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'The Papal Question is the Gordian knot of Italian politics, and its solution is indispensable to any permanent settlement of the Peninsula.'

Edinburgh Review (1860)

'One thing is quite certain, and that is, that no possible settlement of the vexed affairs of Italy can take place while the temporal dominions of the Pontiff stand in its midst, a moral plague spot, at once contagious and infectious.'

Illustrated London News (1860)

For eleven hundred years before 1858 the popes of Rome were monarchs. Like other monarchs in the latter centuries of that epoch, they ruled over specific peoples and a definite territory. They promulgated laws, dispensed justice and collected taxes; they maintained an army, kept prisons and engaged in diplomacy. Unlike other monarchs, they governed as the Vicar of Christ on earth and head of the universal church. They called their state, the States of the Church, the Papal States. Their political rule was the papal temporal power. 'God' and Caesar were one.

Between 1858 and 1861, Pope Pius IX lost most of his people, his territory and his taxes. By means of war and revolution in Italy, and diplomatic power and intrigue in Europe, the papal monarchy was overthrown in most of the central Italian peninsula, first in the Romagna in June 1859, then in the Marches and Umbria in September 1860. The Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia annexed the Romagna in March 1860, and the Marches and Umbria in November 1860. The pope was left with only Rome and the surrounding area. In March 1861, the greatly expanded Piedmont reconstituted itself as the Kingdom of Italy with Victor Emmanuel as king. The pope and the king, and everyone else, waited for the finale which came during the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 when the Italian army took control of the papal city of Rome. Pius IX lived on in the Vatican and its gardens while Victor Emmanuel ruled all Italy from Rome.

A splendid, short documentary history of Italy which covers these events is Denis Mack Smith, ed., The making of Italy, 1796–1870 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968). Then see Denis Mack Smith, Victor Emanuel, Cavour, and the Risorgimento (London and New York: Oxford, 1971) esp. ch. 1.

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The Papal States dated at least from the 750s when King Pippin of the Franks granted Pope Stephan II extensive territory which the Franks had taken from the Lombards. With the authority of both the Lombards and Byzantium broken in Italy, the popes became the effective political authority in the region. The pope and the Frankish king regarded the act as a restoration of the 'donation of Constantine' from the fifth century. Even before the 750s, the popes exercised semi-political authority in landed estates known since the sixth century as the patrimony of St Peter.²

By December 1858, the popes were the longest-reigning monarchs in Europe. The Papal States encompassed four areas known as the Romagna, the Marches, Umbria and Lazio, and occupied the middle third of the Italian peninsula extending from the Po valley in the north nearly down to Naples in the south. It was one of the largest of several separate political entities in Italy, along with the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia, the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, the duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Modena, and the Austrian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia. Rome was the seat of government as well as of the Catholic Church, and, because of its association with the caesars, the arts and the popes, perhaps the most historically compelling city in Europe. Bologna, Ravenna, Ancona and Perugia were other papal cities possessing significance and attraction of their own. Pope Pius IX was political ruler over more than three million subjects, including almost two hundred thousand in Rome itself. Simultaneously, he was spiritual ruler over perhaps two hundred million Catholics in the world, who, especially at this time, grew increasingly to regard him as their father, and to care deeply what happened to the papal monarchy.3 The papal temporal power was not an inconsiderable thing.

In the European context the most effective and most consistent opposition to the papal monarchy came from England. During 1858 to 1861, two consecutive British governments served Queen Victoria – first the Conservatives and then the Liberals – and used the diplomatic power and moral influence of Great Britain to work for the end of papal temporal power as then constituted.

- Peter Partner, The lands of St. Peter: The Papal State in the Middle Ages and early Renaissance (London: Eyre Methuen, 1972), ch. 1; Jeffrey Richards, The popes and the papacy in the early Middle Ages, 476–752 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979); and Walter Ullmann, The Growth of papal government in The Middle Ages: A study in the ideological relation of clerical to lay power, 3rd ed. (London: Methuen, 1970), ch. 2.
- According to government sources, the population of the Papal State (1853) was 3,124,668, approximately the same as Piedmont-Sardinia (1861), 3.3 million; and Lombardy (1861), 3.1 million. Two Sicilies was much larger (1861), 9 million. The population of Rome (1859) was about 182,000, making it the fifth largest city (1861) after Naples, 484,000; Milan, 267,000; Genoa, 242,000; and Palermo, 199,000; followed by Turin, 173,000; Venice, 164,000; Florence, 150,000; and Bologna, 116,000. The population of the whole Italian peninsula (1861) was about 25 million. See, for the Papal States: Statistica della populazione dello Stato pontificio dell'anno 1853 (Rome: 1857); and Stato dell'anime per l'alma città di Roma per l'anno 1859 (Rome: 1860); for all Italy: Popolazione residente e presente dei communi al censimenti dal 1861 al 1961 (Rome: Istituto centrale di statistica, 1967). The figure 200 million was the estimate used by the Irish hierarchy in their Pastoral 5 Aug. 1859.



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To be sure, in the practice of their diplomacy the two British governments differed dramatically. The Tories, who held office from February 1858 until June 1859, with Lord Derby as prime minister and the Third Earl of Malmesbury as foreign secretary, were comparatively conciliatory toward the papacy. They hoped to induce the papal government to adopt reforms and to contribute thereby to stabilizing the troubled situation in Italy and maintaining the peace in Europe. The Liberals, by contrast, who served from June 1859 onward, with Lord Palmerston as prime minister and Lord John Russell as foreign secretary, were vigorously hostile to papal interests and sought more deliberately to assist the overthrow of the temporal power. The differences in approaches of the two governments were as much due to the change in the historical situation – the revolution occurred in the Romagna just as Palmerston and Russell took office – as they were to any relative differences in outlook or ideology.

The Conservative and the Liberal governments fundamentally agreed on a number of basic points, indicative of a shared view of history and a relatively common socio-cultural vision. First, they regarded England as the best society in Europe, the model of civil and religious liberty and material prosperity. Second, they considered the papal government in the States of the Church as undeniably the worst, the epitome of political and religious tyranny and economic backwardness. Third, they believed that Piedmont-Sardinia, with Victor Emmanuel as king and Count Cavour as prime minister, offered the best means of establishing in Italy a stable social order led by a constitutional monarch, liberal aristocrats, and men of property, committed to material prosperity, and 'equally opposed to the excesses of democratic license and to the thraldom of ecclesiastical and political domination'.4

Both governments, with the support of the vast majority of the British population, understood their policy and activity toward the pope and Italy as a means of promoting what they regarded as 'the moral and material progress of mankind'. This purpose deserves to be listed as a basic aim of British foreign policy at the time, along with maintaining British security, and creating and preserving British trade opportunities.⁵ In Italy the promotion of moral and material progress gave the British governments functions to undertake diplomatically in a situation where little threatened British security and trade, or as Russell phrased it once, where 'Great Britain has no wish, and no interest which would lead her to interfere in the internal concerns of Northern and Central Italy.' A crucial difference of method distinguished the British in Italy from the

⁴ Lord John Russell to James Hudson, 31 March 1860, no. 66, Le relazioni diplomatiche fra la Gran Bretagna e il Regno di Sardegna, ed. Giuseppe Giarrizzo (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per l'età moderna e contemporanea, 1962), vol. VIII, 62–3.

⁵ Compare with D.C.M. Platt, Finance, trade, and politics: British foreign policy, 1815-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 363.

⁶ Russell to Hudson, 31 March 1860, no. 66, Gran Bretagna e Sardegna, vol. viii, 62-3.



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British in India where, in part, the aim was the same: in India, where Queen Victoria became queen in 1858, the English exercised direct political rule and possessed a direct and comprehensive power to implement their desires for moral and material progress, whereas in Italy their only instruments were diplomacy, moral influence, hints of armed force, and indirect action in support of others.⁷

The English complaint against the papacy was a radical one. The problem with the States of the Church was not merely that the pope and his government misgoverned, but that the States of the Church was an ecclesiastical state ruled by priests and prelates. Such a state, subservient to churchly and papal needs, was an affront to English *laissez-faire* and Erastian convictions and ways. During the 1850s, and finally through the events of 1858 to 1861, the British governments only slowly came to believe that the solution to what contemporaries sometimes called the Papal Question lay not in reforming the government but in abolishing the Papal States.

Pius IX knew well that the nature of papal temporal power was under attack, but he had difficulty understanding why the English found papal government so objectionable. Repeatedly through the crisis, he emphasized in his encyclicals, in his allocutions to the Sacred College of Cardinals, and in his audiences with the high and the low, that the States of the Church was a patrimony held in trust for St Peter and given by Providence through the course of the ages. Its function was to render the popes subject to no earthly ruler and to provide the temporal freedom necessary for the exercise of the popes' spiritual calling as head of the church of Christ universal. In the very nature of the case, public government and the instruments of public justice in the land were meant to serve ecclesiastical purpose. As Pius IX saw it, the States of the Church was not 'his' to relinquish; his duty was to preserve the patrimony and convey it to the next Vicar of Christ.⁸

In the Italian context, the people and the governments divided into three main tendencies which contemporaries, including the English and the papacy, recognized offered three different types of politics for the settlement of the Papal Question. They, indeed, provided alternative views of history and alternative visions for the make-up of the totality of socio-cultural life. The pope's

- In 1861, the British government published the Statement exhibiting the moral and material progress and condition of India during the year 1859-60 (Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Papers (Commons), 1861, vol. 47 (Accounts and Papers)). The Act for the Better Government of India, passed in 1858 (21 and 22 Vict. c. 106) removed India from the jurisdiction of the East India Company, placed it directly under The Crown, and required that detailed reports on 'the moral and material progress' of India be made. Such a statement was published annually thereafter until 1937.
- The standard treatment of Pius IX in the Risorgimento during these years, based on Vatican sources, is still Pietro Pirri, Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II dal loro carteggio privato, vol. 11; 'La questione romana, 1856–1864' (Rome: Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 1951). Roger Aubert's, Le pontificat de Pie IX, 1846–1878 (Paris: Bloud et Gay, 1952) is still the best volume on his period as pope. See Giacomo Martina, Pio IX, 1846–1850 (Rome: Università Gregoriana Editrice, 1974).

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supporters in Italy were the first tendency, known as the papalini, or the blacks. They included the vast network of the hierarchy of the church, from cardinal to parish priest, as well as the usually anonymous and inert masses of 'the faithful', both in the Papal States and throughout the peninsula. They relied especially upon Austrian influence for support. In Rome itself the pope enjoyed support from most of the Roman nobles, the great majority of the tradition-oriented population of Rome, and, of course, the clergy and the Curia. Cardinal Antonelli was the pope's loyal, if less than perfect, secretary of state who ran the government. The pope and the papalini wanted to maintain a Christian society loyal to the pope, in continuity with the Apostles of Christ, and implementive of the spiritual and moral precepts of the Catholic Church, which they regarded as the focal point of God's Providence. The British consciously opposed not only the papal government but also the papalini who influenced so much of the social life throughout the peninsula.9

The other two tendencies opposed the temporal power. The democrats, also known as the reds, the republicans, or the Mazzinians, challenged not only priestly government, but aristocratic and bourgeois government as well. They advocated the regeneration of Italy through the achievement of a secular society of the people, perhaps even a religion of the people, and led by a government whose authority derived not from God, the church, property, or aristocratic privilege, but from popular sovereignty. The pope experienced the Mazzinians first hand when they overthrew him in 1849 and erected the Roman Republic. The English generally opposed these democratics as revolutionaries, even though Mazzini himself frequently resided in London, and he and his followers exercised very little political power except through the imagination of the established authorities.¹⁰

The liberals were the third tendency, and were known as the whites or the national party. These liberal nationalists, mostly aristocrats and urban professionals and middle classes – 'the respectable classes' – placed their hope in the Piedmont-Sardinia government and looked to Cavour and Victor Emmanuel as their leaders. Many were organized into the Italian National Society. The liberals, with the Piedmont government, were the pope's worst enemies. They truly believed that rule by priests was wrong, an impediment to personal freedom and advancement. Their aim was to build a strong secular and constitutional monarchy in which priests and things ecclesiastical were legally

- 9 See Fiorella Bartoccini, La' Roma dei romani' (Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, 1971), 60, 76–9. Much work remains before we will know who the papalini are and what the ordinary faithful in Italy, including Rome, were like. Anna Maria Isastia, Roma nel 1859 (Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento, 1978), virtually neglects them, even though she notes that they no doubt composed the great majority of the Roman population. See Guido Verucci, Il movimento cattolico italiano: dalla Restaurazione al primo dopo guerra (Messina and Florence: D'Anna, 1978).
- Emilia Morelli, 1849-1859: I dieci anni che fecero l'Italia (Florence: le Monnier, 1977), 10-21. There is a large literature on Mazzini.



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subordinant to the state and public law. They believed in the progress of 'mankind', and wished to build a society shaped by capitalist material development. The English counted on Piedmont and the liberals to usher in the moral and material progress of Italy. Garibaldi, that astonishing guerrilla warrior and charismatic figure, combined two tendencies in one, loyalty to Victor Emmanuel with the democratic vision, and won wholehearted English support.¹¹

On the international plane, a number of governments and peoples were involved in the Papal Question. All European governments opposed the democrats, but they divided over their support for or opposition to the papal temporal power and Piedmont-Sardinia. Most important and most complicated were the French. The pope depended upon Napoleon III as his protector, especially as expressed through the garrison of 5000 to 7000 French troops who, since 1849, kept public order and maintained French influence in Rome and the surrounding region. But the pope also dreaded Napoleon who simultaneously acted as Cavour's co-conspirator and colleague-in-arms against the pope. The French Catholic clergy and the mass of the French faithful compelled Napoleon to stay on the pope's side as much as he did. The English, meanwhile, continually endorsed actions of the French government detrimental to the pope and supportive of Piedmont, while guarding against the aggrandizement of French power and influence in Italy, and even fearing the possibility of a French invasion of England.

The Austrians were the pope's most consistent friends, the defenders of the Vienna settlement of 1815 in Italy. Since 1849, they had garrisoned 6000 to 8000 troops on the Adriatic side of the Papal States at Bologna and Ancona to keep public order and insure Austrian influence there. But the Austrian government behaved erratically and eventually hurt the pope irremediably by evacuating their troops without warning in June 1859. The English government lamented the Austrian presence in Lombardy and Venetia, as well as the Papal States, but needed the Austrians to remain a great power to offset Prussia and Russia, as well as France.

Russia and Prussia usually remained on the periphery, except when congresses of the powers were planned, at which times the pope imagined them as schismatics and Protestants grouped against him.

Of the lesser powers, the pope and his government sought help from Spain in the form of troops or diplomacy. Queen Isabella II and the Spanish Catholic faithful were, on the whole, devoted followers of the pope, sufficiently so to keep the English alert against a repetition of the Spanish armed intervention in Rome in 1849.

See Raymond Grew, A sterner plan for Italian unity: the Italian National Society in the Risorgimento (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Denis Mack Smith, Cavour and Garibaldi, 1860 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954).

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Some of the pope's most effective support, which the English found most difficult to handle, came from the Catholics of Great Britain and Ireland. Under Queen Victoria's rule in the 1850s, there were perhaps 750,000 Catholics in England, including 100,000 in London itself, with a Roman Catholic hierarchy under Cardinal Wiseman, plus perhaps four-and-a-half million Catholics in Ireland with their hierarchy under Archbishop Cullen. These English and Irish Catholics worked almost as one in defence of the pope and Catholic interests. In 1859, thirty-six Catholics sat in the British parliament, all but one from Irish constituencies. The Conservative and the Liberal governments constantly paid attention to this sizeable number of Catholics under British rule, and the pope appealed to them repeatedly for assistance.

In both the Italian and the international context, then, English opposition to papal temporal power stood out and made a decisive difference in the outcome of the course of events in 1858 to 1861. For the liberal opponents of the pope in Italy, England provided the model and the inspiration for the creation of the new Italy, liberated from 'foreigners and priests'. The English government, through all the twists and turns of the events, was the one great power who acted as a consistent critic and opponent of the papal government. The English served as the major facilitator of the attack on the temporal power. They were always present, using their diplomacy and moral influence, and occasionally hinting or threatening armed intervention, working to enable the pope's Italian opponents to succeed, and to ensure that he and his friends failed. The English followed, not a pre-conceived plan, but a direction which at every conjunction led them to pursue the way that went against the papacy.

This English opposition was formidable partly because of the sheer economic, naval and political power it entailed. In financial, industrial and commercial terms, England in the 1850s and 1860s was undisputedly the dominant power in the world. It was an economic power which included even the Papal States within its network of trade and trade treaties. From a naval viewpoint, the English regarded the Mediterranean as virtually an English sea, and the powerful English Mediterranean fleet, based in Malta, encircled the Italian peninsula and included the papal ports of Civita Vecchia and Ancona in its sphere of influence. Politically, the English parliament in the 1850s was working as well as it ever had, and by using the method of gradual reform, the English appeared to succeed in avoiding, as did no other European power, the extremes

For the English Catholic figures, see John Bossey, The English Catholic community, 1570–1850 (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1975), 298 and 313. The total Irish population (1861) was about 5.7 million, of which easily 80 per cent were Catholic. The population of the whole of the United Kingdom (1861) was about 29 million, with about 20 million in England and Wales; Scotland had about 3 million. The population (1861) of London was 2.8 million, while Liverpool, Glasgow, Dublin, Manchester and Birmingham ranged from 472,000 down to 351,000; and Leeds, Edinburgh and Sheffield had around 200,000 each. For the names of the Catholic M.P.s, see The Catholic Directory of the Whole World (Dublin, 1860), 21.



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of authoritarian rule and revolution. From this position the English could hit the papacy with unremitting criticism and opposition.

But the English opposition to the papacy was powerful, too, because it arose out of an essential feature of English identity. Since the sixteenth century, through the struggles of the English reformation, to be truly English meant to be against the pope. Those who remained loyal to the pope, the Catholics, in a most profound sense ceased to be regarded as fully English, and were looked upon as agents of a foreign power. The anti-papal element originated almost two centuries earlier in the controversies out of which came the statutes of *provisors* and *praemunire* of the fourteenth century. ¹³ Through the experiences of the Henrican Reformation, the Elizabethan settlement, the Puritan revolution, and the 'glorious Revolution' of 1688–9, anti-papalism broadened into an anti-Catholicism which sought to cleanse England from 'papists' and 'popery' in all its forms. To be English meant to be Protestant; to enjoy English liberties meant, in part, to be free from the pope. ¹⁴

The place of Catholics in English society was far from settled in the 1850s. It would seem a better reflection of the situation in the 1850s and 1860s to regard anti-Catholicism, not as gradually dying out and visible only through occasional dying spasms, and not as merely a peculiar belief of some intolerant Evangelicals, 15 but as a continuing element in a common English experience and identity which came to active political and social expression from time to time. One of these times came during 1859 and 1860, when virtually all English people, excepting Catholics and Puseyites, were excited to hope for the political downfall of the pope. Seen in this way, England's approach to the loss of papal temporal power in 1858 to 1861 may be understood as an expression in foreign policy and diplomatic action of an anti-Catholic and particularly anti-papal element in the English way of life. Anti-Catholicism figured as an important factor in British diplomacy toward Italy. Denis Mack Smith makes the point: 'One of the reasons why so many people in England were enthusiastic supporters of either Cavour, Garibaldi, or Mazzini was that those three had in common a

- The earliest statutes of provisors came under Edward III: in 1350 (25 E3. st. 5. c.22) and (25 E3. st. 6); in 1352 (27 E3. st. 1); and in 1363-4 (28 E3. st. 2). The first statute of praemunire came in 1392-3 under Richard II (16 R2. c. 5).
- On anti-Catholicism, see esp.: E.R. Norman, Anti-Catholicism in Victorian England (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968). Then see Richard Bauckham, Tudor apocalypse (Abingdon, Oxon.: Sutton Courtenay, 1978); John Miller, Popery and politics in England, 1660-88 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973); J.R. Jones, The Revolution of 1688 in England (New York: W.W. Norton, 1972); G.I.T. Machin, The Catholic question in English politics, 1820 to 1830 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964); Sheridan Gilley, 'Evangelical and Roman Catholic missions to the Irish in London, 1830-1870' (Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University, 1970); and G.F.A. Best, 'Popular Protestantism in Victorian England', in Robert Robson, ed., Ideas and institutions of Victorian Britain: essays in honour of George Kitson Clark (London: G. Bell, 1967), 115-42.
- See Sheridan Gilley, 'Protestant London, no-popery, and the Irish poor, 1830-1860', Recusant history 10 (1969-70), 210-30, and 11 (1971-72), 21-46; and G.I.T. Machin, Politics and the Churches in Great Britain, 1832 to 1868 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), passim.



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strong anti-clericalism, and to this extent Italian nationalism coincided not only with British political interests against France, but also with Protestant anti-Catholicism.' Anti-Catholicism was, in relation to the pope, the negative side of the English hope for the moral and material progress of Italy.

The aim of this study is to examine the intriguing relations between England and the papacy in the Italian and European contexts during 1858 to 1861, and to explain the process by which two English governments, in changing circumstances and with increasing intentionality, used their influence to contribute to the overthrow of the papal temporal power in the Romagna, the Marches and Umbria. The study begins with the movement toward war at the end of 1858, continues with a detailed analysis of the complex and irregular course of events, and concludes with the official incorporation of the papal territory into the kingdom of Italy in 1861. The years 1859 and 1860 were the decisive years both for the end of the temporal power and for the culmination of the Risorgimento, that general cultural movement which yielded the Italian kingdom. They were years of intense and concentrated activity, during which, like 1789–91 for the French, 1775–7 for the Americans, 1688–9 for the English, or 1919–22 for the Irish, things ended and things began in the political realm which affected the life of the whole society.

England and the papacy had no direct diplomatic relations with each other in these years, but they found a way for each to make their desires known to the other. The British government maintained an unofficial diplomatic envoy in Rome, Odo Russell, nephew of Lord John Russell, who established an unusual rapport with both Pius IX and Cardinal Antonelli. He provided a unique and direct channel between the two states which both sides used for diplomatic communication.¹⁷

These were the years of what may be called the Papal Question, when the political status of the papacy in Italy became a central historical issue, and when the essential element of a future settlement of the Papal Question was determined by depriving the pope of his extensive political rule. What historians have called the 'Roman Question' should perhaps be said to begin in November 1860, after the papal loss of the Romagna, the Marches and Umbria, when all those involved turned their attention to the question of depriving the pope of Rome and to forming relations between the pope and the new Italy. Only recently have historians shown considerable interest in the Papal States and Rome in the few years before 1861.¹⁸

- 16 Mack Smith, Victor Emanuel, Cavour, 157.
- Noel Blakiston renewed interest in English relations with the papacy by publishing many of Odo Russell's letters, or extracts from his letters: The Roman Question: extracts from the despatches of Odo Russell from Rome, 1858–1870 (London: Chapman and Hall, 1962; reprint, Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1980).
- These works fill many holes in our knowledge of the Papal States before 1861. Noteworthy are three volumes published by the Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano whose



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This study treats the end of the temporal power both as an important subject in its own right, and as a significant dimension of the making of Italy. Similarly, English policy and diplomatic action on the Papal Question, and the papal response to the English are regarded as special topics of their own, as well as dimensions of Italian affairs. By pointing out how actively the English were involved in the Papal Question, the study wishes to help shift attention in our historiography of the pope and the Risorgimento away from an over-emphasis on France, Sardinia and Austria; 19 and by indicating how central the Papal Question was to the English in their assessment of Italy and their approach to the Italian Question, to help correct an over-emphasis on English consideration of the balance of power, concern over France's position in Europe, and sympathy for Italian nationalism. 20

In the most specific sense, this is a study of the diplomatic and political relations between two states, and the intercourse among many of the great and small powers of Europe. And this is appropriate, given that the Papal Question, like the question of Italian unification, was approached by the governments and people involved at the time as, in large part, a matter for war and diplomacy to decide. Diplomats and political rulers made decisions and performed actions which, to a large degree, determined the course of things. These men were a relatively small handful of wealthy and privileged aristocrats who knew each other well and observed common social rules. However, small in number though they were, we should not forget that they acted not as individuals, but as officials of governments who possessed the power to make large decisions affecting war

- offices are in the top of the Victor Emmanuel monument in Rome: Fiorella Bartoccini, La 'Roma dei romani' (1971); Romano Ugolini, Cavour e Napoleone III nel'Italia centrale: il sacrificio di Perugia (1973); and Anna Maria Isastia, Roma nel 1859 (1978). Three volumes published by Giuffré of Milan are: two by Mario Tedeschi, Francia e Inghilterra di fronte alla questione romana, 1859–1860 (1978); and Cavour e la questione romana, 1860–1861 (1978); plus Salvatore Bordonali, Riflessi diplomatici e politici nella crisi del potere temporale negli anni formativi dell' Unità italiana, 1859–61 (1979).
- The mainline of the historiography of the pope and the Risorgimento has concentrated on France, Sardinia and Austria. For example, I think of: Lynn M. Case, Franco-Italian relations, 1860–1865: the Roman question and the convention of September (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932); Pirri, Pio IX e Vittorio Emanuele II; and Franco Valsecchi, L'Italia del Risorgimento e l'Europa delle nazionalità: l'unificazione italiana nella politica europea (Milane in 1978). Ivan Scott, The Roman question and the powers, 1848–1865 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), devotes little attention to England, partly because his focus is mainly upon French-papal relations, but also because he believes incorrectly that 'England, as an insular and Protestant power, would stand outside this confused religious and political quarrel' (96).
- For example, Harry W. Rudman, Italian nationalism and English letters (London: Allen and Unwin, 1940) is about English sympathies for Italian liberty; Mack Smith, Victor Emanuel, Cavour, acknowledges that anti-Catholicism is a factor, but concentrates on the other factors; Derek Beales, England and Italy, 1859-1860 (London: Thomas Nelson, 1961), is usually quite good at noticing the anti-Catholic factor in the making of English foreign policy toward Italy, but in his conclusion he overstates the importance of the French factor: 'In reality England was not pursuing an Italian policy so much as a French policy' (169).