


KANT'S DIALECTIC



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PREFACE

This book is a sequel to my Kant's Analytic, but it does not presuppose knowledge of the earlier work. It is the only English book-length commentary on the Dialectic in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It may be suggested that one is one too many – that my book fills a welcome gap in the literature – but I would dispute that. I have found that the Dialectic, together with relevant materials from earlier philosophers, especially Descartes and Leibniz, provides the basis for a satisfactory course of fifty-odd classroom hours for graduate students and able undergraduates. Such a course covers a useful amount of 'history of philosophy', guided throughout by an interest in a varied but not too scattered set of philosophical problems. Kant's Dialectic might be a help, but what I am confidently recommending is a different work – Kant's Dialectic.

I continue to be, in the words of an unhappy reviewer of my earlier work, 'one of those commentators who are more interested in what Kant ought to have thought than in what he actually did think'. Still, I try to describe the Dialectic accurately and in some detail. This part of Kant's work is at once knottier and more interesting than is commonly supposed, but the interest is lost if the knots are left tied, and so my philosophical aims have driven me to endeavours which may count as scholarly.

The Dialectic is full of mistakes and inadequacies, or so I shall contend, and of course this is consistent with its being a valuable contribution to philosophy. Still, there are doubtless fewer mistakes than I allege: my charge-list has gradually shortened as I have gained in understanding of the work, and presumably it could be reduced further. But I have worked for as long as I am prepared to, and I now offer what now seems to me to be true. Anyway, when there is evidence of error the truth is better served by an open accusation than by a respectful averting of one's eyes, even in cases where the charge of error can eventually be refuted.

Throughout, I use existing translations of non-English works, modifying them where accuracy demands it. I follow Kemp Smith's translation of the *Critique* except for a few changes in the interests of clarity and a larger number of corrections of mistranslations which are philosophically significant. The most serious of the latter are noted as

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PREFACE

they arise. For help with the German – my knowledge of which is very limited – I am indebted to Lewis White Beck, Petra von Morstein and Margaret Jackson.

Kant's Dialectic grew out of teaching, scattered through a decade, at several universities. My largest block of indebtedness is to students at the University of British Columbia, where I have taught courses on the Dialectic in 1971–3. A few of them are named in the text, in acknowledgment of particular contributions; but to many others – far more than I could appropriately name in a Preface – I owe stimulation, encouragement, criticism and guidance of a high order.

I have been glad of the help of Michael Beebe, who served as my research assistant and gave me, among other things, most of what grasp I have of the issue about absolute space. I am also grateful for help with various parts of the book from my colleagues D. G. Brown, Howard Jackson, Peter Remnant, Richard E. Robinson, Steven Savitt and John Stewart; from J. J. MacIntosh; and especially from M. J. Scott-Taggart.

Secretarial and other expenses were met by research grants - here gratefully acknowledged - from the Canada Council and the University of British Columbia.

Vancouver, B.C. July 1973 J.F.B.



*Bounds of Sense

SYSTEM OF REFERENCES

To keep down the number of footnotes, some references are given in the text. Also, sometimes references which could occupy several footnotes are gathered into one. Each composite footnote refers forwards, and never beyond the end of the paragraph.

Numerals occurring alone refer to page-numbers in the second edition ('B') of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Numerals immediately preceded by 'A' refer to pages in the first edition, and concern material omitted from B. The following abbreviations are also used:

P. F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense (Lon-

don, 1966). N. Kemp Smith, A Commentary to Kant's *Commentary Critique of Pure Reason (London, 1918). Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Under-Essay standing. Gerhardt C. I. Gerhardt (ed.), Die philosophischen Schriften von G.W. Leibniz (Berlin, 1875-90). E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (eds.), Haldane & Ross Philosophical Works of Descartes (Cambridge, 1911–12), Vol. 11. Kant's Analytic J. Bennett, Kant's Analytic (Cambridge, 1966). Kant's Arguments S. J. Al-Azm, The Origins of Kant's Arguments in the Antinomies (Oxford, 1972). H. T. Mason (ed.), The Leibniz-Arnauld *Leibniz-Arnauld Correspondence (Manchester, 1967). *Leibniz-Clarke G. H. Alexander (ed.), The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence (Manchester, 1956). For references to this work in Chapter 8, see that chapter's first footnote Locke, Berkeley, Hume J. Bennett, Locke, Berkeley, Hume: Central Themes (Oxford, 1971). Loemker L. E. Loemker (ed.), G. W. Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters, 2nd edn (Dordrecht, 1969).



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*Metaphysical Foundations Kant, Metaphysical Foundations of Natural

Science (trans. J. Ellington, Indianapolis,

1970).

New Essays Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human

Understanding.

*Practical Reason L. W. Beck, A Commentary on Kant's

Critique of Practical Reason (Chicago,

1960).

Prolegomena to any Future Meta-

physic that will be able to present itself as a Science (trans. P. G. Lucas, Manchester,

1953).

* I offer as a Select Bibliography of the most important readily available writings on matters treated in this book: the Critique of Pure Reason, Descartes' Meditations, and the starred items in the above list.