
 loss of speaker control over, 197  
 and Reed, 171, 184–188  
 reporting privilege, 185, 186, 187, 188, 193  
 speaker control over, 194, 195  
 as a standing committee, 185
- Sarney, José, 53, 54  
 Sekneg, 155

- Senate, United States, 111, 187  
 Senate Finance Committee, 108, 115
- Sheingate, Adam, 11, 12, 139, 152
- Slater, Dan, 9, 25, 71, 217
- Social Security (U.S.)  
 and activist fiscal conservatives, 105, 106, 116, 117, 119  
 actuarial basis of, 95, 97, 104, 109–110, 112, 113, 114, 121, 124  
 asymmetrical opportunities for transforming, 117  
 and benefit increases, 119  
 and benefit reductions, 121  
 amendments to, 111, 113, 116, 117, 122  
 and compartmentalization, 101, 108–109, 116, 118–119, 120, 122  
 contributory financing of, 12, 31, 103, 104, 105, 106–109, 116, 119, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127  
 crisis of, 119–120  
 early politics of, 106–111  
 and expansionists, 105, 108, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 124  
 and negative feedback effects, 97, 125  
 and orthodox conservatives, 105, 112, 113, 121  
 partial privatization, push for, 94  
 and path dependence, 96, 103, 121, 125  
 PAYGO financing of, 110, 112–113, 117–118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123  
 and positive feedback, 102–103, 104, 125, 127  
 and regressive taxes, 95, 110, 111, 113, 119
- resources latent in, 97, 105, 124, 127
- surpluses, 112, 119, 122, 123
- vulnerability to economic downturn and demographic shifts, 120
- See also* Old Age Assistance; programmatic institutions; Roosevelt, Franklin Delano.
- sociological institutionalism, 4  
 affinities with constructivism, 217  
 compatability with historical institutionalism, 8, 32, 216–220  
 compatability with rational choice institutionalism, 32, 219–220  
 and compliance, 10  
 definition of institutions, 5  
 view of institutional change, 5, 216–217, 218–219
- Soeharto. *See* Suharto
- Soemitro, 149, 150, 151, 155, 157
- Streeck, Wolfgang, 3, 15, 67, 210, 218
- structurally-induced equilibrium, 207
- subversives, 23, 26, 40, 47, 56, 133, 138, 140, 142, 147, 162, 163, 182  
 and alliances, 30  
 and drift, 26  
 and conversion, 26  
 definition, 25–26  
 and displacement, 27  
 and enforcement discretion, 28  
 and layering, 26, 27  
 and veto possibilities, 28
- Sudharmono, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159
- Sudradjat, Edi, 159

Cambridge University Press

978-0-521-11883-5 - Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power

Edited by James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen

Index

[More information](#)

236

Index

- Suharto, 9, 133, 136, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 152, 160, 161, 163  
 children, 157, 158, 159  
 and coalition building, 137–138, 144–145, 164  
 dependence on the military, 141  
 fall of, 161–163  
 Islamic allies, 149  
 patronage networks, personal control over, 154  
 personal staff (*staf pribadi*, SPRI), 145, 146  
 personalization of power, 138, 139, 141, 148, 149, 151, 153–160  
 rise of, 143–144  
 strategic deployment of unpredictability and ambiguity, 139  
*See also* New Order.  
 Suharto regime. *See* New Order  
 Sukarno, 142, 143, 144, 152, 156, 159, 161  
 Sweden  
   social policy reform in, 213  
 symbionts, 23, 182  
   and alliances, 31  
   definition, 24–25  
   and enforcement discretion, 28  
 mutualist, 23, 24–25, 31  
   and institutional stability, 25  
 parasitic, 23, 24, 25, 31, 65, 68, 69, 70, 75, 89, 90  
   and drift, 24, 27  
   *See also* con men.  
   and veto possibilities, 28  
 Thelen, Kathleen, 3, 15, 65, 67, 96, 126, 134, 147, 169, 170, 182, 183, 218  
 Townsendites, 108, 112, 114  
 United States, 11  
   affirmative action legislation in, 13  
   civil rights in, 21, 185  
   Congress  
     *See* Congress, United States.  
   Constitution, 173, 186, 187, 189, 190, 191, 196, 197, 198  
   labor rights in, 21  
   Prohibition, 69  
   social policy reform in, 213  
     *See also* Social Security (U.S.).  
 Vargas, Getulio, 41, 42  
 veto players, 18, 19, 20, 28, 29, 56, 162  
 veto points, 18, 28  
 veto possibilities  
   and change-agents, 29  
   and modes of institutional change, 18–20  
 Wahid, Abdurrahman, 160, 161