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Alf Ludtke

Excerpt

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## I

## *State domination in the transition to industrial capitalism*

### The synchronism of symbolic and physical force

The formation of the ‘modern’ state was a topic which repeatedly engaged the attention of Max Weber. In his sceptical look at the secular advance of ‘occidental rationalism’ he noted two, related, tendencies:

The spread of pacification and the expansion of the market thus constitutes a development which is accompanied, along parallel lines, by (1) that monopolisation of legitimate violence by the political organisation which finds its culmination in the modern concept of the *state* as the ultimate source of every kind of legitimacy of the use of physical force; and (2) that rationalisation of the rules of its application which has come to culminate in the concept of the legitimate legal order.<sup>1</sup>

Weber’s own sceptical reticence deterred him from asserting generalised causal relations; developments parallel in time sufficed. The long-term process of the advance of market relations was accompanied by the politically organised monopolisation of ‘violence’ (*Gewaltsamkeit*), the legitimacy of which was inseparable from the formation of the political system, from the state. What was central here was not the state as apparatus, as material substrate: rather, the guarantee of the legitimacy of the conduct of the state, and especially state violence, lay in the latent and manifest concept of ‘the state’ itself. And with this legitimate violence went the formulation and development of socially accepted rules of procedure, the ‘legitimate legal order’ through which the force monopolised by the state would be applied.

A complementary relationship therefore exists between ‘capitalisation’, the increasingly commodity form of social relations – which, although not disregarded by Weber, tends to be swallowed up in the idea of the ‘market’ – and the transformation of the procedures by which power is wielded and secured. As fundamental as this characterisation may be, however, it concentrates solely on *form*, excluding both the substance of social transformation in its uneven regional and cyclical dynamics (these, as it were, prior to the more general labels of commercial, agrarian, and industrial capitalisation and forms of proletarianisation) and the interaction between this substance and the formation of centralised political authority. The social foundations of

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state power and the state apparatus, their functions and dysfunctions for social transformation, for both the dominant as well as the revolutionary or oppressed classes, remain unspecified. In fact, Weber explicitly avoids any such imputation of content: political associations or states are not constituted by virtue of any unique substance or tasks ascribed to them.<sup>2</sup>

Nevertheless the pivot of this characterisation of the state is not 'merely formal'. The decisive criterion adopted by Weber is the *means* through which the state acts. And by choosing the level of 'means', considerable scope for concretisation is provided which is indispensable when dealing with questions of power, domination and force as they affect relationships between people rather than abstract entities. Weber's reluctance to reconstruct state functions from the 'logic' of social modes of production in fact proves to be an advantage: he obtained his characterisation from extensive historical and ethnographical material. And it was on this basis that he was able to expound the thoroughly descriptive definition quoted above.

For Weber, the specific 'means' used by the state, although not its sole means, was its capacity for physical violence (*Gewaltsamkeit*),<sup>3</sup> and Weber here refers to *legitimate* violence, a fact which he usually explicitly adds. It is therefore assumed that the dominated regard the state's capacity for violence and its actual exercise of violence as legitimate. The condition and the possibility of such legitimacy is a fundamental consensus between rulers and ruled. The *possibility* of power and domination,<sup>4</sup> the suppression of the needs of the 'governed', is consequently traced back to a 'belief in legitimacy'. This does not of course mean the disappearance of non-consensual and non-normative sources of such consent. Alvin Gouldner has noted that for Weber the process of assent to domination represents a 'datum' and not a problem: 'for Weber, authority was given assent *because* it was legitimate, rather than being legitimate because it evoked assent' (emphasis in original).<sup>5</sup> In Weber, precisely which modes of behaviour by the governed are to be subsumed under their belief in legitimacy, to what extent ascribing such belief can ever be consensual given unequal access to social resources, and whether agreement is nothing more than a pious hope or, at best, an illusion on the part of the rulers or analysts, represent questions which are simply not raised. Whether violence requires any justification at all is simply passed over.

Weber's approach not only left aside the conditions for the possibility of state domination: it also excluded the practice of domination. This is a very serious and fateful analytic omission – one not confined to Weber alone: numerous interpretations, some sympathetic and some competing, exhibit the same deficiency. In particular, this lacuna is a meeting ground for theories both of social development and of 'modernisation' which draw on Weber's concept of rationalisation and on the 'critique of political economy'.

Those theories based on the principle that the characteristic feature of modern societies is the self-regulating market system<sup>6</sup> tend to regard the physically violent assertion of state power or state-supported claims to power as an atavistic throw-back<sup>7</sup> – or at most an exception wielded only in times when crisis threatens to overwhelm the system itself. In societies of this type direct coercion is merely a subsidiary means of domination. Such a perspec-

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tive also corresponds to one central strand in the ‘critique of political economy’; the oft-quoted ‘silent compulsion of economic relations’<sup>8</sup> also extends into the ‘juridic form’<sup>9</sup> which pervades all social relations and divests ‘extra-economic’ coercion of the violence characteristic of pre-capitalist societies.

Both arguments focus their attention on the question: how do either production and market mechanisms or (and possibly simultaneously) cultural and ideological systems facilitate the smooth reproduction of power and domination? Or, alternatively: how in ‘modern’ societies is the apparent spontaneous acceptance of superior power by the ‘governed’ possible? Acts of directly perceptible oppression do not seem of great consequence in such societies. Rather, the problem seems to lie in understanding how the ‘rules of the game’ are determined and formulated, and further how they become acceptable: what are the ‘filters’ which allow needs to be articulated, and hence problems and conflicts to be perceived, formulated and represented, and additionally acted out and resolved.

Not surprisingly, such interpretations take for granted those institutions which maintain and uphold the law, that is the *police* and the *judiciary*. This also applies to those theories which neglect the ‘hegemony’ or the ‘intellectual and moral leadership of a group’, class or class formation, as developed by Gramsci.<sup>10</sup> Nicos Poulantzas’s position is not untypical. For Poulantzas, contemporary French experience provides sufficient demonstration of the fact that repression, that is physically violent domination, is a regular practice within developed industrial-capitalist societies. It constitutes one amongst a number of means for safeguarding the core areas – to be defined – of capitalist commodity production, and in particular for any periodically necessary disciplining of the sellers of labour-power.<sup>11</sup> Essentially, however, this position holds that it is not violence – irrespective of its specific form – but rather that ‘illusory “general” interest in the form of the state’, whose socially necessary ambiguity was pinpointed by Marx and Engels, which guarantees the perpetuation of even unequal social relations.<sup>12</sup> According to Poulantzas, the translation of this interest into reality depends on the state of class struggle between the rulers and ruled, and in particular on the strategy of power blocs.

In contrast, theories which emphasise system functions and mechanisms, rather than the practice of the actors, accentuate the dual meaning of those ideological and welfare provisions which supposedly generate legitimacy. These not only regulate the unequal perception and satisfaction of the needs of the ruled, but also ‘continuously and permanently deny that such a selectivity takes place’.<sup>13</sup> Offe is thinking here of payments to compensate for social and economic distress, such as state provision of social services or forms of ‘legitimation through procedure’ (Luhmann, *Zweckbegriff und Systemrationalität*) either in the form of elections or in an extensive network of juridical forms.

To propose that the assertion and concealment of domination are two moments in an identical process is not, of course, to be committed to one specific theoretical approach. This thesis is fully elaborated only when it is no longer confined to political apparatuses and their procedures, but rather

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embraces the totality of everyday life,<sup>14</sup> the ‘production and reproduction of immediate life’ (Engels, letter to J. Bloch, September 1890. Two considerations developed by Pierre Bourdieu in the context of his studies of the pre-industrial Kabylia society in Algeria might take us a little further here. One is associated with the concept of ‘gentle violence’ (‘violence douce’) the other with the notion of ‘habitus’.<sup>15</sup>

For capitalist societies ‘gentle violence’ not only means the symbolic representation of physical power and domination, both state and private. Primarily it raises questions of the dual meaning and function of mechanisms and institutions which, precisely by virtue of their unique service for the reproduction of society and its individuals, systematically reproduce both social inequality *and* state power and domination *simultaneously*, ranging from the ‘veil of money’ to social standards of education and cleanliness.<sup>16</sup> For Bourdieu, their ‘gentle violence’ is effective because their function in stabilising power relations and unequal life-chances is masked in the everyday compliance with these standards. For example, the socially accepted necessity for cleanliness and a certain level of knowledge for individual well-being and survival is an expression of a form of self-discipline not only presupposed by such standards but constantly etched into those subject to them in their observance.

‘Gentle violence’ suggests a dissolution of the analytical – yet emancipatory – distinction between those forms of social intercourse prescribed from above, which are actually given, and social relations free of such domination which might, or should, be possible in the future. It renders this historical ‘not yet’ a matter which already appears settled, as if the first phases, at least, of Marx’s ‘realm of freedom’ were already a reality. ‘Hegemony’ in the form of ‘gentle violence’ thus goes beyond the direct bribery which buys consent ‘against one’s better judgement’. In developed bourgeois society, ‘gentle violence’ is imparted through both schools and families, in both public and private institutions, although the distinction between public and private is to some degree transcended in the reproduction of social relations. This form of coercion is effective because it is a constitutive moment in *all* social relations; for example, the monetarised exchange of commodities for the capitalist mode of production. It impregnates the everyday practice of *all* members of society, although to varying degrees. The self-activity of individuals always reflects and confirms the patterns which serve the production and unequal distribution of social wealth and social esteem: ‘gentle violence’ allows the dominated the illusion of non-coercive assent to their status – to inequality and domination.

One of the particular advantages of this approach is the logic inherent in its insistence on the microscopic point of view. Situations and interactions do not count as mere ‘manifestations’: yet analysis is not exhausted in the simple description of their details. The ‘truth’ of processes as perceived does not lie within themselves (Bourdieu, pp. 188–9). What is problematic, however, is the bivalent logic, the ‘either–or’ of the tendency held to characterise social development. The fascination induced by the principle of the market system makes it appear as if the transformation of the social mode of production is

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total: asynchronous or anomalous events are either eliminated in advance or treated merely as trifles:

The greater the extent to which the task of reproducing the relations of domination is taken over by objective mechanisms, which serve the interests of the dominant group without any conscious effort on the latter's part, the more indirect, and, in a sense, impersonal, become strategies objectively oriented towards reproduction: it is not by lavishing generosity, kindness or politeness on his charwoman . . . but by choosing the best investment for his money, or the best school for his son, that the possessor of economic or cultural capital perpetuates the relationship of domination which objectively links him with his charwoman and even her descendants.<sup>17</sup>

In contrast, in non, or not-yet capitalised societies, the rulers are obliged,

to work directly, daily, personally, to produce and reproduce conditions of domination which are even then never entirely trustworthy . . . they are obliged to resort to the most elementary forms of domination . . . thus this system contains only two ways . . . of getting and keeping a lasting hold over someone: gifts or debts, the overtly economic obligations of debt, or the 'moral', 'affective' obligations created and maintained by exchange, in short, overt (physical or economic violence), or symbolic violence, censored, euphemised, i.e. unrecognisable, socially recognised violence.

Bourdieu, crucially, asserts no contradiction between each type of violence within pre-capitalist societies; in fact, under such social relations, the 'co-existence of overt physical and economic violence and of the most refined symbolic violence' is limitless. The establishment of 'objective mechanisms . . . which serve the interests of the dominant group *without any conscious effort on the latter's part*' (emphasis added) is, accordingly, a product of the unfolding of bourgeois capitalist society.

Thus, whereas the rationalisation or capitalisation approach identified a reduction in physical coercion as a key hallmark of social development, for Bourdieu, the (in-) activity of the rulers constitutes an additional difference. In capitalist society the automatism of reproductive mechanisms replaces the unremitting *labour* of domination. Not only does direct repression take on a secondary importance: the 'do-it-yourself' element in the enforcement of domination by the dominant group is also rendered superfluous.

Admittedly, Bourdieu does not consider the possibility of crisis in, threat to, let alone breakdown of this supposedly automatic mechanism of social reproduction and universal dominant (self-) control force. His analysis of the everyday mechanisms of domination also exhibits a further deficiency, in a unique inversion reflecting the weakness of the politico-economic type of analysis.

Although physical repression is not the decisive means of domination for the latter, it is none the less effective 'in the last instance': and its social origins can be determined. What is omitted is any consideration of the mediations with other forms of domination and violence. In contrast, Bourdieu's

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analysis, by definition, excludes the social locus of violence and the agents of violence – violence is *omnipresent*. This neglect of unmediated violence leads to the omission of the relations between ‘euphemised’ and directly physical forms of violence.

Thus far we have concentrated our attention on those means of domination and forms of violence which are intended to guarantee domination. The significance of such strategies and such arrangements of social mechanisms designed by rulers to foster domination – their ‘internal face’ – has only been hinted at. Studies which emphasise the ‘self-restraint’ (*Selbstzwang*) (Elias) of socialised individuals, their ‘discipline’ (Foucault), the disposition to acquiesce in the face of exactions and coercion in the ‘habitus’ (Bourdieu) all attempt to find a vocabulary in which to discuss the processes by which the exactions of the rulers are appropriated, yet, at the same time, redefined by the ruled ‘in their own terms’.

Norbert Elias was one of the first to recognise that the rise of bourgeois society was not merely the consequence of changed relationships at the level of society as a whole. The main focus of his studies on the ‘civilising process’ was on the conditions and consequences of the monopolisation of violence in the forms of everyday social intercourse.<sup>18</sup>

His work provides impressive demonstration, in particular in the example of eating rituals, of the considerable extent to which ‘self-coercion’ constitutes the precondition and foundation of centralised political organisation – the modern state, as defined by Weber. Of particular relevance in our context is Elias’s view that the development of ‘the apparatus of self-restraint’ is very closely linked to the formation of institutions monopolising physical violence and the growing stability of the central organs of society’. ‘Self-restraint’ is not only, therefore, a symbol of the possible, or actual, use of physical violence by the rulers or their organs; it also represents a focus around which the concrete experiences of suffering at the hands of the violence of the rulers accumulate. But how ‘the physical act of violence works together with the force of habit’ is left open: we are not told how this mediation appears concretely.

Fleshing this out obliges us to extend our vision to encompass the entire spectrum of ‘corrective’ activities and institutions; the enforcement of labour and time discipline not only in manufacturing workshops and factories, but also in prisons, workhouses and reform ‘institutions’, in which the policing and enforcement of ‘discipline’ and ‘care’ by an absolutist administration is expressed symbolically, and through physical violence.<sup>19</sup> The ‘complete household’ (*ganzes Haus*) of both the noble-aristocratic as well as the (mainly large-) bourgeois variety also naturally contributed to this social and psychological abuse, in particular of the direct producers. The experiences of maidservants and farmhands at the hands of their ‘overlords’ were part of the immediate everyday reality of the ‘propertyless’ and ‘property-poor’ in both town and country. And, although the supposed protection of the bourgeois small family may have displaced, replaced or complemented the multi-limbed household economy, it nevertheless retained violent patriarchal authority. The bourgeois family continued to be the parade ground for the forced



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internalisation of discipline and oppression, both of itself and of others. One clue to the connections and mediations of the forms of violence is alluded to here: both institutional and familial discipline reveal the permanence, the continuing functional contribution, of 'extra-economic' forms of coercion stemming from pre-capitalist and agrarian societies to the regulation of capitalist production and bourgeois society.

This synchronicity is also apparent in systems of education and hygiene, the advance of which is a hallmark of developed bourgeois societies. School learning in the German states of the eighteenth, and even more so the nineteenth centuries, not only wore legal attire in the form of compulsory attendance, but was additionally enforced through the brutal violence of 'authority'.<sup>20</sup> Running parallel to this, the attentions of the police or more long-term institutional discipline could (and can) be expected for any neglect of hygiene regulations.<sup>21</sup>

This would lend support to the supposition that the direct application of violence, immediate physical suffering, is the prime basis for that experience of domination which is the precondition for the possibility or probability of the willingness to accept, or at least the actual acceptance, of the impositions of political and social authority.

Such acceptance will then appear to be the free acknowledgement of the legitimacy of authority, moved by the 'silent compulsion' of the economy or socio-cultural 'hegemony' – an all-pervading 'habitus' seemingly automatically reproducing submissiveness – when looked at from a distance.

The notion of 'habitus' seeks to break away from the motives, interests, strategies and decisions of actors as the parameters of analysis. Instead it concentrates on the principles by which patterns of behaviour are generated:

. . . habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor.<sup>22</sup>

Such a proposal holds out one prospect for advancing beyond the, by now, ritual theatre between subjectivist and objectivist interpretations of social processes. Based neither solely nor overwhelmingly on the needs and interests of competent actors, nor on a reduction of the entire issue to the objective requirements of the system, habitus represents acquired dispositions, in which patterns embedded into individuals are simultaneously seen as specific to social groups: it constitutes the mediation between objective regularities and directly observable behaviour. It therefore denotes the dialectical link between practical action and the given conditions – which, in turn, are (re-) produced through such action.

Of course, the intention behind this approach and its implementation are

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not one and the same thing. Bourdieu's *Outline of a Theory of Practice* makes repeated reference to the 'work of inculcation and appropriation' inherent in the habitus to some degree. But the concrete form, the actual performance of this work, goes unmentioned. As a consequence, the complex structure of self-activity and external control, of conscious and non-conscious processes, is reduced to a hermetic social mechanism. 'Self-coercion', a process in which psychic repression collaborates with political and institutional sanctions, is sacrificed to the idea of a self-generating behavioural matrix – the 'habitus'. And, despite all the subtlety of Bourdieu's reconstruction, the 'forms of the habitus' crucially are essentially or almost exclusively assembled and operative 'behind the backs' of the subjects. As was the case with 'gentle violence', the agencies of mediation under consideration are the structures of social reproduction, and in particular the processes and institutions of education. And here too the *forms* of the historical advance of those processes and institutions are, for the most part, ignored. Despite Bourdieu's orientation to practice, the actual course of events (of those affected) is obscured by the structure of his logic. Despite the fact, and palpability, of the act of physical violence in everyday life – even in developed societies – it is a fact which escapes Bourdieu; it is as if his intense preoccupation with such an alien society as the Kabylie simultaneously estranged him from specific aspects of his own society.

In contrast to the positions outlined above, the thesis advanced here is directed at the *simultaneity* of the physically violent character of the 'modern state' and the symbolic presence of this violence – including within the forms of social reproduction. This thesis has a methodological obverse: we have to reconstruct the state's mode of action,<sup>23</sup> and the characteristic forms of 'habitus' of its subjects. In other words: the domination and violence exercised or mediated by the state are to be understood as social relations and social practice.

Such a concentration on social practice points the way towards a position which, although on the face of it similar to the position outlined above, presupposes the continuing necessity of extra-economic force for the safeguarding of the production process (and social reproduction) both demonstratively and in the abstract.<sup>24</sup> A number of studies of individual spheres of state activity, in particular planning, infrastructural and economic policy, indicate that general formulae which characterise the state as a 'committee of the bourgeoisie' and point to the growing instrumentalisation of 'state power as a machine of class domination' apply only to the 'state in general'.<sup>25</sup> Evidently, the function of the state, or its apparatuses, as an instrument of the ruling class – more precisely the ruling class configuration – does not fit neatly together with the exigencies of guaranteeing and promoting the further advance of the industrial-capitalist mode of production. The interests of individual capitals, groupings of capitals and the 'average' interests of 'the aggregate capital' were (and are) not self-evident or self-explanatory. The 'limits of activity' for the agents and occupiers of positions of power are not always, or necessarily, coterminous with the 'limits of the system'. The difference between them provides the space for the 'relative autonomy'<sup>26</sup> of



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state bureaucracies – in fact, it demands it. Determining the function, degree and meaning of this autonomy requires not only detailed study of individual decision-making processes and structures of motivation: it also crucially depends on establishing the systematic relationship between forms of behaviour of political agencies and political agents. These display characteristic differences. Standards and criteria applied in establishing conditions of production (both general and specific) do not coincide with those exercised in upholding the law and maintaining ‘civil order’: state agencies act differently in different political arenas.<sup>27</sup> One especially notable example for the Prussian ‘case’ is the simultaneity observable in the 1840s: swift application of violence by the organs of the state against the ‘tumultuous movements’ of railway construction workers on the one hand, with solicitous and circumspect temporising by the same authorities and officials as regards the financing of the same railway on the other.

Our aim in this study is to reconstruct the physical violence within the exercise of state power and domination. Setting out the functions of the state, the arenas in which political processes are acted and fought out and the forms of conduct considered appropriate in each, the class- and group-interests of those under scrutiny here – and in particular the bureaucracy – is simply the first step in this task. Merely advancing beyond a bird’s-eye view of society, and not reducing actors, and their actual and contradictory actions, to a set of ‘results’ is also inadequate for our purpose. Establishing the relationship between the emergence and formation of ‘modern’ state authority and the perceptions and sufferings of those at the receiving end of this authority requires an investigation into how the imperatives of the state and the bureaucracy are translated into everyday practice. The situation of the victims will also then cease to count merely as a ‘cost factor’ in the calculations of the dominators. And such a perspective might also point to the possibilities of developing non- (or, at least as yet un-) bureaucratised forms and potentials for resistance and alternative patterns of social organisation.

**Functions and *modus operandi* of state bureaucracies: the case of Prussia**

Adam Smith summed up the experience in England, the industrial-capitalist pioneer, in the brief formula that the acquisition of valuable and extensive property indispensable for an expanding economy, ‘therefore necessarily requires the establishment of civil government’. He added, ‘civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all’.<sup>28</sup>

In the relatively developed ‘society of free acquisition’ (Lorenz Stein, *Geschichte der sozialen Bewegung in Frankreich*) of eighteenth century England, one of the central functions of state activity was therefore the safeguarding of private property. Redistributive policies, or steps to redistribute power of disposition over resources, could not be allowed to go so far as to jeopardise the system’s organising principles. Smith’s sober formulation

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should be taken as testimony to the real process taking place in England as well as in other societies engaged in the transition to a capitalist mode of production: expanding commodity production and exchange needed state guarantees. And this entailed maintaining the primacy of the private power of disposition over labour-power and its products by administrative or judicial means on an everyday basis. The programme of action pursued by the local powers, as well as centralised administrative and judicial bureaucracies, was that of 'quiet and order'. The policing of the public domain was not detached from the state's, and private, interests in securing the maximum use of means of production to the benefit of their owners, or, in continental Europe, to the benefit of the 'fiscal state'.<sup>29</sup>

Since the eighteenth century, state guarantees for property in England had taken the specific form of the 'rule of law'. Nevertheless, this symbolic yet physically ruthless blend of arbitrariness, paternalistic beneficence and ruling calculus did not necessarily reduce the brutality of its rulers. As Douglas Hay has shown, for the penalties imposed for crimes against property, even the most trivial misdemeanours by the propertyless incurred draconian punishments.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, 'the rhetoric and the rules of a society are something a great deal more than sham' (E. P. Thompson). In Thompson's view – and depending on the context – 'the form and rhetoric of law can restrain the use of power and provide the powerless with a certain protection'.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, it may also be the case that the 'rule of law' during this period of transformation favoured a predominantly violent form of domination, with the spurious justification that draconian means had to be applied to permit any kind of judicial resolution of interests at all. At the same time, the everyday social selectivity inherent in any legal system intended to function within an entrepreneurial bourgeois society may have been overshadowed by a concomitant product of this system: namely the right of every individual to resist blatantly arbitrary treatment.

In contrast to England, economic activity in Prussia – meaning not simply production but also circulation and consumption<sup>32</sup> – was dominated by the agrarian cycle until well into the 1850s. At the same time, market relations and dependencies were also clearly intensifying, both sectorally and regionally. On the land these changed market conditions – and in particular the secular rise in grain prices after 1750 – were reflected in the increase in the number of large estates run under landlord administration.

However, the expedient of simply stepping up the level of exploitation of the dependent peasantry in the East Elbian agrarian regions was no longer sufficient to guarantee the required increases in the productivity of labour. Higher labour rents might provoke insubordination or open protest. Estate owners therefore preferred to use 'landpoor and landless producers' (Harnisch, *Kapitalistische Agrarreform*) who worked on contracts as *Einlieger* or *Häusler* (lodgers and cotters). This trend in the recruitment of agricultural labour-power was mirrored in a rapid expansion in the number of such agrarian 'direct producers'.

The, on the whole, gradual transition from the essentially feudal *Gutsherrschaft* based on the 'extra-economic coercion' of dependent labour-power to