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CHAPTER XV

THE BHĀSKARA SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY

Date of Bhāskara.

UDAYANA, in his *Nyāya-kusumāñjali*, speaks of Bhāskara as a commentator on the Vedānta in accordance with the traditions of the *tridaṇḍa* school of Vedānta and as holding the view that Brahman suffers evolutionary changes¹. Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita also, in his *Tattva-viveka-ṭīkā-vivaraṇa*, speaks of Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara as holding the doctrine of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*)². It is certain, however, that he flourished after Śaṅkara, for, though he does not mention him by name, yet the way in which he refers to him makes it almost certain that he wrote his commentary with the express purpose of refuting some of the cardinal doctrines of Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. Thus, at the very beginning of his commentary, he says that it aims at refuting those who, hiding the real sense of the *sūtra*, have only expressed their own opinions, and in other places also he speaks in very strong terms against the commentator who holds the *māyā* doctrine and is a Buddhist in his views³. But, though he was opposed to Śaṅkara, it was only so far as Śaṅkara had introduced the *māyā* doctrine, and only so far as he thought the world had sprung forth not as a real modification of Brahman, but only through *māyā*. For

¹ *Tridaṇḍa* means "three sticks." According to Manu it was customary among some Brahmins to use one stick, and among others, three sticks.

Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda Dvivedin, in his Sanskrit introduction to Bhāskara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*, says that the Vaiṣṇava commentators on the *Brahma-sūtra* prior to Rāmānuja, Taṅka, Guhadeva, Bhāruci and Yāmunācārya, the teacher of Rāmānuja, were all *tridaṇḍins*. Such a statement is indeed very interesting, but unfortunately he does not give us the authority from which he drew this information.

² "*Bhaṭṭabhāskaras tu bhedā-bheda-vedānta-siddhānta-vādi*"; Bhaṭṭojī Dīkṣita's *Vedānta-tattva-ṭīkā-vivaraṇa*, as quoted by Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda in his Introduction to Bhāskara's commentary.

³ *sūtrā-bhīprāya-saṃvṛtyā svābhīprāyā-prakāśanāt
vyākhyātaṃ yair idam śāstraṃ vyākhyeyam tan-nivṛttaye.*

Bhāskara's Commentary, p. 1.

Also "ye tu bauddha-matāvalambino māyā-vādinā te' pi anena nyāyena sūtra-kāreṇai' va mīrastāḥ." *Ibid.* II. 2. 29.

In another place Śaṅkara is referred to as explaining views which were really propounded by the Mahāyāna Buddhists—*vigītaṃ vicchinna-mūlaṃ mādhyānika-bauddha-gāthitaṃ māyā-vādaṃ vyāvāṇayanto lokān vyāmohayanti.* *Ibid.* I. 4. 25.

both Śaṅkara and Bhāskara would agree in holding that the Brahman was both the material cause and the instrumental cause (*upādāna* and *nimitta*). Śaṅkara would maintain that this was so only because there was no other real category which existed; but he would strongly urge, as has been explained before, that *māyā*, the category of the indefinite and the unreal, was associated with Brahman in such a transformation, and that, though the Brahman was substantially the same identical entity as the world, yet the world as it appears was a *māyā* transformation with Brahman inside as the kernel of truth. But Bhāskara maintained that there was no *māyā*, and that it was the Brahman which, by its own powers, underwent a real modification; and, as the Pañcarātras also held the same doctrine in so far as they believed that Vāsudeva was both the material and the instrumental cause of the world, he was in agreement with the Bhāgavatas, and he says that he does not find anything to be refuted in the Pañcarātra doctrine¹. But he differs from them in regard to their doctrine of the individual souls having been produced from Brahman².

Again, though one cannot assert anything very positively, it is possible that Bhāskara himself belonged to that particular sect of Brahmins who used three sticks as their Brahminic insignia in preference to one stick, used more generally by other Brahmins; and so his explanation of the *Vedānta-sūtra* may rightly be taken as the view of the *tridaṇḍī* Brahmins. For in discussing the point that fitness for Brahma-knowledge does not mean the giving up of the religious stages of life (*āśrama*), with their customs and rituals, he speaks of the maintenance of three sticks as being enjoined by the Vedas³.

Mādhavācārya, in his *Śaṅkara-vijaya*, speaks of a meeting of Śaṅkara with Bhaṭṭa Bhāskara, but it is difficult to say how far this statement is reliable⁴. From the fact that Bhāskara refuted Śaṅkara and was himself referred to by Udayana, it is certain that he flourished some time between the eighth and the tenth centuries. Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī Prasāda refers to a copper-plate found by the

¹ *Vāsudeva eva upādāna-kāraṇaṃ jagato nimitta-kāraṇaṃ ceti te manyante . . . tad etat sarvaṃ śruti-prasiddham eva tasmān nātra nirākaraṇtyaṃ paśyāmaḥ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, II. 2. 41.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* III. 4. 26, p. 208; see also Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvarī's Introduction.

⁴ *Śaṅkara-vijaya*, xv. 80.

late Dr Bhāwdāji in the Mārāṭhā country, near Nasik, in which it is stated that one Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa of the lineage (*gotra*) of Śāṇḍilya, son of Kavicakravartī Trivikrama, who was given the title of Vidyāpati, was the sixth ancestor of Bhāskarācārya of Śāṇḍilya lineage, the astronomer and writer of the Siddhānta-śiromaṇi; and he maintains that this senior Vidyāpati Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa was the commentator on the *Brahma-sūtra*¹. But, though this may be possible, yet we have no evidence that it is certain; for, apart from the similarity of names², it is not definitely known whether this Vidyāpati Bhāskara Bhaṭṭa ever wrote any commentary on the *Brahma-sūtra*. All that we can say, therefore, with any degree of definiteness, is that Bhāskara flourished at some period between the middle of the eighth century and the middle of the tenth century, and most probably in the ninth century, since he does not know Rāmānuja³.

Bhāskara and Śaṅkara.

There is a text of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI. 1. 1, which is treated from two different points of view by Śaṅkara and Bhāskara in connection with the interpretation of *Brahma-sūtra*, II. 1. 14⁴. Śaṅkara's interpretation of this, as Vācaspati explains it, is that, when clay is known, all clay-materials are known, not because the clay-materials are really clay, for they are indeed different. But, if so, how can we, by knowing one, know the other? Because the clay-materials do not really exist; they are all, and so indeed are all that pass as modifications (*vikāra*), but mere expressions of speech (*vācārambhaṇam*), mere names (*nāmadheyam*) having no real

¹ Paṇḍita Vindhyeśvari Prasāda's Introduction.

² We hear of several Bhāskaras in Sanskrit literature, such as Lokabhāskara, Śrāntabhāskara, Haribhāskara, Bhadantabhāskara, Bhāskaramiśra, Bhāskara-śāstri, Bhāskaradiṣita, Bhaṭṭabhāskara, Paṇḍita Bhāskarācārya, Bhaṭṭabhāskaramiśra, Trikaṇḍamaṇḍana, Laugākṣibhāskara, Śāṇḍilyabhāskara, Vatsabhāskara, Bhāskaradeva, Bhāskaraṇṣimha, Bhāskarāraṇya, Bhāskaraṇandanātha, Bhāskarasena.

³ He makes very scanty references to other writers. He speaks of Śāṇḍilya as a great author of the Bhāgavata school. He refers to the four classes of Māheśvaras, Pāsupata, Śaiva, Kāpālika and Kāthaka-siddhāntin, and their principal work *Pañcādhyāyi-śāstra*; he also refers to the *Pāñcarātrikas*, with whom he is often largely in agreement.

⁴ *tad-ananyatvam ārambhaṇa-śabdādibhyaḥ. Brahma-sūtra*, II. 1. 14. *yathā saumya ekena mṛt-piṇḍen asarvaṃ mṛtmayam vijñātaṃ syādvācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttike'ty'eva satyam* (Ch. VI. 1. 1).

entities or objects to which they refer, having in fact no existence at all¹.

Bhāskara says that the passage means that clay alone is real, and the purport of speech depends on two things, the objects and the facts implied and the names which imply them. The effects (*kārya*) are indeed the basis of all our practical behaviour and conduct, involving the objects and facts implied and the expressions and names which imply them. How can the cause and effect be identical? The answer to this is that it is true that it is to the effects that our speech applies and that these make all practical behaviour possible, but the effects are in reality but stages of manifestation, modification and existence of the cause itself. So, from the point of view that the effects come and go, appear and disappear, whereas the cause remains permanently the same, as the ground of all its real manifestations, it is said that the cause alone is true—the clay alone is true. The effect, therefore, is only a state of the cause, and is hence both identical with it and different from it². The effect, the name (*nāma-dheya*), is real, and the scriptures also assert this³.

Bhāskara argues against Śaṅkara as follows: the arguments that the upholder of *māyā* (*māyāvādin*) could adduce against those who believed in the reality of the many, the world, might be adduced against him also, in so far as he believes in monism (*advaita*). A person who hears the scriptures and philosophizes is at first under the veil of ignorance (*avidyā*); and, if on account of this ignorance his knowledge of duality was false, his knowledge of monism might equally for the same reason be considered as false. All Brahma-knowledge is false, because it is knowledge, like the knowledge of the world. It is argued that, just as from the false knowledge of a dream and of letters there can be true acquisition

¹ *Bhāmati, Brahma-sūtra*, II. 1. 14. Rāhu is a demon which is merely a living head with no body, its sole body being its head; but still we use, for convenience of language, the expression “Rāhu’s head” (*Rāhoḥ śiraḥ*); similarly clay alone is real, and what we call clay-materials, jugs, plates, etc., are mere expressions of speech having no real objects or entities to which they can apply—they simply do not exist at all—but are mere *vikalpa*; *vācā kevalam ārabhyate vikāra-jātaṃ na tu tattvato’sti yato nāmadheya-mātram etat; . . . yathā rāhoḥ śiraḥ . . . śabda-jñānā-mupālī vastu-sūnyo vikalpa iti; tathā cā’vastutayā anytam vikāra-jātaṃ*.

² *vāg-indriyasya ubhayam ārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam . . . ubhayam ālambya vāg-vyavahārah pravartate ghaṭena udakam āhare’ ti mṛṇmayam ity asya idaṃ vyākhyānam . . . kāraṇam eva kāryā-tmanā ghaṭavad avatiṣṭhate . . . kāraṇasyā’vasthā-mātraṃ kāryaṃ vyatiriktā’vyatiriktaṃ śukti-rajatavad āgamāpāya-dharmito’c ca anytam anityam iti ca vyapadiṣyate. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, II. 1. 14.*

³ *atha nāma-dheyaṃ satyasya satyamiti, etc. Ibid.*

of good and evil or of certain meanings, so from the false knowledge of words and their meanings, as involved in the knowledge of monistic texts of the Upaniṣads, there may arise right knowledge. But such an argument is based on false analogy. When from certain kinds of dreams someone judges that good or evil will come to him, it is not from nothing that he judges, since he judges from particular dream experiences; and these dream experiences are facts having particular characters and features; they are not mere nothing, like the hare's horn; no one can judge of anything from the hare's horn. The letters also have certain shapes and forms and are definitely by common consent and agreement associated with particular sounds; it is well known that different letters in different countries may be used to denote one kind of sound. Again, if from a mistake someone experiences fear and dies, it is not from nothing or from something false that he dies; for he had a real fear, and the fear was the cause of death and was roused by the memory of a real thing, and the only unreality about it was that the thing was not present there at that time. So no example could be given to show that from false knowledge, or falsehood as such, there could come right knowledge or the truth. Again, how can the scriptures demonstrate the falsehood of the world? If all auditory knowledge were false, all language would be false, and even the scriptural texts would be non-existent.

Further, what is this "*avidyā*," if it cannot be described? How can one make anyone understand it? What nonsense it is to say that that which manifests itself as all the visible and tangible world of practical conduct and behaviour cannot itself be described¹. If it is beginningless, it must be eternal, and there can be no liberation. It cannot be both existent and non-existent; for that would be contradictory. It cannot be mere negation; for, being non-existent, it could not bring bondage. If it brings bondage, it must be an entity, and that means a dual existence with Brahman. So the proposition of the upholder of *māyā* is false.

What is true, however, is that, just as milk gets curdled, so it is God Himself who by His own will and knowledge and omnipotence transforms Himself into this world. There is no inconsistency in God's transforming Himself into the world, though He is partless;

¹ *yasyāḥ kāryam idaṃ kṛtsnaṃ vyavahārāya kalpate
nirvaktuṃ sā na śakye' ti vacanaṃ vacanār-thakaṃ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.*

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for He can do so by various kinds of powers, modifying them according to His own will. He possesses two powers; by one He has become the world of enjoyables (*bhogyā-śakti*), and by the other the individual souls, the enjoyers (*bhoktr*); but in spite of this modification of Himself He remains unchanged in His own purity; for it is by the manifestation and modification of His powers that the modification of the world as the enjoyable and the enjoyer takes place. It is just as the sun sends out his rays and collects them back into himself, but yet remains in himself the same¹.

The Philosophy of Bhāskara's Bhāṣya.

From what has been said above it is clear that according to Bhāskara the world of matter and the selves consists only in real modifications or transformations (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman's own nature through His diverse powers. This naturally brings in the question whether the world and the souls are different from Brahman or identical with him. Bhāskara's answer to such a question is that "difference" (*bheda*) has in it the characteristic of identity (*abheda-dharmaś ca*)—the waves are different from the sea, but are also identical with it. The waves are manifestations of the sea's own powers, and so the same identical sea appears to be different when viewed with reference to the manifestations of its powers, though it is in reality identical with its powers. So the same identical fire is different in its powers as it burns or illuminates. So all that is one is also many, and the one is neither absolute identity nor absolute difference².

The individual souls are in reality not different from God; they are but His parts, as the sparks of fire are the parts of fire; but it is the peculiarity of these parts of God, the souls, that though one with Him, they have been under the influence of ignorance, desires and deeds from beginningless time³. Just as the *ākāśa*, which is all the same everywhere; and yet the *ākāśa* inside a vessel or a house is not just the same *ākāśa* as the boundless space, but may in some

¹ *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, II. 1. 27, also I. 4. 25.

² *abheda-dharmaś ca bhedo yathā mahodadher abhedah sa eva taraṅgādy-ātmanā vartamāno bheda ity ucyate, na hi taraṅgā-dayaḥ pāṣāṇā-diṣu dṛśyante tasyaiva tāḥ śaktayaḥ śakti-śaktimatoś ca ananyatvaṃ anyatvaṃ co-palakṣyate yathā'gner dahana-prakāśanā-di-śaktayaḥ... tasmāt sarvam ekā-nekā-tmakam nā'tyantam abhinnaṃ bhinnaṃ vā. Ibid.* II. 1. 18.

³ *Ibid.* I. 4. 21.

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sense be regarded as a part of it; or just as the same air is seen to serve different life-functions, as the five *prāṇas*, so the individual souls also may in some sense be regarded as parts of God. It is just and proper that the scriptures should command the individual souls to seek knowledge so as to attain liberation; for it is the desire for the highest soul (*paramātman*) or God or Brahman that is the cause of liberation, and it is the desire for objects of the world that is the cause of bondage¹. This soul, in so far as it exists in association with ignorance, desires and deeds, is atomic in nature; and, just as a drop of sandal paste may perfume all the place about it, so does the atomic soul, remaining in one place, animate the whole body. It is by nature endowed with consciousness, and it is only with reference to the knowledge of other objects that it has to depend on the presence of those objects². Its seat is in the heart, and through the skin of the heart it is in touch with the whole body. But, though in a state of bondage, under the influence of ignorance, etc., it is atomic, yet it is not ultimately atomic in nature; for it is one with Brahman. Under the influence of *buddhi*, *ahamkāra*, the five senses and the five *vāyus* it undergoes the cycle of rebirths. But though this atomic form and the association with the *buddhi*, etc., is not essential to the nature of the soul, yet so long as such a relation exists, the agency of the soul is in every sense real; but the ultimate source of this agency is God Himself; for it is God who makes us perform all actions, and He makes us perform good actions, and it is He who, remaining within us, controls all our actions.

In all stages of life a man must perform the deeds enjoined by the scriptures, and he cannot rise at any stage so high that he is beyond the sphere of the duties of work imposed on him by the scriptures³. It is not true, as Śaṅkara says, that those who are fit to

¹ *rāgo hi paramātma-viṣayo yaḥ sa mukti-hetuḥ viṣaya-viṣayo yaḥ sa bandha-hetuḥ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.*

² *Ibid.* II. 3. 18, 22, 23.

³ *Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, I. I. 1. In holding the view that the *Brahma-sūtra* is in a sense continuous with the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, which the former must follow—for it is after the performance of the ritualistic duties that the knowledge of Brahman can arise, and the latter therefore cannot in any stage dispense with the need for the former—and that the *Brahma-sūtras* are not intended for any superior and different class of persons, Bhāskara seems to have followed Upa-varṣa or Upavarṣacārya, to whose commentary on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* he refers and whom he calls the founder of the school (*śāstra-sampradāya-pravartaka*). *Ibid.* I. I. 1, and II. 2. 27. See also I. I. 4: *ātma-jñānā-dhikṛtasya karmabhir vinā apavargā-nupapatter jñānena karma samucṛtyate.*

have the highest knowledge are beyond the duties of life and courses of ritualistic and other actions enjoined by the scriptures, or that those for whom these are intended are not fit to have the highest knowledge; in other words, the statement of Śaṅkara that there cannot be any combination (*samuccaya*) of knowledge (*jñāna*) and necessary ritualistic duties of life (*karma*) is false. Bhāskara admits that pure *karma* (ritualistic duties) cannot lead us to the highest perception of the truth, the Brahman; yet knowledge (*jñāna*) combined with the regular duties, i.e. *jñāna-samuccita-karma*, can lead us to our highest good, the realization of Brahman. That it is our duty to attain the knowledge of Brahman is also to be accepted, by reason of the injunction of the scriptures; for that also is one of the imperative duties imposed on us by the scriptures—a *vidhi*—the self is to be known (*ātma vā are draṣṭavyaḥ*, etc.). It is therefore not true, as Śaṅkara asserted, that what the ritualistic and other duties imposed on us by the scriptures can do for us is only to make us fit for the study of Vedānta by purifying us and making us as far as possible sinless; Bhāskara urges that performance of the duties imposed on us by the scriptures is as necessary as the attainment of knowledge for our final liberation.

Bhāskara draws a distinction between cognition (*jñāna*) and consciousness (*caitanya*), more particularly, self-consciousness (*ātma-caitanya*). Cognition with him means the knowledge of objective things, and this is a direct experience (*anubhava*) arising out of the contact of the sense organ, *manas*, and the object, the presence of light and the internal action of the memory and the sub-conscious impressions (*saṁskāra*). Cognition is not an active operation by itself, but is rather the result of the active operation of the senses in association with other accessories, such that whenever there is a collocation of those accessories involving the operation of the senses there is cognition¹. Bhāskara is therefore positively against the contention of Kumārila that knowledge is an entity which is not directly perceived but only inferred as the agent which induces the intellectual operation, but which is not directly known by itself. If an unperceived entity is to be inferred to explain the cause of the per-

¹ *jñāna-kriyā-kalpanāyāṁ pramāṇā-bhāvāt... ālokaendriya-manah-saṁskāreṣu hi satsu samvedanam utpadyate iti tad-abhāve notpadyate, yadi punar aparaṁ jñānaṁ kalpyate tasyāpy anyat tasyāpy anyad ity anavasthā; na ca jñāna-kriyānumāne liṅgam asti, samvedanam iti cen na, agrhīta-sambandhatvāt. Bhāskara-bhāṣya, I. I. 1.*

ceived intellectual operation, then another entity might be inferred as the cause of that unperceived entity, and another to explain that and so on, and we have a vicious infinite (*anavasthā*). Moreover, no unperceived entity can be inferred as the cause of the perceived intellectual operation; for, if it is unperceived, then its relation with intellectual operation is also unperceived, and how can there be any inference at all? Thus, cognition is what we directly experience (*anubhava*) and there is no unperceived entity which causes it, but it is the direct result of the joint operation of many accessories. This objective cognition is entirely different from the subjective consciousness or self-consciousness; for the latter is eternal and always present, whereas the former is only occasioned by the collocating circumstances. It is easy to see that Bhāskara has a very distinct epistemological position, which, though similar to Nyāya so far as the objective cognition is concerned, is yet different therefrom on account of his admission of the ever-present self-consciousness of the soul. It is at the same time different from the Śāṅkarite epistemology, for objective cognition is considered by him not as mere limitation of self-consciousness, but as entirely different therefrom¹. It may also be noted that, unlike Dharmarājadhvarindra, the writer of the Sanskrit epistemological work, *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Bhāskara considers *manas* as a sense-organ². On the subject of the self-validity of knowledge Bhāskara thinks that the knowledge of truth is always self-valid (*svataḥ-pramāṇa*), whereas the knowledge of the false is always attested from outside (*parataḥ-pramāṇa*)³.

As has already been said, Bhāskara does not think that liberation can be attained through knowledge alone; the duties imposed by the scriptures must always be done along with our attempts to know Brahman; for there is no contradiction or opposition between knowledge and performance of the duties enjoined by the scriptures. There will be no liberation if the duties are forsaken⁴. The state of salvation is one in which there is a continuous and unbroken consciousness of happiness⁵. A liberated soul may associate or not associate itself with any body or sense as it likes⁶. It is as omniscient,

¹ *kecid āhuḥ ātmā pramāyām indriya-dvāroṇādhī-nirgama-viṣayeṣu vartate... tad idam asamyag darśanam;... ālokaendriyādibhyo jñānam utpadyamānaṃ... cānyad iti yuktaṃ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya.*

² *Ibid.* I. 4. 21.

³ *Ibid.* IV. 4. 8.

⁴ *Ibid.* II. 4. 17.

⁵ *Ibid.* III. 4. 26.

⁶ *Ibid.* IV. 4. 12.

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omnipotent and as one with all souls as God Himself¹. The attachment (*rāga*) to Brahman, which is said to be an essential condition for attaining liberation, is further defined to be worship (*samārādhana*) or devotion (*bhakti*), while *bhakti* is said to be attendance on God by meditation (*dhyānādinā paricaryā*). *Bhakti* is conceived, not as any feeling, affection or love of God, as in later Vaiṣṇava literature, but as *dhyāna* or meditation². A question may arise as to what, if Brahman has transformed Himself into the world, is meant by meditation on Brahman? Does it mean that we are to meditate on the world? To this Bhāskara's answer is that Brahman is not exhausted by His transformation into the world, and that what is really meant by Brahman's being transformed into the world is that the nature of the world is spiritual. The world is a spiritual manifestation and a spiritual transformation, and what passes as matter is in reality spiritual. Apart from Brahman as manifested in the world, the Brahman with diverse forms, there is also the formless Brahman (*niṣprapañca brahman*), the Brahman which is transcendent and beyond its own immanent forms, and it is this Brahman which is to be worshipped. The world with its diverse forms also will, in the end, return to its spiritual source, the formless Brahman, and nothing of it will be left as the remainder. The material world is dissolved in the spirit and lost therein, just as a lump of salt is lost in water³. This transcendent Brahman that is to be worshipped is of the nature of pure being and intelligence (*sal-lakṣaṇa* and *bodha-lakṣaṇa*)⁴. He is also infinite and unlimited. But, though He is thus characterized as being, intelligence, and infinite, yet these terms do not refer to three distinct entities; they are the qualities of Brahman, the substance, and, like all qualities, they cannot remain different from their substance; for neither can any substance remain without its qualities, nor can any qualities remain without their substance. A substance does not become different by virtue of its qualities⁵.

Bhāskara denies the possibility of liberation during lifetime (*jīvan-mukti*); for so long as the body remains as a result of the

¹ *muktaḥ kāraṇā-tmānam prāptaḥ tadvad eva sarva-jñāḥ sarva-śaktiḥ. Bhāskara-bhāṣya*, IV. 4. 7.

² *Ibid.* III. 2. 24.

³ *Ibid.* II. 2. 11, 13, 17.

⁴ *Ibid.* III. 2. 23.

⁵ *na dharma-dharmi-bhedena svarūpa-bheda iti; na hi guṇa-rahitaṁ dravyam asti na dravya-rahita guṇaḥ. Ibid.* III. 2. 23.